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ABSTRACT  
 
    Focusing in particular on a psychoanalytic understanding of terrorism and 
adversarial political leaders, this thesis undertakes the textual analyses of 
significant individual profiles and the key texts reflecting psychoanalytic personality 
pathology profiling. The thesis situates the methodology of this normative, clinically 
oriented paradigm within the psychobiographic tradition of applied psychoanalysis 
and critiques the medico-scientific validity of ‘at a distance’ pathologising profiles.  
 
    The thesis presents its own analytic tools such as ‘clinical parallelism’, where a 
determinist ahistorical schema of a parallel clinical case is superimposed onto the 
psychobiographical subject. Arguing that it represents a paradigm shift in 
psychobiography, a methodological distinction is made between the 
characterological, traditionally Freudian subject of psychobiography, who is 
developed by the speculative reconstruction of childhood relationships. This is in 
contradistinction from a more object relational personological subject who is mainly 
inferred from adult behaviour. The distinction is emphasised throughout the thesis, 
and introduced through the wartime psychoanalytic profiles of Hitler.  
 
    The origins and early history of the overarching discipline of psychobiography 
including a critique of Freud’s only dedicated psychobiography of Leonardo Da Vinci 
are explored. This demonstrates that the flaws which surfaced early on in the 
psychobiographic project are still apparent in modern personality pathology profiling. 
Political personality profiling is then situated within the context of post War American 
psychoanalysis and its relationship to American political culture, and there is an 
exploration of the ethical dilemmas particularly in respect of the Barry Goldwater 
affair, which have ensued.  
 
    Predicated in particular, on the notion of early disturbed or traumatogenic object 
relating leading to narcissistic and paranoid functioning in adult life, the thesis 
examines how psychoanalytic theories are adapted in the pathologising discourse. 
There is a critique of the way psychoanalytic conceptualisations are integrated with 
ideological imperatives most notably by the principal protagonist of the thesis, Jerrold 
Post and the personality pathology theorists’ analysis of terrorist ‘pathology’.  
 
    The thesis concludes by arguing that the elision of psychoanalysis with the 
Western hegemonic and normative ideological position of the personality pathology 
paradigm represents an inherent bias. This risks through for example Nancy Kobrin’s 
cultural psychobiographic analysis of suicide terrorism, alienating in particular Islam, 
and undermines the perception of psychoanalysis as a universal discipline. 
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OBJECTIVES  
 
 
1. To critically investigate the historical context of psychobiography within 
psychoanalysis, its methodology and precepts. 
    
2. To show that normative interpretations of psychoanalytic concepts are deployed 
in adversarial political personality profiles, with the intention of constructing 
pathological subjects out of ideological adversaries. 
 
3. To argue that the ‘at a distance’ technique deployed in personality pathology 
profiling cannot replicate the clinical context of psychoanalysis, and thus have 
neither diagnostic validity nor predictive efficacy. 
 
4. To critique the taken for granted assumptions of personality pathology theory, in 
the psychoanalytic discourse of terrorism. 
 
 
The thesis has as its overarching research question:  
 
‘Can evidence be provided that psychoanalysis has been deployed for the 
ideologically determined personality pathologising of the leaderships of adversarial 
political regimes or those adversarial groups labelled as terrorist?’ 
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1    The Ideological Context 
 
 
‘The cause is not the cause ... individuals become terrorists in order to join terrorist 
groups and commit acts of terrorism’ 
(Post, 1998, p 35, emphasis in the original). 
 
‘political terrorists are driven to commit acts of violence as a consequence of 
psychological forces, and that their special psycho-logic is constructed to rationalize 
acts they are psychologically compelled to commit’  
(Post, 1998, p 25, emphasis in the original). 
 
‘To succeed in achieving its espoused cause would threaten the goal of 
survival ... Terrorists whose only sense of significance comes from being terrorists 
cannot be forced to give up terrorism, for to do so would be to lose their reason for 
being’  
(Post, 1998, p 38, emphasis in the original). 
 
‘for the paranoid individual seeking a “legitimate” channel for his aggression, the 
terrorist group provides an ideal venue. Because terrorists bring their personalities 
with them when they enter the group, the same personality distortions that led to 
their conflict and isolation in society will express themselves in the group’ 
(Post, 1986, p 223). 
 
    In constituting the pathological terrorist subject, Jerrold Post’s statements above 
represent the key ‘ideological’ tenets of the ‘personality pathology’ theory of 
terrorism. As the leading proponent of this personality pathology paradigm and the 
principle protagonist of this thesis, Post’s personality pathology model is inherently 
predicated on the presumption that terrorists are a distinct psychologically 
classifiable group. As such, they have a uniform psychological functioning or 
‘psycho-logic’ (Post, 1998, p 25). The central hypothesis of the personality 
pathology theory of terrorism is then, that terrorists are driven by internal 
psychological forces and thus not motivated ‘to achieve instrumental (e.g. political 
or economic) goals but rather rationalize violent acts that they are compelled to 
commit’ (Post, 2000, p 172).     
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    Exploiting the psychoanalytic theories of early object relating from principally 
Heinz Kohut and Otto Kernberg, Post and the mainstream of personality pathology 
theorists argue that terrorism reflects not simply group pathology, but an 
accumulation of individually pathological group members. Similarly, as Shmuel 
Erlich points out, the individual terrorist in the ‘currently widely held 
psychoanalytic stance is clearly expressed in this formulation that mistreatment, 
delinquency, and disregard for others stem from faulty or traumatogenic early 
object relations’ (Erlich, 2003, p 148).  
 
    The terrorist group is seen in personality pathology theory as providing a home 
for these narcissistically injured paranoid individuals, with the group’s functioning 
then reflecting their paranoid pathology. Attempting compromise with terrorists 
would be ineffectual, because that would threaten their psychological raison d’être 
of perpetuating terrorist violence (Post, 1986; Post, 1998). So that for Kernberg, the 
‘only effective way to deal with terrorism is to control and defeat it’, echoed by 
former US Vice President Dick Cheney who tells Fox News in January 2006 ‘[w]e 
don’t negotiate with terrorists. I think you have to destroy them’, (Kernberg, 2003, 
p 964; Newsmax, NewsMax.com Wires, January the 20th, 2006).  
 
    Recognition of a negotiable existential casus belli is counterproductive to a 
narrative in which the conceptualisation of terrorism is framed in terms of 
unconscious motivations existing within the terrorist himself. The thesis argument 
is that a taken for granted, hegemonic, normative ‘Western’ perspective, has 
enlisted psychoanalytic conceptualisations in support of one side in explaining 
politico/ideological conflicts. As Raymond Corrado argues, political terrorists are 
then seen as engaging ‘in gratuitous violence, which reveals psychopathological 
rather than socio-political’ causes (Corrado, 1981, p 295). The policy consequences 
are that if terrorists are pathological, ‘their political demands can be ignored and 
the strategic focus will be overwhelmingly a military response. If terrorists are 
political idealists, then it raises the possibility that complex political and social 
issues must be addressed by governmental policy’ (ibid, p 293). 
     
   At the present time, the Western preoccupation is with the rise of Islamic State or 
ISIS. Pretending  Graeme Wood believes, that ISIS ‘isn’t actually a religious, 
millenarian group, with theology that must be understood to be combatted, has 
already led the United States to underestimate it and back foolish schemes to 
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counter it’ (Wood, 2015, p 6). Despite what are seen as his sincere intentions 
according to Jason Burke, President Barack Obama, repeats the same mistakes as 
the Bush administration post 9/11 in that President Obama’s ‘administration 
would “degrade and ultimately destroy” ISIS, described the enemy as “a terrorist 
organisation, pure and simple” (Jason Burke, The Guardian, 19th of August, 2015). 
This is far from the case believes Burke, because ‘ISIS is a hybrid of insurgency, 
separatism, terrorism and criminality, with deep roots in its immediate local 
environment, in broader regional conflicts and in geopolitical battles’ (Burke, 2105).  
 
    The tenor of the post 9/11 American institutional discourse of terrorism reflected 
explanations in terms of an essentially ahistorical personality pathology paradigm. 
American spokesmen both official and unofficial showed according to Charles 
Townshend, ‘a marked reluctance to accept the fairly well-established view that 
Osama bin Laden’s primary casus belli against the USA was the defilement of Saudi 
Arabia by the presence of US troops. Instead they preferred more abstract 
explanations of the attacks rooted in envy or hostility’ (Townshend, 2002, p 9). The 
attractiveness of ascribing these ‘abstract’ explanations rooted in the personality 
rather than political strategy of their adversary is a reflection this thesis proposes, 
of an evolved American cultural sensibility to psychoanalytic commentary. Through 
the 1920’s and 30’s in America, psychoanalytic thought ‘quickly became firmly 
embedded in the nation’s cultural firmament’, and indeed remains, ‘a valuable lens 
by which to view the American idea and experience’ (Samuel, 2013, pp xi, xii). Both 
the institutional and the American public sphere, is then, readily amenable to a 
psychoanalytic perspective.  
 
 
2    The Assimilation of Psychoanalysis in American Culture.  
 
    The reputation and acceptance of psychoanalysis in America, was further 
enhanced during the Second World War. There was for example a wide spread 
belief in the efficacy of psychoanalytic techniques for dealing with the psychological 
casualties of war (Hale, 1995; Burnham, 1978; Hale 2000). Professional pressures 
in Europe had historically consigned psychoanalysis, to practice principally in 
private (Wallerstein, 2002; Hale, 1995). Although there were many prominent lay 
psychoanalytic practitioners among the émigré community, and a burgeoning 
training programme for lay psychotherapy, post War American psychoanalysis was 
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itself medically dominated.  In Post War USA bolstered by the intellectual talent of 
the European émigrés psychoanalysts as Nathan Hale writes, ‘gradually came to 
dominate psychiatric instruction in medical schools and schools of social work. By 
the mid-1960s, 58% of the chairmen of departments of psychiatry were 
psychoanalysts. Closely reflecting this general proportion, 6 out of 10 chairman at 
top medical schools were analysts or had had analytic training’ (Hale, 2000, p 82). 
 
     Consequently, in the US, psychoanalytic conceptions predominated in treating a 
much wider range of mental illnesses and disorders (Hale, 1995; Wallerstein 2002). 
In 1954 both the American Psychoanalytic Association and the American 
Psychiatric Association jointly condemned ‘the practice of psychotherapy by any 
but trained physicians’ (Hale, 2000, p 84). This did  give psychoanalysis an aura of 
scientific respectability, and with less emphasis on sexuality it was, argues Hale, a 
more ‘severe personal discipline’ which would morph into ‘the ‘“pure” American 
version of psychoanalysis whose ultimate outcome was normalcy and happiness’ 
(Hale, 1995, p 277; Hale, 2000; Milton et al, 2004; Burnham, 1978). The analyst as 
either psychiatrist or psychoanalyst, the two terms were in the public perception 
seen as broadly synonymous at the time, was regarded as ‘warmly sympathetic, 
understanding, charismatic, and possessed of uncanny insight’ (Hale, 1995, p 278). 
Thus, psychoanalysis in American medical practice had become ‘comfortable and 
paternalistic, reconciled with conventional values’ (Milton et al, 2004, p 63; Hale, 
2000). 
 
    With psychiatrists in this Post War period almost uniformly psychoanalytically 
oriented, psychoanalysis was part of a dominant new intellectual milieu, 
particularly influential according to Burnham, because they ‘represented scientists 
who were sensitive to the values of other intellectuals who shared the intellectuals’ 
concern with preserving Western civilization’ (Burnham, 1978 p 55; Hale 2000). 
Psychoanalysts were becoming the arbiters of the new normative, and inevitably 
the stereotypically down to earth but scientifically expert psychoanalytic 
practitioners were sought out for comment by the media (Hale, 1995). Indeed these 
analysts positively enjoyed, ‘being in the limelight’ and displaying their expertise 
(Slovenko, 2000, p 112; Hale, 1995). Thus evolved, the now accepted modern 
practice, of giving psychoanalytic clinically diagnostic opinion for public 
consumption, ‘at a distance’.    
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    Modern personality pathology theorists reflect, the thesis argues a normative, 
particularly American hegemonic ideology. This has wider implications than the 
discourse of terrorism, both in the political sphere and within the discipline of 
psychoanalysis. This particular normative perspective of personality pathology 
informs an a priori clinical analytic stance when investigating phenomena such as 
terrorism. Thus, ideological determinations become intrinsically implicated in 
proposed psychoanalytic conceptualisations of those phenomena. These 
conceptualisations are then incorporated into the wider discourse of 
psychoanalysis, risking the identification of psychoanalysis with a particular 
normative political position. The key claim of the research undertaken here is to 
demonstrate that the subject constituted by personality pathology theorists, is 
actually an ideological rather than a psychoanalytic construct. A clinical essentially 
ahistorical notion of psychic functioning is applied in order to promote a particular 
normative and ideological discourse.  
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1     Introduction. 
 
    This chapter outlines the research structure relating it to the psychoanalytic 
theory, clinical practice, historical background and contemporary functioning of the 
personality pathology discourse. The key concepts of the thesis are defined and a 
pathologising discourse will be identified as a distinct and evolving paradigm within 
the applied psychoanalytic tradition of psychobiography. The mode of thinking 
about and describing a subject ‘at a distance’, is part of a tradition wherein 
psychoanalysis applies its concepts outside of the therapeutic context.  
 
    The validity of clinical psychoanalytic methods such as countertransference 
interpretation and clinical neutrality as it is applied outside of this therapeutic 
context will be critiqued. Mindful of the contingent historical factors which 
influence the direction of a discourse, the research will examine the seminal works 
in the psychobiographic project and these works are listed and contextualised in 
relation to their research themes.    
 
 
2    Chapter Structure and Summaries.  
 
    This section sets out the organisation of the thesis by summarising each chapter 
as it develops the themes and objectives investigated in the research. 
 
Introduction 
 
    The introduction sets out the general political context of the thesis, introduces 
the personality pathology paradigm of terrorism and establishes the status of 
psychoanalytic thinking in modern American culture.  
 
Chapter One: Setting the Scene 
 
   In Chapter One the key concepts of the thesis are defined, in particular that of 
the applied psychoanalytic discipline of psychobiography. The status and validity of 
‘therapeutic’ psychoanalytic techniques such as clinical neutrality and the analyst’s 
countertransference interpretation, as resources in clinical psychobiography, are 
critiqued.  
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    The facsimile clinical encounter or pathography is introduced as the basis of 
personality pathology profiling, arguing that it inherently medicalises the subject. 
With the psychobiographical narrative based around conceptual themes of psychic 
functioning, psychobiographic data is not a simple accretion of historical facts, but 
a process of interpretation relating to meaning in the psychobiographer’s own 
subjectivity.  
 
Chapter Two: Methods. 
   
    The methodology employed in this thesis is outlined and differentiated from 
historical research. The evidence adduced involves testing the original sources 
utilised by personality pathology theorists, biographical evidence, and the 
psychoanalytic conceptualisations and theoretical arguments deployed in the 
pathologising discourse. The key psychobiographies and texts examined in detail 
are outlined in relation to the research themes developed through them.  
 
    The chapter outlines the newly derived concept of ‘clinical parallelism’ one of the 
main methodological tools used in this research for analysing psychobiographic 
technique. In order to compensate for the lack of an actual therapeutic client, the 
clinical psychobiographic enquiry takes another ‘similar’ known subject or 
situation, and the ‘at a distance’ analysis then mirrors the developmental trajectory 
or analytic outcome of the actual case history. Thus, a determinist ahistorical 
schema of a parallel clinical case is superimposed onto the psychobiographical 
subject. 
 
    A further distinction is made between two basic psychoanalytic 
conceptualisations of subjectivity deployed in psychobiography and provides a 
method of differentiating them. Thus, the functioning of the characterological 
subject is intrapsychic, and the acquired character layers are understood through 
the Oedipal relationships and libidinal development. The personological subject, is 
inter-psychic and understood by reference to pre-oedipal oral phase particularly 
traumatic object relating, and also reflects the immutable inherited personality 
aspects or core self.  
 
Chapter Three: The Early Beginnings of the Psychobiographic Project.  
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    From Freud’s early musings which began the psychobiographic project, Chapter 
Three charts and critiques the early development of psychoanalytic thinking 
applied ‘at a distance’ to the understanding of both the artist and his art. Literary 
works were taken by Freud as analysable closed systems, with the product of the 
artist’s imagination taken as a comprehensive and indeed complete psychic 
formation.  
 
    Freud had intended his psychobiography of Leonardo Da Vinci to be a template 
for a more holistic approach, devised in order to counter the pathographies of 
psychoanalytic colleagues such as Isidor Sadger. Freud’s Leonardo would represent 
the characterological approach to psychobiography. Sadger’s pathographic 
methodology was predicated on uncovering on the twin themes of innate 
personality coupled with childhood sexuality. This directly presages the twin track 
genetic predisposition coupled with childhood trauma approach of the modern 
personological profiling of personality pathology theory.  
 
    Although Freud had originally declared that psychoanalysis must not be 
employed as a weapon of aggression, his later pathographic psychobiography of the 
World War One American President Woodrow Wilson was regarded as an outright 
character assassination, which opened the way for the application of 
psychoanalysis to politics.  
 
Chapter Four: What Makes Hitler ‘Tick’?: Profiling the Enemy.  
 
    This chapter compares and critiques two wartime psychobiographies of Adolf 
Hitler, Walter Langer’s A Psychological Analysis of Adolph Hitler: His Life and 
Legend (1943) and Henry Murray’s Analysis of the personality of Adolf Hitler: With 
Predictions of His Future and Suggestions for Dealing With Him Now and After 
Germany’s Surrender (1943), reputedly the first modern political personality 
pathology profiling. Jerrold Post was to use Langer’s psychoanalytic study of Adolf 
Hitler as the template for his own CIA political profiling unit. This study utilises a 
traditionally Freudian characterological analysis, seeking to build up a 
comprehensive developmental picture of Hitler’s childhood. A second contrasting 
profile which later emerged from Murray inferred early narcissistic trauma from 
Hitler’s adult functioning. The thesis then draws a distinction between 
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characterological and personological profiling as a distinct paradigm shift in 
psychobiography. 
 
Chapter Five: The Modern Context of Political Profiling. 
 
    In an era defined by Cold War paranoia, this chapter examines the discourse of 
adversarial psychoanalytic political profiling within the context of Post War 
American psychoanalysis. It traces the evolution of the public and media oriented 
psychological profiling of individuals ‘at a distance’. With increasing public 
scrutiny, reputations could be defamed by virtue of psychological diagnoses.  Such 
diagnoses were similarly manipulated to meet public expectations as in the 
psychiatric profile of Lee Harvey Oswald by Renatus Hartogs, or politically 
exploited, as in the smearing of Daniel Ellsberg by the Richard Nixon 
administration.   
 
    The research explores how American psychiatry resolved the ethically 
contentious issue of psychoanalytically analysing a subject without consent, 
brought to a head through the furore over the politically motivated psychological 
denigration of US presidential candidate Barry Goldwater. The chapter relates 
Jerrold Post’s ongoing influence in the US/Israeli anti-terrorist and security matrix, 
and discusses the role of the ‘psychoanalytic expert’ in the public and institutional 
sphere. 
 
 
Chapter Six: The Theory Behind Jerrold Post’s Personological Profiling. 
 
   The personality pathology theory of modern adversarial political personological 
profiling, encompasses chiefly ‘self psychological’ and ‘object relational’ 
perspectives. In particular, this includes the notion of an early disturbed or 
traumatogenic object relating, leading to narcissistic and paranoid functioning in 
adult life. The psychoanalytic conceptualisations deployed by Post (2004; 2006b) 
are principally the notion of ego identity and identity crisis (Erik Erikson), paranoid 
splitting and projection (Melanie Klein), malignant narcissism and borderline 
functioning (Otto Kernberg), the self object in the leader follower narcissistic 
transference relationship (Heinz Kohut) and group paranoia and paranoid 
leadership (Wilfred Bion).  
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    ‘At a distance’ diagnoses of narcissistic pathology are made according to an 
essentially ahistorical normative conception of the individual. These individual 
diagnoses are then extrapolated onto wider cohorts as the pathological basis of 
paranoid group functioning. The thesis follows through these theoretical strands in 
relation to Post’s adaptations of them, arguing that there is necessarily a mismatch 
between the normatively applied theoretical model and a complex and messy 
existential reality. 
 
    The putative success of the Camp David profiles of Anwar Sadat and Menachem 
Begin, gave Post and his CIA profiling unit a great deal of kudos and the authority 
of expertise in government circles. The research contrasts Post’s benign profile of 
Anwar Sadat, with his pathography of Saddam Hussein within their contemporary 
political contexts. As well as influencing the US Congressional vote during the 1990 
Gulf Crisis, Post was also closely involved with US intelligence circles in the run up 
to 2003 Iraq War, arguing that Saddam’s ‘malignantly narcissistic personality’ 
would make it impossible for him to ever give up his weapons of mass destruction 
(Post 2003). The thesis critiques his evolving profiling strategy.  
 
Chapter Seven: Psychoanalytic Cultural Critiques and Ideological Polemics. 
 
    As opposed to the analysis of individuals which may then be extrapolated to 
wider cohorts, Chapter Seven concerns bespoke cultural psychobiography such as 
Nancy Kobrin’s analysis of Islamic culture. This form of analysis relies for its 
validity more on its resonance to the particular culture rather than the clinical 
expertise of the analyst or exact consonance with psychoanalytic theory which may 
be quite loosely adapted. The chapter describes how certain psychoanalysts 
integrate a psychoanalytic sensibility with ideological imperatives, in order to 
construct a pathologising discourse of terrorism. The thesis shows how Post’s 
notion of the ‘threat of success’ which he states determines the repetition 
compulsion of figures such as Yasser Arafat and the PLO, reflects a normative 
ideological position of psychic rather than existential cause of terrorism. Becoming 
part of the literature, these reified ideological assumptions are then re-adduced as 
evidence determining clinically oriented psychoanalytic assumptions of terrorism.  
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   The difficulties of the psychoanalytic analyses of non Western cultures are 
examined, and how psychoanalysis may be deployed in open cultural polemics, 
particularly in respect of a denigration of Islamic societies. The thesis argues that it 
is a category error to ascribe developmental psychic trajectories for individuals 
engaged in a contingent activity such as terrorism, which is an indeterminate 
notion anyway. Such ascriptions are merely labelling exercises undertaken by the 
psychoanalyst as expert, and collective group motivation is erroneously re-adduced 
as the psychic trajectory of the individuals in that group.  
 
    Adherence to a collective phantasy rather than the acting out of an individual 
fantasy script is argued as the distinguishing feature of the terrorist as opposed to 
for example, the serial killer. A psychoanalytic explanation for the psychic 
conditioning to brutality which allows otherwise psychologically healthy individuals 
to commit acts of terrorism, is offered.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
    The concluding argument of the thesis is that the elision of psychoanalysis with 
the Western hegemonic and normative ideological position of the personality 
pathologists represents a risk of alienating in particular Islam, and undermines the 
perception of psychoanalysis as a universal discipline. The Conclusion focuses on 
the flaws identified in the personality pathology paradigm which facilitate the 
ideological bias argued by the thesis. The themes and evidence produced by this 
research are summarised, demonstrating that the modern discourse of 
psychoanalytic adversarial profiling is contingent upon a series of complex events 
and relationships. It is argued that the psychoanalytic cultural critique of the 
individual in a terrorist group need not necessarily pathologise that individual.   
 
 
3    Key Concepts Defined. 
 
    Modern psychological profiling derives from attempts ‘to conduct personality 
assessments of political leaders “at a distance”’, and the methodology deployed by 
personality pathology theorists is termed in this thesis as the clinical ‘at a distance’ 
profile (Horgan, 2002-3, p 3; Goleman, 1991; Brainard, 2011; Carey, 2011). 
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Political ‘at a distance’ profiling derived from the applied psychoanalysis of 
pathographic or clinical/medical psychological analysis, an early variant of the 
psychobiographic project. Applied psychoanalysis is itself a notion broadly defined 
according to Eric Nuetzel, as the ‘use of psychoanalytic ideas in the study of 
human activities outside the purview of the psychoanalytic consulting room’ 
(Nuetzel, 2003, p 396). Psychoanalysis is not merely the pre-eminent paradigm 
within psychobiography but the discipline is effectively a branch of ‘applied 
psychoanalysis’. As such, psychobiography has institutional recognition, and this 
relationship, is at the core of the thesis. 
 
    Given the right circumstances the American Psychiatric Association (APA) ‘Task 
Force on Psychohistory’ states that, ‘a psychoanalytically- trained psychiatrist (or 
other professional in human behavior) can come to a rather reliable estimate of the 
principal motivational forces, the more significant personal conflicts, and the basic 
psychological adaptive measures of his subject’ (Hoffling et al, 1976, p 4). The 
uncovering of these motivational forces are indeed the espoused the basis, and 
effectively the definition of, the psychobiographic project. 
 
    Within the field of psychobiography, there is a great deal of methodological and 
terminological overlap, with the terms psychobiography and psychohistory being 
used somewhat interchangeably in the literature (Runyan, 1984; Hofling et al, 
1976). Psychobiography, the thesis takes to be the motivational analysis of an 
individual. Psychohistory may refer to an older usage for an individual’s psychic 
history or as representing the application of psychoanalytic concepts to a wider 
historical or cultural sphere (Runyan, 1984; Hofling et al, 1976). For clarity, this 
thesis will use only the term psychobiography throughout, taking it to reflect a 
psychoanalytic biography of an individual but also the psychoanalytic appraisal of 
a social context. The term profiling is used in the context of this thesis, to describe 
the psychobiographic process being applied to a designated living subject for a 
specific agenda, rather than psychobiography undertaken from intellectual 
curiosity. 
 
    In any event, ‘at a distance’ clinical profiling, psychobiography and 
psychohistory, all derive from the same historical origin, all rely on the same 
epistemological resources and basic methodology in order as Peter Lowenberg puts 
it, to ‘reconstruct, or re-create in their minds, the life of their subjects’ (Lowenberg, 
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1983, p 16). Specifically, clinical ‘at a distance’ adversarial political profiles are as 
this thesis defines them: clinically oriented analyses undertaken without having 
conducted a personal interview and without the consent or even the knowledge of the 
subject in order to gain a psychological advantage over that subject within particular 
set of circumstances or in order to publicly present an adverse image of that subject. 
These profiles are undertaken either under the auspices of or, in support of a 
normative institutional position. 
 
    There is then, an inherently normative imperative, that is to say an acceptance of 
the socially dominant regulatory regime, the thesis contends, for analysts privileging 
‘personality pathology’ attributions, to portray radical or revolutionary groups 
including those who may employ terrorism as a tactic, as being inherently 
problematic from a psychoanalytic perspective. The ‘tendency among analysts is’ as 
K. R. Eissler puts it,  ‘to look at a patient engaging in revolutionary activities or 
believing in revolutionary persuasion as acting out’ (Eissler, 2002, p132).  
 
    As a corollary of these subjects being outside of the analyst’s ideological and 
normative value system, there is a commensurate corollary to pathologise, that is to 
say, regard those groups and indeed the individuals within them as being 
psychologically abnormal. Ideology is understood in this thesis as defined by Erik 
Erikson, to be ‘an unconscious tendency underlying religious and scientific as well 
as political thought: the tendency at a given time to make facts amenable to ideas, 
and ideas to facts, in order to create a world image convincing enough to support 
the collective and the individual sense of identity’ (Erikson, 1972, p 20). 
Psychoanalysis itself, this thesis contends, becomes part of a politico-ideological 
discourse in pathologising those individuals who take up arms against this 
normative establishment or politico/socially dominant class. This is a class or 
establishment, of which the American psychoanalyst is regarded as an integral 
part. A prominent exemplar of the psychoanalyst in the service of government (the 
CIA), Post was instrumental in furthering a psychoanalytic perspective in the 
profiling of political leadership. 
 
    For the methodology of his CIA profiling unit, Post adapted what he terms the 
‘clinical case study to mental illness’ (Post, 2006a, p 52). Designed to replicate the 
context of the clinical encounter, the thesis proposes that these pathographic ‘at a 
distance’ profiles reflect distinctly ‘diagnostic’ analyses of their subjects, with the 
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consequent presumption of some form of individual pathology to investigate. The 
thesis proposes that in order to compensate for the lack of an actual therapeutic 
client, the clinical psychobiographic enquiry takes another ‘similar’ known subject 
or situation and the ‘at a distance’ analysis mirrors the developmental trajectory or 
analytic process and outcome of an actual case history.  
 
    Although personality is a somewhat amorphous notion, Gordon Allport gives a 
reasonably succinct definition of personality, as the ‘dynamic organization within 
the individual of the psychophysical systems that determine his characteristic 
behaviour and thought’ (Allport, 1961, p 28). When that characteristic behaviour 
and thought is deemed to be psychologically outside of the norm, it constitutes 
some form of personality pathology. The personality pathology theorists engaged in 
modern adversarial profiling rely principally upon a synthesis of psychoanalytic 
‘self psychology’ and ‘object relational’ perspectives, and along with genetic 
determinants, the notion of early disturbed object relating leading to narcissistic 
and paranoid pathological functioning in adult life. 
 
    The functioning of a characterological subject evolves intrapsychically, and is 
understood through his Oedipal relationships and libidinal development. This 
subject has an acquired psychic formation, disturbances of which tend to the 
neuroses. The characterological subject in psychobiography is developed by the 
speculative reconstruction of childhood relationships. The personological subject, 
as it is understood in this thesis is constituted through inter-psychic relationships. 
This personological subject is influenced by the pre-oedipal oral phase, particularly 
early traumatic object relating, and the immutable hereditary aspects or core self.  
Psychic disturbances of this personality formation tend to the psychoses. The 
personological subject in psychobiography is mainly the thesis proposes, inferred 
from adult behaviour.  
 
    The ‘traumatogenic quality’ of disturbed object relating to early care givers 
particularly the mother, depends according to Werner Bohleber, on whether  
 
‘an intensive relationship has developed between the child and object. The 
object relationship itself acquires a traumatic quality ... it is not primarily 
the child’s injuries from physical force that produce a traumatic disorder; 
rather, the most intensely pathogenic element is mistreatment or abuse by 
24 
 
the person whose protection and care is needed ... The greater the trauma, 
the more severe is not only the damage to the internal object relationship, 
but also the breakdown in the protective, stabilizing internal communication 
between self – and object – representations’  
(Bohleber, 2007, p 339). 
  
Such traumatogenic experiences form a component of personality, as a 
‘“mechanism of narcissistic protection”’, representing ‘a stable, more or less rigid, 
organization of the libidinal economy of the person; it is at the same time submitted 
to the pressures of the drives and to social constraints, to gratifying or traumatic 
experiences, and to the repetitions or defenses that they give rise to’ (Dadoun, 
2005, p 271). 
 
              
    Although not a specifically designated grouping, the major protagonists of this 
thesis would reasonably be recognised as what Marc Sageman terms personality 
pathology theorists and the subject which they constitute is in the context of this 
thesis, a personological one (Sageman, 2004, p 83). Although this notion of 
personality pathology theory inherently privileges the role of the individual, it does 
by extension also propose the particularity of a group ‘personality’ in determining 
psychic functioning. The group is seen as a reflection of the leader’s psyche, 
particularly in charismatic leadership.  
 
    The concept of charismatic leadership is deployed comprehensively by Post, who 
takes Weber’s notion of charismatic authority ‘as a personal authority deriving from 
“devotion to the specific sanctity, heroism or exemplary character of an individual 
person and of the normative patterns or order revealed or ordained by him”’ (Post, 
2015, p 72; Weber, 1922). Post is at pains to point out that charismatic authority is 
a two way relationship, and that charismatic leaders ‘are at heart the creation of 
their followers’ (Post, 2015, p 72). As opposed to the purely clinical context of the 
case history, psychobiographic profiling is intrinsically linked to its social, indeed 
ideological, context.    
     
 
4    Psychobiography as Case History in Applied Psychoanalysis. 
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    Psychobiography did derive ostensibly as a form of substitute case history 
outside of the consulting room, and was later ‘applied’ as a form of psychoanalytic 
enquiry in its own right. From the inception of the Freudian project, the goal of 
‘applied’ psychoanalysis was, according to Fritz Schmidl, ‘to emphasize that 
literature, mythology, etc could be demonstrated to confirm Freud’s theories, 
notably the Oedipus Complex’ (Schmidl, 1972, p 404). There is a traditionalist view 
though which contends that true psychoanalysis is found only in the clinical 
therapeutic context, and that only data derived from there should serve as the 
empirical basis for all psychoanalytic propositions (Esman, 1998). As a corollary, 
according to Esman, it is only in the clinical context ‘that these propositions can be 
tested for their validity. The interchange between analyst and patient is, in this 
view, akin to a laboratory situation’ (Esman, 1998, p 741).  
  
    The notion of the therapeutic context as being akin to the scientifically controlled 
environment or closed system, for scientifically testing hypotheses is inherently 
problematised, because of the intimate and private nature of the clinical encounter. 
There are also too many external factors which impinge, with Susan Budd a 
practising independent psychotherapist doubting the possibility of a ‘full and clear 
statement of case material which will let us decide whether the theory which was 
used to decipher the clinical facts was adequate or not’ (Budd, 1997, p 31).  
 
    Case material is never then simply a ‘true’ and unexpurgated reflection of the 
clinical encounter. As a stylised record of treatment, a case history may be 
produced for therapeutic supervision or more formally and publicly according to 
Budd, ‘in order to support a theoretical argument or demonstrate a process’ (Budd, 
1997, p 31). Indeed the essential quandary of the case history is how to put into 
the ‘public domain’, that which is inherently intimate and private, within a 
culturally acceptable format.     
 
    Similarly, in being a culturally situated practice, psychoanalytic thinking ‘is 
affected by general intellectual shifts’, as with changing psychoanalytic notions of 
whether homosexuality is to be regarded as a perversion for example (Budd, 1997, 
p 31, p 38). Similarly, changing psychoanalytic attitudes regarding women reflect 
societal change rather than clinical discoveries. A substantial school of thought as 
Esman has it argues that ‘clinical facts’ may themselves be somewhat ethereal, 
‘constantly changing, ever elusive, intersubjectively or socially constructed’ 
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(Esman, 1998, p 746). From an epistemological perspective, clinical ‘discoveries’ are 
almost invariably already theory laden, and theory is inevitably imbued with 
observations from applied psychoanalysis. Indeed, as Schmidl points out, that ‘[i]n 
almost every instance where Freud wrote about a subject outside of psychoanalysis 
proper, he made significant contributions to psychoanalysis itself’ (Schmidl, 1972, 
p 403). 
 
    Commentators such as Esman argue, then, that there is no absolute distinction 
between clinical and applied psychoanalysis, pointing out that in his The 
Interpretation of Dreams Freud had used his own dreams as data, not data acquired 
in the clinical encounter (Esman, 1998; Freud, 2001/1900, S.E. IV; Freud, 
2001/1900, S.E. V). Similarly, Freud had made theoretical observations concerning 
the unconscious roots of paranoia derived from the story of Schreiber and his first 
thoughts on narcissism are found in his Leonardo (Freud, 2001/1911, S.E. XII; 
Freud, 2001/1910 S.E. XI). Just as ‘cultural phenomena served to illustrate or 
reinforce Freud’s nascent ideas about individual and social psychology’, so too ‘the 
published clinical cases were intended to serve this end’ (Esman, 1998, p 743). 
Freud believed that long before he was aware of him, ‘a little Hans would come who 
would be so fond of his mother that he would be bound to feel afraid of his father 
because of it’ (Freud, 2001/1905, S.E. X, p 42). The extrapolation of such Oedipal 
relationships are, a central and recurring theme in psychobiography. 
    
 
5    Developing the Psychoanalytic Narrative of the Subject. 
 
    In his Young Man Luther, Erik Erikson describes Luther’s supposed relationship 
to his mother:  
 
‘A big gap exists here, which only conjecture could fill. But instead of 
conjecturing half-heartedly, I will state, as a clinician’s judgment, that 
nobody could speak and sing as Luther did if his mother’s voice had not 
sung to him of some heaven; that nobody could be as torn between his 
masculine and feminine sides, nor have such a range of both, who did not at 
one time feel that he was like his mother; but also, that nobody could 
discuss women and marriage in the way he often did who had not been 
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deeply disappointed by his mother - and had become loath to succumb the 
way she did to the father, to fate’  
 
          (Erikson, 1958, p 69).  
 
    What Erikson is doing is moving from a presumed characteristic of Luther’s, to 
the ‘inferential reconstruction of essential data about the latter’s family 
environment. We have here, instead of the legitimate confirmation of an outline 
whose essential shape is already traced, the creation of a quasi-arbitrary drawing’ 
(Friedländer, 1978, 27). The principle defect of employing clinical methodology in 
psychobiography is then that its findings are to rest ultimately on the therapist’s 
own intuition (Elms, 1994).  
      
   A psychobiography reflects the analyst’s own and current perception of his 
subject, and he analyses’ biographical data in terms of that perception. The 
psychobiographical narrative is then organised around themes or overarching 
metaphors reflecting that perception such as Mahatma Gandhi’s celibacy symbolic 
of his pacifism or Barry Goldwater’s paranoid warmongering which are seen as 
emblematic of his paranoid psychic functioning. For psychoanalysis ‘at a distance’, 
it is the initial view or a priori perception of the subject which is critical.  
 
    Indeed that an original clinical intuition or diagnosis influences the subsequent 
perception of the subject, is well established by research (Langer and Abelson, 
1974). In their own 1974 experiment on the effect of ‘labels on clinicians’ 
judgement’, Langer and Abelson recorded the evaluations of psychoanalysts who 
viewed the same interview but with half believing the subject to be a patient and 
half a job applicant. Their findings were that ‘[w]hen the interviewee was labelled 
“patient,” he was described as significantly more disturbed than he was when he 
was labelled “job applicant”’ (Langer and Abelson, 1974, p 4). Those analysts 
believing the subject to be a job interviewee saw a ‘“candid and innovative”; 
“ordinary, straightforward”; “upstanding middle-class-citizen type”’ whereas those 
who believed they were viewing a patient, found someone ‘“frightened of his own 
aggressive impulses”’ with ‘“considerable hostility, repressed or channelled”’ (ibid, p 
8). Similarly, the ‘job’ group found the subject ‘“fairly realistic”’ whereas the 
‘patient’ group found his ‘“outlook not based on realities of the ‘objective world’”’ 
(Langer and Abelson, 1974, p 8).  
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    In his study of undercover ‘pseudopatients’ in a psychiatric hospital, David 
Rosenhan found that the original diagnostic labelling was the key determinant on 
how a subject was viewed by the medical staff (Rosenhan, 1973). How the patient’s 
language was interpreted, took on an entirely different meaning for example, as it 
‘would have been ascribed if it were known that the man was “normal”’ (Rosenhan, 
1973-2012, p 5).  
 
    Commensurate with what he has decided as his subject’s personality theme, the 
psychobiographer is searching for a hook upon which to hang his theory, a chink of 
insight to help prise open the personality, as William Schultz describes, it a ‘koan 
(i.e., in the Zen tradition, a paradoxical, elusive phrase or episode requiring for its 
solution a leap to another level of understanding)’ (Schultz, 2005, p 8). So that 
apart from the rare instances of, for example, Erikson’s comprehensive biographies 
of Luther (Erikson, 1958) and Gandhi (Erikson, 1993/1970), the psychobiographic 
focus is much narrower than that of a standard biography, or of historical research 
in general. Psychobiography as Schultz points out tends to target ‘one facet of a life 
at a time, a more or less discrete episode or event or action’ (Schultz, 2005, p 9). 
This leads to a different basis for the accumulation of knowledge in history and 
psychobiography, and thus each discipline has differential perspective on the same 
epistemological resources.  
 
    Data in psychobiography ‘only gradually begins to take on meaning and 
consistency in the light of given hypotheses’, in a process ‘not unlike the 
methodological technique of the psychoanalyst in his work with the history and 
meaning of his patient’s life’ (Meissner, 2003, p 184). What distinguishes the 
psychobiographer’s process in Meissner’s view is that psychobiographic data does 
not exist as historical fact per se.  Data only exists in relation to the 
psychobiographer’s interpretation of it, and ‘[s]ubstantiating the claims of 
psychological interpretation requires a distinctly different method, and therein lies 
the difference between biography and psychobiography’ (Meissner, 2003, p 186).  
 
    In psychobiography, there is not an accretion of knowledge on the unfolding 
ontological topic, because psychobiographic taxonomy is by theoretical orientation 
and conceptual agenda. So that Erikson’s Young Man Luther (1958) rather than 
being classed in Renaissance or religious history is seen as illuminating for 
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example an ego psychological perspective on identity crisis. Scholars then engage 
with the work on the basis of its psychoanalytic and not historical salience. Even 
where there is a corpus of psychobiographic work on a particular individual, as 
notably on Adolf Hitler, they do not inherently build on each other. Rather, in what 
this thesis terms as Walter Langer’s characterological as opposed to Henry 
Murray’s personological profile, they are competing psychoanalytic 
conceptualisations of Hitler’s psyche (Langer, 1943; Murray, 1943). However, both 
the Langer and Murray profiles emphasize the pathology of their subject, and the 
thesis argues that this is not incidental to the obviously egregious Hitler, but 
represents a pathologising discourse within psychobiography. 
 
6    Flaws Inherent in the Psychobiographic Method. 
 
    The pathologising discourse stands or falls this thesis argues, on its particular 
and specific evidence and method, rather than simply relying on the probity of the 
theoretical concepts deployed. As an established tradition within psychoanalysis, 
psychobiography has an extended corpus of works including scholarly critiques on 
its methodology.  This research will extend this by identifying a distinct personality 
pathology strand within psychobiography, as represented in particular by the 
clinical ‘at a distance’ adversarial political profile.  
 
    Early in the development of psychobiography, guidelines for the methodological 
procedure had been outlined by Freud (2001/1910, S.E. XI). These methodological 
strictures have been developed and critiqued by a number of theorists in 
psychobiography, most notably in the works of Erikson (1950, 1958, 1963, 1968, 
1993), John Mack (1971), Robert Lifton (1974), Friedländer (1978), Lowenberg 
(1983; 1988), Runyan (1984; 1988), Elms (1994; 2003) Winer and Anderson (2003) 
and Schultz (2005).  
 
    These psychobiographic critiques have been synthesised and systematised in, 
what is intended as a form of methodological best practice by Schultz, in his 
Handbook of Psychobiography (2005). Schultz stipulates that psychobiographies 
should be cogent, having basic interpretative persuasion, and that the narrative 
structure should let ‘conclusions follow naturally from an array of data’ (Schultz, 
2005, p 7). Indeed Freud (2001/1910, S.E. XI) had argued that psychobiographical 
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data should be collected iteratively, rather than drawing conclusions from a single 
mass of data.  
 
    There should be a data convergence from as many and varied sources as 
possible and that the evidence should be logically sound, ergo free from self 
contradiction, and show as Schultz terms it, consistency with other psychic 
knowledge and be able to withstand falsification (Schultz, 2005). Primarily though, 
Schultz advocates what he terms ‘sudden coherence’, because the ‘best 
interpretations make the initially incoherent cohere. Mystery’s elucidation is 
psychobiography’s most salutary aim’ (Schultz, 2005, p 7). Whilst mystery’s 
elucidation is the principled aim of the psychobiographic project it will be argued in 
this thesis, that there is a strain within psychobiography which gives primacy to a 
purely ideological representation of the subject. In doing so, these particular 
psychobiographies reflect a number of the methodological flaws identified within 
the psychobiographic project generally.  
 
    Psychobiographic ‘reconstruction’ consists in the inventing of ‘psychological facts 
inferentially for which no direct evidence exists. Often resorted to in the absence of 
verifiable data about childhood history’ (Schultz, 2005, p 10). Known as the ‘critical 
period fallacy’, an attempt is made to construct the study of an individual’s life, 
around a presumed key period such as childhood (Runyan, 1984, p 209). Similarly, 
an incident in the subject’s life, perhaps simply by virtue of its being well 
documented, is given undue significance, in a reductive flaw known as ‘eventism’. 
This episode is then taken as ‘not only the prototype of his behaviour but the 
turning point in his life from which all subsequent events and work are derived’ 
(Runyan, 1984, p 209, emphasis in the original).  
 
    There is also a form of post hoc fallacy where the putative symptomology is 
traced back to a known childhood event, but this is done without ever being able to 
validate whether that event was psychically significant for the subject, or whether it 
had acquired significance simply by virtue of being documented. Again, due to the 
often paucity of psychobiographic data, the mere fact that the event is known, often 
determines that it is given psychic significance, or more particularly, that it has 
psychic resonance for the psychobiographer’s purposes. An inherent 
psychobiographic focus on the significance given to childhood development, where 
childhood if documented at all, is usually of the least well known period of the 
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individual’s life. Milton Lomask regards this as representing a flaw in itself, which 
he terms as ‘simplism’ (Lomask, 1987, p 131).  
 
    The general flaw of ‘reductionism’ as a criticism of psychobiography per se, 
explains ‘adult character and behavior exclusively in terms of early childhood 
experience while neglecting later formative processes and influences’, (Schultz, 
2005, p 10). The tendency is also known after Erikson as ‘orinology’, with Erikson 
in particular criticising the reductionism of analyses predicated specifically on 
childhood trauma that he describes as ‘traumatology’, precisely the method 
deployed by personality pathology theorists in the pathologising discourse (Erikson, 
1993/1970; Runyan, 1984).  
 
    The general lack of adequate biographic evidence is a problem inherent in the 
psychobiographic project. This leads to the tendency of inferring or indeed 
‘reconstructing’ childhood development and other aspects of the subject’s life. Or 
similarly by making a clinical diagnosis and then taking childhood development as 
symptomology, a method known as pathography. Such reconstruction is needed in 
psychobiography, because the preeminent role of childhood in determining adult 
psychic functioning is axiomatic in psychoanalysis. However, David Stannard 
argues that, psychoanalysis does not establish reliable connections between 
childhood experiences and adult personality, and that the ‘best modern research 
now firmly indicates that there are no psychological structures established in early 
childhood that are sufficiently resilient to survive into adulthood without constant 
environmental support’ (Stannard, 1980, p 150, emphasis in the original). 
 
       Indeed the overarching argument, of which Stannard is a prominent exponent, 
is that, as there is no scientific proof of the efficacy of psychoanalytic therapy, and 
that as psychoanalytic theory is logically flawed, so ‘goes the essential 
underpinning of psychohistorical explanation’ (Stannard, 1980, p 58). Stannard’s 
argument is that psychobiography is invalidated per se, because of the lack of 
scientific evidence for its propositions. However, there will always be aspects of 
psychoanalysis’ object of enquiry, which are simply not be amenable to strictly 
scientific appraisal and validation, whether or not one accepts psychoanalysis as a 
science (Meyerhof, 1969; Friedländer, 1978).     
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    Using psychoanalytic propositions in general, in order to reconstruct from adult 
behaviour to supposed childhood experiences, Stannard regards as a function of 
the post hoc, ergo propter hoc fallacy. Added to what Stannard sees as this dubious 
presumption of causation following childhood events, is the indeterminacy of 
interpretation, where ‘in the absence of objective and verified data analysts are free 
to emphasize one aspect of psychoanalytic theory and deemphasize another’ 
(Stannard, 1980, p 36). 
 
     If psychoanalytic propositions are invalid in reconstructing childhood 
experiences, even in the clinical context, as Stannard argues, discussion of their 
application to psychobiography would simply be moot. However, if one does accept 
the validity of psychoanalytic propositions, the application of a diagnostic clinical 
methodology to the psychobiographic project, is nonetheless problematic. The 
practice is known as pathography, the combating of which had been Freud’s 
principle reason for undertaking his Leonardo. Schultz describes pathography as 
‘[p]sychobiography by diagnosis, or reducing the complex whole of personality to 
static psychopathological categories and/or symptoms’ (Schultz, 2005, p 10). This 
thesis contends that pathography is the key technique in the clinical 
psychobiographies of the pathologising discourse. 
 
    By undertaking what George Makari describes as the ‘medical and psychiatric 
evaluation’ of historical figures, psychiatrist Paul Möbius as early as 1870, was 
undertaking a ‘pathographic’ form of analysis (Makari, 2008, p 167). Actually 
terming his method as ‘pathography’, everybody was according to Möbius, 
‘pathological to a certain degree’ (Möbius quoted in Schiller, 1982, p 80; Möbius, 
1909). This was itself a notion which had been explored as Johan Schioldann 
argues, with Socrates, Plato and Aristotle and ‘their reflections on genius and its 
possible association to insanity’ (Schioldann, 2003, p 303).  
 
    In psychoanalysis itself, ‘the portions of the theory which deal with 
psychopathology are the portions which are most developed’ (Anderson, 1981, p 
456). Extrapolating the clinical/therapeutic to psychobiography tends to be albeit 
by default reductionist and somewhat ‘one-sided’, because the psychobiographer’s 
inherent tendency is to ‘overemphasizes the subject’s psychological difficulties’ 
(Anderson, 1981, p 456). In any event, as Elms expresses it, clinical data is in itself 
‘basically pathographic in orientation’ (Elms, 1994, p 13).  
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    Pathography represents an attempt to impose an identifiable clinical framework 
onto the subject’s life, the medicalised or clinical psychological narrative of a 
subject. Adversarial clinical ‘at a distance’ personality profiling, is as this thesis 
argues, a form of pathographic enquiry which seeks the scientific validation 
through psychoanalysis, of an ideological position. The role of the clinician is then, 
the thesis argues, fundamentally different in ‘at a distance’ profiling, from that of 
the therapeutic setting.    
 
 
7    Countertransference and Psychobiographic Bias. 
 
    One ‘methodological point truly unique to clinical work’, is in Erikson’s view, ‘the 
disposition of the clinician’s “mixed” feelings, his emotions and opinions. The 
evidence is not “all in” if he does not succeed in using his own emotional responses 
during a clinical encounter as an evidential source and as a guide in intervention, 
instead of putting them aside with a spurious claim to unassailable objectivity’ 
(Erikson, 1959, p 93). The deep subjective involvement of the psychobiographic 
researcher is for Lowenberg, a qualitative difference between general history and 
psychohistory (Lowenberg, 1983). 
 
    Indeed one of the putative clinical techniques deployed in psychobiography in 
order to compensate for the lack of existential evidence, is the deployment of the 
analyst’s own countertransference reactions as evidence. The claim is that the 
psychobiographic ‘encounter’ as a facsimile clinical encounter, is replete with a 
transference relationship. The argument of this thesis is that as the subject takes 
absolutely no part in the process, there can be no relationship, what is occurring in 
the analyst’s head is simply a metaphor for a relationship. 
 
    Assessing the validity of using a form of clinical transference relationship in 
psychobiography, Stannard argues that: 
 
   ‘As a therapeutic technique it requires the existence of a living subject, one 
willing and able to actively participate in the effort to reach awareness of the 
allegedly repressed impulses or forgotten traumatic events (and their unique 
interpretations) that are said to underlie the symptoms in question. This 
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active participation - necessarily involving, it is claimed, transference 
feelings onto the person of the analyst - is essential to the cooperative 
process of giving insight, overcoming resistances, “making the unconscious 
conscious”, and eventually effecting a cure. The fact that this is patently and 
by simple definition impossible when dealing with the scattered literary 
remains of a long-dead (and therefore, needless to say, inactive and non-
participating) subject has led many - most notably good psychoanalytically 
trained clinicians – to dismiss out of hand as what Freud himself called 
“wild” psychoanalysis’  
 
(Stannard, 1980, p vii). 
 
Even in psychoanalytic terms, the lack of a direct response from the subject makes 
a transference relationship essentially untenable, and psychobiography as a 
concept, is essentially ‘“wild” psychoanalysis’ (Stannard, 1980). The argument is 
that the impossibility of a transference relationship, effectively the therapeutic 
context, means that psychobiography has no validity per se (ibid). 
 
    However, whether or not there is a transference relationship in psychobiography 
does not depend on the validity of psychoanalytic concepts, or the efficacy of 
psychoanalysis as therapy. The psychobiographer is not seeking to effect a ‘cure’. 
The psychobiographer is seeking to understand and has feelings towards his 
subject, and so there is ipso facto, some form of transference relationship. A 
transference relationship, albeit one-sided, does exist between the 
psychobiographer and his data, which may give a valid and unique psychoanalytic 
insight into the psychobiographer’s version of the subject, and may also promote a 
wider psychoanalytic understanding. The argument of this thesis is that, the 
transference relationship in psychobiography is something entirely other than a 
facsimile clinical case. Psychobiography does not have clinical validity without the 
participation of a willing subject, but should not be assessed in those terms.  
 
    However, when psychoanalysts in general terms as Laplanche and Pontalis point 
out, refer to the ‘unqualified use of the term “transference”’ it is ‘transference during 
treatment. 
    Classically, the transference is acknowledged to be the terrain on which all the 
basic problems of a given analysis play themselves out: the establishment, 
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modalities, interpretation and resolution of the transference are in fact what define 
the cure’ (Laplanche and Pontalis, 1988, p 455, emphasis in the original).  
 
    Freud had come across the notion of ‘transference’ whilst working in conjunction 
with his early collaborator Joseph Breuer. In their 1895 work Studies in Hysteria, 
Freud notes that if the ‘relation of the patient to the physician is disturbed, her 
cooperativeness fails too; when the physician tries to investigate the next 
pathological idea, the patient is held up by an intervening consciousness of the 
complaints against the physician that have been accumulating in her’ (Freud and 
Breuer, 1986, p 389).  
 
    Although there are a number of differing perspectives on the concept, 
countertransference is broadly taken as the ‘whole of the analyst’s unconscious 
reactions to the individual analysand especially to the analysand’s own 
transference’ (Laplanche and Pontalis, 1988, p 92). Although Freud did not actually 
have much to say on the subject of countertransference, in his 1910 paper Future 
Prospects of Psycho-Analysis, he has it that, [w]e have become aware of the 
“counter-transference”, which arises in him as a result of the patient’s influence on 
his unconscious feelings, and we are almost inclined to insist that he shall 
recognize this counter-transference in himself and overcome it’ (Freud, 1910, XI, pp 
144). 
 
    In arguing that there is an ‘at a distance’ transference relationship, the 
psychobiographic matrix incorporates, according to Manfred Kets De Vries, the 
interaction between ‘the researcher, the subject, the data and the audience’, so that  
‘after a sufficient immersion, the subject starts “talking” to the researcher and 
evokes certain responses - that is, countertransference reactions’ (Kets De Vries, 
1990, p 427). These ‘certain responses’ or ‘countertransference reactions’, are with 
the psychobiographer’s data and not his subject. The “talking” is metaphor not 
facsimile. Whatever analytic technique is employed, it cannot compensate for flaws 
or lack in the data, but may actually compound those flaws through an analytic 
rationalisation of them. In the therapeutic transference relationship, it is the 
patient’s feelings which are redirected or transferred onto the analyst. In 
psychobiography, this relationship is at all times a function of the projection back 
on himself of the psychobiographer’s own responses or countertransference 
towards his data.  
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    Notwithstanding arguments over scientific validity, and the disagreement 
between the various psychoanalytic schools in respect of its therapeutic value, the 
analyst’s countertransference in psychobiography this thesis argues, seeks to make 
subjectivity into a virtue in order to simply mitigate an amalgam of inherent biases. 
Interpreting through the prism of the analyst’s own theoretical and ideological 
position is known as ‘intuition bias’, and w ith ‘confirmation bias’, information is 
interpreted to confirm the existing beliefs. Where after an event has occurred there 
arises a belief that it was ‘known’ that this eventuality was inevitably going happen, 
before the event actually took place is known as ‘hindsight bias’. Indeed, as will be 
demonstrated in the case of Renatus Hartogs, the psychobiographer may actively 
discount prior information or evidence, in favour of an interpretation 
commensurate with a teleological trajectory towards his current perception of the 
subject. 
 
    The psychobiographer obviously relies on historical and biographical sources, 
but it would need to be his intuition and interpretation which turned this material 
into clinical data. A statement from a subject need not then be taken by the 
psychobiographer as transparent, as it may be regarded for example as a ‘reaction 
formation’, conveying the opposite of a true belief. This purely subjective 
assessment may lead to a bias where an unfavourable attitude towards the subject 
is seen as a legitimate clinically interpretable countertransference reaction on the 
part of the analyst. This in turn may be treated as actual evidence in his analysis, 
with the ‘perceptive’ researcher using his countertransference as another data 
source for validating inferences (Kets De Vries (1990).   
 
    Reified speculations or retrodictions from these inferences become part of a 
particular profile, and then in turn form part of the accredited literature. So that in 
formulating theories or indeed as part of a diagnostic evaluation, what were 
originally speculative inferences become part of the supportive evidence. What was 
actually flimsy evidence now appears more plausible because it relates to earlier 
‘findings’, although these findings were originally only reified speculations in 
themselves. Later commentators proceed ‘as if’ the contentions were given facts and 
therefore re-present/represent them, without any of the original caveats. With 
successive authors uncritically using these reified speculations as cited fact, an 
entire corpus of wholly spurious evidence becomes extant in the literature. There is 
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then an inbuilt bias concerning the subject, in the literature, instead of an a priori 
position of clinical neutrality.  
 
 
8    Clinical Neutrality and Scientific Validity in Psychobiography.  
 
    In the clinical therapeutic context, the notion of clinical neutrality is designed to 
counter any inherent analyst bias. In his discussion paper on the topic, Jay 
Greenberg (2012/1986) argues that in taking analytic neutrality as a goal, the 
‘analyst should try to create an atmosphere in which respect for all aspects of the 
patient’s personality’ is regarded.  Contrarily, the neutrality of the researcher, who 
‘by the nature of his task is indifferent to the wellbeing of his subject’ is very 
different from that of the ‘healer’ (Greenberg, 2012/1986, p 4, p 2). In respect of 
neutrality, by their very natures, the therapeutic approach is necessarily at odds 
with the psychobiographical research approach. Clearly, it is possible to 
incorporate particular clinical insights into psychobiography, but not as the thesis 
seeks to show, to incorporate a wholesale clinical/therapeutic methodology into 
psychobiography.  
 
     In acknowledging that there are caveats to the deployment of psychoanalytic 
techniques generally in biography, Anderson calls for full credit to be prominently 
afforded at the outset to the accomplishments of the subject, because ‘it is 
exceedingly difficult for a psychobiographer to prevent his inner concerns and 
conflicts from causing him to make distorted psychological interpretations’ 
(Anderson, 1981, p 465). In similar vein, Paul Roazen proposes that a measure of 
scepticism should be built into the psychobiographic project, because despite the 
propensity for psychoanalytic concepts being used for moral purposes, the ‘more 
Freud’s claims as a neutral scientist are taken credulously’ the more the likelihood 
increases ‘that psychoanalytic ideas will be turned in a partisan direction’ (Roazen, 
1987, p 589). With psychobiographers, and certainly clinical profilers, assuming a 
mantle of scientific authority, the issue of the clinical neutrality or scientific validity 
of psychoanalysis necessarily impacts on the credibility of the psychobiographic 
project.   
 
    Clinical psychoanalysis does not readily lend itself to the ‘scientific’ verification 
or validation of prognostic outcomes, which are actually part of the shifting inter-
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subjective and iterative relationship between analyst and patient. Because it is 
always dealing with what is effectively ‘work in progress’, in psychoanalysis it is not 
possible to ‘know exactly the initial conditions of the system (what Freud calls “the 
constitutional factor”)’ (Ward and Zarate, 2000, p 31). Militating against the 
possibility of predictive validation as expressed by Ward and Zarate is the normal 
push and pull of life’s exigencies, and because of ‘the many interactions between 
the parts of the system we are studying’ (Ward and Zarate, 2000, p 31). It would be 
impossible to assess what particular behavioural change was due strictly to a 
psychoanalytic intervention (Ward and Zarate, 2000).  
 
    The clinical context is highly nuanced, completely individual and as such 
inherently unpredictable, and although not an absolute guarantee, the ongoing 
interaction with the patient is the principal precaution against theoretical bias in 
clinical intervientions. The particularity of the individual subject should be 
constantly referenced in the clinical encounter, and that as an analyst Patrick 
Casement constantly asks himself, ‘“[i]s the patient’s individuality being respected 
and preserved, or overlooked and intruded upon?” ... It is a tragedy if this comes to 
be limited to a process nearer to that of “cloning”, whereby the patient comes to be 
“formed in the image” of the analyst and his theoretical orientation’ (Casement, 
2002, p 25).  
 
    This effect of ‘cloning’ which is problematic in the clinical context evolves as an 
actual method in psychobiography. A ‘similar’ known subject or situation is 
effectively cloned ‘at a distance’ by mirroring the developmental trajectory or 
analytic outcome of the actual clinical case history. In this process which the thesis 
terms ‘clinical parallelism’, without any feedback at all from the subject, once the 
‘analysis’ is in a groove whatever the direction, there is no method of correction, as 
all evidence is viewed in terms of the analytic groove. The psychobiographic subject 
is ‘predicted’ in terms of the narrative account of a similar clinical case. The 
clinician looks to case history material as a guide to possible interventions in 
therapy so as to influence the outcome. The psychobiographer looks to case history 
material in order to choose a plausible outcome. The clinical case history is the 
story of a treatment, whereas a psychobiography is the treatment of that story.  
 
    Scientists according to Elms, are in the business of prediction predicated on 
numerical values, but because ‘humans aren’t precisely predictable, the numbers 
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usually involve calculations of statistical probability’ (Elms, 1994, p 12). As 
individual personalities are not divisible into statistically analyzable compartments, 
these statistical calculations may describe lives in general terms, but never 
uniquely represent any actual, particular individual. This is why the 
psychobiographer needs to pick a particular story even if it is a composite one, to 
reflect his subject. 
 
    In personal analysis, there may be some measure of testing or manipulating 
variables such as suggesting alternative interpretations to a patient, but scientific 
propositions which require the manipulation of variables cannot be evaluated in 
psychobiography, because there is no interaction with the subject. Again, the 
psychobiographer cannot proffer such variables at each stage of his subject’s 
development because his analysis is based on a narrative theme leading teleogically 
to the current psychic functioning of his subject. Otherwise, he would be 
interminably revising his own analysis. He must pick a story which he believes 
reflects his subject, and then justify it.   
 
    Psychoanalytic theory evolved principally from inductive enquiry, Runyan 
pointing out that ‘the theories of Freud, Jung, Otto Rank, and Wilhelm Reich were 
based in important ways on interpretations of themselves, which were then put 
forward as more general theories of human personality’ (Runyan, 1984, pp 8-9). 
There are according to Budd, general pattern theories concerning for example 
human sexuality, and a case historical or ‘linear and causal account of a particular 
individual, of great depth and complexity, but seen in terms of his or herself, where 
no attempt is made to see how typical or atypical he or she is, whether and why 
other people show similar consequences from similar childhood events, and so on’ 
(Budd, 1997, p 36).  
 
    Through the technique of clinical parallelism, the particularity of an individual 
case history is converted into if not a wholly generalisable formulation, then at least 
one reflecting another particular ‘parallel’ individual psychic trajectory. The 
argument of the thesis is that the idiosyncratic nature of the human encounter in 
the therapeutic context makes such paralleling highly problematic, there being 
either universally accepted general conditions, or psychic developments unique to 
an individual.   
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    Adherence to a theory is integral to demonstrating the internal consistency ergo 
validity of the clinical profiler’s method and conclusions. The profiler or 
psychobiographer is therefore obliged or inclined, to adapt the evidence to his 
theory. Whereas in the clinical encounter the clinician adapts his theory to the 
patient and to his particular circumstances, the psychobiographer relies on 
coherence to his theory and an acceptance of his expertise in order to validate his 
conclusions. Indeed, it is the acknowledgement of this clinical expertise, which 
gives psychoanalytic profiling its status, and allows the psychoanalytic expert to 
construct the pathological subject position. 
 
 
9    Identification and the Power to Label.  
 
    From Michel Foucault’s perspective according to Sarah Mills, ‘[p]sychoanalysis 
described a wide range of subject positions which individuals inhabit precariously, 
sometimes wilfully adopting particular subject roles and sometimes finding 
themselves being cast into certain roles because of their past developmental history 
or because of the actions of others’ (Mills, 1997, p 34). Psychoanalysis was in 
Foucauldian terms, according to Milchman and Rosenberg, ‘a mode of thinking 
that creates the binary opposition between normality and pathology. This dividing 
practice which to use a Foucauldian trope, is dangerous because it judges 
“individuals” (normal) as “outsiders” (pathological)’, with the labelling decision 
‘having been arrogated by the expert, the psychoanalyst’ (Milchman and Rosenberg, 
2013, p 2). In the personality pathology discourse, the subject position constructed, 
was that of the pathological ‘Other’. 
 
    Much of Foucault’s writing is concerned with the interconnection between power 
and knowledge, with discourses creating ‘[e]ffectiveness in the order of power, as 
well as productivity in the order of knowledge’ (Foucault, 2000, 102). Knowledge 
relates to power within a particular location, ‘is produced within a shared social 
context and within definite historical circumstances. Discourse is made up, then, of 
rules of conduct, established texts and institutions’ (Smith, 1998, p 254). Thus, 
knowledge for Foucault, is produced and maintained by, and to serve, the interests 
of particular groups or institutions. Through Post’s professional and institutional 
standing, his personality pathology paradigm is part of a discursive matrix of 
knowledge and power, and ‘psychoanalysis as a discursive formation allows the 
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possibility of psychoanalytic subject positions’ in constructing power relationships 
(Barker, 1998, p 7). 
 
    In one such relationship, Freud had, Foucault argues, ‘exploited the structure 
that enveloped the medical personage; he amplified its thaumaturgical 
[wonderworking] virtues, preparing for its omnipotence a quasi-divine status ... in 
the doctor’s hands; he created the psychoanalytic situation where, by an inspired 
short-circuit, alienation becomes disalienating because, in the doctor, it becomes a 
subject’ (Foucault, 1991, p 165). The otherwise alienated, can engage with the 
discourse through the utterances of the doctor, the medical expert.  
 
    In a discourse such as this medico-scientific one, sanctioned statements are 
those ‘utterances which have some institutional force and which are thus validated 
by some form of authority’ (Mills, 1997, p 61). In this historical context, the 
medico-scientific expert, Post’s, personality pathology paradigm, carries the 
institutional force of sanctioned statements, which ‘have a profound influence on 
the way that individuals act and think’ (ibid, p 62). As discourses are in themselves 
constitutive, once the ‘pathological subject’ has been constructed through these 
sanctioned statements, he becomes part of a further discursive strategy of power 
(Kendall and Wickham, 2000; Foucault, 1980; Mills, 1999; Hall, 2001).  
 
    The discursive strategy of power produces material effect, so that whether the 
terrorist for example, is actually pathological or not, he is dealt with as if he were 
(Foucault, 2000; Hall, 2001). The medico-scientific credibility of psychoanalytic 
labelling, and the institutional ability to set the terms of the debate, is the essence 
of power in the personality pathology discourse. The discursive strategy of 
pathology labelling, constitutes a subject as a pathological terrorist, and puts him 
outside of the norm. The corollary, as Corrado represents it, is that establishment 
power elites are exculpated for their part in any conflict, and the exclusion of these 
pathologised subjects, facilitates repressive policies towards not only the terrorists, 
but also their espoused causes (Corrado, 1981; Crenshaw, 1986; Horgan, 2006). 
 
    The idea of labelling, lends itself intrinsically to the notion of identification and 
as an ideological corollary, to the notion of propaganda in constituting the subject. 
From a psychoanalytic perspective, Ernst Kris employs the conceptual tool of 
identification as Freud had expounded it in his Group Psychology and analysis of 
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the Ego, (Freud, 2001/1921, XVIII). The term propaganda Kris uses in the ‘widest 
sense of communication from authority ... with the assumption that in every 
society some means of social control of this nature exist, which establish contact 
between the responsible leaders and the community’ (Kris, 1943, pp 381-382).  
 
    The positive nature of identification cannot then be taken for granted, and 
propaganda schemas are deployed by both authoritarian and democratic states and 
focusing on the relationship to their respective leaderships (Kris, 1943; Freud, 
2001/1921, S.E. XVIII). Freud states that identification is ‘the original form of 
emotional tie with an object; secondly, in a regressive way it becomes a substitute 
for a libidinal object-tie, as it were by means of introjection of the object into the 
ego’ (Freud, 2001/1921, S.E. XVIII, pp 7-8). The underlying process, was that ‘the 
mutual tie between members of a group is in the nature of an identification of this 
kind, based upon an important emotional common quality; and we may suspect 
that this common quality lies in the nature of the tie with the leader’ (Freud, 
2001/1921, S.E. XVIII, p 108).  
 
    For Freud the superego was a self-reflective independent agency of the ego, with 
conscience as one ‘of its functions and that self-observation, which is an essential 
preliminary to the judging activity of conscience, is another of them’ (Freud, 
2001/1933, S.E. XXII, p 60). In the course of development, the superego in Freud’s 
schema, ‘also takes on the influences of those who have stepped onto the place of 
parents – educators, teachers, people chosen as ideal models’ (ibid, p 64). 
  
    Identification in totalitarian or authoritarian regimes should take place in the 
‘superego’, whereas in democratic propaganda, there is an even distribution, of 
‘identification in the superego’ and ‘ego identification’ (Kris, 1943, p 396). According 
to Kris, in democratic societies the art connoisseur as the expert or ideal model is 
essential to the creation of an aesthetic illusion, where messages are always 
mediated and interpreted (Kris, 1943). Within democratic societies, the sense of 
continuity with the elite or establishment is provided by the connoisseurs/experts, 
who function ‘as intermediaries between the communication emanating from a 
representative leadership and the people’ (Kris, 1943, p 399).  
 
    The argument of the thesis is that Post and the other personality pathology 
theorists represent a superego function of the modern state, reflecting a normative, 
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hegemonic establishment. Intellectual propaganda is the mediating ‘soft’ power of 
the expert, reflecting through their diagnoses the normative power in determining 
those who are within or without the pale, the pathological subject. Power accrues 
from the sense of oneness attaching to the expert such as Post. The expert shares 
with his audience, and telling them effectively, what they wish to hear. It is as Erik 
Erikson has it, that the sense of ego identity ‘is the accrued confidence that the 
inner sameness and continuity prepared in the past are matched by the sameness 
and continuity of one’s meaning for others’ (Erikson, 1963/1950, p 261). The thesis 
seeks to challenge assumptions based on this conformity of interests, in particular 
through a rigorous examination of the evidence, presented by such experts.  
 
 
10    Evidential Limitations in Psychobiographic Analyses. 
 
    E. Victor Wolfenstein sought to demonstrate through the evidence of particular 
case studies, that individuals although involved in the contingent activity of 
revolution, could be labelled with particular personality formations, based on 
developmental trajectories. Wolfenstein’s argument is that a perceived 
oppositionalism of the revolutionary personality, is predicated on an unresolved 
Oedipus complex (Wolfenstein, 1967).  
 
    The notion of the Oedipus complex may however, the thesis contends, be 
deployed in either an individual or a cultural context. In individual terms, the 
Oedipus complex plays according to Laplanche and Pontalis, ‘a fundamental part in 
the structuring of the personality, and in the orientation of human desire. 
    Psycho-analysis makes it the major axis of reference for psychopathology, and 
attempts to identify the particular modes of its presentation and resolution which 
characterise each pathological type’ (Laplanche and Pontalis, 1988/1973, p 283). 
As the principle originator of individual neurosis, it is the primary source for 
therapeutic investigation. Having an Oedipus complex as an adult implies then, 
that there were issues unresolved from childhood. 
 
    From a cultural perspective it is in Freudian terms the Oedipus ‘conflict’ which is 
the genesis of the superego and of social functioning. Freud denotes this group or 
cultural manifestation of the Oedipus complex:  
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‘the father of prehistoric times was undoubtedly terrible, and an extreme 
amount of aggressiveness may be attributed to him ... We cannot get away 
from the assumption that man’s sense of guilt springs from the Oedipus 
complex and was acquired at the killing of the father by the brothers banded 
together. On that occasion an act of aggression was not suppressed but 
carried out’  
 
(Freud, 2001/1930, S.E. XXI, p 131). 
 
     Freud believed that each member of the group, when within that group resolved 
an analogous Oedipus complex with the leadership. Transforming group hatred 
and aggression against an analogous paternal authority into loyalty and devotion to 
the leader is not then a resolution of the member’s particular childhood Oedipus 
crisis with his actual father. It is a cultural rather than individual determination, 
with any ensuing neuroses deriving from group rather than individual psychic 
processes, indeed the group itself acts as an irrational individual. In the view of this 
thesis, an actual contingent revolution would be a group reaction, not a collection 
of revolutionary personalities acting as a group. 
 
    Taking his definition of a revolutionary as someone who actually takes part in a 
revolution, Wolfenstein argues that the contingent revolutionary Mahatma Gandhi’s  
‘revolutionary personality’ derived from his Oedipus complex  (Wolfenstein, 1967, p 
87). The sixteen year old Gandhi had left his father’s deathbed and was having 
sexual relations with his heavily pregnant wife as his father actually died, and their 
child had died soon after birth (Wolfenstein, 1967). Thus, sexual activity had led to 
‘death - and, one would surmise, in Gandhi’s mind it had led to the death of his 
father as well. One aspect of the Oedipal fantasy is that the son desires the 
elimination of the father and in adolescence feels that his developing sexual 
potency will be the instrument of that desire’ (Wolfenstein, 1967, p 87).  
 
    Gandhi spent the rest of his life seeking to assuage this burden of guilt through 
‘sexual abstinence and by the nursing of others’, and refusing ‘simply to submit, to 
give in and admit his guilt ... he continued to assert his independence, his right to 
manhood and the prerogatives of men, but in a strange and disguised form. Passive 
resistance (or nonviolent action), that peculiar contradiction in terms, was the 
indirect expression of almost overwhelming  guilt - and vigorous self-assertion’ 
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(Wolfenstein, 1967, p 87). Gandhi’s sexual abstinence, political trajectory and 
philosophy of passive resistance is then linked to an Oedipus complex of 
ambivalence and guilt towards the father unresolved in adolescence, deriving out of 
that traumatic deathbed Oedipal event. The particular nature of Gandhi’s Oedipal 
development is then central to Wolfenstein’s entire analysis of Gandhi.  
    
    Recently published letters to the German Jewish architect Hermann Kallenbach 
reveal that Gandhi had had a homosexual or, at least homoerotic relationship with 
Kallenbach, a ‘lifetime bachelor, gymnast, and body builder’ (Lelyveld, 2011, p 88). 
In one letter disclosed by Joseph Lelyveld and written from London in 1909, 
Gandhi ‘writes: “Your portrait (the only one) stands on my mantelpiece in the 
bedroom. The mantelpiece is opposite to the bed.” Cotton wool and Vaseline, he 
then says, “are a constant reminder.” The point, he goes on, “is to show to you and 
me how completely you have taken possession of my body. This is slavery with a 
vengeance”’ (ibid, p 89). Whether this reflects an actual physical consummation of 
their relationship is not critical psychoanalytically, because as Freud points out, 
‘[w]hat decides whether we describe someone as an invert [homosexual] is not his 
actual behaviour, but his emotional attitude’ (Freud, 2001/1910, S.E. XI, p 87).  
 
    A homosexual may have, in Freud’s conceptualisation a particular form of the 
Oedipal complex. The genesis of male homosexuality as expressed in Freud’s Group 
Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego (1921), is in a large class of cases that: 
 
‘A young man has been unusually long and intensely fixated upon his 
mother in the sense of the Oedipus complex. But at last, after the end of 
puberty, the time comes for exchanging his mother for some other sexual 
object. Things take a sudden turn: the young man does not abandon his 
mother, but identifies himself with her; he transforms himself into her, and 
now looks about for objects which can replace his ego for him, and on which 
he can bestow such love and care as he has experienced from his mother’  
 
(Freud, 2001/1921, S.E. XVIII, p 108). 
 
The feminine side of Gandhi’s nature that Wolfenstein sees as being at the heart of 
Gandhi’s strategy of passive resistance, would then have to be reconsidered in 
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terms of a possible Oedipus complex predicated on a mother fixation, rather than 
Oedipal guilt over the death of the father. 
 
    Wolfenstein’s analysis of the revolutionary had been deploying Erikson’s notion 
of the life cycle, in particular the identity crisis of adolescence and young 
adulthood, but only from the perspective of Oedipal conflict. Erikson himself had a 
much broader conceptualisation, claiming that ‘the revolutions of our day attempt 
to solve and also to exploit the deep need of youth to redefine its identity in an 
industrialized world’ (Erikson, 1963/1950, p 263). For his own estimation of 
Gandhi, Erikson sees as critical ‘the decades in South Africa during which he 
developed the revolutionary technique of militant nonviolence’ (Erikson, 1993/1970, 
p 1, emphasis in the original). Erikson does as with Wolfenstein, take the guilt 
arising out of Gandhi’s leaving of his father’s deathbed, which  
 
‘clinical theory would suggest, must be heir to the Oedipus conflict. In 
Gandhi’s case, the “feminine” service to his father would have served to deny 
the boyish wish to replace the (aging) father in the possession of the (young) 
mother and the youthful intention to outdo him as a leader in later life. Thus 
the pattern would be set for a style of leadership which can defeat a superior 
adversary only nonviolently and with the express intent of saving him as well 
as those whom he oppressed’ 
 
(Erikson, 1993/1970, p 129). 
 
    Whilst embarking on this feminised non violent revolutionary response to the 
Oedipal guilt of the conflict with his father, with only a two line mention of 
Kallenbach, Erikson is similarly unaware that at this critical phase of Gandhi’s 
radicalisation, he was engaged in the very least, a homoerotic relationship.  
Psychobiography cannot simply accrue and adapt such dissonant information. In 
historical research, the Kallenbach letters would otherwise simply have further 
developed the already complex character of Gandhi. If the theoretical basis of a 
psychobiography or psychoanalytic profile predicated on a particular personality 
schema is undermined, so too is the general thrust of the whole psychobiography 
or profile. The analyses of both Wolfenstein and Erikson are plausible, clinically 
and theoretically sound, and may well be right. However, a possibly homosexual 
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Gandhi is a substantively different person with a more prosaic rationale for 
apparent heterosexual celibacy, than the one they have analysed.  
 
 
11    Conclusion. 
 
    The structure of the thesis including a chapter summary has been outlined and 
the principle concepts of the thesis defined. The intention of this thesis is to 
unpack the personality pathology paradigm, the principal psychoanalytic 
explanation for the phenomenon of terrorism and designated tyrants. From the 
necessarily fragmentary evidence that psychoanalysis has at its disposal, there is 
according to Runyan, a ‘heuristic value of leading investigators to explore a range of 
hypotheses that might not otherwise have occurred to them’ (Runyan, 1984, p 
221). Relying for their validity on theoretical consonance and the expertise of the 
analyst, psychobiographies go beyond heuristic hypotheses, proposing a holistic 
psychic account of their subject.   
 
    Creating a coherent developmental trajectory or life narrative to explain past 
behaviour does not necessarily translate into any facility for prediction, and 
exposes flaws in the psychobiographic project. The adoption of a clinical 
psychoanalytic process known as pathography, without the safeguards of 
therapeutic neutrality has the effect of inherently pathologising the subject. 
Without direct input from the subject, psychoanalytic evidence is insufficient and 
artificially reconstructing this evidence leads to biases which skew the analysis. 
Attempts at compensating for this skewing effect, such as examining analyst 
countertransference reactions simply reinforces, the thesis argues, the analyst’s 
agenda. The next chapter details the method of enquiry used in this thesis. 
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1    Introduction 
 
    This chapter sets out the methods designed to unpack what is identified as a 
pathologising discourse, a distinct paradigm within the psychoanalytic discipline of 
psychobiography. The basic assumption behind clinical psychobiographic analysis 
is that subjects can be psychoanalysed ‘at a distance’ without the benefit of the 
subject’s physical presence, speech and ability to interact.  
 
    My methodology relies on the detailed analyses of psychobiographic texts and 
critiques, whilst emphasising the contingency of their socio-historical context. Data 
collection is informed by the need to test the original sources utilised by personality 
pathology theorists. This then involves collecting not only psychobiographic and 
indeed biographical evidence, but also critiquing the psychoanalytic 
conceptualisations and theoretical arguments deployed in the pathologising 
discourse.  
 
    Describing the thesis concept of clinical parallelism, the chapter outlines how in 
order to compensate for the lack of an actual therapeutic client the clinical 
psychobiographic enquiry, takes another ‘similar’ known subject or situation. The 
‘at a distance’ analysis then mirrors the developmental trajectory or analytic 
outcome of the actual case history. Similarly, devised as a methodological tool for 
this thesis is the distinction between personological and characterological profiling 
which is demonstrated in this chapter.   
 
 
2   Collecting Evidence. 
 
    One of the principle methods employed in this study is the detailed and critical 
reading of key texts with the aim of problematising certain ‘taken for granted’ 
assumptions upon which personality pathology theory is predicated. The 
psychoanalytic concepts upon which these ‘taken for granted’ assumptions are 
based are explicated and their deployment critiqued. The choice of data is in the 
first instance influenced by the evidence adduced by the personality pathology 
theorists whose conclusions are being contested. The personal pathology theorist’s 
source materials and their deployment of them are researched and critiqued, and 
theoretical arguments and counter arguments from other commentators are then 
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presented. The psychoanalytic concepts deployed along with their specific 
implications as tools in the discourse are similarly presented as data. Data is then 
collected in support of hypotheses and themes deriving from the critique, rather 
than a data set collected and hypotheses inductively adduced from it.  
 
    The material from which data has been selected and evidence has been adduced 
in this research includes; newspaper articles, magazine pieces, TV programmes, 
published private letters, journal articles, books, commission reports, political 
speeches, court transcripts, government e-mails, submissions to US Congressional 
Committees, biographies and psychobiographies, published intelligence profiles, 
published intelligence position papers, and sundry reports from bodies such as the 
APA Task Force on Psychohistory.  
 
    Material that was once publicly and widely deployed to influence the discourse is 
not necessarily now readily accessible. Because data collection in this research is 
deductively determined by hypothesised themes rather than hypotheses inductively 
deriving from a collected data set, certain texts are critical to the understanding of 
a particular theme. As identified, one of the key texts in the discourse of adversarial 
political profiling is the 1964 September/October issue of Fact magazine. This 
particular Fact issue was notorious for the psychoanalytic traducing of US 
Presidential candidate Barry Goldwater, with 1,189 psychiatrists declaring some, in 
extremely uncomplimentary terms, that Goldwater was psychologically unfit to be 
President.  
 
    Upheld on appeal to the US Supreme Court, Goldwater successfully sued Fact 
magazine for defamation, which is perhaps why this particular issue is no longer 
generally available. Indeed researching at the British Library the Keeper of Journals 
was able to confirm that there was no data base to which the British Library had 
either access or information in order to obtain this magazine. This Fact magazine 
issue is however critical to an understanding of the ethical background of the 
modern pathologising discourse, and after several years of searching, a copy was 
eventually acquired privately for the research. 
 
   The research trail may equally have blind alleys, as was the case with Jerrold 
Post who had been retained as an expert witness by the US Justice Department in 
the 1997 trial of Omar Rezaq. Making his role in the trial the subject of a 2000 
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paper ‘Terrorist on Trial: The Context of Political Crime’ and sundry book chapters, 
with Post considering it important to counteract what he saw as the defence 
attempt to put ‘Israel on trial. They were aided in their endeavor by a remarkably 
one-sided portrayal of the Arab-Israeli struggle by a Middle East scholar, who 
depicted the Arab world in general, and the Palestinian people in particular, as 
victims of Israeli aggression’ (Post, 2000, p 176). It was his own task, ‘to provide a 
sense-making explanation for the jury of how an individual who was sane could 
commit such a bloody atrocity’, and ‘that it was important to convey to the jury’, 
how bloody and professional Rezaq’s Palestinian terror group was (Post, 2007, pp 
16, 22; Post, 2000).  
        
    After a great deal of investigation through the British Library, the Institute of 
Advanced Legal Studies Library, the New York Court Reporters and eventually a 
page by page search through the entire transcript of the month long trial, no trace 
could be found of Post’s evidence. Fortuitously, the mystery was solved much later 
when analysing Post’s testimony in another trial. In the case of the USA v bin 
Laden et al, where United States Attorney Patrick Fitzgerald in seeking to 
undermine Post’s testimony, refers to the article on Rezaq. Fitzgerald puts it to Post 
that, ‘[i]s it not a fact that you did not actually testify in front of the jury in that 
case’ (USA v Bin Laden et al, 2001, Trial Transcript Day 70, 8339). Post replies that 
‘I indicated that I was assisting the prosecution. I did not indicate I testified in the 
article’ (USA v Bin Laden et al, 2001, Trial Transcript Day 70, 8340). However, if 
Post was assisting the prosecution by providing ‘sense-making for the jury’, he 
could surely not have done this without testifying in front of them.  
 
    Some lines of enquiry however, remained completely unresolved as in the series 
of Cabinet Office emails concerning preparations for the infamous ‘dodgy dossier’ 
presented to the press by Alistair Campbell1, ‘Iraq - its Infrastructure of 
Concealment, Deception and Intimidation’ (2003) in the run up to the 2003 Iraq 
War. In a preparatory email Cabinet Office official, Daniel Pruce, comments on the 
2002 ‘Draft Dossier (J Scarlett2 Version of 10 Sept)’ to Campbell:   
 
                                                 
1
 Campbell was Prime Minister Tony Blair’s Director of Communications in 2003. 
2 John Scarlett was head of the Joint Intelligence Committee in the run up to the 2003 Iraq War. 
 
52 
 
‘I think we need to personalise the dossier onto Saddam as much as possible 
- for example by replacing references to Iraq with references to Saddam, 
- in similar vein I think we need a device to convey that he is a bad and 
unstable man.  
    The section on Saddam’s Iraq (pp 9-11) could be expanded into a 
psychological profile and presented as such’  
 
(Daniel Pruce, email to Alistair Campbell included in email from Pruce to 
Clare Sumner, of the 14th of August, 2003).  
 
    This is though exactly what Post had provided for the Americans in his 
November 2002 profile entitled “Saddam is Iraq; Iraq is Saddam” (Post and Baram, 
2002). How Pruce’s suggestion was received at cabinet level, would then reflect a 
senior British governmental perspective on the pathologising discourse. A Freedom 
of Information (FOI) request for the emails following on in the chain was though 
turned down by the Cabinet Office, as was an appeal against the decision. As Pruce 
had been on secondment from the Foreign Office Intelligence Unit, FOI requests 
were also made there for any profile on Saddam or intelligence report from Post. 
After an extended search, the Foreign Offic could find no trace of either.  
 
 
3    Ethics  
 
    Ethical permission for the project was granted by the University Psychology 
Department Ethics Committee. Given that the materials used are secondary 
sources which are in the public domain, there was considered to be, no immediate 
ethical sensitivity in respect of the data collection method. Critical research will 
probably at some stage at least implicitly, involve criticism of perhaps leading 
figures in a discourse. It should also be noted that even secondary research in 
psychobiography will necessarily at some stage concern discussion of the intimate 
details of known individuals, some of whom may be living subjects. Moreover, 
research that relates prominently to terrorism will also have political implications 
and affect perhaps delicate sensibilities not least those of the victims. Indeed, one 
of the aims of the research is to examine the effects on individuals and groups 
when applying psychoanalysis to biography or terrorism. From the outset, the 
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ambition of the research has been to act with the utmost sensitivity to the subjects 
and fairness towards the protagonists of the discourse being researched. 
 
 
4   Clinical Parallelism.  
 
    The notion of ‘clinical parallelism’ was perhaps more properly a finding than a 
method of the thesis. There is direct evidence for clinical parallelism in only a small 
number of cases, most notably in Freud’s Leonardo (1910), and Volkan’s (2007) 
discussion of his analysand, ‘Gary’.  However, that the process was possibly and I 
would propose probably in operation, was a consideration when examining all of 
the cases, but not claimed specifically, without there being a direct reference to it. 
Because, in clinical psychobiography, whether retrodicting the psychic development 
of an individual, or more particularly predicting the future behaviour of the subject 
in political profiling, some form of behavioural template is required. Just as Freud 
used his patients to guide his musings on artistic figures, psychobiographers use 
actual or archetypal clinical characters as parallel ‘analysands’, in their ‘at a 
distance’ clinical analyses.  
 
    In developing his ‘at a distance’ adversarial political personality profiles, 
effectively pathographies, Post draws on the ‘clinical case study methodology, also 
known as the anamnesis [preliminary medical history from the patient’s 
perspective]’ (Post, 2003b, p 70). In the context of the clinical encounter according 
to Erik Erikson, the patient normally has a complaint and recognisable symptoms, 
and the clinician medical or therapeutic attempts ‘an anamnesis, an etiological 
reconstruction of the disturbance, and an examination … evaluating the evidence 
and in arriving at diagnostic and prognostic inferences (which are really the clinical 
form of a prediction) … A clinical prediction takes its clues from the complaint, the 
symptoms, and the anamnesis’ (Erikson, 1959, p 74, my emphasis).  
 
    Psychoanalysis concerns itself with predictions only, maintains David Rapaport, 
in respect of ‘clinical psychoanalysis and Psychiatry’ (Rapaport, 1960, p 17). As 
such, the ‘problem of prognosis has three facets: the prognosis for treatment by the 
psychoanalytic method, the prognosis for “spontaneous remission,” and the 
prognosis for treatment by modified psychoanalysis or other therapy’ (ibid). Apart 
from a spontaneous remission, it is the interaction between clinician and patient 
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which is critical to the outcome, ergo prediction. The success of the prognosis is an 
estimation of the efficacy of that interaction. The clinician necessarily then engages 
with the patient and their subsequent meetings form the case history, which is 
essentially, according to Erikson, the process of verifying or contradicting the 
efficacy of therapeutic predictions (Erikson, 1959).  
 
    All clinical encounters, in Erikson’s view, contain an essential core, that of a 
contract between an individual in need of help who agrees to give his information in 
confidence, and another in possession of professional methods, who agrees to help 
(Erikson, 1959). It is inherent in the therapeutic or clinical situation that the 
subject is in some way troubled. In order to properly simulate the 
prognostic/predictive clinical methodology, there must necessarily be some form of 
complaint or maladaptive behaviour in order to investigate as a form of clinical 
entrée. Therefore, in clinical psychobiography or pathography, subjects are 
inherently if albeit unwittingly problematised or ‘medicalised’. There is, however, no 
corresponding therapeutic process to either, confirm or disconfirm the putative 
diagnosis or predictions, whose outcomes the analyst would otherwise be 
influencing in the course of the therapy.  
 
    At the outset of a psychobiographic investigation incorporating the clinical or 
pathographic approach, symptoms are inferred and the subject quite cursorily 
‘diagnosed’. There then follows a search through the subject’s archives or 
biographical information, in order to construct a facsimile ‘anamnesis’ in place of 
the patient’s own account of the history of his putative ‘complaint’. The particular 
evidence adduced by the pathographer is designed to make the subject one with his 
putative ‘complaint’. From disparate life experiences, a cohesive life narrative with 
normally just one or two themes is constructed, which is commensurate with the 
original ‘diagnosis’. The pathographer then seeks to identify a trajectory in the 
individual’s life course which would correspond to the clinical prognosis. In order to 
demonstrate a predictable trajectory, the subject’s symptomology is ‘paralleled’ with 
seemingly analogous clinical characteristics of an actual case history. Ergo this 
technique of ‘clinical parallelism’ is inherently psychically determinist.  
 
    The notion of clinical parallelism is distinct from the clinical concept of parallel 
process, which takes place within the therapeutic process itself. Parallel process 
occurs when events in a client’s life appear to mirror that of the analyst, in such 
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cases as Michael Formica has it, ‘[a]s a therapist, you can do two things: you can 
allow your own issues to get the best of you and get drawn into your client’s spin - 
very messy - or you can use your own process to benefit the client, and your 
client’s process to propel your own. That’s parallel process, and it’s a powerful tool 
that benefits everyone when employed judiciously. It is a teacher, a guide and a 
mentor’ (Michael Formica, Psychology Today, the 7th of January, 2009).  
 
   Analysts involved in supervision also observed, according to McNeil and Worthen, 
that the ‘transference of the therapist and the countertransference of the 
supervisor within the supervisory session appeared to parallel what was happening 
in the therapy session between client and therapist’ (McNeil and Worthen, 1989, p 
329). Parallel processes of either type, are still iterative processes of transference 
relationships. ‘Clinical parallelism’ is employed in order to replace the iterative 
process. 
 
    In the early Freudian project, clinical material was seen as Susan Budd points 
out, as being organisable ‘in terms of a general psychic pattern - this patient was 
orphaned early, or this one was excessively anally stimulated, and therefore the 
mental apparatus would have been affected in an ultimately predictable manner’ 
(Budd, 1997, p 32). Character defences or unconscious fantasies deriving from 
these early experiences could then be determined irrespective of their context. 
However, although Freud had originally envisioned such a psychically deterministic 
schema, he had, as Milton et al portray his position, ‘gradually reached the 
standpoint of contemporary psychoanalysis: that there are no specific or consistent 
determinants of specific neurotic problems ... Although very adverse childhood 
situations will mostly have adverse effects, the precise nature of the effects cannot 
be predicted, as there are so many variables in human life’ (Milton et al, 2004, p 
81).  
 
    Arguing that it is just such a determinist schema which gives the experienced, 
clinically-informed biographer his analytic edge, Volkan illustrates his own method 
of ‘clinical parallelism’, by describing the analytic process of one of his actual 
analysands (Gary) and relating it to the facsimile analytic process employed in his 
psychobiography of Kemal Atatürk (Volkan, 2007). Although conceding that the 
issue is problematic, Volkan argues that data gathered as part of the therapeutic 
process from ‘transference, transferences neurosis and therapeutic enactments’ 
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can in part be replaced ‘by the self-observations of the writer regarding his or her 
own feelings, fantasies and perceptions about the subject’ (Volkan, 2007, p 7).   
This effectively institutes countertransference as psychobiographical data.  
 
    Once all the available material data including any ‘diaries, documents, 
interviews, political philosophies, the subject’s actions and artistic productions, 
and any relevant films or audio material’ has been collected, Volkan believes that 
along with the analyst’s ‘counter-transference, insights from actual psychoanalytic 
patients with similar life stories can be used to guide the author in making 
formulations about the inner world of the subject’ (Volkan, 2007, p 7; Volkan in 
Gehrie, 1992). In the clinical context, according to Volkan, ‘psychoanalysts depend 
on their own fantasized meanings in interpreting what their patients communicate’ 
as in psychobiography, but without of course, the possibility of testing for validity 
(Volkan, 2007, p 6).  
 
    Within the therapeutic context and indeed the transference relationship itself as 
Patrick Casement sees it, ‘there is a tendency to experience a feeling of deja vu 
when there are elements of similarity between a current clinical situation and 
others before it. This can prompt a therapist to respond to new clinical phenomena 
with a false sense of recognition, drawing upon established formulations for 
interpretation’ (Casement, 2002, p 9). Indeed the reason that Freud felt constrained 
to attempt his ill-starred clinical reconstruction of Leonardo Da Vinci’s youth was 
because, as Peter Gay points out, he had ‘recently encountered his likeness’, in a 
neurotic patient that he had been treating (Gay, 1998, p 271). Again, clinical 
parallelism ensures grooving into a used parallel track, but not necessarily that the 
track is going in the right direction. 
 
 
 5   A Differentiation between Personality and Character in Psychobiography. 
 
    The thesis proposes a differential schema as a method for analysing 
psychobiography, and is deployed throughout the thesis to explicate the 
determining characteristics of the personality pathology model of profiling. The 
argument is that modern personality pathology profiling is part of a distinct 
paradigm shift in psychobiography. The manner in which modern personality 
pathology is conceptualised is distinguished from an earlier more traditional 
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Freudian focus on problematic libidinal character development as the genesis of 
neurosis. This distinction is key to the theorisation of modern clinical ‘at a distance’ 
profiling and by extension significant to the psychobiographic project in general.  
 
    For Post, the ‘term personality connotes a systematic pattern of functioning that 
is consistent over a range of behaviors and over time. In the political personality 
profile, we attempt to characterize the core political personality, identifying the 
deeply ingrained patterns that are coherent and accordingly have powerful 
predictive implications’ (Post, 2006a, p 69, emphasis in the original). Post has it 
that he seeks ‘to identify the characteristic pattern of ego defenses, for it is this 
repetitive manner of mediating between the subject’s internal and external worlds 
that is at the heart of personality, the basis of the structure of character’ (ibid, p 
78). Personality is seen to be the basis of character but without distinguishing 
them as separate concepts, with Post taking the terms as being either 
interchangeable or in the least complementary, and that is indeed the general 
usage (Post, 2006a; Lowenberg1983).  
 
    Personality in this thesis is taken to represent the immutable aspects of the 
individual, a ‘core self’ disturbances of which would tend towards the psychoses. 
Character, reflects the developed acquired moral layer of the self, prone to neurotic 
disturbance. Following this formulation as Leo Bartemeier writes, the ‘neurotic 
character does not suffer from a constitutional defect. It ensues as a result of a 
psychological mismanagement of the primary family relationships’ (Bartemeier, 
1970, p 331). What early personality theorists, Henry Murray3 and Clyde Kluckholn 
refer to as ‘constitutional determinants’, are critical (Murray and Kluckholn, 1953). 
The personality of an individual according to Murray and Kluckholn ‘is the product 
of inherited dispositions and environmental experiences. These experiences occur 
within the field of his physical, biological, and social environment, all of which are 
modified by the culture of his group. Similarities of life experience and heredity will 
tend to produce similar personality characteristics in different individuals, whether 
in the same society or in different societies’ (Murray and Kluckholn, 1953; Murray, 
1938). This is then an individual personality irrespective of national or cultural 
character.  
     
                                                 
3
 Henry Murray actually coined the term personology.  
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    In employing the more modern psychoanalytic theories around object relations, 
self-psychology and ego psychology, there is no need to have as Lowenberg points 
out, an ‘instinctual theory of love and aggression as libido theory does’ (Lowenberg, 
1983, p 30). Both ego psychology and personality analyses are according to 
Lowenberg, ‘based on the evidence of adult behavior. They do not require 
reconstruction of infantile experience or reductions to origin - the behavior and 
patterns of accommodating to the world exist in adulthood and the evidence is 
historical’ (Lowenberg, 1983, p 20). Whilst from an object relations perspective 
‘individuals relate as they have learned to, or were programmed to, according to the 
unconscious fantasies of infancy’, and these fantasises are also inferred from their 
manifestations in later life (ibid).  
 
    There is no need in a personological schema for arcane speculation about 
childhood development and relationships. Childhood trauma for example, can 
simply be inferred on the basis of current psychic functioning or rather what this 
analysis will show as being the ideological perception of that psychic functioning. 
Less involved and convoluted, this methodology consequently tends to be more 
reductive and restrictive, with necessarily only a limited number of supposedly 
‘predictable’ psychic trajectories. This notion of a distinction between 
characterological and personological profiling reflects not only a key finding of this 
research, but a new analytic tool in comparative psychobiography. 
    
    As will be demonstrated by example throughout the thesis, there tends to be 
either an Oedipal characterological orientation or a pre-Oedipal personological 
emphasis, in psychobiographic analyses. The personological relates to the origins of 
pathological conditions which lead to the psychoses, and characterological relating 
to unconscious generally sexual orients conflicts of the developmental phases, 
which may lead to neuroses. Personological functioning is more inter psychic 
rather than intra psychic due to the emphasis on traumatogenic early object 
relating in the pr-Oedipal (mainly oral) phase. Freud describes his 
conceptualisation of the oral phase ‘as the earliest recognizable sexual organization 
the so-called “cannibalistic” or “oral” phase, during which the original attachment 
of sexual excitation to the nutritional instinct still dominates the scene’ (Freud, 
1918, S.E. XVII, p 106). As such it is the most basic and primitive phase of psychic 
development. 
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    The personological focus is likewise on the more primitive ego defence 
mechanisms of splitting and projection. The notion of ‘splitting the unconscious’ 
was apparent in the work of Freud and his early collaborator, Joseph Breuer 
(Freud, 1910, XI, p 22; Freud and Breur, 1986/1893-1895). In Melanie Klein’s 
schema, the first few months of the child are seen as containing an ‘innate conflict 
between love and hate and the ensuing anxieties. However, coexisting with this 
division there appear to be various processes of splitting, such as fragmenting the 
ego and its objects, whereby a dispersal of the destructive impulses is achieved’ 
(Klein, 1987, pp 216-217). Projection although a regular psychic feature, was for 
Freud the ‘most striking characteristic of symptom-formation in paranoia ... An 
internal perception is suppressed, and, instead, its content, after undergoing a 
certain kind of distortion, enters consciousness in the form of an external 
perception’ (Freud, 1911, XII, p 66).  
 
    As the distinction between a characterological and personological approach is a 
particular conceptualisation of this thesis for the purpose of psychobiographic 
analysis, there is no extant specific reference in the literature describing this 
distinction. A general distinction is given by Charles Ryecroft explaining that 
‘personality types’ in the psychoanalytic literature, are in fact discussed ‘under the 
heading of character’ (Ryecroft, 1995, p 129). There are then two subsections; 
‘Clinical character types are labelled by reference to the psychiatric condition to 
which they are inferred to be analogous or which they most resemble, hence 
hysterical, obsessional, phobic, schizoid, depressive, manic characters’ whereas; 
‘Developmental character types are labelled by reference to the stage of libidinal 
development from which the characteristics are inferred to derive; hence oral, anal, 
phallic, genital characters’ (Ryecroft, 1995, p 129). Ryecroft’s formulation reflects 
the thesis distinction in that characterological refers to the developmentally 
acquired psychic layers of the individual, and the personological emphasis is more 
concerned with trauma. 
 
    Laplanche and Pontalis acknowledge that there ‘is a psycho-analytically 
orientated characterology which correlates different character types either with the 
major psychoneurotic conditions (speaking of obsessional, phobic, paranoiac 
characters and so on) or else with the various stages of libidinal development 
(which are said to correspond to oral, anal, urethral, phallic-narcissistic and genital 
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character types-sometimes reclassified in terms of the major opposition between 
genital and pre-genital characters)’ (Laplanche and Pontalis, 1973, p 67).  
 
    Anal characteristics, for example, are developmental, learned through the family. 
The anal character’s drastic training of his children leading to character traits as 
Ayla Demir points out, ‘such as conservatism, avarice (greed), pedantry (a person 
who pays attention to detail or rules and is excessively concerned with formalism 
and precision), miserliness, and the desire to discipline others as one was 
disciplined oneself, are passed on from generation to generation’ (Demir, 2014 p 
12). These may not be appealing and somewhat neurotic character traits and 
determine how the individual reacts with the world in particular his politics, but 
they do not preclude him from carrying on normal relations.    
 
    In the paranoid personality, splits will have first occurred in the oral phase of 
early infancy. The breast is seen as both all good when giving and all bad when the 
mother has been withholding. As Melanie Klein has it, in the rage of an ‘oral-
sadistic relation to her mother’s breast’ the baby seeks to eliminate the obstacle to 
pleasure (Klein, 1987/1955, p 50). A derivative of this rage is in Kernberg’s 
schema, chronic hatred. This hatred justifies itself as revenge, and ‘[p]aranoid fears 
of retaliation also are usually unavoidable accompaniments of intense hatred, so 
that paranoid features, a wish for revenge, and sadism go hand in hand’ (Otto 
Kernberg , 2013/1996, p 3). Trauma is a catalyst, so that ‘the actual experience of 
sadistic behavior of a needed, inescapable object instantaneously shapes the rage 
reaction into the hatred of the sadistic object’ (ibid, p 4). 
 
    Core character or, in this thesis, personality formations such as paranoiac, are 
then distinguished from character traits such as anal, acquired during the 
development phase. Similarly, a distinction is made between genital, and pre-
genital, chiefly oral phase characters. Whether they are variously referring to 
personality or character type, in respect of this critique, Laplanche and Pontalis, 
and Rycroft who compile such classifications, are acknowledging the potential for a 
taxonomic psychoanalytic distinction between ‘character’ as reflecting an acquired 
psychic condition, and ‘personality’ as representing the basic structure of the 
psyche and this the thesis argues, is how they are deployed in psychobiographic 
analyses.  
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6    Conclusion.  
 
    The principle methodology of this thesis entails the critical reading of the texts 
and psychobiographies implicated in what has been identified as the pathologising 
discourse. The type of data adduced as evidence in the thesis and the manner in 
which it was collected have been described. The major themes of the pathologising 
discourse have been identified with reference to their key texts. The thesis has 
devised the analytic tool of clinical parallelism, in order to identify the clinical 
trajectory employed by psychobiographers by way of referencing similar or ‘parallel’ 
diagnostic cases. This renders the psychobiographic subject amenable to a ‘clinical 
prediction’ of his psychic development and future behaviour in particular for 
adversarial profiling. The thesis argued that this essentially determinist 
psychobiographic schema could not reflect the iterative clinical process between 
analyst and analysand.  
 
    Similarly, the thesis proposes a method of grouping psychobiographies, 
principally in order to identify the particular characteristics of the personality 
pathology paradigm. As opposed to what the thesis describes as a 
‘characterological’ perspective which relates to psychobiographies based on 
traditional Freudian developmental phases, the personality pathology paradigm 
which is encompassed by a ‘personological’ perspective is based on early 
particularly traumatic, pre-Oedipal object relating. This distinction is then used as 
a method for exploring the psychoanalytic concepts deployed in adversarial 
profiling in order to distinguish them for what the thesis claims are actually their 
ideological determinations. 
 
    From the earliest days of psychoanalysis there has been a distinction made in 
psychobiography between a more holistic developmental analysis and a purely 
clinical notion, focusing on heredity and combined with a mainly traumatogenic 
monocausal explanation. The next chapter outlines these early and indeed 
formative attempts at psychobiography including Freud’s characterological 
psychobiography of Leonardo Da Vinci and the early personological pathographies 
of Isidor Sadger.  
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CHAPTER THREE: 
 
 
 THE EARLY BEGINNINGS OF THE PSYCHOBIOGRAPHIC PROJECT 
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1    Introduction.   
 
    This chapter traces the origins and early development of the psychobiographic 
project. Psychobiography in Freud’s conceptualisation of it was intended to be a 
holistic and systematic motivational approach to a subject’s entire life, in 
contradistinction to the extant medicalised clinical psychoanalytic strand of 
psychobiography which focused exclusively on the pathological aspects of the 
individual (Freud, 1910, S.E. XI; Elms, 1994). These medicalised psychobiographic 
accounts, known as pathographies, provide (according to the argument of this 
critique), the methodological basis for the discourse of modern ‘at a distance’ 
political profiles.  
 
    The chapter critiques Freud’s Leonardo his only dedicated psychobiography, 
which would represent what the thesis describes as the the characterological 
approach to psychobiography. Whereas, Isidor Sadger’s pathographic methodology 
predicated on uncovering the twin themes of innate personality coupled with 
childhood sexuality, directly presages the twin track genetic predisposition coupled 
with childhood trauma approach of the modern personological profiling of 
personality pathology theory.  
 
    Although Freud had originally declared that psychoanalysis must not be 
employed as a weapon of aggression, his later pathographic psychobiography of 
Woodrow Wilson4 was regarded as an outright character assassination. This study 
opened the way for the application of psychoanalysis to politics. So that from the 
inception of the psychobiographic project, it is possible to trace the genesis of the 
methodological, epistemological and ethical controversies, still informing and 
resonating in the current psychobiographic debate.   
 
 
2    Freud’s Early Psychobiographic Musings. 
      
   At early meetings of what would later become Freud’s Vienna Psychoanalytic 
Society, Freud who had the only substantial catalogue of cases, ‘encouraged 
members’ efforts at psychohistory (Elms, 2003, p 67). The material gained from free 
association is, as Freud describes it, the ore from which the ‘precious metal’ of 
                                                 
4
 Wilson was U.S. President during World War One and the subsequent Versailles Treaty.     
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psychoanalysis is extracted from the patient, and necessarily requires personal 
contact with that patient (Freud, S.E. XI, 1909, p 32). From the earliest days of 
psychoanalysis, Freud had used biographical and other cultural material for 
inspiration, as with his formulation of the Oedipus complex or elucidation, as in 
the notion of sublimation in his Leonardo (Freud, 1900, S.E. IV; Freud, 1910, S.E. 
XI).  
  
    Having been intrigued by viewing a performance of Sophocles’ Greek tragedy 
‘Oedipus Rex’ on the 15th of October 1897 Freud writes to his friend Wilhelm Fleiss, 
that ‘[e]veryone in the audience was once a budding Oedipus in fantasy’ (Freud in 
Masson, 1985, p 272). At the time, Freud had been suffering as Wilson and Zarate 
express it, ‘an inhibiting intellectual paralysis ... He was on the verge of a nervous 
breakdown’ after the death of his father in 1896 (Wilson and Zarate, 2003, p 128). 
His theoretical musings on what would become the Oedipus complex were further 
crystallized on viewing a production of Hamlet with Freud continuing in his letter to 
Fleiss;  
 
‘I am not thinking of Shakespeare’s conscious intention, but believe, rather, 
that a real event stimulated the poet to his representation, in that his 
unconscious understood the unconscious of his hero …. the torment he 
suffers from the obscure memory that he himself had contemplated the 
same deed against his father out of passion for his mother ... His conscience 
is his unconscious sense of guilt. And is not his sexual alienation in his 
conversation with Ophelia typically hysterical? And his rejection of the 
instinct that seeks to beget children? And, finally, his transferral of the deed 
from his own father to Ophelia’s? And does he not in the end, in the same 
marvellous way as my hysterical patients, bring down punishment on 
himself by suffering the same fate as his father of being poisoned by the 
same rival?’  
 
(Freud’s letter to Fleiss of the 15th of October 1897, Masson, 1985, pp 272, 
273). 
 
    Again in the same letter, he confides to Fleiss, ‘I have found, in my own case too, 
being in love with my mother and jealous of my father, and I now consider it a 
universal event in early childhood’ (Freud’s letter to Fleiss of the 15th of October 
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1897, Masson, 1985, p 272). Shakespeare’s artistic product is taken then as a 
reflection of Shakespeare’s own unconscious, from which Freud is theorising a 
generalisable developmental phenomenon. In comparing or mirroring Hamlet’s 
behaviour to that of his hysterical patients, in particular one suffering as was 
Freud, ‘with a severe reaction to the loss of his father’  he is initiating what this 
thesis terms ‘clinical parallelism’, as form of methodological tool for substantiating 
a narrative in psychobiography (Wilson and Zarate, 2003, p 128).  
 
    Further, Freud is also intimating a parallel chain of transferences encompassing 
what had been his own severe reaction to his father’s death, which Richard 
Osborne describes as repressed feelings of ‘rivalry, jealousy, ambition and 
resentment - returned to him as remorse, shame, impotence and inhibition’ 
(Osborne, 1993, p 31). This is then reflected by the putatively ‘real’ experience of 
Shakespeare, who in turn has Hamlet transferring his Oedipal rage to Ophelia’s 
father. Thus Freud believed that his unconscious understood Shakespeare’s 
unconscious as a form of countertransference, just as Shakespeare’s unconscious 
understood the unconscious of Hamlet.  
 
    Through the examination of his literary product, the psychobiographer Freud 
believed, could enter into the mind of an author. The biographical subject becoming 
known in this way could then be understood psychically, with reference to clinical 
experience with a patient, that is to say ‘clinical parallelism’. This notion is 
predicated on the assumption that the subject is himself being authentic and what 
is written about him actually reflects real events in the subject’s life. As was the 
case with Shakespeare and the ‘evidence’ of Hamlet, that his fiction represented a 
truth in the author.  
 
    Continuing to use works of literature to explicate psychoanalytic concepts and 
despite what Mark Gerhie argues are ‘the considerable shortcomings when 
compared to Freud’s clinical method’, his approach in The Delusion and the Dreams 
in Jensen’s “Gradiva”, would become ‘set as a kind of “template” for method in 
applied psychoanalysis’ (Gehrie, 1992, p 239; Freud, S.E. IX, 1907). Despite 
Freud’s constant acknowledgements that the characters were the creation of the 
author, Gehrie points out that throughout the study, Freud ‘proceeds with his 
“analysis” of Gradiva as if it were psychoanalytic data, i.e., treating the story 
narrative like associations from a patient on the couch’, that ‘[i]n effect, it served as 
67 
 
permission to apply analytic theories to all sorts of data from disparate sources 
without many of the careful controls that are ordinarily exercised by analysts in the 
clinical situation’ (Gehrie, 1992, p 239, my emphasis).  
 
     What Gehrie is critiquing, is only problematic if the analytic techniques being 
applied, aspire to actual clinical validity. The use of ‘disparate sources’ was in 
Freud’s view actually a positive attribute, because with the open access to such 
material, the reader could make up his own mind on the efficacy of an 
interpretation based on the same information as the analyst, as opposed to the 
necessarily filtered access to clinical data (Gehrie, 1992, p 239; Freud, S.E. IX, 
1907). However, fully alerted to the possibility of a ‘complete caricature of an 
interpretation’, Freud also notes the ease with which ‘to find what one is looking for 
and what is occupying one’s own mind’ (Freud, S.E. IX, 1907, p 91). This is a 
disarmingly honest admission by Freud, but being aware does not preclude such 
flaws. Indeed, it is the contention of this thesis that such flaws reflect the very 
basis of ideologically determined personality pathology profiling. The object of the 
exercise was though for Freud, to arrive at the same place psychoanalytically as the 
author, who has arrived there intuitively (Freud, S.E. IX, 1907).  
 
    In awe of great artists, Freud believed, according to John Mack, that they were 
able to intuitively create a closed system, a complete and internally consistent 
psychic model, drawing on ‘sources not yet opened up for science’ (Freud, 1907, 
S.E. IX, p 8; Mack, 1971; Falk 1985). As such, Freud felt comfortable in applying 
the methods of psychoanalysis in relating to the behaviour, dreams and fantasies of 
the central character in Gradiva, Norbert Hanold. In the process of Hanold’s 
transferring his unnatural attachment from the sculpted relief of a young girl to a 
real woman, Freud found features in the development of Hanold’s psychic world 
consistent with his own theory of neurosis and clinical work. These were the 
emergence of childhood memories and the operation of repression, among other 
psychic mechanisms (Mack, 1971; Freud, S.E. IX, 1907).  
 
    The dénouement of the novel as for Hanold’s psyche follows as Lucille Dooley 
describes it, the ‘psychoanalytic method of catharsis for his restoration to sane and 
normal life’ (Dooley, 1916, p 365). Although Jensen knew nothing of psychoanalytic 
processes, he brings a buried memory to the consciousness of the heroine, a fact 
which enhances rather than invalidates Freud’s interpretation according to Dooley. 
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The author’s processes have a ‘completeness that is not always possible in a study 
from real life’ (ibid). Indeed, it would be difficult to obtain such psychobiographic 
completeness, anywhere but in a work of fiction.  
 
    Literary texts were approached by Freud, according to Francis Baudry, as 
‘organic, live and real’, but these works are not the ‘barely modified case studies’ 
that Freud took them to be (Baudry, 1984, p 552). Freud was then disappointed in 
his expectation of such writers as necessarily providing psychological clues for the 
actions of their characters, later realising that works of art were not designed for 
this purpose (Falk, 985). Neither can a literary work be taken uncritically, as 
representing the psychic reality of the author.  The essential difficulty arising at the 
inception of the psychobiographical project was the lack of a clear mechanism for 
objectively linking a psychoanalytic truth, to the particular and existential 
biographical ‘truth’, presented in the artist’s product.  
 
 
3    Isidor Sadger and the Pathography Debate. 
     
    An early disciple of Freud, Sadger had been a pioneer of the pathographic 
methodology which is now employed in the view of this thesis, by modern ‘at a 
distance’ clinical profilers. Even prior to joining the Vienna Circle, Sadger, as 
Makari points out, was already writing pathographies predicated on Paul Möbius’ 
psychiatric/medical notion of degenerative heredity (Jones in Freud, 2001/1910, 
S.E. XI; Makari, 2008; Schioldann, 2003). With the initial interest in ‘uncovering 
the pathological elements in the personalities of creative men’, certain artists were 
labelled as Mack writes, ‘“degeneres superieurs” but degenerates nevertheless’ 
(Mack, 1971, 145). So that Freud and the other members of the Vienna Circle, were 
particularly worried about a public backlash because beloved cultural heroes, in 
Sadger’s hands, were being turned into degenerates (Nunberg and Federn, 1962).  
 
    In the heated discussions that followed the presentation of Sadger’s paper on the 
popular novelist Conrad Ferdinand Meyer, Sadger retorts to hostile colleagues: 
‘pathographies purely out of medical interest, not for the purpose of throwing light 
on the process of artistic creation, which, by the way, remains unexplained even by 
psychoanalytic interpretation’ (Sadger quoted in Nunberg and Federn, 1962/1907, 
p 267). The method of examining artistic works to gain insight into the personality 
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of the subject and of the processes of artistic creativity as espoused by Freud, was 
regarded by Sadger as nothing more than what literary historians did, but 
‘augmented by the key which Freud has put in our hands’ (Sadger quoted in 
Nunberg and Federn, 1962/1907, p 267).  
 
    It is not Sadger argues, ‘possible accurately to deduce a poet’s real experiences 
from his works because there is nothing to distinguish the real from the illusory; 
one does not know where truth ends and poetic imagination begins. Therefore, the 
approach from a poet’s work is unreliable’ (Sadger quoted in Nunberg and Federn, 
1962/1907, p 258). This thesis has some sympathy for Sadger’s perspective here. 
Psychobiographies, although conforming to a standard more exacting than ordinary 
biographic insight, cannot have a higher evidential status than literary criticism, 
because no matter how insightful the psychobiography, it will always be predicated 
on insufficient or insufficiently reliable psychoanalytically valid data. The circular 
paradox of the psychobiographic project is that in seeking to find the psychic truth 
of the subject, it would be essential to know that subject’s psychic reality. However, 
before being able to clinically interpret the psychic reality of the subject in order to 
uncover the psychic ‘truth’ of the subject, the psychobiographer has already 
inferred the psychic ‘truth’ in order to ‘reconstruct’ a psychic ‘reality’, which he 
then ‘interprets’ to demonstrate the psychic ‘truth’, which he has inferred.  
 
    In the debate over Sadger’s pathography of Meyer, Freud was particularly 
scathing, noting that ‘Sadger has a rigidly established way of working. That is, he 
uses a two-sided scheme: hereditary tainting and modern erotic psychology. [All of] 
life is then viewed in the light of this scheme’ (Freud quoted in Nunberg and 
Federn, 1962/1907, p 257). Dismissing this approach, Freud argues that ‘Sadger’s 
investigation has not clarified anything for him. The enigma of this personality 
remains unsolved. But there is altogether no need to write such pathographies. The 
theories can only be harmed and not one iota is gained for the understanding of the 
subject’ (Freud quoted in Nunberg and Federn, 1962/1907, p 257).  
 
    Coupled with Sadger’s reductionist interpretation of the role of heredity, his 
analysis of Meyer’s supposed unrequited love for his mother, was regarded as 
somewhat crude and simplistic, and it was the subject of a great deal of criticism 
from other members of the Vienna Circle (Nunberg and Federn, 1962/1907). 
Wilhelm Stekel maintaining for example that, ‘Sadger has a formula with which he 
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wants to explain the psychology of all writers [literally: “poetic souls”]; but the 
matter is not that simple. This is surface psychology’ (Stekel quoted in Nunberg 
and Federn, 1962/1907, pp 255-56). This does in fact represent an underlying flaw 
of personality pathology profiling in ascribing an underlying psychology or 
teleological psychic trajectory to a whole contingent category such as the ‘terrorist’, 
which this thesis will argue is in fact a category error.  
 
    The pathographic methodology, as represented by Sadger, was seen by Freud as 
an exercise in confirming an original ‘diagnosis’. A preconceived idea of a particular 
psychological facet of the subject which ‘should’ be found, invariably is found and 
then focused on, at the expense of taking a more holistic view of that subject. 
Indeed in respect of Sadger’s stereotyped psychosexual focus, Freud had felt 
obliged to openly distance himself from Sadger’s view of Meyer, telling his lifelong 
friend the Swiss Protestant pastor the Reverend Oskar Pfister, that it was Sadger, 
not he, who had denounced Meyer’s mother and sister as sexual objects (Freud in 
Meng and Freud 1963/1910). Although as Mack points out, there were actually 
‘few psychoanalytic concepts available ... beyond the vicissitudes of infantile 
sexuality, available to apply to the limited data’ (Mack, 1971, p 145). 
 
    Sadger does propose a symptomology of ‘character defect’ which he terms 
‘hereditary neurosis’ and ‘hereditary psychosis’ (Sadger in Nunberg and Federn, 
1962/1907, p 22). This reflects formulations of borderline personality disorder as 
deployed in modern personality pathology theory. Sadger’s ‘borderlines’ have the 
same defining lack of a sense of self and identity, ‘a disinclination to any 
permanent connection with one’s own self’ (Sadger in Nunberg and Federn, 
1962/1907, p 184).  Starting in puberty the mood swings of ‘deep melancholia 
alternating with exuberant cheerfulness’, and ‘a yearning to die which may become 
intensified to the point of suicide’ (ibid). They are impulsive lacking a ‘sense of 
orderliness (for instance, in money matters and the like)’ (ibid). These individuals 
are incapable of remaining ‘faithful to one passion’ or one person and as such are 
‘poor husbands’ for example (ibid). As well as in the sexual sphere, they have ‘an 
abnormal desire for certain stimulants (alcohol, tobacco, coffee)’ (ibid). They 
demonstrate ‘[e]xcessive emotionality and impressionability’, and their narcissistic 
‘vanity, pride, self-assertion are pronounced’ (Sadger in Nunberg and Federn, 
1962/1907, p 185).  
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    The two sided schema of a Sadger personality pathography is now deployed 
comprehensively in adversarial personality pathology profiling, except that the 
vicissitudes of infantile sexuality have been replaced by the vicissitudes of 
unempathetic parenting and childhood trauma, along with those hereditary and 
‘borderline’ personality traits. The methodology also neatly reflects the circular 
retrodictions of modern clinical personality pathology profiling, wherein otherwise 
innocuous events take on a malign connotation but only in reference to the original 
ideologically driven speculative diagnosis, which are then adduced as evidence to 
affirm the self same diagnosis.   
 
    Freud denounces this tendency in pathography of identifying characteristics as 
being pathological which, were so commonly found as to render them diagnostically 
meaningless. As such, Freud also berates Stekel, whose ‘analytic method is too 
radical; everything in Grillparzer [Stekel’s biographical subject] can be found in 
every neurotic, as well as in normal persons’ (Freud in Nunberg and Federn, 1967, 
p 9). Simply as a function of the pathographic methodology, what might have been 
regarded normal is arbitrarily adduced as being pathological.  
 
    Often no childhood material exists at all, a problem Sadger faced in his 
pathography of Heinrich von Kleist. Undaunted, Sadger reasons ‘by analogy, and 
from result to cause, we may say that Kleist must have had the commonly found 
worship of his mother, and jealousy of his brothers, sisters, and father’ (Sadger in 
Dooley, 1916, p 385). When deploying this determinist methodology of ‘clinical 
parallelism’, the tendency is to reify what are really inferential speculations about 
conditions existing in childhood, which are predicated on perceptions of the subject 
as an adult. As with arbitrarily ascribed diagnostic symptoms, these inferences are 
then further represented as actual evidence upon which to posit further 
speculations. These new speculations in their turn are then deployed to validate 
the original interpretations of the adult subject, in the same form of circular 
retrodiction.  
 
    Sadger’s pathography of Kleist was intrinsically linked to the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth century discourse of homosexuality, with Sadger regularly 
publishing his texts, as Bertrand Vichyn points out, in ‘magazines dedicated to the 
medico-legal defense of homosexuality’ (Vichyn, 2005-2012, p 4). The aetiology that 
Sadger developed from his analyses, focused on the role of the strong mother and 
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the weak or absent father, with his homosexual patients frequently recovering 
memories of a ‘precocious love for a woman, most often the mother’ (ibid). Sadger 
claimed that his aim was to cure homosexuals of their perversion, indeed his 
homosexual patients were obliged to ‘certify’ that even if they did not face legal 
sanction, that they would undergo his treatment and ‘admit that they possibly 
already had experienced some feeling for the opposite sex’ (Vichyn, 2005-2012, p 
4). 
 
    For many years thought to have been lost, in his biography of Freud, Sadger 
(who had by then become estranged from him), assuages some of the chagrin of the 
spurned (Dundes, 2005; Sadger, 2005/1930). Freud is painted as a martinet 
envious of his own disciples and Sadger, who according to Vichyn (2005/2012), 
introduced the concept of narcissism into psychoanalysis, sees this as a key facet 
of Freud’s personality, a theme that would become central in modern personality 
profiling. Indeed, it is the proposition of this thesis that the Sadger pathographies 
were the origin of modern personological profiling.  
 
 
4    Leonardo, Freud’s First Dedicated Psychobiography. 
 
    Freud’s psychobiography Leonardo Da Vinci and a Memory of his Childhood 
(2001/1910, S.E. XI), would become the template for future (particularly 
characterological) psychobiographies. Freud believed that although not giving a 
definitive representation of the subject, clinical techniques could be employed for 
an understanding of that subject. It was Freud’s psychobiographical process and in 
particular, that he had had an agenda, which would critically affect the 
development of psychobiography and by extension the pathologising discourse.  
 
    In undertaking his Leonardo, Freud had been acutely aware that ‘readers today 
find all pathography unpalatable’ (Freud, 2001/1910, S.E. XI, p 130). In wanting to 
make a clean break with the relentless negativity of the Sadger style of 
pathography, Freud’s intention in Leonardo was a more holistic, systematic and 
motivational conception of psychobiography (Elms, 1994). If the normal processes 
of psychoanalytic enquiry were applied successfully to psychobiography, the 
behaviour of a personality in the course of his life could be explained, according to 
Freud, ‘in terms of the combined operation of constitution and fate, of internal 
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forces and external powers. Where such an undertaking does not provide any 
certain results - and this is perhaps so in Leonardo’s case - the blame rests not 
with the faulty or inadequate methods of psycho-analysis, but with the uncertainty 
and fragmentary nature of the material relating to him’ (Freud, 2001/1910, S.E. XI, 
p 135). This is in the view of this thesis, somewhat disingenuous on Freud’s part. If 
the material is insufficient, then so necessarily will be the analysis, ergo the 
psychobiographic process itself should have more limited aims accommodating the 
fact the data will never fulfil psychoanalytic requirements.  
 
    There are limitations of psychobiographic enquiry, (indeed of psychoanalysis 
itself), that Freud points to which have resonance for modern profiling. The method 
was firstly not designed ‘to make us understand how inevitable it was that the 
person concerned should have turned out in the way he did and in no other way’ 
(Freud, XI, 1910, p 135). Secondly, Freud argues that the nature and direction of 
psychic repression could not be generalised. For Leonardo according to Freud, it ‘is 
probable that another person would not have succeeded in withdrawing the major 
portion of his libido from repression by sublimating it into a craving for knowledge’ 
(Freud, XI, 1910, pp 135-136). Modern profilers however, point to generalised 
circumstances in order to explain the personality formations of their subjects, 
without explication as to why any number of others experiencing the same 
circumstances did not share the same psychic reactions.      
  
   The aim in Leonardo, as Freud describes it, was to ‘explain the inhibitions in 
Leonardo’s sexual life and in his artistic activity’ (Freud, 2001/1910, S.E. XI, p 
131). For his motivational analysis, Freud’s maxim was to ‘first inquire into the 
man’s sexual life in order, on that basis, to understand the peculiarities of his 
character’ (Freud in Nunberg and Federn, 1967/1909, p 339). To that end, Freud 
focused on what he regarded as the unusual resolution of Leonardo’s Oedipus 
complex, which resulted in the strong identification with his mother, leading to the 
determining speculation that Leonardo was a passive homosexual.  
 
    Homosexuality as per of Freud’s formulations in his Leonardo, occurred when a  
 
‘boy represses his love for his mother: he puts himself in her place, identifies 
himself with her, and takes his own person as a model in whose likeness he 
chooses the new objects of his love. In this way he has become a 
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homosexual. What he has in fact done is to slip back to auto-erotism: for the 
boys whom he now loves as he grows up are after all only substitutive 
figures and revivals of himself in childhood - boys whom he loves in the way 
in which his mother loved him when he was a child. He finds the objects of 
his love along the path of narcissism, as we say’  
 
(Freud, 2001/1910, S.E. XI, p 100).  
  
 
Leonardo contains, according to Ernest Jones, Freud’s first published use of the 
term narcissism as he elaborated on Sadger’s themes for his own exploration of 
Leonardo’s homosexuality (Jones in Freud, 1910, S.E. XI). This early 
psychobiographic exploration of ‘narcissism’ reflects a theme which now dominates 
modern adversarial personality pathology profiling.  
 
    The illegitimate child Leonardo, Freud proposed, having been raised without a 
father during the first years of his life, became the object of obsessive love from his 
mother, which excited his own precocious sexuality. This was not only responsible 
for his homosexuality but inhibited his artistic career. Because Leonardo had never 
experienced repressive paternal authority, his scientific curiosity still flourished 
(Freud, 2001/1910, S.E. XI). This form of analysis demonstrates what Saul 
Friedländer (1978) argues is a two stage psychobiographical process. Firstly, 
formulate a general principle such as ‘the relation between a fixation on the mother 
and homosexuality, or between the absence of the father and the development of 
scientific curiosity’, and secondly ‘the application of these general principles to the 
particular case of Leonardo da Vinci’ (Friedländer, 1978, p 21).  
 
    Although such a formulation is characteristic of scientific explanations in 
general, in psychohistory it equates to what Friedländer terms a ‘double 
approximation’, leaving the psychobiographer lacking the wherewithal to ‘affirm 
that the known elements of the particular case coincide exactly with the necessary 
conditions of the general rule’ (Friedländer, 1978, p 21). This was further 
complicated in the case of Leonardo, there being no clinical experience according to 
Friedländer, establishing a link between ‘paternal authority and intellectual 
audacity’ (ibid).  
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    There is, accepts Friedländer, clinical experience of a relationship between 
homosexuality and a fixation on the mother. Whether there was a more intense 
attachment to the mother in Leonardo’s case can only be conjecture, so that to the 
‘indeterminacy of the particular context is thus added to the imprecision of the 
general rule, whence the existence of a double “as if”’ (Friedländer, 1978, p 22). 
Effectively then, Freud’s inferences are not strictly evidence based and thus can 
only be regarded as general speculations, along with any number of other equally 
plausible conjectures. Although Freud believes that it is sufficient to be arguing 
from what he regards as established theory, the general likelihood of these 
inferences being accurate or at least reasonable, is intrinsically linked to how 
closely they do align with the available data. 
 
    In respect of Leonardo’s supposed passive homosexuality, Freud writes that, ‘on 
the basis of all we know about him, it seems out of the question that he should 
have been active in sexual matters. Probably, he is to be regarded as an inhibited 
homosexual, or one who is homosexual in thought only. He did select young and 
handsome pupils, but there is nothing at all to signify that he had any direct sexual 
relations with them’ (Freud in Nunberg and Federn, 1967/1909, p 339). Except of 
course that the known evidence, as Michael White (2001) points out, is of Leonardo 
being charged with homosexual intercourse and surrounding himself with pretty 
young boys throughout his life. This would suggest that Leonardo at least gave 
himself the opportunity and aroused the suspicion of actual sexual activity.  
 
    Whether predicated on Freud’s idealisation of Leonardo, or an intention to 
explicate the psychoanalytic notion of sublimation, that Leonardo did not act on 
any homosexual impulses is central to Freud’s theoretical exposition of Leonardo’s 
character. Thus in ascribing Leonardo’s creativity as a function of his sublimation 
of the sexual urge, Freud eschews the external evidence arguing that ‘it is irrelevant 
to our purpose whether the charge [of committing homosexual acts] brought 
against the young Leonardo was justified or not. What decides whether we describe 
someone as an invert is not his actual behaviour, but his emotional attitude’ 
(Freud, S.E. XI, p 87). This reflects the argument that psychobiographic evidence is 
not the same as evidence in general history, where it would be adduced if 
historically validated. In psychobiography, evidence is adduced or discounted in 
relation to its internal validity in respect of the diagnostic imperative of the 
profiler’s psychoanalytic theory, or indeed ideological perspective.  
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    External validity then is seen as of secondary importance to a putative 
theoretically derived ‘internal’ psychological validity. Internal validity, as Elms puts 
Freud’s position, ‘refers to how well a new piece of biographical data fits with what 
we already know about the subject’s internal psychological processes or structure’ 
(Elms, 2003, p 72). So that Freud argues for example that, ‘[w]hen anyone has, like 
Leonardo, escaped being intimidated by his father during his earliest childhood, 
and has in his researches cast away the fetters of authority, it would be in the 
sharpest contradiction to our expectation if we found that he had remained a 
believer and had been unable to escape from dogmatic religion’ (Freud, S.E. XI, p 
123). Here though, that charges of apostasy were brought against Leonardo is 
prayed in aid of externally validating Freud’s contention, because it is consistent 
with his internal analysis.  
 
    The selective use or presentation of evidence may be an inevitable corollary of 
the subjective nature of the psychobiographical process, where the emotional 
response or countertransference reaction to the subject, is critical. Freud identified 
with Leonardo argues Elms, and he ‘increased his sense of identification by 
endowing Leonardo erroneously with some of Freud’s own characteristics’ (Elms, 
1994, p 39). In the years before he wrote Leonardo, according to Peter Gay (1998) 
Freud had been preoccupied by his repressed homosexual feelings for his friend 
Fleiss. This may reflect Freud’s contention that Leonardo’s genius was in part 
attributable to his repressed or in the least, not acted upon homosexuality. 
Similarly, Freud’s contention of Leonardo’s irreligiousness may have more to do 
with the fact that Freud himself had been ‘a consistent and militant atheist since 
his school days, mocking God and religion’ (Gay, 1998, p 525). 
 
    The views that Freud espouses through his hero Leonardo also reflected 
discursive positions in the wider and then more problematic19th century discourses 
of homosexuality and secularism.  Freud’s espousal of secularism touched on a 
conflict which at its peak, according to Clark and Kaiser, ‘touched virtually every 
sphere of social life’ (Clark and Kaiser, 2003). Although Freud would vary his view 
on homosexuality, it was influential in the discourse particularly as expressed in a 
1935 letter to an American mother: 
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‘Homosexuality is assuredly no advantage, but it is nothing to be ashamed 
of, no vice, no degradation; it cannot be classified as an illness; we consider 
it to be a variation of the sexual function, produced by a certain arrest of 
sexual development. Many highly respectable individuals of ancient and 
modern times have been homosexuals, several of the greatest men among 
them. (Plato, Michelangelo, Leonardo da Vinci, etc)’  
  
(Freud, 1935).  
 
 
5    The Clinical Significance of Leonardo’s ‘Vulture’ Fantasy.  
 
    Freud gives clinical primacy indeed effectively predicates his analysis, upon a 
remark that Leonardo makes in one of his scientific essays, that ‘[i]n my earliest 
recollection of childhood, it seems to me as though a vulture had flown down to me, 
opened my mouth with his tail, and several times beaten it to and fro between my 
lips’ (Freud in Nunberg and Federn, 1967/1909, p 340). The presumption that 
Freud makes is that this was an infantile sexual fantasy, transmuted by what must 
have been Leonardo’s adult awareness of Egyptian mythology, linking mother with 
vulture (ibid). However, in the translation that Freud relied upon, the Italian word 
‘nibbio’ meaning kite, had actually been mistranslated as vulture (Jones in Freud, 
2001/1910, S.E. XI; Esman, 1998; Elms, 1994; Bergman, 1973).  
 
    Jones gives a somewhat arcane explication of the etymological roots of Freud’s 
error, arguing that the mistranslation does not wholly invalidate Freud’s study of 
Leonardo, as ‘the main body of Freud’s study is unaffected by his mistake: the 
detailed construction of Leonardo’s emotional life from his earliest years, the 
account of the conflict between his artistic and his scientific impulses, the deep 
analysis of his psychosexual history’ (Jones in Freud, 2001/1910, S.E. XI, p 62). 
Freud’s analysis, whatever bird it was, is not contradicted, but merely robbed of 
one corroborating piece of evidence. Indeed, if the vulture phantasy were simply a 
heuristic psychoanalytic speculation, Jones’ view would be quite legitimate. In 
Freud’s Leonardo however, it represents the key piece in the anamnesis for making 
his diagnostic analysis. 
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    The internal validity of Freud’s clinical argument is fatally undermined, as the 
specifically ‘vulture’ fantasy is inextricably linked to Freud’s key psychoanalytic 
contention that Leonardo had a mother fixation. This mother fixation in turn 
predisposes his homosexuality, with the nature of Leonardo’s sexuality determining 
not only his character, but critically impacting his scientific and artistic output. 
The fact that Leonardo could never finish his later works was due in Freud’s view to 
the ‘stigma of infantilism, and renders it probable to us that his investigations 
actually go back to these matters, to his first fixation onto the mother’ (Freud in 
Nunberg and Federn, 1967/1909, p 343). Indeed, that if psychoanalytic notions of 
childhood themselves are correct as Freud puts it, ‘then it follows that the fact 
which the vulture phantasy confirms, namely that Leonardo spent the first years of 
his life alone with his mother, will have been of decisive influence in the formation 
of his inner life’ (Freud, 2001/1910, S.E. XI, p 92).  
 
    Aside from the issue of mistranslation, Freud’s reliance on the vulture fantasy 
represented, as Martin Bergman claims, a basic methodological challenge to 
psychobiography (Bergman, 1973). In the therapeutic context, childhood memories 
are frequently ‘puzzling until illuminated by free association or through an 
interpretation of transference behavior’ (Bergman, 1973, p 835). Leonardo’s 
‘vulture’ memory was, ‘a screen memory unique to the artist. In order to 
understand it, Freud made the historically important decision to draw upon the 
technique of interpretation of symbols’ (ibid). Questioning the reliability of 
interpretations based solely on symbols, Bergman argues that ‘symbols are 
overdetermined and their meaning is less constant and less universal than Freud 
assumed. Clinical experience has taught us that to interpret dreams through 
symbols alone, is often to miss their personal and therefore their crucial meaning’ 
(Bergman, 1973, p 835).  
 
    Convinced of the clinical validity of his findings in respect of the vulture fantasy, 
Gay (1998) recounts how Freud in a letter to Carl Gustav Jung first announced his 
solution to the Leonardo mystery. Freud had encountered a neurotic patient who, 
though without his genius, resembled Leonardo. This was reason why Freud ‘was 
so confident that he could reconstruct Leonardo’s virtually undocumented 
youngest years: the vulture fantasy was, for him, heavily laden with clinical 
associations ... He had no doubt that Leonardo’s recollection represented at once 
the passive homosexual sucking on a penis and the infant blissfully sucking at its 
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mother’s breast’ (Gay, 1998, p 271). Thus, Freud had arrived at a certain analytic 
determination of Leonardo’s vulture fantasy, adduced to internally validate a hunch 
based on the analysis of a current patient, as a prime exemplar of ‘clinical 
parallelism’.      
 
    The psychobiographic method must necessarily proceed though from some form 
of preliminary assumptions, it is inherent in the very process of choosing a subject. 
Freud’s contention that Leonardo was a passive homosexual was adduced as an 
inference by virtue of its resonance to his original assumption, for which he was 
then seeking psychological consonance. So, Freud’s circular inference was that 
Leonardo had fixated on his mother in early childhood due to the inferred absence 
of his father, an absence reasonably inferred because it fitted with the inference of 
Leonardo’s passive homosexuality. This was validated by the ‘vulture’ fantasy, in 
turn being interpreted as such because of Leonardo’s passive homosexuality, which 
demonstrated a mother fixation inferred from a hunch of Leonardo’s homosexual 
orientation. Once initiated by the psychoanalytic hunch, these circular chains of 
inference take on a momentum of their own, with contradictory evidence not being 
accommodated iteratively but discarded as flawed by virtue of not fitting in with the 
‘evidence’ adduced in the inferential chain.  
 
    In his Moses and Monotheism: Three Essays (2001/1939, S.E. XXIII), Freud 
instigates an inferential momentum by boldly declaiming that ‘[t]he fact remains 
that there is only one answer to the question of where the Jews derived the custom 
of circumcision from - namely, from Egypt’, (Freud, 2001/1939, S.E. XXIII, pp 26-
27), Nonetheless Freud acknowledges that he his dealing ‘autocratically and 
arbitrarily with Biblical tradition - bringing it up to confirm my views when it suits 
me and unhesitatingly rejecting it when it contradicts me - I am exposing myself to 
serious methodological criticism and weakening the convincing force of my 
arguments’ (Freud, 2001/1939, S.E. XXIII, note 2, p 27). This is a tactic which this 
critique claims as a recurring theme in adversarial profiling, deployed in order to 
incite a chain of speculation in the hope, as in Freud’s case, ‘that I shall find some 
degree of justification later on, when I come upon the track of these secret motives’ 
(Freud, 2001/1939, S.E. XXIII, note 2, p 27).  
 
    Once a weight of inferential evidence has been accrued to the initial speculation, 
data is interpreted and causation retrodicted in order to validate it. Then initial 
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hunch, psychoanalytic intuition or expert judgement, becomes part of the 
evidential chain, literally proving itself. Even Freud’s most strongly promulgated 
inferences according to Gay (1998) were always accepted only provisional. This had 
made his perseverance with his vulture theory somewhat puzzling. Gay writes that, 
‘while it is exceedingly probable that the mistranslation making a vulture out of a 
kite had been called to Freud’s attention, he never corrected it. Throughout his long 
career as a psychoanalytic theorist, Freud proved himself ready to revise far more 
important, long-held theories. But not his “Leonardo”’ (Gay, 1998, pp 273-274).  
 
    Along with his identification with Leonardo, Elms (1994) argues that Freud’s own 
existential crisis may be responsible for some of the ill judged speculation in 
Leonardo. Freud’s arguments may have been linked to his ‘growing anxieties about 
Jung’s religious mysticism and about the inadequacy of Jung or any other 
psychoanalyst to become Freud’s successor. Freud was further disappointed with 
the general public’s failure to give psychoanalysis its due, and he was becoming 
increasingly worried about how his age, ill health, and death would affect the 
psychoanalytic movement, beyond the issue of finding a successor’ (Elms, 1994, p 
49). Indeed, Gay hypothesises that Freud’s staunch adherence to his Leonardo, was 
a ‘reminder to Jung that Freud was not inclined to compromise on the 
inflammatory and divisive issue of the libido. In this embattled decade, the making 
of polemical points, whether directed at open adversaries or at wavering 
supporters, was never far from the center of Freud’s intentions’ (Gay, 1998, p 274).  
        
 
6    Introducing Psychoanalytic Concepts into Historical Research. 
 
    After its publication, analysts according to Mack, ‘seem to have been restrained 
by Freud’s warning in the Leonardo biography regarding the problems of lack of 
evidence and the dangers of subjectivity in such studies, and by the obvious 
shortcomings of the Leonardo work itself, rather than stimulated to undertake 
similar follies on their own initiative’ (Mack, 1971, p 149). There was however, no 
shortage of crude psychobiographic imitators delighting, as Mack expresses it, in 
the ammunition afforded by misapplied Freudian concepts in order to ‘attack the 
subject under the pretense of providing greater understanding’ (ibid, p 148). In his 
1957 presidential address to the American Historical Association, William Langer 
has it that although Freud was able to ask important and innovative questions 
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concerning Leonardo’s personality, that the novelty of his essay along with its 
startling conclusions ‘had much to do with precipitating the flood of psychoanalytic 
or, better, pseudo-psychoanalytic biographical writing during the 1920’s. Almost all 
of this was of such a low order - ill-informed, sensational, scandalizing - that it 
brought the entire Freudian approach into disrepute’ (Langer, 1958, p 287).  
 
    It is this evaluation and reconstruction in terms of a clinical methodology with 
Freud’s Leonardo as a prototype that argues Manfred Kets De Vries (1990), which 
sets the psychobiographical project apart from the more traditional historical 
approaches. Before the introduction of Freudian concepts according to Kets De 
Vries, historical portraits were mostly either descriptive or chronological, with 
historians failing to ‘understand the irrational sides of their subjects. Common 
sense, intuition, or empathy seemed insufficient for uncovering motives and 
explaining human action’ (Kets De Vries, 1990, p 424).  
 
    Early Freudians, as Friedländer (1978) argues, had been parochial, focusing on 
instinctual traits, stages of adaptation, and the universally determined character of 
psychic conflicts from which no one was exempt. Translated to psychobiography, 
Runyan identifies the criticism of taking an essentially parochial theory, ‘developed 
to explain the behavior of neurotic middle- and upper-class Viennese at the turn of 
the twentieth century’, as if it were transhistorical, transcultural, scientifically 
based clinically proven data (Runyan, 1984, pp 214-15). Psychobiography can 
provide, as Robert Wallerstein writes, ‘some major illuminations from a 
psychoanalytic perspective. But the risk of a massive reductionism to infantile 
trauma and unresolved childhood oedipal issues as the totality of the psychological 
insights offered in the particular person in history is a grave one’ (Wallerstein, 
1988, pp 160-161). 
 
    There was according to Robert Jay Lifton, an implicit assumption in classical 
psychoanalysis, of a larger historical universe which was ‘nothing but a 
manifestation of the projections or emanations of the individual psyche’ (Lifton, 
1974, p 23, emphasis in the original). Within this essentially ahistorical framework 
Freud, influenced by both German historicism and Judeo-Christian millennialism, 
regarded the singular ‘Event’, as being historically determining (Lifton, 1974, , p 
25). So that, for example, the re-enactment of the primeval murder of the father, 
the genesis of Jewish history as depicted in Freud’s Moses and Monotheism, is seen 
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at the same time as both an historical though mythical event (Lifton, 1974; Freud, 
20011939, S.E. XXIII). It also pertains to the individual psyche as a product of the 
Oedipus complex, taken argues Lifton ‘as the ultimate source of these decisive 
occurrences. Indeed, one could view Freud’s overall historical method as a kind of 
apologia for the Oedipal Event’ (Lifton, 1974, p 25).  
 
    Freud had in general focused ‘upon individual psychopathology as existing more 
or less apart from history’, as in not being a reflection of history (Lifton, 1974, p 26; 
Carlson, 1978). Leonardo had presaged, in Lifton’s view, the ahistorical ‘idea of 
interpreting the outcomes of major historical events as expressions of the 
individual psychopathology of a particular national leader’, again a notion very 
much taken up later in personological personality pathology profiling as in Post’s 
“Saddam is Iraq; Iraq is Saddam” (Lifton, 1974, p 26; Post and Baram, 2002).  
 
    Freud’s ‘prehistorical paradigm’ represents, according to Lifton, the encounter 
between father and sons enveloping ‘indiscriminately the individual and the 
undifferentiated collectivity’, and with the ‘individual-psychopathological model it is 
the aberration of a specific individual which is writ large’ predestined by ‘repetition 
compulsion’ (Lifton, 1974, , pp 25, 26, emphasis in the original). So that although 
this biologically determinist ahistoricism would be superseded in Freud’s own 
thinking, in modern ‘at a distance’ clinical profiling, personality pathology theorists 
continue to predicate their discursive analyses such as Post’s analysis of Osama 
bin Laden and Al Qaeda, on the notion that the personality of the leader, inherently 
reflects through a narcissistic transference relationship, the psyche of his group 
and of the phenomenon itself (Post, 2003; 2004; Volkan, 1998). Thus, pathological 
leaders and their groups are ineluctably destined to repeat their maladaptive 
behaviour and will, according to Post, unconsciously sabotage their chances of 
success in order to perpetuate this behaviour (Post, 1987; Post, 1998). Similarly, 
notwithstanding any particular cultural or ideological inferences, Post’s concept of 
the ‘threat of success’, is the thesis argues, essentially an ahistorical notion with 
which to label a recalcitrant adversary (Post, 1987, 1998).  
 
 
7    The Cultural Perspective in Psychobiography. 
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    Psychobiography argues Stannard, is itself ahistorical and that, ‘is its ultimate 
failing. Perhaps the single most important achievement of modern historical 
thinking has been the growing recognition on the part of the historian that life in 
the past was marked by a fundamental social and cognitive differentness from that 
prevailing in our own time’ (Stannard, 1980,  p 151). However, the tools of the 
present can only be used to investigate the past, and we cannot gainsay our 
cognitive ability. In that sense, historical enquiry is no less ahistorical than 
psychobiography. A more inclusive perspective of psychobiography is as James 
Anderson puts it, that ‘psychological, economic, and cultural explanations, are 
generally not competing; rather, they point to “coexisting or corresponding 
processes”’ (Anderson, 1981, p 458). Indeed, countering the argument of 
ahistoricism, Elms (2003) maintains that in his Leonardo, Freud had actually 
promulgated the notion of relating his subject to the people of his own era and 
culture, in order to determine whether his subject’s behaviour was either, relatively 
normal or deviant.  
 
    Unique or unusual behaviour as viewed through the prism of another era and 
culture may actually have been merely mundane, in their time and place. Elms 
notes for example, that Freud highlights the psychological significance of 
Leonardo’s noted inability to finish paintings, which it had been argued, reflected 
the practice of other great artists at the time such as Michelangelo. However, 
contemporary sources emphasize ‘Leonardo’s notorious inability to finish his 
works’, Freud contextualised Leonardo’s behaviour and was able to demonstrate 
that this ‘behavior was indeed rather unusual and therefore revealed more about 
Leonardo’s psyche than about his society’ (Elms, 2003 p 73). 
 
   Freud’s Leonardo would appear, then, to also presage the more culturally 
oriented psychoanalytic psychobiographies. Progressing from what he regards as 
classical psychoanalysis with the arrival of what Friedländer terms psychoanalytic 
culturalists, more socio-cultural and eclectic theoretical perspectives have been 
adopted in psychobiography (Friedländer, 1978). Modern anthropology does ‘not 
put into question the universality of the Oedipus complex as such, but only the 
universality of the specific Oedipal relations that exist in the Western family’ (ibid, 
p 20). Thus in Friedlander’s view, this gives psychoanalysis the theoretical basis, 
along with sufficient information on their institutions and mores, for the 
psychobiographical study of other cultures. Although particularly exemplified by 
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Erikson’s notion of the life cycle, few psychoanalysts, Friedländer maintains, ‘would 
deny the crucial influence of socio-cultural factors on the elaboration of the family 
practices that determine the development of the child as he goes through the stages 
of instinctual maturation’ (Friedländer, 1978, p 19; Erikson, 1963; Erikson; 1968).  
 
    Reductive simplifications as Runyan (1984) has it, constrain a narrative to an 
unnatural order inconsistent with actual lived experience. Although such accounts 
may be inconsistent with actual lived experience, they may lend the narrative 
artistic purpose, and indeed Freud’s work was sometimes itself on the cusp of art 
and science. Of his Moses for example, Freud confides to his old friend Arnold 
Zweig that he had originally entitled it ‘The Man Moses, a historical novel’ (Freud, S. 
in Freud, E., 1970/1934, p 91; Freud, 2001/1939 S.E. XXIII). Freud’s dilemma, 
Hans Meyerhof believes, was ‘that, though trying to be a pure scientist, he always 
came up with results that read as if they were literature’ (Meyerhof, 1962, p 13). 
Summing up the effect of this dilemma László Halász writes, that the ‘reader of 
Freud's Leonardo has two contradictory attitudes simultaneously: a willing 
suspension of his/her disbelief, as is usual with a literary work; and maintenance 
of his/her doubts about anything that is not factually correct or testable, as is 
usual with a scientific work’ (Halász, 2003, p 7). 
 
    In hoping to dissuade Zweig from writing a biography of the then not long 
deceased philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche, Freud writes;  
 
‘I am much more clearly conscious of my inclinations against the project 
than the reasons for it. But no doubt it will not matter what I say. 
    The poetic urge, if it’s strong enough, will prove itself stronger. It seems to 
me that we touch here on the problem of poetic licence versus historical 
truth. I know my feelings on this point are thoroughly conservative. Where 
there is an unbridgeable gap in history and biography, the writer can step in 
and try to guess how it all happened. In an uninhabited country he may be 
allowed to establish the creatures of his imagination. Even when the 
historical facts are known but sufficiently remote and removed from common 
knowledge, he can disregard them … 
    Now when it is a question of someone so near to us in time and whose 
influence is still as active as Friedrich Nietzsche’s, a description of his 
character and his destiny should aim at the same result as a portrait does -
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that is to say, however the conception may be elaborated the main stress 
should fall on the resemblance. And since the subject cannot sit for the 
portrait, one has first to collect so much material about him that it only 
needs to be supplemented with a sympathetic understanding’  
 
(Freud’s letter to Zweig 12th of May, 1934, Freud, E., 1970, pp 77-78).  
 
    There is a key distinction which Freud makes then, between the poetic license 
readily afforded in the explanations of distant figures, with the need for not only 
fullness and accuracy but also empathy, when dealing with contemporaries. A 
psychobiography should not construct or reconstruct absent material, but rather 
provide a ‘sympathetic understanding’ for what was actually known. Similarly, 
although Freud advocated the use of psychoanalysis as an investigative method for 
the legal profession, he balked at providing an analysis without the fullest of 
information (Slovenko, 2000). In 1924, the Chicago Tribune offered Freud a 
substantial sum of money in order to diagnose the notorious murderers Leopold 
and Loeb. Declining Freud commented, that ‘“I would say that I cannot be 
supposed to be prepared to provide an expert opinion about persons and a deed 
when I have only newspaper reports to go on and have no opportunity to make a 
personal examination”’ (Freud quoted in Slovenko, 2000, p 105). This is exactly 
though, the premise and indeed type of data upon which the expert opinion of 
modern clinical ‘at a distance’ political profiling is based.  
 
 
8    Freud’s Study of Woodrow Wilson, the First Political Psychobiography. 
  
    Whilst Freud did not directly address contemporary social developments 
(Adorno, 1973), its traces were inscribed on the minutiae of his individual subjects. 
With particular types of individual affliction reflecting current socioeconomic 
conditions, Freud’s evolving work then necessarily reflected historical trends (ibid). 
Notwithstanding their clinical and theoretical essence, Freud’s post 1918 works 
also had according Daniel Pick, ‘an immediate political purchase on contemporary 
mass politics and the demagogic role of Fascist leaders’ (Pick, 2012, p 141). In his 
Group Psychology And The Analysis Of The Ego for example, although Freud doesn’t 
name individuals or movements, he describes the ‘spiral into fascism’ (Pick, 2012, 
p 141; Freud, 2001/1921, S.E. XVIII).  
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    In his Group Psychology Freud does make specific reference to what he saw as 
the libidinal betrayal of the ‘fantastic promises’ as represented by the ‘American 
President’s Fourteen Points’ (Freud,2001/1921, S.E. XVIII, p 95). It was not until 
Freud’s psychobiography of this same American President Woodrow Wilson, co-
authored by William C. Bullitt, that Freud would deal fully with contemporary 
political issues relating to a recently deceased personality (Freud and Bullitt, 1967). 
It is ironic, then, as Gay points out, that it was in a criticism of another somewhat 
scurrilous psychoanalytically inspired biography of Wilson by William Bayard Hale 
that Freud enunciated the dictum; ‘psychoanalysis should never be used as a 
weapon in literary or political polemics’ (Freud quoted in Gay, 1985, p 140).  
 
    Wilson was intensely disliked as Paul Roazen (2006) amongst others points out, 
by both Freud and Bullitt. Bullitt was himself a very senior American diplomat, a 
former American ambassador to both the Soviet Union and France (Solms, 2006). 
The animosity of Bullitt one of Freud’s analysand’s, derived as Roazen has it, from 
the disavowal by Wilson for his mission to Soviet Russia at the time of the 
Versailles Treaty. Making it very clear in his introduction to the psychobiography, 
Freud’s animus was derived from the sense of betrayal he felt at the failed promise 
of Wilson’s supposed divinely inspired idealism (Freud 1967).  
 
    With the perceived abrogation of America’s diplomatic authority, the Versailles 
proceedings were dictated writes George Prochnik, by the ‘machinations of 
Clemenceau and Lloyd George, who then set about imposing economically crippling 
terms’, that were to blight the futures of both Germany and Freud’s beloved Austria 
(Prochnik, 2007, p 2). In his introduction to the Wilson biography, Freud writes, 
that the ‘figure of the American President, as it rose above the horizon of 
Europeans, was from the beginning unsympathetic to me, and that this aversion 
increased in the course of years the more I learned about him and the more 
severely we suffered from the consequences of his intrusion into our destiny. With 
increasing acquaintance it was not difficult to find good reasons to support this 
antipathy’ (Freud, 1967, pp 3-4). 
 
    Freud has it that Wilson’s childhood development was dictated by a domineering 
father. Wilson’s libido was dominated by his feminine side and as such, Freud was 
‘obliged’ to ‘conclude that a considerable portion of his libido must have found 
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storage in aggressive activity toward his father ... nearly all the unusual features of 
Wilson’s character were developed from the repressions, identifications and 
sublimations which his ego employed in its attempt to reconcile his aggressive 
activity toward his father with his overwhelming passivity to his father’ (Freud, 
1967, p 8).  
 
    An original manuscript including passages not found in the published book was 
discovered by Roazen as Mark Solms (2006) recounts, whilst searching amongst 
Bullitt’s papers. Containing Freud’s general theoretical introduction to 
psychoanalysis for the book, it also included an unpublished excerpt postulating a 
profound link between Christianity and latent homosexuality (Solms, 2006; 
Schatzman, 2005). If the passive attitude towards a father as exhibited by Wilson, 
does not find direct expression, it will argues Freud, ‘find that expression by 
identifying with Jesus Christ’ (Solms, 2006, p 1292). Christ had fulfilled the 
powerful and contradictory wishes of being completely passive and subservient, 
ergo feminine in relation to the father. Christ was according to Freud, ‘completely 
masculine, powerful and authoritative like the father. By humbly submitting to the 
will of God the Father, by surrendering to total femininity, Christ was able to 
become God Himself, the ultimate goal of masculinity’ (Freud quoted in Solms, 
2006, p 1293). 
 
    The analogy with Christ is used as Solms puts it, to deal with the Oedipal 
problem of the ‘relationship with the father’ (Solms, 2006, p 1293). In Wilson’s case 
Freud argued, a ‘considerable portion of the human race had to suffer for the 
overwhelming love which the Reverend Joseph Ruggles Wilson had inspired in his 
son’ (Freud 1967, p 23). This disturbed Oedipal relationship in Freud’s view, was 
one with which Wilson struggled his entire life, and led eventually to his moral 
collapse at Versailles, where his fawning feminine side dominated (Freud,1967). 
 
    Just as Freud infers irreligiousness to his hero Leonardo, he puts religiosity at 
the core of his antipathy to his anti-hero Wilson. This animosity not only towards 
religion but to Wilson, is reflected in his view that, ‘I do not know how to avoid the 
conclusion that a man who is capable of taking the illusions of religion so literally 
and is so sure of a special personal intimacy with the Almighty is unfitted for 
relations with ordinary children of men’ (Freud, 1967, p 4). Wilson’s ‘saviour 
complex’ as Freud expresses it, was the ‘inevitable conclusion in his unconscious 
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during his first years; if his father was God, he himself was God’s only beloved son, 
Jesus Christ’ (Freud, 1967, p 10). Once again, in conflating his antipathy to 
religion with his attitude or countertransference towards his biographic subject, it 
is Freud’s anticlerical discourse which appears to dictate his perceptions, his 
putative analytic hunches. 
 
 
9    The Controversy over Freud’s Involvement in the Wilson ‘Pathography’. 
 
    Although acknowledging his antipathy, Freud had originally been chary of 
openly even commenting on Wilson, expressing that, ‘“I may be possibly kept back 
by the consideration that Mr. Wilson is a living personality and not a product of 
poetical phantasy as the fair Gradiva was”’ (Freud quoted in Gay, 1998, p 555). 
With Wilson dead, although not as long dead as Nietzsche had been for Zweig, 
Freud eschews his former reticence. Justifying his involvement, Freud argues that 
when an important public figure such as Wilson was dead, ‘he becomes by common 
consent a proper subject for biography and previous limitations no longer exist. 
The question of a period of post-mortem immunity from biographical study might 
then arise, but such a question has rarely been raised’ (Freud, 1967, p 5). Although 
the question of a proper lapse of time had of course been raised by Freud himself, 
when arguing against Zweig’s proposed biography of Nietzsche (Freud in Freud, E., 
1970/1934).  
 
    In terms of a political discourse, the legacy of an individual may still have 
political traction and influence long after they have left office or even died. Wilson’s 
internationalist legacy was symbolically potent, and as Kendrick Clements 
remarks, ‘Richard Nixon recognized the power of Wilson’s legacy when he returned 
Wilson’s desk to the Oval Office in 1969’ (Clements, 2015, p2). Protecting a political 
legacy may be more emotive than protecting the reputation of the living subject, of 
paramount importance for relatives and friends and indeed political associates. 
Wilson died in 1924 and although the manuscript was typed in final form by 1932, 
Erik Erikson points out that Freud and Bullitt agreed to hold back on publishing 
until after the death of Wilson’s widow and in the event, the book was not actually 
published until after Bullitt’s death a year later in 1967 (Erikson, 2011; Gay 1998; 
Solms, 2006). 
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    The study is relentlessly negative towards ‘Little Tommy Wilson’ as Freud refers 
to him. In adult life, Wilson ‘found it difficult to maintain friendly relations with 
men of superior intellect or position, and preferred to surround himself with women 
or inferiors’ (Freud, 1967, p 10). Very problematically then, Freud has it that ‘we 
must attack the misconception that we have written this book with a secret 
purpose to prove that Wilson was a pathological character, an abnormal man, in 
order to undermine in this roundabout way esteem for his achievements. No! That 
is not our intention’ (Freud and Bullitt, 1967, p 5).  
 
    Undermining Wilson was the clear intention of the book, which as Weinstein et 
al describe as a ‘biased application of a simplistic and distorted version of 
psychoanalytic theory, is not regarded by either historians or psychoanalysts as a 
scholarly contribution’ (Weinstein et al, 1978, p 585). As such, it was not only 
disowned by Freud’s family but as Solms puts it, by ‘just about every Freud scholar 
qualified to express an opinion on the matter’ (Solms, 2006, p 1263). Indeed 
Erikson was acutely aware of the damage the book would do to the entire Freudian 
project, in that the ‘chestnut of “Freudulance” will be warmed over and over’ 
(Erikson and Hofstadter, 2011/1967, p 2). Erikson is at pains to point out then 
what he claims as the study’s glaring incongruities with Freud’s style, and that ‘it is 
not at all certain which parts of the body of this book, if any, were written by 
Sigmund Freud himself’ (ibid).   
 
    Hinting that his involvement was indeed limited, in referring to the Wilson 
biography Freud writes to his friend Zweig, that ‘I am once again writing an 
introduction for something someone else is doing I must not say what it is, but it 
too is an analysis and at the same time very much a matter of contemporary 
interest, almost political’ (Freud’s letter to Zweig of the 7th of December, 1930 in 
Freud, E., 1970, p 25). As Freud’s original contribution had been lost apart from 
his introduction to the manuscript, Erikson maintains that the book could only 
reasonably be attributed to Bullitt (Erikson, 2011). However, Freud makes the 
position quite clear in his introduction. Bullitt, who of course knew Wilson 
personally, had as Freud writes, ‘prepared a digest of data on Wilson’s childhood 
and youth. For the analytic part we are both equally responsible; it has been 
written by us working together’ (Freud, 1967, p 5).  
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    Notwithstanding the reservations of Erikson et al over Freud’s involvement, there 
is some consensus according to Solms, that the text in its manner and rhetoric are 
Bullitt’s but the ideas and particularly the general part containing the excluded 
original material were Freud’s. In any event as Mack summarises, ‘Freud cannot be 
absolved of all responsibility for its authorship or for the failure to edit or curtail 
the work’ (Mack, 1971, p 149) Freud, ‘whose life was devoted to the understanding 
and tolerance of the complexity of human psychology, found his work being 
misused to oversimplify and reduce human motive to banality and, wittingly or 
unwittingly, had taken part in one such study himself’ (Mack, 1971, p 149). 
 
    Whatever his motives ‘Freud’s personality profile of Wilson concentrated on the 
leader’s gift for self-deception, as well as his inexhaustible well of hidden hatred’, 
effectively opening the way, according to Anthony Elliott, ‘for the application of 
psychoanalysis to politics’ (Elliott, 2002, p 2). It is somewhat unfortunate that this 
politico/psychoanalytic template should have been such an invective. It showed 
that psychoanalytic concepts could be deployed not only diagnostically but also 
aggressively in a political context, which is the basic premise of modern adversarial 
political ‘at a distance’ pathology profiling. 
 
 
10    Conclusion. 
 
    Psychobiography as a blend of art and science in progress, gives a window onto 
the human condition in accessible form. Although incorporating insights which 
make it interesting, meaningful and relevant to that human condition, it can never 
feasibly acquire sufficient or appropriate data for a clinical explanation of any 
particular individual ‘at a distance’. The critique in this chapter has shown that 
psychobiographic neutrality as a concept has been historically and inherently 
unachievable, because wider discourses are inevitably implicated in the 
psychobiographic project. Such was the case with the discourse of homosexuality 
in Sadger’s pathographies, coupled with an anticlerical discourse by Freud, in both 
Leonardo and the study of Woodrow Wilson. 
 
    In spite of his errors and the subsequent abuse of his psychobiographic process, 
modern scholars of Leonardo according to White (2001), still acknowledge their 
debt to Freud’s insights in Leonardo. Even if Freud’s speculations were not 
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clinically reliable, in his Leonardo he did discuss as Elms points out, ‘basic 
psychological processes that might help to explain other variants in developmental 
patterns, not only the specific version that Leonardo had presumably experienced’ 
(Elms, 2003, p 70). 
 
    By their very nature, psychological let alone pathographic studies of political 
leaders are contentious. Whilst declaring his antipathy for Wilson at the outset, 
Freud can still ask ‘the reader not to reject the work which follows as a product of 
prejudice. Although it did not originate without the participation of strong 
emotions, those emotions underwent a thorough subjugation. And I can promise 
the same for William C. Bullitt, as whose collaborator I appear in this book’ (Freud, 
1967, p 4-5). There is no reason to doubt Freud’s sincerity but this in itself is 
problematic. This reflects the misguided belief that it is possible for a wholly 
objective clinical-scientific psychobiographical analysis. Rather than the psychic 
truth of Leonardo or Wilson, they are the psychic truths of Freud’s Leonardo and 
Woodrow Wilson which are very particular to Freud. 
 
    The analysis of works of art or distant historical figures does afford the 
possibility of psychoanalytic insight, without the ethical dilemmas involved in 
seeking to inscribe unverifiable psychic ‘truths’ on unwitting living subjects. The 
next chapter describes the first institutional deployment of psychoanalysis as a 
‘weapon’, with moral prohibitions suspended in the war against Hitler. This leads to 
the development of ‘at a distance’ political profiling and this thesis argues, the 
divergence between characterological and personological approaches becomes 
apparent.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
92 
 
 
CHAPTER FOUR: 
 
 
 
WHAT MAKES HITLER ‘TICK’?: PROFILING THE ENEMY  
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1    Introduction. 
 
    This chapter critiques the methodologies of two psychoanalytic profiles of Adolf 
Hitler undertaken at the behest of the American intelligence services during World 
War Two. As well as an impetus for innovation, war tends to have a suppressing 
effect on moral inhibitions and Freud’s admonition against the use of 
psychoanalysis as a weapon, became more honoured in the breach. The Wartime 
profiles were then a catalyst for the adversarial possibilities of psychoanalysis 
opened up by Freud’s clearly antagonistic psychoanalytic profile of Woodrow 
Wilson, and the exigencies of war.  
 
    Undertaken in 1943 and envisioned as a full scale facsimile clinical analysis, the 
first of these profiles Walter Langer’s study of Adolf Hitler, is a seminal event in the 
political profiling project. The study gave Jerrold Post the inspiration for his 
dedicated CIA personality profiling unit, referring to Langer’s analysis of Hitler as 
the ‘Holy Grail of profiling’ (Post, BBC2, 25/11/2005). Although not believed to 
have been acted upon during the War, Post describes the Langer study as the 
‘prototype of the psychodynamically oriented clinically informed assessment of a 
foreign leader at a distance, it is of great importance, for it was to become the 
model of subsequent endeavors in support of government policy’ (Post, 2006a, p 50, 
my emphasis). 
 
    The second profile critiqued in this chapter is a memorandum prepared secretly 
by Langer’s colleague, Henry Murray. As opposed to Langer’s more traditionally 
Freudian characterological analysis, which seeks to build up a comprehensive 
developmental picture of Hitler’s childhood, Murray’s inference of diagnostic 
categories from Hitler’s adult functioning was the first modern personological 
personality pathology profile. Incorporating precursor notions to those later 
theorised by Heinz Kohut and Otto Kernberg, Murray’s profile of Hitler 
demonstrates that there was a paradigm within psychobiography already shifting 
towards personological profiling. 
 
    A major contention of the thesis explored in this chapter is that the distinction 
between characterological and personological profiling reflects more than the 
evolving deployment of newer psychoanalytic conceptualisations; rather, it 
represents a distinct paradigm shift. In this chapter, the thesis will seek to 
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demonstrate by way of a detailed critique and comparison of the Langer and 
Murray profiles, that these conceptualisations represent two entirely different 
approaches to profiling, the personological and the characterological.  
 
 
2    Background to and Personnel of the Langer Study. 
 
    Walter Langer was the younger brother of William Langer the chief of the 
Research and Analysis Branch of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), wartime 
forerunner of the CIA. Analysed by Anna Freud, Walter had been in Vienna at the 
time of the Anschluss studying psychoanalysis, and had ‘seen the Nazi machine in 
action - pogroms, wholesale arrests, regimentation, etc. - and had been exposed to 
the Nazi propaganda apparatus for a long period of time’ (Langer, 1972, pp 18-19; 
Waggoner, New York Times, the 7th of April, 1994). As well as treating those 
psychologically damaged by war, psychoanalysts were employed in the Allied 
intelligence services, and the psychic make up of Hitler was clearly of particular 
interest. William Langer had specifically, according to Pick (2012), made the case 
for employing his psychoanalyst younger brother. The head of what Susan Cavin 
describes as the elitist and very clubbable OSS, the then Colonel, ‘Wild Bill’ 
Donavon, approached Walter with a view to employing psychoanalytic techniques 
in psychological warfare (Pick, 2012; Cavin, 2008; Langer, 1972).  
 
    In Walter Langer’s Post War account, he describes Donavon as being very 
receptive to psychoanalytic ideas, and Langer had been set the task of adapting 
clinical insight with a view to overcoming the widespread discontent for a possible 
draft in the US. The patriotic fervour following Pearl Harbour had however, made 
this particular work contemporaneously redundant (Langer, 1972). Although still 
on staff as a freelance consultant, Langer was kept kicking his heels until in the 
spring of 1943 when Donavon in Langer’s account of the meeting, asks Langer 
what he made of Hitler as he’d been over there and seen ‘him and his outfit 
operating. You must have some idea about what is going on”’ (Langer, 1972, p 19). 
What was needed as Donavon addressed it, was a realistic appraisal of Hitler and 
the situation in Germany, and that ‘“most of all, we want to know as much as 
possible about his psychological make-up - the things that make him tick. In 
addition, we ought to know what he might do if things begin to go against him. Do 
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you suppose you could come up with something along these lines?”’ (Donavon 
quoted in Langer, 1972, p 19, my emphasis).  
 
    Langer then set about putting together a study team and although he doesn’t 
name them in his 1972 bestselling book, The Mind of Adolf Hitler, Langer actually 
had three distinguished collaborators: Professor Henry Murray of the Harvard 
Psychological Clinic, Dr. Bertram D. Lewin of the New York Psychoanalytic Institute 
and Dr. Ernst Kris from the New School for Social Research (Langer, 1943; Langer, 
1972). As the OSS’s chief psychologist, Murray was presumably the senior figure in 
the group, although it was Langer who was approached to lead the Hitler study. 
One of the group, as Langer has it, was unable to make the meetings in New York 
[Kris and Bertram were both actually based in New York] and although he 
promised to participate in writing, ‘[u]nfortunately, not a word was ever received 
from him’ (Langer, 1972, p 27). In fact, Murray had secretly prepared his own 
memorandum for which Pick believes Langer never forgave him, and that the 
‘mistrust and resentment between themselves complicated and soured their 
inquiries (Pick, 2012, p 132). 
 
    Also, something of a shadow figure in the endeavour is Carl Gustav Jung, who 
had first introduced Murray to psychoanalysis (Allpsych, 2011). Jung’s insights on 
Hitler’s putative feminine side are deployed by Langer (1943), and Murray 
consulted Jung on numerous occasions throughout the War (Cavin, 2008). Jung’s 
view of Hitler was that he had a tremendous mother complex which meant he 
would ‘be under the domination either of a woman or of an idea’, reflecting his 
ideological passion for Germany (Jung in Knickerbocker, 1939, p 129). 
 
   Particular mention should be made of the psychoanalytic study of Hitler 
undertaken by W.H.D. Vernon under the supervision of Murray and G.W.Allport, 
before the United States entered the War (Vernon 1941; Murray, 1943; Cavin 
2008). This study is arguably the core thematic analysis forming the substantive 
‘case history’ for both the Langer and Murray studies, with Murray reproducing it 
in full within his own memorandum.  
 
    The main theme of Vernon’s analysis, was that Hitler’s motivating force was his 
attempt to resolve his inner conflicts by projecting them onto the external world, 
just as in his ‘childish interpretation of sexual congress the father attacks, 
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strangles, and infects the mother, so the Jew, international Jewish Capital, etc., 
encircle and restrict Germany, threaten and attack her and infect her with 
impurities of blood’ (Vernon, 1941, p 78-79). Vernon posits a paranoid split in 
Hitler’s personality structure predicated upon the particular nature of his Oedipal 
conflict. Regarded as particularly significant, Hitler’s putative witnessing of the 
primal scene, Vernon outlines Hitler’s repressed sexuality, the symbolic 
equivalence he makes between his mother and Germany and his syphilophobic 
anti-Semitism (Vernon, 1941).  
 
  
3    Langer’s Motivational Analysis and Methodology.     
     
    After a survey of their raw material, the Langer team ‘in conjunction with our 
knowledge of Hitler’s actions as reported in the news’, agreed a diagnosis that 
Hitler ‘was, in all probability, a neurotic psychopath’ (Langer, 1972, p 26). Sorting 
‘the wheat from the chaff’ of this material Langer explains, would be impossible 
without such a ‘diagnosis as a point of orientation’ for data evaluation, and a 
higher probability rating, was given to information which could, most ‘easily be 
fitted into this general clinical category’ (ibid). The Langer group then, argues Hans 
Gatzke, ‘judged the reliability of their sources by the way they fitted the group’s 
preconceived image of Hitler’ (Gatzke, 1973, p 397).  
 
    As with Freud’s Leonardo, evidence was to be accepted or rejected on the basis of 
internal clinical validity, effectively on whether it confirmed the diagnosis. Providing 
a diagnostic ‘point of orientation’, becomes the basis for a confirmatory bias in 
reviewing the subsequent material, and with only confirmatory evidence being 
sought and then adduced, ipso facto the cursory diagnosis is confirmed. Along with 
personal interviews conducted with informants who had fled Nazi Germany, the 
study’s data would be material preselected by their small psychoanalytically 
trained research team, which would then be sifted and discussed by the analysts 
(Langer, 1972). Indeed in relation to their clinical methodology, they would make 
‘full use of the psychic processes that take place outside the field of consciousness’, 
and as Langer describes it, ‘unconsciously evaluate its significance and relate it to 
what is already known’ (Langer, 1972, p28). In other words, they were relying on 
their intuition and or countertransference responses.  
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    Although Langer does not give the theoretical basis for any of his conjectures, 
his diagnosis of Hitler as a neurotic psychopath appears to correspond to Freud’s 
formulation of the neurotic type of ‘criminal from a sense of guilt’ found in the 1916 
paper ‘Some Character Types Met with in Psycho-Analytic Work’ (Freud, S.E. XIV, 
2001/1916). A paradoxical sense of guilt exists before the crime to which it became 
attached, and indeed the crime is committed because of the sense of guilt. Analysis 
invariably uncovered claims Freud, that ‘this obscure sense of guilt derived from 
the Oedipus complex and was a reaction to the two great criminal intentions of 
killing the father and having sexual relations with the mother’ (Freud, S.E. XIV, 
1916, pp 332-333). As described by Leo Bartemeier, such neurotics are ‘driven by 
an unseen fate, - a compulsive force - a demoniacal impulse’ and this impulsion to 
gain relief by doing that which was forbidden meant as Freud puts it, that the 
‘sense of guilt was at least attached to something’ (Bartemeier, 1970, p 330; Freud, 
S.E. XIV, 2001/1916, p 332).  
 
    Hitler was striving for psychological adjustment, and there was Langer believed, 
‘a definite moral component in his character no matter how deeply it may be buried 
or how seriously it has been distorted’ (Langer, 1943, pp 127-128). Hitler’s 
particular sense of guilt Langer argues, was provoked by his putative perversion, 
itself attributable to the nature of his Oedipus conflict, in particular from having 
witnessed the ‘primal scene’. Hitler’s crimes actually gave him a sense of relief, 
because as Langer is at pains to point out, that as opposed to amoral brutes such 
as Goering, ‘[u]nquestionably Hitler has suffered severe guilt reactions’ (ibid, p 
138).  
     
    As material on Hitler’s early life was scant, Langer proposed that Hitler’s own 
artistic output could be adduced as evidence of ‘conscious processes which are 
symbolically related to his own problems. The examples he chooses for purposes of 
illustration almost always contain elements from his own earlier experiences which 
were instrumental in cultivating the view he is expounding’ (Langer, 1943, p 147). 
Given that these examples are themselves in lieu of Hitler’s biographical material, 
there is no way that Langer can test the validity of his hypothesis against actual 
biographical material. That Hitler was referring to actual events in his childhood 
can only be pure speculation, and cannot in any way be relied upon as evidence 
biographical or otherwise. 
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    The validity of this method of ‘clinical parallelism’ Langer claimed was in the 
efficacy of deploying the wealth of knowledge derived from applying psychoanalytic 
techniques, reflecting the team’s cumulative clinical experience in dealing with 
patients presenting with difficulties similar to Hitler’s (Langer 1972). The Langer 
team, are not however, treating Hitler they are searching their case histories for 
patients with similar presenting histories or parallel narratives. In this instance, 
utilising the technique of clinical parallelism, allowed the Langer team to ‘evaluate 
conflicting information, check deductions concerning what probably happened, or 
to fill in gaps where no information is available. It may be possible with the help of 
all these sources of information to reconstruct the outstanding events in his early 
life which have determined his present behavior and character structure’ (Langer, 
1943, p 148).  
 
    This is not the searching for clinical material in order to assess an intervention 
strategy, but looking for a similar fuller parallel anamnesis or patient background 
in order to conjecture what Hitler’s back story would have been. The parallel 
accounts becoming part of the Hitler case history as conjectures, are then reified to 
clinical inferences. The Langer team surmised for example, that Hitler’s mother 
Klara must have lavished excessive love and affection on him, because she had 
already lost three children before Hitler had been born (Langer, 1943, p 160). The 
frail child Adolf would have formed ‘a strong libidinal attachment’ to his mother, 
and was as a result over protected and spoilt (Langer, 1943, p 160). Intimate 
activity would then have been condoned which would have been disapproved of by 
Hitler’s father Alois, who was seen as a brutal intruder into the young Adolph’s 
‘paradise’ with his mother (Langer, 1943).  
   
  
4    Hitler and the Primal Scene.      
 
    Hitler’s ‘artistic’ output in particular his 1929 political treatise Mein Kampf,  
would similarly be presented as case history material, with Langer and his 
collaborators assessing its validity from the perspective of their own therapeutic 
experience and accumulated clinical research. They would then reverse engineer to 
reveal the putative clinical symptoms that Hitler would have presented with, had he 
been a patient.  
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    The resentment of a brutish father coupled with an increasing libidinal 
attachment to his mother Langer surmises, served to develop Hitler’s Oedipus 
complex to an extraordinary extent. As hatred for his father increased the  
‘more dependent he became upon the affection and love of his mother, and 
the more he loved his mother the more afraid he became of his father’s 
vengeance should his secret be discovered. Under these circumstances, little 
boys frequently fantasy about ways and means of ridding the environment of 
the intruder. There is reason to suppose that this also happened in Hitler’s 
early life’  
 
(Langer, 1943, p 161).  
 
    Langer further conjectures that, ‘it would seem from the evidence that his 
aggressive fantasies towards the father reached such a point that he became afraid 
of the possibility of retaliation if his secret desires were discovered. The retaliation 
he probably feared was that his father would castrate him or injure his genital 
capacity in some way - a fear which is later expressed in substitute form in his 
syphilophobia’ (Langer, 1943, p 181). There is however, no obvious ‘evidence’ that 
Hitler had aggressive fantasies towards his father, because as Saul Friedländer 
points out, that although the known facts can be related in various ways ‘[w]hat we 
cannot know is how Hitler experienced the events we know, and what fantasies they 
evoked in him’ (Friedländer, 1978, p 48, emphasis in the original). But these 
conjectures and fantasies are constituted by Langer as known facts in his analysis 
of Hitler. 
 
   Proceeding with his inferential schema, Langer believed that intensifying Hitler’s 
antagonistic feelings towards his father, was ‘the fact that as a child he must have 
discovered his parents during intercourse. An examination of the data makes this 
conclusion almost inescapable and from our knowledge of his father’s character 
and past history it is not at all improbable’ (Langer, 1943, p162, my emphasis). 
This witnessing of the primal scene is regarded by Langer as the crucial event in 
Hitler’s psychic development, and it was the ‘hysterical re-living of this experience 
which played an important part in shaping his future destinies’ (Langer, 1943, p 
162). The significance of witnessing parental intercourse or the ‘primal scene’ for 
young children, according to Freud, was that  
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‘they inevitably regard the sexual act as a sort of ill-treatment or act of 
subjugation: they view it, that is, in a sadistic sense. Psycho-analysis also 
shows us that an impression of this kind in early childhood contributes a 
great deal towards a predisposition to a subsequent sadistic displacement of 
the sexual aim. Furthermore, children are much concerned with the problem 
of what sexual intercourse - or, as they put it, being married - consists in: 
and they usually seek a solution of the mystery in some common activity 
concerned with the function of micturition or defaecation’ 
 
(Freud, 2001/1905, S.E. VII, p 196). 
 
    In constructing a clinically congruent account, Langer insists that Hitler must 
have actually witnessed rather than fantasised the ‘primal scene’, seemingly in 
order to justify the severity of Hitler’s conversion hysteria (Langer, 1943). The 
principle psychoanalytic aspects of witnessing the primal scene which reflect the 
leitmotif of Langer’s analysis, are described by Laplanche and Pontalis who write, 
that ‘the act of coitus is understood by the child as an aggression by the father in a 
sado-masochistic relationship; secondly, the scene gives rise to sexual excitation in 
the child while at the same time providing a basis for castration anxiety; thirdly, 
the child interprets what is going on, within the framework of an infantile sexual 
theory, as anal coitus’ (Laplanche and Pontalis, 1988/1973, p 335). Here then is 
the sado-masochism that Langer posits at the core of Hitler’s character; the 
castration anxiety that determined Hitler’s Oedipal hatred of his father and thus 
symbolically of Germany’s enemies; the syphilophobia that he relates to Hitler’s 
anti-Semitism; and the anally voyeuristic coprophilia as the essence of Hitler’s 
perversion (Langer, 1943; Vernon, 1943/1941).  
 
    With the primal scene as central to his analysis, Langer looks for corroborating 
evidence of it. Langer adduces it from a passage in Mein Kampf which alludes to a 
drunken and brutal attack by the father on the mother of a three year old boy 
(Langer, 1943). As in the Mein Kampf passage, there were also five children in 
Hitler’s family so that  ‘we begin to suspect that in this passage Hitler is, in all 
probability, describing conditions in his own home as a child’ (ibid, p 150). 
Although sordid and notwithstanding a much milder possible interpretation of the 
German than Langer uses, it seems farfetched Gatzke argues, to regard it as a 
sexual scene. Hitler famously secretive about his early life, gives no indication that 
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the passage was intended to be autobiographical (Gatzke, 1973). Nor ‘does the grim 
picture painted there agree with what we now know about Hitler’s far from dismal 
childhood’, Hitler’s text in Gatzke’s view, reads more like a clichéd contemporary 
anti-urban novel (Gatze, 1973, p 397).    
  
    The thesis argument is that the psychobiographer’s relationship 
countertransference or otherwise, is not with his subject but with his data. Langer 
sees the young Hitler peering out from the pages of Mein Kampf, but for Erik 
Erikson this is not a disguised version of Hitler’s actual childhood. Rather, it is the 
deliberate attempt to create a propaganda myth blending ‘historical fact and 
significant fiction in such a way that it “rings true” to an area or an era, causing 
pious wonderment and burning ambition’ (Erikson, 1963/1950, pp 327- 328). In 
any event, it is clearly not the corroborative data which makes Langer’s contention 
or ‘fact’ as he has it, of Hitler’s having witnessed the primal scene, an ‘almost 
inescapable’ conclusion (Langer, 1943, p 162).  
 
    In spite of his using other speculative expressions such as ‘not at all 
improbable’, Langer proceeds as if Hitler’s witnessing of the primal scene was a 
confirmed piece of data on which to base further inferences (Langer, 1943, p 62). 
The now reified speculation affirms that, ‘[b]eing a spectator to this early scene had 
many repercussions’, including ‘the fact that he felt that his mother had betrayed 
him in submitting to his father’ (Langer, 1943, p 62, my emphasis). This again is a 
feature of modern personality pathology profiling, where the narrative continues as 
if the reified speculations and their chains of inferences were verified facts. These 
are then used as the basis for further inferences, and with their constant recycling 
in other texts these reified inferences, become a corpus of data from which later 
authors further theorise.   
 
   
5    The Coprophilic Perversion at the Core of Hitler’s Personality.  
     
    The Hitler family doctor Eduard Bloch, describes Hitler’s mother Klara as being 
‘an exemplary housekeeper’, which for Langer would constitute evidence of Klara 
Hitler’s ‘excessive cleanliness and tidiness’ (Langer, 1943 pp 158, 179, my 
emphasis). From this inferred ‘excessive cleanliness’, Langer further infers that 
Klara would also have ‘employed rather stringent measures during the toilet 
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training period of her children’ (Langer, 1943, p 179). Along the inferential chain of 
such strict toilet training, would be that it left ‘a residual tension in this area and is 
regarded by the child as a severe frustration which arouses feelings of hostility. 
This facilitates an alliance with his infantile aggression which finds an avenue for 
expression through anal activities and fantasies. These usually center around 
soiling, humiliation and destruction, and form the basis of a sadistic character’ 
(Langer, 1943, p 179). 
  
    When Hitler’s Oedipus complex was reaching its fullest intensity, it was further 
aggravated by his mother’s pregnancy which, in ‘addition to accentuating his 
hatred for his father and estranging him from his mother, we can assume that this 
event at this particular time served to generate an abnormal curiosity in him’ 
(Langer, 1943, p 181). It was thus that Hitler would have adhered to a childhood 
belief that babies were born via the anus. The desire to verify this fact for himself 
was seen as the basis of Hitler’s putative perversion (Langer, 1943).  
 
    Hitler’s perversion is seen by Langer as a compromise position, ‘between 
psychotic tendencies to eat faeces and drink urine on the one hand, and to live a 
normal socially adjusted life on the other. The compromise is not, however, 
satisfactory to either side of his nature and the struggle between these two diverse 
tendencies continues to rage unconsciously’ (Langer, 1943, p 190). Shunning 
intimate relationships in order to control these despised urges and with a fear of 
genital sex, Hitler had translated these conflicts into symbolic form (Langer, 1943). 
Hitler’s severe guilt reactions to this coprophilic perversion Langer believed, had a 
recognizable influence on his conscious life by externalising his inner struggles, 
manifested in his ruthless purging of the German race.  
 
    Describing the mechanics of this perverted practice, Langer cites a second hand 
account from Otto Strasser, who supposedly heard it from Hitler’s niece and former 
lover Geli Raubel. Geli is said to have ‘stressed the fact that it was of the utmost 
importance to him that she squat over him in such a way that he could see 
everything’ (Langer, 1943, p 186). Interviewed by Langer in person, Strasser was a 
prominent Nazi who claimed to have been intimate with Geli before Hitler reputedly 
drove her to suicide in 1931 (Langer, 1943). Strasser, whose elder brother Gregor 
had been murdered on Hitler’s orders, had fled Germany becoming, as Gatzke 
points out, an ardent opponent of Hitler. According to historian Richard Ovary, 
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Strasser is a very dubious witness, with really no way of knowing whether his 
account was just ‘one of those titillating rumours which people spread about Hitler. 
Add all the stuff about Hitler’s homosexuality and so on and sexual perversions, 
this was a kind of libel if you like, which was more widespread in the 1930’s 
perhaps than we might realise’ (Ovary, BBC 2, the 25th of November, 2005).  
 
    Strasser’s is the key piece of witness evidence for the Langer study, with the 
analytic strands being reversed engineered to accommodate it. Would for example, 
Klara Hitler’s good housekeeping simply have gone unremarked rather than 
becoming a vital inferential link in the analysis, if Langer had not come across 
Strasser’s scatological hearsay evidence? Langer ignores, in Gatzke’s view, ‘equally 
“reliable” accounts of other possible perversions’ of Hitler, or as others ‘believe that 
his sex life is perfectly normal but restricted’ (Gatzke, 1973, pp 399, 400). Indeed, 
according to Gatzke, ‘nothing new has come to light to confirm the account of his 
masochistic perversion, and from what we know about his relations with Eva 
Braun they may have been more nearly normal than assumed’ (Gatzke, 1973, p 
400; Orlow 1974).  
 
    Eva Braun is mentioned in the Langer study and that there was talk of marriage 
after the War, but Langer claims that their affair, ‘was not exclusive’ (Langer, 1943, 
p 83). Langer then seems to have simply discounted her in his schema. In fact, the 
Nazis were able to exercise considerable control over the presentation of Hitler’s 
public image and they ensured, for example, as Halmburger and Brauburger have 
it, that Eva Braun never appeared in public with Hitler (Halmburger and 
Brauburger, 2001). The outward representation of Hitler’s sexuality was dictated by 
the political requirements of Nazi ideology, and that Hitler was not to be seen to 
have romantic liaisons (let alone that he should marry), was as Jung analyses it, a 
function of the symbolic myth that Hitler was wedded to Germany (Jung in 
Knickerbocker, 1939). Indeed, this celibate façade of Hitler’s was a key facet of Nazi 
propaganda and according to Jung, an essential if not subliminal feature of his 
attraction to German women (Jung in Knickerbocker, 1939).  
 
 
6    Hitler’s Syphilophobia and Ideological Anti-Semitism. 
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    As Hitler’s perversion developed and became more disgusting to his ego, it was, 
Langer maintains, ‘disowned and projected upon the Jew’, who ‘became a symbol of 
everything which Hitler hated in himself’, as his inner conflicts became transposed 
onto the racial and national conflicts in the outside world (Langer, 1943, p 209). 
Giving voice to Hitler’s inner struggle, Langer’s narrative declares; ‘“My perversion 
is a parasite which sucks my life-blood and if I am to become great I must rid 
myself of this pestilence.” When we see the connection between his sexual 
perversion and anti-Semitism, we can understand another aspect of his constant 
linking of syphilis with the Jew. These are the things which destroy nations and 
civilizations as a perversion destroys an individual’ (Langer, 1943, p 210).  
 
    Along with this schema of symbolic equivalences Langer presents as a diagnostic 
corollary Hitler’s own syphilophobia as deriving from the castration anxiety 
resulting from the psychic conflict with his father in an extreme Oedipus complex, 
which was seen as the psychic impetus of his ideology. A work conceived before 
Hitler came to power, in The Mass Psychology of Fascism, psychoanalytic theorist 
Wilhelm Reich writes that the ‘irrational fear of syphilis constitutes one of the 
major sources of National Socialism’s political views and its anti-Semitism. It 
follows, then, that racial purity, that is to say, purity of blood is something worth 
striving for and fighting for with every available means’ (Reich, 1970/1933, p 116, 
emphasis in the original). 
 
    Syphilophobia and its link to anti-Semitism was then by no means particular to 
Hitler, but was already a key facet of right-wing German ideology. Paraphrasing 
leading Nazi ideologue Alfred Rosenberg, an early Nazi party member who in 1920 
was already writing anti-Semitic tracts such as The Tracks of the Jew Through the 
Ages and Immorality in the Talmud, Reich puts it that the ‘“intuitive mysticism of 
existential phenomena”, “rise and fall of peoples”, “blood poisoning”, “Jewish world 
plague”, are all part and parcel of the same line, which begins with “fight of the 
blood” and ends with the bloody terror against the “Jewish materialism” of Marx 
and the genocide of the Jews’ (Reich, 1970/1933, p 117-118; Atkinson, 2000). 
Reich himself gives a culturalist, if sexually idiosyncratic, explication of the Nazi 
phenomenon. In denouncing Rosenberg, Reich declares that ‘the core of the fascist 
race theory is a mortal fear of natural sexuality and of its orgasm function’, and 
that the “creed of the soul” and its “purity” is the creed of asexuality, of “sexual 
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purity”. Basically, it is a symptom of the sexual repression and sexual shyness 
brought about by a patriarchal authoritarian society’ (Reich, 1970/1933, p 118).  
 
    In his own colourful evocation, Langer describes Hitler’s transformation from 
wallowing in the scatological mire of Vienna to being the anti-Semitic catalyst for 
the eschatological destiny of the German people. Langer’s discourse of individual 
personal pathology never got to grips, however, as did Reich’s orgasmic societal 
account, with the teleological imperatives of Nazi ideology. Whatever Hitler’s role, 
‘the final solution’ was developed by Nazi ideologues and meticulously 
operationalised by Nazi bureaucrats, at least tacitly acquiesced in by a wider 
society. The ‘Wannsee Protocol’ that the bureaucrats developed reflected the 
generalised fusion of ideological absurdity and the banality of a bureaucratic evil, 
which had its own manic momentum.  
 
    Clare Spark argues that the perspective of the Langer study is further 
complicated by the prevailing anti-Semitic attitude of America’s establishment elite. 
In conjecturing that Hitler may have had Jewish blood, Langer was unduly 
fascinated with the speculation that Hitler may have inherited Jewish ancestry 
from the famous Rothschild’s (Spark, 1999). Maria Anna Schicklgruber, Alois 
Hitler’s mother had been a maid in the Rothschild household when she became 
pregnant with Alois (ibid). Hitler’s seemingly divinely inspired character 
transformation could be explained in that ‘the cunning, commanding Rothschild 
genes have asserted themselves over the fawning and coprophageous ghetto hippie 
Jewish ones displayed in the meek, defeated, forgiving, ignoble, feminized, Christ’ 
(Spark, 1999, p 126).  
 
    Langer makes a number of references to Hitler’s Jewish appearance and to 
Jewish friendships in his Vienna days. From the hypothesis of Hitler’s Jewish 
blood, ‘much of Adolf’s later behaviour could be explained in rather easy terms on 
this basis’ (Langer, 1943, p 96). Langer is signalling his belief that Hitler’s 
‘Jewishness accounted for astonishing feats of statesmanship and duplicity’ (Spark, 
1999, p 123-124). Langer betrays an internalised anti-Semitic stereotype which 
had subverted, according to Spark, his ‘attempt at “a realistic appraisal of the 
German situation”’ (Spark, 1999, p 119). 
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    Erikson, for example, was unconvinced that anti-Semitism was the all pervasive 
signature of Hitler’s persona (Erikson, 1942; Erikson, 1950). Hitler’s horror of 
Jewry as ‘an “emasculating germ”’ represented ‘less than 1 per cent of his nation of 
70 million - is clothed in the imagery of phobia; he describes the danger emanating 
from it as a weakening infection and a dirtying contamination, syphilophobia is the 
least psychiatry can properly diagnose in his case. But here again, it is hard to say 
where personal symptom ends and shrewd propaganda begins’ (Erikson, 1950, p 
341). 
 
    An elitist liberal democratic hegemonic establishment with an inherent fear of 
subversion along with its anti-Semitism had been, for Spark, the actual impetus for 
Langer’s psychological determination of Hitler (Spark, 1999). Indeed as to the 
elitism, Cavin points out that the OSS was known ‘as “Oh So Social” because its 
ranks were filled with upper class old boys and society girls. In a period that 
spanned only four years (1941-1945), the O.S.S. and Office of Wartime Information 
(OWI) tapped the rising, fleeing and falling stars of the American and European 
academy’ (Cavin, 2008, p 1). The ‘fleeing’ part of the academy was almost 
exclusively Jewish, one of whom, was Langer’s colleague, Ernst Kris. The presence 
of this son of a Jewish lawyer from Vienna would suggest that there was at least an 
accommodation between the elitists and the Jews on Langer’s team. 
 
  
7    The Theoretical Distinction between the Langer and Murray Approaches. 
 
    At the time of his cooption onto the Langer team, Murray5 was already a well 
established, indeed pioneering figure, in personality research. From his theoretical 
perspective, an individual was according to Murray, the culturally modified product 
of genetics and environmental experience, which would apply universally across 
different societies (Murray 1938; Murray and Kluckholn, 1953). The key theoretical 
distinction between Murray and Langer was then, that whereas Langer’s more 
traditional emphasis was on Hitler’s acquired character attributes, Murray’s 
emphasis was personological, with its correspondent ‘constitutional determinants’.   
 
                                                 
5
 Murray was head of the psychology department at Harvard University, and had developed the widely 
used Thematic Apperception Test (TAT) for uncovering distinct personality types. 
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    In his account of Hitler’s personality, Murray describes ‘Hitler’s high idealego, 
his pride, his dominance and aggression, and his more or less successful 
repression of the superego – indicate that his personality structure corresponds to 
that of Counteractive Narcism. The implication of this term is that the manifest 
traits and symptoms of Hitler’s personality represent a reaction formation to 
underlying feelings of wounded self-esteem’ (Murray, 1943, p 185). Coupled with 
core hereditary determinants, Hitler’s personality structure was determined by a 
psychic wounding leading to what Murray refers to as counteractive narcissism. 
This formulation contains many of the features of what Otto Kernberg would later 
theorise as malignant narcissism. This reflects the core personological personality 
pathology paradigm, before the theories of Kernberg and Heinz Kohut were 
available for deployment in psychobiography. 
 
    Narcissistic wounding reflecting repressed childhood trauma manifests itself in 
the drive for counteractive aggression or counteractive narcissism and revenge 
(Murray, 1943). Murray’s notion of counteractive narcissism encompasses a 
grandiose persona intent on ‘self-display; extravagant demands for attention and 
applause; vainglory’ (Murray, 1943, p 186). There is a compulsive criminality in 
this personality, whereby he belittles others but suppresses his conscience in order 
to exert revenge for imagined belittling which he cannot tolerate (Murray, 1943).   
 
    Although Murray, as with Langer, regards Hitler’s contentious witnessing of the 
primal scene as the pivotal moment in Hitler’s psychic life, he does not interpret it 
as Langer does, as being the repression of awakened sexuality and betrayal by his 
mother (Murray, 1943; Langer, 1943). Rather, the severe shock of witnessing the 
primal scene resulting in a metaphorical blinding is regarded by Murray as 
crystallising the animus of Hitler towards his brutal father, the traumatic moment 
at which Hitler’s very self is narcissistically wounded (Murray, 1943).  
 
    The psychic energy for narcissistic aggression is triggered in Hitler only much 
later in life, when a somewhat similar stimulus occurred as in the subjugation and 
humiliation of his German motherland, his narcissistic wounding reactivated by his 
now literal blinding in the trenches of World War One (Murray, 1943; Cornell 
University Law Library, 2012). Not the return of the repressed as an underlying 
symbolic equivalence as in Langer’s account, but the existential trigger provoking 
an underlying personality formation into activity. The primal trauma suffered at the 
108 
 
hands of his father had distorted Hitler’s psychic life and selfhood, and Murray 
relates this to Hitler’s ensuing paranoid orientation, boundless pursuit of power for 
himself and Germany, his total lack of conscience and his unconstrained 
aggression in pursuit of power (Murray, 1943).  
 
    Murray’s view was that Hitler was largely in control of his complexes and citing 
Erikson, that he could ‘exploit his hysteria’, thus functioning as it were in a 
borderline state between hysteria and schizophrenia, effectively as a borderline 
personality (Murray, 1943, p 25; Erikson, 1942, p 476). Again, the identification of 
what would become known as borderline traits in particular paranoid projection 
identified by Murray, are presently deployed as one of the major diagnostic 
elements that political personality pathology theorists seek to attribute to their (in 
particular, terrorist), subjects (Kernberg 1975; Post, 2004).  
     
    The mechanism of paranoid projection as a way of maintaining self esteem writes 
Murray,  
 
‘occurs so constantly in Hitler that it is possible to get a very good idea of the 
repudiated portions of his own personality by noticing what he condemns in 
others - treachery, lying, corruption, war-mongering, etc. This mechanism 
would have had more disastrous consequences for his sanity if he had not 
gained some governance over it by consciously adopting (as good political 
strategy) the practice of blaming his opponents’  
        
(Murray, 1943, pp 13-14).  
     
    Although also recognising paranoid projection as Hitler’s principal defence 
mechanism, Langer goes on to incorporate this defence mechanism into his schema 
of symbolic transference. Langer diagnoses Hitler as neurotic. Neurosis defined by 
Laplanche and Pontalis, is a ‘psychogenic affection in which the symptoms are the 
symbolic expression of a psychical conflict whose origins lie in the subject’s 
childhood history; these symptoms constitute compromises between wish and 
defence’ (Laplanche and Pontalis, 1988/1973, p 266). Whereas, Hitler is seen by 
Murray as a psychotic, whose ‘paranoid insanity’ exhibited ‘at one time or another 
all of the classical symptoms of paranoid schizophrenia: hypersensitivity, panics of 
anxiety, irrational jealousy, delusions of persecution, delusions of omnipotence and 
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messiahship’ (Murray, 1943, p 14). These include many of the features that would 
constitute Kernberg’s conceptualisation of malignant narcissism (Kernberg, 1989).  
 
    Langer’s adherence to the early Freudian emphasis on Hitler’s hysteria as 
representing a conversion symptom for neurosis is then at odds with Murray’s 
more modern formulation, of a counteractive or malignant form of narcissism. The 
dynamic evolution of such narcissism degrades the autocrat as Seliktar and Dutter 
have it, ‘into the realm of delusions and fantasies, which, concomitantly, lead to an 
almost complete detachment from reality’ (Seliktar and Dutter, 2009, p 286). 
Indeed Murray predicted that Hitler would eventually succumb to an insanity 
which was being staved off by an ‘insociation ... responsible for the maintenance of 
Hitler’s partial sanity, despite the presence of neurotic and psychotic trends’ 
(Murray, 1943, p 216). It was this insociation he had with the German nation and 
of his being in the company of likeminded men, that had Murray believed, in some 
way psychologically grounded Hitler (Murray, 1943). Although according to Langer, 
Hitler did have characteristics which bordered on the schizophrenic and that ‘faced 
with defeat his psychological structure may collapse and leave him at the mercy of 
his unconscious forces. The possibilities of such an outcome diminish as he 
becomes older’ (Langer, 1943, p 246).  
     
    From Murray’s personological perspective, Hitler’s insanity was inevitable in 
time, whereas from Langer’s characterological viewpoint it became less likely as 
time went by. That Hitler succeeded in remaining within the community of men by 
making a reality of his fantasies, both Murray and Langer agree. Whether Hitler 
sought to evade reality either through psychic mania or in neurotic fantasy, he had 
managed to remain on a more or less even keel by distorting reality itself, the Third 
Reich being an exercise in fantasy and madness in its own right.  
 
 
8    The ‘Prediction’ of Hitler’s Suicide.  
 
    Langer’s enduring claim to fame, is as Walter Waggoner in his New York Times 
obituary puts it, that his ‘prophetic psychological study of Hitler ... predicted 
Hitler’s suicide’ (Walter Waggoner, New York Times, the 10th of July, 1981). 
Similarly, the legend has come down that ‘Langer successfully predicted that Hitler 
would choose to take his own life rather than face capture’ (Horgan, 2002-2003, p 
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3). In his own analysis of the Langer study, Post claims the suicide ‘prediction’ as 
‘an uncanny psychoanalytic intuition’, (Post, BBC 2, the 25th of November, 2005c). 
It was an emblematic triumph for the deployment of psychoanalysis in the nascent 
psychological profiling project and as such, Langer has gone into folklore. 
 
    In 1943, Hitler’s committing suicide was one of eight options that Langer and 
Murray consider. Langer’s assessment being that as not only had Hitler already 
made several suicide attempts and has ‘threatened to commit suicide, but from 
what we know of his psychology this is the most plausible outcome’ (Langer, 1943, 
p 247). Both Murray and Langer concur that Hitler’s ‘would not be a simple 
suicide. He has too much of the dramatic for that and since immortality is one of 
his dominant motives we can imagine that he would stage the most dramatic and 
effective death scene he could possibly think of’ (Langer, 1943, pp 247-248; Murray 
1943). Having ‘vowed that he would commit suicide if his plans miscarried’ Hitler 
would do so in ‘the most dramatic manner’ and he might for example Murray 
speculates, retreat to the Berghof and throw himself off the parapet, or even 
dynamite the whole mountain (Murray, 1943, p 32). 
 
    In his modern slant on Langer’s study, the notion of the empty self, according to 
Post is built up of a compensatory grandiose messianic façade. When that façade is 
shattered, it becomes ‘totally intolerable, and this is really I believe what Langer 
was conjecturing. That if his dream of total glory of total power were to fail and that 
façade of grandiosity was to shatter underneath this, an empty self would emerge 
and this was intolerable for Hitler and he had to kill himself rather than be 
confronted with this total shame and total humiliation’ (Post, BBC 2, 
25/11/2005c). Except of course, that Langer’s prediction was that if Hitler was 
going to commit suicide, he would not skulk away humiliated, but would do so 
publicly as a grand dramatic gesture in order to enhance his reputation. 
 
    Elsewhere in his own profile of Hitler, Post describes Hitler as exemplifying the 
charismatic, destructive paranoid personality, whose ‘personal psychology 
externalized through paranoid dynamics to the national scene’ (Robbins and Post, 
1997, p 276). It is rare, in Post’s view, ‘for a paranoid to commit suicide’ (Robbins 
and Post, 1997, p 79). With the ‘intolerable burden’ of being under attack by an 
internal persecutor, the paranoid projects the ‘internal persecutor onto an outside 
presence against which he must defend himself’ (Robbins and Post, 1997, p 79). 
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There is, for Post, a theoretical quandary of a paranoid Hitler not only committing 
suicide, but in the advocacy Langer’s seminal profile, this suicide becoming the 
teleological inevitability for a narcissistically wounded Hitler (Post, BBC 2, 
25/11/2005c). 
 
    Such post hoc rationalising and reassessment is an inherent feature of modern 
profiling, because psychoanalysis is not designed for such prediction. At the time, 
the principle concern for both Langer and Murray then, was that a dramatic Hitler 
suicide would secure his need for immortality, and achieving his bond with the 
German people through death (Murray, 1943; Langer 1943). Hitler knew according 
to Langer, ‘how to bind the people to him and if he cannot have the bond in life he 
will certainly do his utmost to achieve it in death’ (Langer, 1943, p 248). A dramatic 
Hitler suicide, ‘would be extremely undesirable from our point of view because if it 
is cleverly done it would establish the Hitler legend so firmly in the minds of the 
German people that it might take generations to eradicate it’ (Langer, 1943, p 248). 
A dramatic Hitler suicide would actually ensure the continuing drama of Hitlerism, 
and galvanise the war effort of the German people.  
 
    Hitler did not commit suicide when it was obvious that his plans had miscarried, 
but stuck it out to the bitter end with the Russians just yards from his bunker. 
Hitler’s suicide did not then affect the course of a war, which was already lost. An 
actually defeated Hitler, as opposed to one against whom the tide had turned, by 
this time manifested all the indicators of a suicide risk (Cheng et al, 2000). Suicide, 
rather than face capture by the Russians, would have been a readily predictable 
outcome anyway. 
 
   One of the other options considered by both Langer and Murray was that of Hitler 
being assassinated. One possibility that intrigued both analysts was that this might 
be undertaken by a Jew, even perhaps at Hitler’s own behest. Indeed, Murray 
added Judas betraying Christ to a number of apocalyptic metaphors, wherein 
Hitler could then ‘die in the belief that his fellow countrymen would rise in their 
wrath and massacre every remaining Jew in Germany’ (Murray, 1943, p 30).  Thus, 
suicide by Jew would ensure Hitler’s ultimate vengeance. Langer believed that if the 
assassin were a Jew, ‘this would convince the German people of Hitler’s infallibility 
and strengthen the fanaticism of the German troops and people. Needless to say, it 
would be followed by the complete extermination of all Jews in Germany and the 
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occupied countries’ (Langer, 1943, p 246). It is significant to note that both 
Murray’s dramatic and Langer’s chillingly matter of fact ‘needless to say’ comment 
is to a genocide which would take place after Hitler’s death. 
 
 
9    Post and a Modern Re-Appraisal of the Langer Study. 
 
    Essential to an understanding of Hitler, according to Post, is an appreciation of 
the effect of the void created in childhood by what ‘we’ve come to call the wounded 
self’ (BBC 2, the 25th of November, 2005). This wounding Post infers from Langer’s 
account of the sadistic brutality of Hitler’s father, Alois (ibid). This 
conceptualisation of the wounded self is taken from the much later ‘self psychology’ 
of Heinz Kohut, a notion not mentioned in Langer’s traditionally Freudian study. 
Such psychic or narcissistic wounding is, however a central theme of Murray’s 
personological profile and theoretically prefiguring Kohut (Post in BBC 2, 
25/11/2005c; Kohut, 2009/1971; Murray, 1943). 
 
    The act of being subject to his perversion and being sexually humiliated by a 
woman represented, for Post, the ‘unmasked wish to surrender, capitulate, to be 
seen as a weak man, against which, Hitler was forcefully quarrelling 
psychologically. And its power, the power of the will was central for him. This was a 
highly potent powerful leader, but underneath that, underneath that was this man 
who was desperately weak and desperately afraid and afraid of, yet seeking 
submission and capitulation’ (Post in BBC 2, 25/11/2005c). Rather than reflecting 
Langer’s analysis, this estimation resembles Murray’s analysis, whose view it was 
that Hitler had a ‘relatively weak character (ego structure); his great strength comes 
from an emotional complex which drives him periodically’ (Murray, 1943, p 24). 
 
    The magnitude of Hitler’s ego weakness, according to Post, led to a psychological 
drive to overcome it, and so he ‘developed a compensatory messianic self. Again, 
that’s the surface picture on top of this empty self this wounded self from that 
rather cruel childhood’ (Post in BBC 2, 25/11/2005c; Robbins and Post, 1997). Far 
from resulting from a cruel childhood, Hitler’s ‘Messiah complex’ Langer believed, 
derived from his being spoiled by his mother (Langer, 1943). Although accepting 
that he cannot offer a theoretical explanation for it, Langer believed that the fact of 
Hitler’s mother, being half the age of his father, was critical, because ‘in such cases 
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there is a strong tendency to believe that their father is not their real father and to 
ascribe their birth to some kind of supernatural conception’ (Langer, 1943, p 173). 
This sense of being a ‘chosen one’ in Langer’s schema, also relates to Hitler’s 
morbid fear of death, and the fact that he had survived his numerous tribulations 
(Langer 1943).  
 
    Effectively then, Post has represented his own notion of Hitler’s Messiah complex 
as deriving from the brutality of Hitler’s traumatic childhood, as being what Langer 
had been surmising. Whereas, Langer is actually quite clear in expressing Hitler’s 
Messiah complex as a rationalisation of the near mystical manner in which he has 
from childhood been favoured, and thus survived and prevailed. Again, according 
to Post Hitler was carrying within him this ‘messianic self concept, where it was 
history had written his role to be the most important leader in the world. When 
evidence started coming back that was undeniable that this was not to be, that the 
tide had turned, this was quite shattering for him. Because don’t forget that 
Messianic self concept was the compensatory overlay where the profound void 
within’ (Post in BBC 2, 25/11/2005c). At Hitler’s core, in Langer’s schema, was not 
a void but rather a psychic conflict deriving from sexual perversion. Far from 
crumpling, Hitler had always been bolstered in his Messianic self image by the fact 
that he had overcome numerous tribulations always coming through as a stronger 
character (Langer, 1943). 
 
    Both Langer and Murray are credited with ‘counterintuitively’ predicting that 
Hitler would be seen less frequently as the war went against Germany (BBC 2, 
25/11/2005c). In the summary of his conclusions, Murray notes of Hitler, that 
there ‘is some evidence that his mental powers have been deteriorating since last 
November 1942. Only once or twice has he appeared before his people to enlighten 
or encourage them’ (Murray, 1943, p 29). Corresponding with the disastrous and 
pivotal Battle of Stalingrad, the increasing infrequency of Hitler’s public 
appearances and the impairment of his mental powers was then established fully a 
year before the autumn of 1943, when both reports were published. In such 
circumstances, it would actually have been ‘counterintuitive’ to predict that Hitler 
would now start appearing more frequently. Nazi ideology, as Kris (1943) had 
outlined, was predicated on the Hitler myth and Aryan triumphalism, so that in 
propaganda terms it would have been counterproductive to associate Hitler with 
relentlessly adverse news.  
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    Hitler, obsessed with health, was visibly failing physically as well psychologically. 
This may have been from the cocktail of drugs provided by his physician Dr. 
Theodore Morrel, or even, that he may well have been suffering from a form of 
Parkinson’s disease (Waite, 1977; Redlich, 1998). Whatever actually ailed Hitler, 
both Langer and Murray were well aware at the time, that Hitler was failing. 
Shedding a more contemporary therapeutic light, Richard Ryder writes that, ‘in the 
modern world, Adolf might seek psychological treatment, at least for his occasional 
slight depressions and his fears of impotence. If so, what would a psychiatrist make 
of him? I think a competent professional would give him the diagnostic label of 
Narcissistic Personality Disorder (NPD) with mild Bipolar Disorder (Cyclothymia)’ 
(Ryder, 2009, p 89). 
 
 
10    A Culturally Oriented Psychobiographic Perspective of Hitler. 
 
    The background conceit of the two studies was that the War was still in the 
balance at the time of writing. These supposed intelligence reports were tasked to 
examine only one scenario: Germany’s impending defeat. There are, any number of 
other scenarios, in which the Allies assessing their options, would need to have to 
known if Hitler’s obvious psychological decline was irreversible or whether he would 
recover if Germany’s fortunes improved. There is, then, no discussion of policy 
options, only an assessment of the effect on Hitler of Germany beginning to lose the 
War. The conclusion Langer came to was that in all likelihood Hitler would 
withdraw to the symbolic womb of his Bavarian retreat, where he would probably 
kill himself or in Murray’s view, go insane. 
 
    In his perception of Hitler’s ideological position, Langer says that ‘his judgments 
are based wholly on emotional factors and are then clothed with an intellectual 
argument’ (Langer, 1943, p 117). Both of these psychological profiles underplayed 
the ideological currents within which Hitler’s strategic thinking was formulated. 
Neither the Langer nor Murray reports reflect what David Faber regards as the 
ideological centrality of the concept of Lebensraum, or the strength and effect of 
Hitler’s own ideological commitment to it (Faber, 2008). Hitler’s ideological trilogy 
from which he never wavered was represented according to Phillip Blood, by three 
fundamental abstractions, the ‘race for space and space for race, purified by a 
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perpetual state of war’ (Blood, 2006, xiii). Hitler’s ambition was, ‘to bequeath 
German “living space” (Lebensraum), a concept not conjured up by him and 
incorrectly assumed to mean only the acquisition of territory. Hitler’s Lebensraum 
was about German existence, in its broadest meaning, in a Germanic world’ (Blood, 
2006, xiii).  
 
    Although citing Erikson’s analysis of Hitler’s relationship to the German people, 
Murray similarly fails to pursue Erikson’s notion that ‘German space concepts, 
inner disunity, encirclement, and lebensraum seem vague and often insincere to the 
non- German. He does not realize that in Germany these words carry a conviction 
far beyond that of ordinary logic’ (Erikson, 1942, p 483, emphasis in the original). 
Hitler’s ideological commitment had popular resonance, as he not only touted the 
lure of military conquest, but also promised a nation with burning spiritual 
ambition, ‘a victory of race consciousness over the “bacterial” invasion of foreign 
aesthetics and ethics within the German mind. His aim was not only the eternal 
obliteration of Germany’s military defeat in the first World War, but also a complete 
purge of the corrupt foreign values which had invaded German culture’ (Erikson, 
1950, p 348).  
 
    For Jung, Hitler was answering a call from a nation which itself had a Messiah 
complex intensified by defeat in World War One. On the back of this, the Nazis 
ideologically transformed Germany with their cult of Hitler (Jung in Knickerbocker, 
1939). There was then an historical conceptualisation of national destiny to which 
Hitler was attuned. This is underplayed by the clinical orientation of personality 
pathology profiling which is predicated on a certain ahistoric psychic determinism. 
In their more culturally-oriented psychobiographic analyses, both Erikson and 
Jung can envisage Hitler reacting to the zeitgeist rather than solely his own psychic 
impulsions.  
 
    Indeed, amidst the general euphoria of the signing of the Munich Agreement, 
Jung was still able to predict that Hitler would simply disregard it because the 
imperative of his ideological goal was to the East and Russia (Jung in 
Knickerbocker, 1939). Even in the autumn of 1943 with all the information filtering 
through about the treatment of the Jews in occupied Europe, Langer’s and 
Murray’s respective analyses of Hitler still did not lead them to anticipate perhaps 
the most profound signifier of the War, the Holocaust. Whereas, Reich had 
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pronounced the genocide of the Jews as the teleological inevitability of Nazi ideology 
before Hitler even came to power (Reich, 1939). 
 
    Langer had been tasked, as Pick points out, to produce a ‘piece of intelligence’ 
demonstrating ‘how far a clinical reading of Hitler could go beyond the banal 
observations of non-specialists’ (Pick, 2012, pp 128, 144, emphasis in the original). 
Indeed, it was Langer’s later belief that if a study such as his had been available 
much earlier ‘there might not have been a Munich’ (Langer, 1972, p 32). That Hitler 
was an odd character was, according to Ovary, already well known, and rumours 
concerning his sexuality were both lurid and rife (Ovary, BBC 2, the 25th of 
November, 2005). So would clinically attesting these rumours have served policy 
makers better than the more culturally oriented understanding of an ideologically 
driven Hitler and his attachment to the semi-mystical notion of Lebensraum, which 
Erikson and Jung argued (Jung, 1939; Erikson, 1942)? 
 
 
 
11    Conclusion. 
 
    The argument of this chapter has been that in their clinical pathographic 
profiling, Langer and Murray move the emphasis away from the historical 
contingencies and ideological currents which determine both the possibilities and 
constraints in the trajectory of their subject Hitler. Through Post’s adoption of its 
methodology for his CIA unit, the Langer study would become the template for 
modern clinical ‘at a distance’ adversarial political profiling.     
 
    The unique and distinctive contribution of Langer was in the view of this thesis, 
in clinically adapting Strasser’s problematic hearsay evidence concerning Hitler’s 
coprophilic viewing habits, to a diagnostic strand which was seen as determining 
Hitler’s political and ideological rationale (Langer, 1943). It is its diagnostic basis 
which gives Langer’s findings, ergo predictions, their clinical validity, and Hitler’s 
coprophilic perversion is critical. Otherwise, the Langer analysis simply reflects the 
general themes extant in the literature, in particular, the Vernon ‘Case History’ 
used by both Langer and Murray.  
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    Similarly, the relationship of Hitler’s personality to the German people in 
projecting out these fantasies and their unconscious assimilation by them, were 
already being explored psychoanalytically. Jung in a 1938 radio broadcast analysed 
Hitler’s siren voice as ‘nothing other than his unconscious into which the German 
people have projected their own selves’ (Jung quoted in Cavin, 2008, p 7). In 1942, 
Erikson describes Hitler’s ‘imagery, common and monomanic as it seems, reflects a 
typical aspect of German fantasy life’ Erikson, 1942, p 488). 
     
    I argue that the Langer and Murray profiles represent two different theoretical 
approaches in psychobiography. Langer’s characterological analysis is predicated 
on the unfolding of Hitler’s Oedipus complex and his childhood and sexual 
development and relies on speculative chains of inference. Murray takes the more 
direct personological approach inferring Hitler’s personality from his perceived 
adult psychic functioning. Childhood trauma leads to an aggressively narcissistic 
Hitler who pursues his own ends regardless of the consequences. Langer’s Hitler is 
a neurotic conflicted soul with the two tendencies of his character, one moral one 
and one psychotic at war with each other. Murray’s Hitler is effectively a one 
dimensional borderline psychopath who is only temporarily staving off psychosis 
because he has the political power to make his fantasies an existential reality. 
 
    The underlying imperative that Post took from the Langer study to his dedicated 
CIA profiling unit is that ‘you can’t deter optimally a leader you don’t understand, 
and to relegate be it a Hitler or Joseph Stalin and or a Saddam Hussein to a crazy 
evil madman, really degrades our capacity to deal with them optimally because 
we’re not pushing them. What makes them tick?’ (Post, BBC 2, the 25th of 
November, 2005c, my emphasis).  
 
    With the increasing influence of psychoanalysis in America after World War Two, 
what made politicians and indeed public figures ‘tick’, would become a 
preoccupation of not only Post at an institutional level but also of particularly 
American psychoanalysis in general. After the Second World War, psychoanalysis 
became more deeply implicated in American culture and now living public figures 
were increasing put under a public psychoanalytic gaze. The next chapter describes 
how psychoanalytic analyses ‘at a distance’ became integrated into American 
political culture and the ethical consequences for American psychiatry and 
psychoanalysis. 
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1    Introduction.  
 
 
    This chapter traces the impact of ‘at a distance’ psychoanalytic analyses in post-
war American political culture. In post-war America, ‘analysts’, that is to say 
psychoanalysts and psychiatrists practicing psychoanalysis, had become, the new 
‘sages and critics of the social weal’ (Mack, 1971, p 157).  As such, they found 
themselves drawn into a more active participation in public life. Within this 
normative context, they began to indentify more readily with other individuals in 
the institutional domain, becoming ‘like other members of the establishment’ (ibid). 
Indeed a psychoanalytic interest in political leaders could be seen as in part, a 
function of the inherent narcissism of interest in people like themselves (Mack, 
1971).  
 
    The conventional wisdom of the day, ‘suggested that the psychiatrist had become 
the priest or authority figure in American culture within a new secularism’ 
(Burnham, 1978, p 6). Carol Kahn Strauss similarly opines that psychoanalysis 
was ‘almost the new religion of capitalism’, with the increasing influence of 
psychoanalysis contemporaneous with major changes that were taking place in 
American culture (Kahn Strauss, 2010). An ongoing concern of these analysts was 
the damage that could be wrought by the mentally ill, in particular paranoid 
leaders (Mack, 1971), a concern newly heightened by the murderous capacity of the 
nuclear age. This chapter will seek to show how psychoanalysis itself became 
implicated in a climate of American political paranoia.  
 
    This paranoia was also played out in the public sphere of psychoanalysis, and 
the chapter critiques the resolution of the ethical issues which were brought to a 
head through the furore over the politically motivated psychological denigration of 
US presidential candidate, Barry Goldwater. The chapter relates Jerrold Post’s 
ongoing influence in the US/Israeli anti-terrorist and security matrix, and 
discusses the role of the ‘psychoanalytic expert’ in the public and institutional 
sphere 
 
 
2    Psychological Wellbeing in the American Political Establishment. 
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    Despite the obvious danger posed by pathological or indeed mentally ill leaders, 
Mack (1971) believed that there were important caveats to the direct institutional 
engagement of analysts as monitors of psychological wellbeing, from within the 
establishment. How does the analyst, questions Mack, ‘remain above the suspicion 
of using his knowledge and authority to influence policy? Or, conversely, how does 
he himself remain uninfluenced by the pressures and political purposes of those 
who surround the leader’ (Mack, 1971, p 159)? Indeed Mack’s reservations, as this 
critique seeks to demonstrate, were extremely apposite.  From their hegemonic 
position, institutionally engaged analysts were able to dictate what was sayable in 
the discourse, by determining who was to be labelled as paranoid or otherwise 
pathological. As establishment figures themselves, they were deploying 
psychoanalytic concepts as a function of what was now their own normative 
discourse.  
 
    Expanding on his thesis, Mack prays in aid the psychoanalytically trained social 
scientist Arnold Rogow’s 1963 psychobiography of James Forrestal6. In the case of 
Forrestal, it was in fact difficult ‘to distinguish between political positions and 
policies which were an exaggeration of a ‘‘tough” conservative stance of military 
preparedness combined with an understandable suspiciousness of Russia, from 
attitudes and actions that reflected his paranoid illness’ (Mack, 1971, p 158). 
Indeed as in Forrestal’s case, a paranoid leader’s views might well ‘correspond to 
the fears and political purposes of large groups of people both within and without 
the government’ (ibid). 
 
    What was seen as an exaggerated American emphasis on military planning was 
related to Forrestal’s supposedly delusional focus on a communist conspiracy 
(Mack, 1971). There was the further danger of those, not actually clinically ill, 
acting out similar psychic conflicts in pursuance of political office. It was then, 
seen as critical to take measures in order to identify them also (ibid). Diagnostic 
criteria are then deployed in order to assess individuals supposedly displaying 
symptoms of pathology similar to those suffering clinical illness. The stigmatising 
effect of mental illness or pathology permeates every aspect of the individual, 
influencing every perception of him and his achievements (Akashah and Tennant, 
1980). 
                                                 
6
 Forrestal was the first US Secretary for defence and the highest ranking American leader to commit 
suicide. 
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    Something of a maverick, Forrestal’s ideas were at odds with the post-war liberal 
intellectual milieu and Akashah and Tennant believe that Forrestal’s supposed 
pathology was exploited politically. In treatment following what appeared to be a 
suicide attempt, Forrestal was diagnosed as having a depression akin to severe 
battle fatigue and the diagnosis was used by the Russians to cast doubt on 
American foreign policy making in general. Forrestal’s career was reinterpreted ‘by 
Americans as well as Russians as merely symptoms of his alleged illness’ (Akashah 
and Tennant, 1980, p 89).  
 
    Akashah and Tennant list Rogow’s interpretations of Forrestal’s behaviour which 
supposedly and retrospectively demonstrated or retrodicted Forrestal’s paranoid 
functioning, without the influence of a pathological diagnosis. Thus they give 
alternative explanations for his behaviour. For example, one of the symptoms 
Rogow had used in determining Forrestal’s paranoia was that he believed he was 
being followed (Akashah and Tennant, 1980, p 89). Having controversially opposed 
the creation of the state of Israel in 1948, as Akasha and Tennant point out, he 
was actually being followed by the US secret services and probably by Israeli 
agents, who were definitely tailing his staff (ibid).  
 
    Shrill attacks were levelled against Forrestal by sections of the media whilst he 
was in office, although there was some belated acceptance that Forrestal had been 
hectored ‘with innuendos and false accusations’ (Akashah and Tennant, 1980, p 
91). It is a democratic deficit if a pathological labelling keeps such ‘holders of 
unconventional but possible valuable ideas from being heard’ (Akashah and 
Tennant, 1980, p 92).  
   
 
3    Renatus Hartogs and the ‘Schizoid’ Lee Harvey Oswald. 
 
    In the aftermath of the November 22nd 1963 assassination of President John F. 
Kennedy, the American media sought the expertise of the comforting and avuncular 
psychiatry represented by figures such as Renatus Hartogs. A leading émigré 
psychoanalytic psychiatrist working at New York City’s juvenile reformatory the 
Youth House, Hartogs was frequently interviewed when sensational murders 
occurred, Hartogs readily assured the public that it was actually the perpetrator 
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and not they who was paranoid, and determined to outrage them from motives of 
his own personal grandiosity (Hartogs Testimony to Warren Commission, 16th April 
1964a; Donald Jackson, Life, 21st of February 1964; Warren Commission, 1964).  
 
    In his public diagnosis of Oswald’s personality formation, Hartogs would base 
his analysis upon the perception of the public persona, of the now putatively 
pathological adult subject. In this instance and unusually, there was actual clinical 
evidence of childhood psychological functioning available in order to attest or falsify 
these analytic inferences. Almost incredibly and unbeknownst to Hartogs at the 
time, the evidence was from a diagnosis made by Hartogs himself, when the young 
Oswald had been referred by juvenile court to the Youth House in New York.  
 
    Shortly after Oswald’s own assassination at the hands of Jack Ruby, a 
confidential psychiatric report had been released to the FBI by Judge Florence 
Kelley. The New York Post on November 30th 1963 cited from the Hartogs report 
that, Oswald had had a ‘psychiatric and truancy record in the Bronx’ (Greg Parker, 
Scribd.com, the 7th of February, 2008). The article continued that it was ‘“learned 
from other sources that the psychiatric report recommended young Oswald - then 
only 13 - for commitment” ... this recommendation was though “turned down by 
the court” adding that “the probation report found schizophrenic tendencies and 
said that Oswald was “‘potentially dangerous’”’ (Greg Parker, Scribd.com, the 7th of 
February, 2008). 
 
    Seemingly vindicating Hartogs’ made-for-TV analysis, there was further leaking 
from the law enforcement team investigating the assassination. As reported by 
Donald Jackson reported for Life magazine that a ‘diagnosis of incipient 
schizophrenia was made, based on the boy’s detachment from the world and 
pathological changes in his value system. His outlook on life had strongly paranoid 
overtones. The immediate and long range consequences of these features, in 
addition to his inability to verbalize hostility, led to an additional diagnosis: 
“potential dangerousness”’ (Donald Jackson, Life, 21st of February, 1964, p 72). It 
was not fully clear in the reporting however, what was now coming from 
authoritative sources, or what might have been rehashed from other sources such 
as Hartogs’ own later opining.  
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    The upshot was that Hartogs believed that he recognised the phrasing of 
‘incipient schizophrenic’ and ‘potentially dangerous’ as being his own. He also 
remembered that he was actually the psychiatrist who had made the original 
clinical diagnosis of Oswald, and that it was a ‘fantastic’ coincidence as he would 
later tell the Warren Commission set up to investigate the assassination, that he 
had been asked for his views on TV before knowing Oswald’s identity (Hartogs 
Testimony to Warren Commission, 16th April 1964a, p 7). Hartogs would go on to 
state publicly that he was not surprised that Oswald had been arrested, as 
‘psychologically’, he had ‘all the qualifications of being a potential assassin’ 
(Hartogs quoted by Donald Jackson, Life, 21st of February, 1964, p 72).  
 
    To the Warren Commission Hartogs testified that Oswald had ‘definite traits of 
dangerousness. In other words, this child had a potential for explosive, aggressive, 
assaultive acting out which was rather unusual to find in a child who was sent to 
Youth House on such a mild charge as truancy from school’ (Hartogs Testimony to 
Warren Commission, 16th April 1964a, p 4). Hartogs had therefore recommended 
that Oswald be institutionalised immediately. Whilst giving his testimony under 
oath to the Warren Commission, Hartogs was handed a copy of his actual report 
which he hadn’t seen in the intervening eleven years. Under cross examination 
from the attorney for the Commission Walter Liebeler, Hartogs somewhat ruefully 
accepted that it ‘contradicts my recollection’ (Hartogs Testimony to Warren 
Commission, 16th April 1964a, p 9).  
 
    What Hartogs had actually recommended, was that rather than being 
institutionalised immediately, Oswald ‘should be placed on probation under the 
condition that he seek help and guidance through contact with a child guidance 
clinic, where he should be treated preferably by a male psychiatrist who could 
substitute, to a certain degree at least, for the lack of father figure. At the same 
time, his mother should be urged to seek psychotherapeutic guidance through 
contact with a family agency’ (Hartogs, 1953, p 3). The tenor and substance of 
these recommendations if not wholly in response to, were certainly attuned to the 
attitude of the judge, who had in the first instance referred Oswald to the Youth 
House for reports, on the relatively minor issue of truancy. Because in 1953, the 
judge had been chiefly concerned by the fact that Oswald was being brought up by 
a single mother, particularly one who was ‘selfinvolved and conflicted’ (Hartogs, 
1953, p 2; Hartogs and Freeman, 1965).  
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    What seems to have caused the initial confusion arising out of Judge Kelley’s 
1963 press release was the wording of Hartogs’ diagnosis that, ‘Lee has to be 
diagnosed as “personality pattern disturbance with schizoid features and passive-
aggressive tendencies”’ (Hartogs, 1953, p 2). Schizoid features are characterised ‘by 
a long-standing pattern of detachment from social relationships ... the typical 
“loner”’, who reacts ‘passively to adverse circumstances’ (Psych Central, 1992-
2012). Passive-aggressive individuals ‘appear to comply or act appropriately, but 
actually negatively and passively resist’ and are resentful, stubborn, 
‘[a]rgumentative, sulky, and hostile especially towards authority figures’ (Langone 
Medical Center, 2011).  
 
    The term schizoid has changed its usage over time, and the possible confusion in 
the press is summed up by the entry in the American Heritage Medical Dictionary 
definition: ‘1. Of, relating to, or having a personality marked by extreme shyness, 
seclusiveness, and an inability to form close friendships or social relationships. 
2. Schizophrenic. No longer in scientific use’ (Free Dictionary, 2012). Although the 
second definition may still have been current in a well-thumbed newsroom medical 
dictionary at the time, Hartogs’ diagnosis is clearly not referring to Oswald as an 
actual schizophrenic, but rather delineating Oswald’s solitary and sulky character 
as the reason for his truanting.  
 
    Out of context and by a process of misinterpretation akin to Chinese whispers, 
the Hartogs’ report conclusions, and indeed Hartogs own later position are 
transmogrified. Hartogs’ report was that ‘[n]o finding of neurological impairment or 
psychotic mental changes could be made. Lee has to be diagnosed as “personality 
pattern disturbance with schizoid features and passive - aggressive tendencies”’ 
(Hartogs, 1953, p 2). The Warren Commission could find no mention of Hartog’s 
later claim of ‘strongly paranoid overtones’ (Warren Commission,1964, p 379). In 
his testimony to the Warren Commission, Hartogs was asked to explain why he 
later diagnosed a ‘severe personality disturbance’, that Oswald was ‘a potential 
assassin, potentially dangerous ... insipient schizophrenic’ (Liebeler cross 
examination of Hartogs Testimony to Warren Commission, 16th April 1964a, p 8). 
 
    Counsel for the Commission Wesley Liebeler similarly put it to Hartogs that 
there was actually nothing in the report to indicate potential violence (Liebeler 
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cross examination of Hartogs Testimony to Warren Commission, 16th April 1964a). 
Hartogs replied that although it wasn’t mentioned in the report, he had ‘implied it 
by the diagnosis of passive-aggressive’ (Hartogs Testimony to Warren Commission, 
16th April 1964a, p 9). Passive-aggressive, according to Hartogs, indicated a ‘passive 
retiring surface façade, under which the child hides considerable hostility of 
various degrees ... usually in a passive-aggressive individual the aggressiveness can 
be triggered off and provoked in stress situations or if he nourishes his hate and 
his hostility for considerable length of time so that the passive surface façade all of 
a sudden explodes’ (Hartogs Testimony to Warren Commission, 16th April 1964a, p 
9, p 10).  
 
   There was evidence submitted to the Warren Commission which very much 
supported Hartogs’ original contention of Oswald as the archetypal passive-
aggressive loner. Although not recognised as psychiatrically distinct, the passive 
aggressive disorder represents unexpressed anger and hostility, and is a chronic 
condition. Passivity, is its manifestation, it is not the cover for an incipient but 
suppressed violent aggression ready to explode (Langone Medical Center, 2011). 
From his time in the U.S. marines, for example, the Warren Commission took 
testimony that Oswald manifested his feelings ‘about authority by baiting his 
officers’, and ‘that Oswald’s extreme personal sloppiness in the Marine Corps “fitted 
into a general personality pattern of his: to do whatever was not wanted of him, a 
recalcitrant trend in his personality”’ (Warren Commission, 1964, p 385). This 
reflects the passive aggressive symptomology of ‘[d]eliberate inefficiency - 
purposefully performing in an incompetent manner’ (Langone Medical Center, 
2011). Oswald according to evidence submitted to the Warren Commission, 
“seemed to be a person who would go out of his way to get into trouble” and then 
used the “special treatment” he received as an example of the way in which he was 
being picked on and “as a means of getting or attempting to get sympathy”’ (Warren 
Commission, 1964, p 386). 
 
    Although Hartogs may have unwittingly resolved on the extreme volte face from 
his original analysis, the more subtle revision of profiles to accommodate 
contradictory new evidence within a theoretical schema would become a standard 
retrodictory functioning of the profiling process. Despite Hartogs’ tortuous 
retrodictory justification under oath, the Warren Commission’s unequivocal 
assessment was that ‘[c]ontrary to reports that appeared after the assassination, 
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the psychiatric examination did not indicate that Lee Oswald was a potential 
assassin, potentially dangerous, that “his outlook on life had strongly paranoid 
overtones” or that he should be institutionalized’ (Warren Commission, 1964, p 
379).  
 
 
4    Hartogs the Accidental Profiler  
 
    Hartogs’ later psychoanalytic profile of Oswald incorporates both a 
characterological developmental analysis, and a personological determination of 
narcissistic personality pathology predicated on pre-Oedipal trauma. Co-authored 
by journalist Lucy Freeman, Hartogs’ book was actually based on evidence 
submitted to the Warren Commission. Hartogs claimed that he ‘would describe Lee 
Harvey Oswald at the time I saw him as being potentially explosive. I suggested 
that he receive psychiatric treatment so that his inner violence - what might be 
called his silent rage - would not later erupt and cause harm. I handed in my 
recommendation, hoping it would be carried out’ (Hartogs and Freeman, 1965, p 
11). Even accepting Hartogs’ idiosyncratic understanding of what is implied by the 
phrase ‘passive-aggressive tendencies’, it is still a very revisionist interpretation of 
his original report (Hartogs, 1953).  
 
    The unempathetic parenting of Oswald’s mother is referred to in Hartogs original 
report and he posits a personological notion of early developmental trauma brought 
about by inadequate parenting as affecting the personality. Theorists such as Heinz 
Kohut (1971) and Otto Kernberg (1975) would later incorporate such notions into 
their formulations of narcissistic injury and narcissistic rage. The two year old 
Oswald, according to Hartogs, also suffered the physical and psychological trauma 
of being beaten by two child minders. This was compounded in the child, by a 
sense that  
 
‘his mother has abandoned him because she is angry at him, and he may 
feel a murderous rage at her for deserting him. He may show his fury by 
screaming at whoever takes care of him. Or else he may turn his anger 
inward, becoming depressed as he hates himself for not being able to cope 
with what he believes to be his mother’s forsaking him’  
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           (Hartogs and Freeman, 1965, p 20).  
 
    Merging his original diagnostic formulation, Hartogs also posits a form of 
characterological sexually deterministic analysis predicated on Oswald’s putative 
castration anxiety, alongside the solitary or schizoid features which he notes in his 
original report. As there was difficulty for Oswald in controlling ‘his aggressive and 
sexual desires, any physical contact, with either male or female, would be 
dangerous’ (Hartogs and Freeman, 1965, p 95). With his delusions of grandeur and 
thwarted psychosexual development, in killing Kennedy Oswald was displacing the 
Oedipal hatred of his fantasised all powerful dead father, killing the all powerful 
presidential ‘father figure’ (Hartogs and Freeman, 1965, p 259). Oswald also 
demonstrated according to Hartogs, a pre-Oedipal hatred of his mother. This again 
reflects the theorisation of primitive oral rage that Kernberg would later propose 
along with narcissistic grandiosity, as the dominant features of his borderline 
personality formation. This is a concept regularly deployed in personality pathology 
profiling. 
 
    In adapting and subsuming his own early clinical assessment, and making a 
very particular analysis of evidence submitted to the Warren Commission, Hartogs 
has effectively retrodicted what this thesis typifies as a modern personality 
pathology profile, predicated on childhood trauma and narcissistic rage. The 
inherent paradox in such an analysis is that it is only when the deed is done, that 
it is it retrospectively possible to say that this was ‘predictable’. There are however, 
many individuals with similar backgrounds, who do not go on to become 
pathological let alone assassins. Any number of innocent people with these 
backgrounds, could then, become unnecessarily and indeed unfairly suspect.  
 
    This form of analysis is then, inherently retrodictive, rather than predictive, and 
as Hartogs demonstrates that it is always possible to superimpose a determination 
of narcissistic personality pathology, onto even previously contra-indicated clinical 
diagnoses. Similarly, in his report, Hartogs analysis quite accurately describes how 
Oswald’s passive aggressive, schizoid personality would actually develop as an 
adult. Despite later claims to the contrary, he does not predict Oswald’s future 
violent notoriety, nor can personality pathology theory in general terms, predict the 
contingent trajectory of a subject. Hartogs, as Jerrold Post would later do with his 
profile of Osama bin Laden, sought to fulfil the role of public analyst by redirecting 
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paranoid projections and effecting, a form of public therapeutic holding. With albeit 
the unwitting revision of his own diagnosis, Hartogs deploys a key element in the 
‘at a distance’ profiling process of ‘confirmatory bias’, as he selectively adduces any 
evidence he can adapt to his current position.  
 
    As a form of hindsight bias, Hartogs, constructs a new causal narrative 
predicated on the belief that he had known that Oswald would turn out to be an 
assassin, rather than on the a priori objectivity of his original report (Satel, 2004). 
The power of the current persona of the individual to influence the first impression 
or countertransference, is the basis for ‘at a distance’ diagnoses. 
Psychobiographical data is then retrofitted, to accommodate the current perception. 
Here it is poignantly and indeed tellingly demonstrated, because in doing so, 
Hartogs denies the evidence of his own original and, in my estimation quite 
competent, analysis.    
 
 
5    Barry Goldwater: The Anti-Establishment Presidential Candidate. 
 
    Facing Democratic President Lyndon Johnson in the 1964 US presidential 
election was the right-wing Republican senator from Arizona Barry Goldwater. 
Something of an establishment outsider at that time, Goldwater represented a 
right-wing reaction to the then dominant liberal intellectual and establishment 
milieu, who, were particularly exercised by Goldwater’s espousal of the deployment 
of nuclear weapons in Vietnam (Spartacus Educational, 2012). Although he lost the 
general election by a landslide, Goldwater did succeed in wresting the Republican 
Party away from its liberal East Coast power nexus, which was to pave the way for 
the ultimate success of Ronald Reagan (Bart Barnes, Washington Post, Saturday, 
May 30th, 1998).  
 
    Many analysts, both psychoanalytic and psychiatric, were part of the liberal 
intellectual milieu highly antipathetic to Goldwater. It was however, to the horror of 
the American Psychiatric Association (APA) that a large number of its members, 
were prepared to give politically motivated ‘at a distance’ clinical diagnoses of 
Goldwater. The APA President and medical directors, wrote to Fact magazine, the 
publisher of these psychoanalytic/psychiatric polemics that, ‘“By attaching the 
stigma of extreme political partisanship to the psychiatric profession as a whole in 
129 
 
the heated climate of the current political campaign, Fact has in effect 
administered a low blow to all who would advance the treatment and care of the 
mentally ill of America”’ (APA statement quoted in John Mayer, Psychology Today, 
16th of August, 2009). The reliably forthright Hartogs writes for example, that 
Goldwater was in his ‘opinion emotionally unstable, immature, volatile, 
unpredictable, hostile, and mentally unbalanced. He is totally unfit for public office 
and a menace to society’ (Renatus Hartogs in Fact magazine, September-October, 
1964b, p 31). 
 
    In the 1964 presidential campaign, Goldwater’s blunt speaking had served to 
alarm the American public. At the Republican Convention itself, although 
Goldwater was actually paraphrasing Cicero, his now oft quoted sentiment that 
‘“extremism in the defense of liberty is no vice and . . . moderation in the pursuit of 
justice is no virtue”’ caused according to Barnes, a similar furore (Bart Barnes, 
Washington Post, Saturday, 30th of May, 1998). In the febrile election atmosphere, 
the liberal wing of his own party had already branded him as Goldwater himself 
later recalled, a ‘fascist, a racist, a trigger-happy warmonger, a nuclear madman 
and the candidate who couldn’t win’ (ibid).  
 
 
6    ‘Psychiatrists use Curse Words’: Slander by Diagnosis. 
 
     Dr Karl Menninger’s aphorism above refers to the phenomenon that as Ralph 
Slovenko expresses it, ‘labels used by psychiatrists have replaced curse words in 
common discourse and are now used to stigmatize’ (Slovenko, 2000, p 111). 
Technical phrases such as psychotic or psychopath no longer simply reflect 
psychiatric illness but are pejorative terms for a despised ‘Other’ (Slovenko, 2000). 
Fact magazine in its much discussed edition featuring Goldwater, published a 
sample of the views of the 2417 psychiatrists who responded to a survey question 
asking, ‘Do you believe Barry Goldwater is psychologically fit to serve as President 
of the United States?’ (Fact magazine, September-October, 1964). 657 had 
responded that Goldwater was fit, 571 said that they had insufficient information 
to respond and the rest gave Fact its front cover of, ‘1,189 Psychiatrists Say 
Goldwater Is Unfit To Be President’ (Fact magazine, September-October, 1964).  
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   These 1,189 psychiatrists were then, prepared to make adverse clinical 
appraisals taking political posturing at face value, and ratcheting up the feverish 
electoral tension. One anonymous contributor included what would become 
something of a standard adversarial personality pathology profile: 
 
‘authoritarian, megalomanic, grandiose, basically narcissistic 
characters with a warped, highly personal sense of reality, with 
significant unresolved problems with their personal and sexual 
identity, whose over simple solutions to complex problems symbolize 
an infantile, magical manner of thinking and feeling, and who, in part 
as a result of glaring failure to look into and understand themselves 
and their own motives, tend to project what are at root their own 
inner problems onto persons and events outside themselves. The 
extreme example of this was, of course, Hitler, whose paranoid and 
megaloid delusions were tragic attempts to compensate for his 
profound inner sense of worthlessness and impotence. He projected 
his own guilt and blame onto the Jews. Goldwater projects them 
similarly onto the “Communist conspiracy” and “Eastern liberal 
interests.” Life has, for such persons, little meaning unless they can 
“identify” some organized plot by someone or some group directed 
against them. Their paranoid thinking is thus abundantly evident’  
 
(Fact magazine, 1964, p 41). 
 
    Dr Randolph Leigh Jr. warned that he was ‘highly fearful of Senator Goldwater’s 
casually precipitating us into an all-out atomic war. His public utterances strongly 
suggest the megalomania of a paranoid personality ... as dangerous as a time-bomb 
with a short fuse’ (Randolph Leigh, in Fact magazine, September-October, 1964, p 
30). Dr Chester W. Johnson Jr.’s assessment was that ‘Goldwater has the same 
pathological make-up as Hitler, Castro, Stalin and other known schizophrenic 
leaders’ (Chester Johnson, in Fact magazine, September-October, 1964, p 26). 
Johnson’s reasons being twofold, ‘(1) Logical or scientific or truthful analysis of his 
statements is completely impossible. His words are double-talk!  
(2) His statements and actions show distinct persecution feelings’ (Chester 
Johnson, in Fact magazine, September-October, 1964, p 26). Dr Johnson’s analysis 
was based on statements that he himself regarded as impossible to analyse. 
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Notwithstanding, addressing the issue that there were too few personal details on 
Goldwater to constitute the clinical evidence required for making a diagnosis of 
paranoia, Dr Eugene V. Resnick asked, ‘would it have been impossible to make this 
diagnosis of Hitler and Stalin before their careers (and their illnesses) came into full 
bloom!’ (Eugene Resnick in Fact magazine, September-October, 1964, p 29). 
 
    Of Goldwater’s conservatism, Dr Alfred Berl has it that, Goldwater ‘feels 
genuinely a part of these frustrated and malcontented “conservatives.” They reflect 
his own paranoid and omnipotent tendencies ... He projects his failures onto the 
public, as was characteristic of dictators in the ‘30s and ‘40s’ (Alfred Berl in Fact 
magazine, September-October, 1964 p 26). In respect of Goldwater’s perceived 
illiberalism, supervising psychiatrist Max Dahl was ‘tempted to call’ Goldwater a 
‘“frustrated Jew.” Sure enough he was eulogized by an insincere orator as “the 
peddler’s grandson,” and he himself has on occasion declared that he is proud of 
his ancestry. It is, however, abundantly clear to me that he has never forgiven his 
father for being a Jew ... To add the final touch, he espoused the cause of extremist 
groups who violently hate not only the Jews but also Negroes and Catholics’ (Max 
Dahl, in Fact magazine, September-October, 1964, pp 33-34).  
 
    Diodato Villemena thought Goldwater’s rejection of change may ‘reflect a threat 
by a father-image, namely, someone who is stronger than he is, more masculine 
and more cultured’ (Diodato Villamena, in Fact magazine, 1964, p 30). For the most 
part Goldwater took the critiques as part of the rough and tumble of politics, but 
this strand of analysis questioning his ancestry and masculinity would prove most 
personally troubling for him. For one anonymous contributor, 
 
‘[d]escriptions of his early life that I have read indicate to me that his mother 
assumed the masculine role in his family background. My impression was 
that she was domineering and considerably lacking in her ability to provide 
affection and interest in her children. The picture, therefore, is of a 
domineering, emasculating mother and a somewhat withdrawn, passive, 
narcissistic father. It would appear that Barry had a stronger identification 
with his mother than with his father. This would provide a fertile 
background for sado-masochistic temperament, such as is seen in paranoid 
states’  
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(Anonymous, Fact magazine, September-October, p 39).  
 
    Upheld on appeal, Goldwater won his libel suit against Fact and its publisher 
Ralph Ginsburg, despite the fact as Time magazine reported that, the American 
‘Supreme Court has made it extremely difficult for such persons to win a libel suit. 
To avoid stifling the free-speech right to criticize government leaders’ (Time 
magazine, Friday, May 17th, 1968; Justia.com, 2012). It had been in particular, the 
‘masculinity slur’ according to Time, which had worried Goldwater who said that, ‘“I 
come from a family that has pride in family, pride in ancestors.” He also felt that 
people in the street were thinking, “There goes that queer, there goes that 
homosexual, or there goes that man who is afraid of his masculinity”’ (ibid).  
 
    Even in the Goldwater issue of Fact, there had been concerns raised about a 
conflation of psychoanalytic conceptualisations and techniques with political 
machinations. Lawrence Friedman writes that, ‘I must emphasize to you that a 
cornerstone of Freud’s teaching was that psychoanalysis should be used only for 
understanding and therapy, never as a weapon. The temptation to do so is great, 
and because it frequently is so used does not make it right’ (Lawrence Friedman in 
Fact magazine, September-October, 1964, p 59). Categorical in his opposition to 
Goldwater, Friedman declared though that he would attack his ideas and political 
orientation, not his psychology (Lawrence Friedman, in Fact magazine, September-
October,1964). Clinically Friedman argued, such long range diagnoses without 
examining the ‘patient firsthand’ were inherently insufficient for ‘making a 
diagnosis or prognosis of future behaviour’ (Lawrence Friedman, in Fact magazine, 
September-October,1964, p 59).  
 
    Apart from those psychiatrists who thought Goldwater was psychologically fit or 
even psychologically fitter that his opponent Johnson, who might of course have 
been displaying an equal and opposite political bias, were a number who pointed 
out that psychological problems need not necessarily affect fitness to govern 
anyway. As Joseph Schacter M.D. had it, although he disapproved of and indeed 
found Goldwater frightening, he could not ‘honestly say he is psychologically unfit 
to serve as President ... I don’t believe emotional disorder in the past or even the 
diagnosis of schizophrenia is prima facie evidence of unfitness to govern ... 
Abraham Lincoln was repeatedly subject to severe depressions. It is conceivable to 
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me that a compensated schizophrenic could be a brightly creative administrator’ 
(Joseph Schacter in Fact magazine, September-October, 1964, p 38).  
 
    After an illustrious thirty year career in the US Senate, Goldwater7, was as 
Barnes describes him, ‘the Grand Old Man of the Republican Party and one of the 
nation’s most respected exponents of conservatism’ (Bart Barnes, Washington Post, 
Saturday, May 30th, 1998). Despite his seemingly unambiguously right wing 
platform, Goldwater’s ideology was actually more nuanced, as seemingly was his 
character. He was mindful of his own workers welfare, but was against federal 
welfare programmes. He ‘ended racial segregation in his family department stores, 
and he was instrumental in ending it in Phoenix schools and restaurants and in 
the Arizona National Guard’ (ibid). Interestingly however, he ‘voted against the 1964 
Civil Rights Act’ (ibid). Goldwater’s peculiarly American rationale was that he 
considered the Civil Rights Act ‘unconstitutional’ (ibid).  
 
    This uncompromising legalism was why this arch conservative could seemingly 
contrarily support ‘gay rights’, arguing that ‘“[t]he big thing is to make this country, 
along with every other country in the world with a few exceptions, quit 
discriminating against people just because they’re gay,” he said. “You don’t have to 
agree with it, but they have a constitutional right to be gay. And that’s what brings 
me into it”’ (Bart Barnes, Washington Post, 30th of May, 1998). Similarly, against 
later taunts of liberalism from the ‘socially conservative’ neoconservative Christian 
Right alliance, Goldwater retorted, that ‘“A lot of so-called conservatives today don’t 
know what the word means,” he told the Los Angeles Times in a 1994 interview. 
“They think I’ve turned liberal because I believe a woman has a right to an 
abortion. That’s a decision that’s up to the pregnant woman, not up to the pope or 
some do-gooders or the religious right. It’s not a conservative issue at all”’ (Bart 
Barnes, Washington Post, 30th of May, 1998).  
 
    The ‘Goldwater imbroglio’ was considered a very black day for American 
psychiatry, and led the APA to draft ‘Section 7.3 of its Principles of Medical Ethics 
With Annotations Especially Applicable to Psychiatry, which became known as the 
Goldwater Rule’ (Mark Moran, Psychiatric News, Friday 17th of October, 2008; Post, 
2002a; Pinsker, Psychiatric News, the 3rd of August 2007; Hoffling et al, 1976; 
                                                 
7
 Goldwater would later become chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee and the Senate 
Intelligence Committee. 
134 
 
Friedman, The New York Times, the 23rd of May 2011; Mayer, Psychology Today, 
the 2nd of August 2009). The rule stipulates, that it ‘is unethical for a psychiatrist to 
offer a professional opinion unless he or she has conducted an examination and 
has been granted proper authorization for such a statement’ (Mark Moran, 
Psychiatric News, 17th of October, 2008). The 1976 APA Task Force on 
Psychohistory would later spell out that this ruling explicitly covered 
psychoanalytic profiles and psychobiographies undertaken by psychiatrists (Hofling 
et al, 1976).   
 
 
7    President Richard Nixon Directs the Burglary of a Psychoanalyst.  
 
    President Richard Nixon’s administration was robustly alive to the potential of 
deploying the intimate revelations of psychoanalytic enquiry for political purposes. 
A somewhat paranoid Nixon himself believed that he was ‘up against an enemy, a 
conspiracy’ (Richard Nixon quoted in Wells, 2001, p 467). Nixon had according to 
Tom Wells, fixated on Daniel Ellsberg a senior policy advisor on the Vietnam War to 
both Secretaries State Robert McNamara and Henry Kissinger. Ellsberg had in fact 
leaked the so called ‘Pentagon Papers’ which revealed the true nature and extent of 
American involvement in Vietnam (Nixon quoted in BBC 4, 21st of February 2010). 
Tasked by Nixon to ‘convict the son of a bitch in the press’, a secret White House 
Special Investigations Unit had been formed which became known to history as the 
‘Plumbers’. The ‘Plumbers’ were later responsible for organising the infamous 
‘Watergate’ burglary, which would eventually lead to the resignation of Nixon 
(Wells, 2001; Linder 2011). 
 
    In early August 1971 Egil Krogh8, National Security Council staff member David 
Young, former FBI agent G. Gordon Liddy and former CIA agent E. Howard Hunt 
met to plan the ‘first-rate criminal conspiracy ... that led inexorably to Watergate 
and its subsequent cover-up’ (Egil Krogh, The New York Times, 30th of June 2007). 
The ‘Plumbers’ had decided to break into the office of Ellsberg’s psychoanalyst, 
Lewis Fielding. It was the two burglars used, Bernhard Barker and Eugenio 
Martinez who were later arrested inside the ‘Watergate’ offices of the Democratic 
National Committee in June 1972 (Linder, 2011).  
 
                                                 
8
 Krogh was the deputy assistant to President Nixon. 
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    The Fielding break-in had been deemed necessary because a previous 
psychological profile of Ellsberg prepared by CIA psychiatrists had proven 
inadequate for the nefarious purposes of the ‘Plumbers’. The plan was, according to 
Krogh, to break into Fielding’s office in order to get a ‘“mother lode” of information 
about Mr. Ellsberg’s mental state, to discredit him’ (Egil Krogh, The New York 
Times, 30th of June 2007). Ellsberg would then be smeared by leaking the profile to 
the press. Ellsberg’s former wife Carol had named Fielding to the FBI, and director 
J. Edgar Hoover had ordered that Fielding be interviewed. When FBI agents 
attempted to interview Fielding, the psychoanalyst not only turned them down but 
as Wells claims, ‘he refused to even acknowledge that Ellsberg had been his patient’ 
(ibid, p 9). The idea mooted that the FBI might then undertake the burglary as a 
special operation, was discounted by the ‘Plumbers’ on the grounds that ‘Hoover 
might later use it as “leverage” against Nixon’ (Egil Krogh, The New York Times, 30th 
of June 2007).  
 
    Hunt, who was in charge of the operation (although Nixon took a keen interest 
personally), was in particular hoping for discussions of ‘Dr. Ellsberg’s oedipal 
conflicts or castration fears’ (Wells, 2001, p 11; BBC 4, 24th of February 2010; 
Omestad, 1994). The-would be smearers were very encouraged by Ellsberg’s 
‘indiscretion about sexual matters and seemingly rich sex life’ (Wells, 2001, p 5). 
Indeed Ellsberg’s supposed predilection for foreign women Hunt thought 
particularly suspicious, and he was keen to find evidence of a ménage a trois with 
two women (Wells, 2001). Illuminating from another perspective as Wells recounts, 
G. Gordon Liddy conveyed to Dr. Bernard Malloy9who had been covertly tasked 
with undertaking the profile, that he had information from a ‘neutral source ... that 
the bedroom of the subject’s California oceanfront former home contained an 
extraordinary amount of mirrors’ (Wells, 2001, p 5). 
 
    Malloy had explained the ‘inadequacy’ of their first profile on an insufficiency of 
data, particularly on Ellsberg’s youth. The CIA psychiatrists were though according 
to Wells, ‘skittish’ about producing a second profile, not only because it might be 
misconstrued as deriving from a doctor-patient therapeutic relationship, but 
because ‘studying U.S. citizen violated the CIA’s charter’ (Wells, 2001, p 11). This 
was in contravention as Thomas Omestad points out, of the CIA’s ‘ban on its 
engaging in domestic activities’ (Omestad, 1994, p 110). Indeed Malloy confided to 
                                                 
9
 Malloy was head of the CIA psychiatrists unit. 
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‘a CIA official that his worries did not involve “professional ethics” but legal issues; 
he desired “that the Agency’s connection with this matter must never surface”’ 
(Wells, 2001, p 488). The issue for the psychiatrists was then the illegality of 
investigating an American citizen, rather than any professional ethical concerns 
that might have constrained them from smearing the unwitting subject of their 
diagnosis.  
 
    In Wells’ view, the CIA profilers ‘discussions of Ellsberg’s narcissistic rage and 
need for appreciation are largely on the mark’ (Wells, 2001, p 492). Although the 
ascription of individualistic narcissistic rage against authority would become the 
lynchpin of modern personological adversarial profiling, the CIA psychiatrists’ 
formulation was disregarded by the ‘Plumbers’, who had been expecting a more 
traditional Freudian characterological profile. A more characterological profile 
would necessarily have included intimate psychoanalytic speculation and a 
discussion of Ellsberg’s sexuality. This was more readily amenable to be edited for 
an unsophisticated tabloid smear, rather than a personological profile to be used in 
undermining an ideological position.   
 
    Ellsberg was in fact prosecuted over the ‘Pentagon Tapes’, facing a possible 115 
years imprisonment if convicted (BBC 4, 21st of February 2010). However, a memo 
from the Watergate prosecutor Earl Silbert detailing the burglary of Fielding’s office 
became known to presiding Judge Mathew Byrne, and although he had been 
offered the directorship of the FBI by the White House in order not to, he granted a 
motion to dismiss, on the grounds that ‘“the bizarre events have incurably infected 
the prosecution of this case”’ (Judge Byrne quoted in Linder, 2011, p 11).  
 
 
8    Jerrold Post: The Ethics of Political Profiling  
 
    In response to the ongoing disquiet over psychobiographic issues in general, the 
1976 APA Task Force produced a report entitled ‘The Psychiatrist as 
Psychohistorian’ (Hoffling et al, 1976). The Task Force formally recognised that the 
advent of a psychoanalytic understanding of the preconscious and unconscious, 
was instrumental in providing psychiatrists, and indeed other psychoanalytically 
trained professionals, with an internally consistent motivational psychology as a 
critical adjunct to the study of history in general and biography in particular 
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(Hoffling et al, 1976). The Task Force averred that although the opinions given in 
the Goldwater issue of Fact were in their capacity as psychiatrists, they ‘had no 
scientific or medical validity whatsoever’ (Hoffling et al, 1976, p 2). Valid opinions 
could only be given on the basis of a confidential clinical examination, and that the 
same consideration applied in the case of psychoanalytic profiling. The Task Force 
concluded then that it was basically unethical for a psychiatrist to do a 
‘psychoprofile of a living person  ... without written informed consent of the subject’ 
(Hoffling et al, 1976, p 13).  
 
    It would not necessarily be, the Task Force maintained, ‘unethical for a 
psychiatrist to produce confidential profiles in the service of the national interest’ 
(Hoffling et al, 1976, p 13). They cautioned however, about the professional ‘risks 
involved in profiling living persons, and most especially fellow citizens’ (ibid). So 
that despite a seemingly total ban on psychoprofiling without consent, there was no 
ethical objection ‘to producing for the confidential use of government officials 
psychobiographies or profiles of significant international figures whose personality 
formation needs to be understood to carry out national policy more effectively’ 
(Hoffling et al, p 12).  
 
    There was always the danger of confidential or secret documents being leaked, 
but for the Task Force, this did ‘not seem particularly significant in relation to a 
Hitler or a Stalin or, in general, to extranationals who impinge on the national 
interest’ (ibid, pp 12-13). Effectively then, there was an exclusion for albeit the 
incidentally or accidentally publicly available diagnoses of foreigners, deemed to 
impinge on the US national interest. This was an ethically inconsistent and readily 
exploitable compromise.     
     
    Following from this, there is now an ongoing debate in the American psychiatric 
community as to whether the ‘Goldwater Rule’ should be amended in order to 
formalise and confirm the ethical validity of publicly disseminating profiles of 
America’s adversaries (Psychiatric News, May 18th 2007; Henry Pinsker, Psychiatric 
News, August the 3rd 2007; John Mayer in Psychology Today, 2nd of August 2009). 
Professor of psychiatry Richard Friedman argues for the regularisation of this 
exception to the ‘Goldwater Rule’, in allowing for the psychobiographic profiling by 
psychiatrists of foreign leaders such as Muammar el-Qaddafi, (whom Friedman 
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describes as suggesting a ‘malignant narcissism’ personality disorder) (Richard 
Friedman, New York Times, 23rd of May 2011).  
 
    Whether such a diagnosis is correct or useful, Friedman has ‘no idea, but it is 
ethically defensible’ (Richard Friedman, New York Times, 23rd of May 2011). It is 
deemed ethically justifiable because Qaddafi was perceived as a ‘national threat’ 
(Richard Friedman, New York Times, 23rd of May 2011). The perspective on 
informing the public of this diagnosis, and the putative consequences, are viewed 
solely from the normative and hegemonic position of the perceived American 
national interest. Effectively then, anybody perceived by the analyst as a threat to 
the USA, has no ethical rights against defamatory analyses even if they have no 
conceptual or factual use or validity.   
 
    For Jerrold Post, the constraints of the ‘Goldwater Rule’ are, in any event, ‘a 
masterpiece of internal contradiction’ (Post, 2002a, p 636). Because, in other parts 
of the section, psychiatrists are ‘“encouraged to serve society by advising and 
consulting with the executive, legislative and judiciary branches of the 
government”’, and that they ‘“may interpret and share with the public their 
expertise in the various psychosocial issues that may affect mental health and 
illness”’ (Post, 2002a, p 636). Indeed, Post sees his role in the public discourse of 
terrorism, for example, as assuaging public anxiety over any psychic culpability. 
Extolling his analysis of bin Laden, Post has had ‘confirmation from senior 
government officials and senior psychiatrists that this has made a positive 
contribution to a traumatized nation and, was, in effect, an exercise of 
“responsibility to participate in activities contributing to an improved community”’ 
(Post, 2002a). 
 
    It would not of course, be feasible for Post in his adversarial profiling, to gain the 
authorisation required by the Goldwater Rule, from subjects over whom he was 
either seeking to gain an advantage or publicly denigrate as ideological adversaries. 
Believing that the public dissemination of his profiles served the ‘national interest’, 
Post instances his study of Saddam Hussein asserting that the ‘president of the US 
Institute of Peace cited the profile as a “contribution of the highest order to the 
national welfare.” It assuredly was a career high point’ (Post, 2002a, p 637).  
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   Post’s 1990 Saddam profile was subject to a complaint under the ‘Goldwater 
Rule’. The perennial defence Post makes is, that he presents political psychology 
not professional psychiatric opinions. The sentiment of the APA is that ‘there is no 
way in the ordinary course of events that the public can distinguish between a 
professional opinion and a citizen’s opinion if the citizen happens to be a 
psychiatrist’ (APA President-elect Joseph English, quoted in Slovenko, 2000, p104). 
Indeed, Post’s defence had been summarily dismissed by a member of the APA 
Ethics Committee reviewing the complaint against him, on the grounds that, the 
reason his opinion was ‘sought is that you are a psychiatrist. So willy-nilly, any 
opinion you offer is a psychiatric opinion’ (Post, 2002a, p 644). 
 
    Post received his postgraduate training in psychiatry at Harvard Medical School 
and the National Institute for Mental Health, and is now Professor of Psychiatry at 
George Washington University. Evolving out of a 1965 pilot programme based in 
the CIA’s Psychiatric Staff, Post had founded and led for twenty one years what he 
refers to as a psychodynamically informed CIA political profiling unit, The Center 
for the Analysis of Personality and Political Behavior (CAPPB) (Post, 2004). This 
unit had been initiated specifically to undertake clinically oriented analyses of 
America’s potential adversaries. According to Thomas Omestad, ‘Post himself was 
viewed as a tough bureaucratic infighter and promoter of his craft’ (Omestad, 1994, 
p 111; Post, 2006b; Post, 2004; Post 2005a). 
 
    Whilst head of this CIA unit, Post had also been tasked by the US government ‘to 
use the same techniques in trying to understand psychology at a distance, when 
the epidemic of terrorism began in the early 1970s, to begin studies of the 
psychology of terrorism. This was the first government enterprise in this area’ 
(Evidence of Post in USA v Usama Bin Laden et al, Southern District of New York, 
27th of June, 2001, 8312-8313; my emphasis). Indeed Post would become a very 
prominent academic expert on the psychology terrorism, and a leading proponent 
of the personality pathology paradigm (Sageman, 2004). In this role, Post briefs the 
US government, presents papers to the US Congress and the United Nations, and 
organises and chairs international conferences (Post, 2005a, Post, 2005b). 
 
    Post is a very distinguished and influential figure in American public life at the 
nexus of psychoanalysis and academic psychiatry and has received recognition and 
plaudits at the highest levels in American institutional life. Post’s professional 
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standing and indeed personal integrity are not questioned in this thesis. Post for 
example, very decently testified as an expert witness on behalf of a Khalfan 
Mohamed who was facing the death penalty, arising out of a conviction in the trial 
of ‘Usama bin Laden et al’ for the 1998 Al Qaeda bombing of the US embassy in 
Dar es Salaam (USA v Usama Bin Laden et al, Southern District of New York, 27th 
of June, 2001, 8324). Risking his professional reputation, Post’s expert standing 
was severely tested under cross examination by public prosecutor Patrick 
Fitzgerald (ibid). Post has received hate mail for simply discussing the motivations 
of terrorists (Hough, 2003). 
 
    American social scientists, Post maintains, ‘generally had no reservations 
concerning working for their government during the Second World War but were 
deeply alienated during the Vietnam war. The national security researcher in Israel 
in recent years may be in a position akin to American scholars in the 1940s’ (Post 
and Ezekiel, 1988, p 504). The perceived existential threat to Israel and latterly the 
post 9/11 ‘war on terror’ has created a certain 1940’s atmosphere. In what appears 
to be a closely integrated American and Israeli security research community, there 
is a nexus of influence, of which the psychoanalytic psychobiographer Post, is very 
much a part. Post, as Criminal Justice Professor Adam Lankford points out, is ‘one 
of the key figures the US government relies upon to develop its homeland security’ 
(Lankford, 2013, p 35). 
 
    Along with the US Military, Post briefs ‘the Israel military leadership on current 
concepts of counter-terrorism’ (Post, 2005e). Post collaborated with two former 
Israeli Defence Force intelligence officers for the book, Yasser Arafat – psychological 
profile and strategic Analysis (Kimhi, Even and Post, 2001). Of his is collaborators, 
Shmuel Even is, according to the Institute for National Security Studies, retired as a 
Colonel from the IDF Intelligence Branch (INSS, 2015), and Shaul Kimhi went on to 
become an ‘Advisor and lecturer to Israel’s national security system regarding 
political psychology issues’ (Kimhi, 2015).  
 
    In 2002 along with Ehud Sprinzak10, Post undertook research in Israel on 
incarcerated Palestinian terrorists. This research was funded by the Smith 
Richardson Foundation ‘a major financier of neoconservatism’ (IPS, 2009). A 
consultant to Israel’s ministry of Internal Security, Sprinzak was an advisor to 
                                                 
10
 Sprinzak was a founding dean of the University Interdisciplinary Center, in Herzliya, Israel. 
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former Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, and had a ‘central role in Rabin’s 
decision-making process’ (IDC, 2015).  
 
    Amatzia Baram, Post’s collaborator on the 2003 profile of Saddam Hussein, is 
Professor Emeritus in the Department of the History of the Middle East and 
Director of the Centre for Iraq Studies at the Israeli University of Haifa (GIS, 2015). 
Baram, since 1980, has ‘been advising the Israeli government and since 1986 also 
the US government (during the Reagan, Bush, Clinton and Bush administrations) 
about Iraq and the Gulf’ (ibid). In 2008-2009 Anat Berko was a visiting professor at 
Post’s George Washington University and in 2009 co-authored a paper with Post, 
‘Talking with Terrorists’. Retired as a Lieutenant Colonel after twenty five years in 
the Israeli Defence Force, Berko is a ‘member of both Israel’s Counter-Terrorism 
Team and Israel’s National Security Council, and serves as an advisor to senior 
government officials’ (Israeli Speakers, 2015).  
 
    As well as being a sought after commentator, Berko ‘conducts counter-terrorism 
lectures for NATO, and before Congress, the State Department, the FBI and the 
military forces, and for a multitude of universities throughout the United States 
and elsewhere’ (Israeli Speakers, 2015). Handpicked by Israeli Prime Minister 
Benjamin Netanyahu, Berko, whose ideology ‘dovetails perfectly with the prime 
minister’s’, won a seat to the Israeli Parliament the Knesset as member of 
Netanyahu’s Likud Party in 2015 (Raphael Ahren, Times of Israel, 11th of March 
2015).  
 
    On his retirement from the CIA, Post had become Professor of Psychiatry, 
Political Psychology and International Affairs, and Director of the Political 
Psychology Programme, at George Washington University. His twenty one years in 
the CIA would necessarily afford him not only a great deal of experience in dealing 
with policy makers, but innumerable and ongoing contacts with them. Loch 
Johnson points out that the CIA particularly encouraged the ‘growth of closer 
personal ties between analysts and policymakers’, and that ‘[t]his “personal 
chemistry” may be the most important aspect of the entire intelligence cycle’ 
(Johnson, 1989, p 98). 
 
    The CIA has an established history of operating within American academia. 
Citing the findings of the Church committee’s 1976 report on the CIA, Johnson has 
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it that ‘academicians (including administrators, faculty members, and students) 
carried out an assortment of intelligence-related activities. Among other things, 
they authored books and articles based on research financed by the CIA; spotted 
and assessed individuals for Agency use; served as “access agents” to make 
introductions between the CIA and potential agents or employees (foreign and 
American); and provided information to the Agency, both with and without prior 
instructions’ (Johnson, 1989, p 158). 
 
    The CIA is prohibited from carrying out covert action, psychological warfare or 
propaganda within the United States (Johnson, 1989; Wells, 2001). It has, 
according to Johnson, ‘an ally outside the government who is not so shy: the 
Association of Former Intelligence Officers (AFIO), an interest group supportive of 
the intelligence community. Its domestic propaganda operations can be entirely 
overt. Publications that strike the fancy of its board, for instance, are purchased in 
bulk and distributed to opinion leaders throughout the United States and abroad. 
While the objective remains the same for both the CIA and AFIO’ (Johnson, 1989, p 
24). Former CIA officer, AFIO member and Professor of Political Science Robert 
Robins, was at one time the CIA contact at Tulane University (Berenofsky, 2004; 
AFIO, Weekly Intelligence Notes18-02, the 6th of May 2002). Robins is Post’s 
collaborator on the 1997 book Political Paranoia which is discussed throughout this 
thesis (Robins and Post, 1997).    
 
    Post has, then, extensive insight into the relationship on security matters 
(particularly in relation to terrorism), between government and academia. In a 
paper co-written with Raphael Ezekiel, (although not explicitly referring to himself), 
Post nonetheless sums up what is his own situation. As Post describes it, the 
‘sojourn in the corridors of government for the national security policy scholar is an 
extremely valuable experience. Not only does he learn the constraints of the policy 
world, but he also becomes schooled in the discourse of communication. For the 
academic to bring to government the capacity for responding to a current need 
while relating the immediate crisis to a more comprehensive perspective is of 
immeasurable value to all parties’ (Post and Ezekiel, 1988, p 507). It is the 
perceived immediacy of a topic which differentiates the academic from the policy 
maker. As Post describes it, ‘when academicians make the journey to the corridors 
of government, they quickly find themselves with a foreshortened time perspective, 
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needing to get results, to “solve” the terrorist problem’ (Post and Ezekiel, 1998, p 
504). 
 
    Academic consultants such as Post occupy a space between academia and 
government proper. Post is not only Associate Director for Safety and Security, at 
‘The George Washington Aviation Institute’, but also edits and contributes to 
publications for the United States Air Force Counterproliferation Center. In Post’s 
academic field, there is something of a synergy with government perspectives. 
Although tailored for their particular audiences, essentially the same material will 
be reproduced in Post’s papers which may appear in learned journals, government 
and military publications, as book chapters in his own popular books or edited 
collections, the countless magazine and newspaper coverage of that material, and 
the extraordinary amount of personal appearances that Post makes. It was during 
the eight months after 9/11 that Post came into his own, with ‘approximately 350 
interviews by electronic and print media concerning, terrorism, Osama bin laden, 
and suicidal terrorism’ (Post, 2005a) 
 
   In terms of the personality pathology discourse, Post effectively synthesises the 
academic, the governmental and the popular. The role of an expert such as himself, 
as Post sees it, ‘remains clearly anchored in the academy but is able to draw on his 
expertise to assist the policy maker confronting crises as well as long-range 
problems ... The academic consultant must be able to respond in such a way as to 
assist the policy maker in dealing with his real-world problems. He must be able to 
demonstrate an understanding of the policymaker’s needs and be able to see the 
world through his eyes’ (Post and Ezekiel, 1998, p 508). Although being in the 
academy, such a consultant needs to be amenable to the discursive subject 
position of the government policy maker.  
 
    Post accepts that scholars who are opposed to government policy cannot in 
conscience cooperate with it. For some (which would necessarily include Post), in 
national security matters ‘there is a clear identity between the scholars and the 
government, and full cooperation is natural and desirable’ (Post and Ezekiel, 1998, 
p 504). Similarly, perhaps also explaining why Post remains so well informed on 
issues not necessarily in the public domain, is the commensurate expectation 
where the ‘government official, on the other hand, cannot expect the consultant to 
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be fully useful without providing him with a context of substantive information and 
policy constraints’ (Post and Ezekiel, 1998, p 508). 
 
    Expressing the view that there was actually ‘more armchair psychiatry than 
critics can stomach’ in contravention of the ‘Goldwater Rule’, Curtis Brainard 
singles out a particular Post media blitz. Post had been a ‘busy man since fighting 
began in Libya in late February, appearing in numerous articles speculating about 
Qaddafi’s mental state’ (Brainard, Columbia Journalism Review, the 30th of March 
2011). Along with Fox News sandwiching Post’s views between comments that 
Qaddafi was amongst other things, ‘nuts’, and ‘Post told a Public Radio 
International and WNYC show that Qaddafi has “borderline personality” disorder - 
but the show did not mention, let alone explain, the caveats that come with such 
an assessment’ (ibid; Jerrold Post, Foreign Policy, the 15th of March 2011). Once in 
the public arena, diagnoses become part of that public discourse and are 
manipulated according to the dictates of that discourse. 
 
    Although Post claims that any assessment of his is not a ‘definitive clinical 
diagnosis’, coming from a professor of psychiatry it is taken as being scientific, 
clinically informed and authoritative, and is deployed as such in the personality 
pathology discourse. In respect of Post’s Qaddafi profile, Brainard argues that the 
‘statement that Qaddafi’s insanity diagnosis is “admittedly non-clinical” is a weak 
disclaimer and totally inadequate given the forceful charges that follow’ (Brainard, 
Columbia Journalism Review, the 30th of March 2011). Simply by choice of subject, 
such clinical profiling becomes part of an ideological discourse, and the tenor of the 
clinical analysis and how it is perceived is dependent upon the subject’s position in 
the discourse. 
 
 
9    Conclusion. 
 
    In the post-war American media age, public commentary including the 
‘professional’ psychiatric assessments of individuals, became ubiquitous and 
popular. Psychoanalytic profiles reflect the personal or ideological position of the 
profiler and what he seeks to achieve in the discourse, irrespective of previously 
adduced evidence. This was the case with Renatus Hartogs, who re-imagined his 
own diagnostic findings seemingly in order to fit with the new popular 
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understanding of Lee Harvey Oswald’s personality (Hartogs and Freeman, 1965). 
After a number of scandals, principally the psychoanalytic traducing by 
psychiatrists of US presidential candidate Barry Goldwater, serious reservations 
were raised over the ethical status of profiling individuals who do not willingly 
submit to analysis.  
 
    In spite of the furore over the Goldwater fiasco, the public psychoanalytic 
profiling of individuals had gradually become entrenched in American culture. 
Through the invocation of being in the ‘national interest’, the ‘Goldwater Rule’ was 
ethically discounted in the case of the adversarial other by American psychiatry. 
The thesis introduced the career of the preeminent figure in the nexus of 
psychoanalysis, academia and the US/Israeli security and counter-intelligence 
establishment, Jerrold Post. The psychoanalytic conceptualisations and Post’s 
deployment of them in the personality pathology discourse are described in the 
next chapter.   
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CHAPTER SIX: 
 
 
 
THE PSYCHOANALYTIC THEORY BEHIND JERROLD POST’S 
PERSONOLOGICAL PROFILING. 
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1    Introduction. 
 
    From ‘ego psychology’ through ‘object relations’ and ‘self psychology’, this 
chapter seeks to demonstrate how these newer psychoanalytic theories are 
deployed in the modern, personological profiling of the pathologising discourse, and 
in particular through the adaptations of the principal protagonist of the thesis, 
Jerrold Post. The chapter follows through these theoretical strands and Post’s 
adaptations of them, arguing that there is necessarily a mismatch between the 
normatively applied theoretical model and a complex and messy existential reality. 
     
    Post’s personality pathology assessments, however psychoanalytically 
consonant, it is argued, cannot be reductively transposed onto complex contingent 
circumstances. The chapter seeks to demonstrate how Post adapts a distinct 
strand in psychobiography, relating to the turn to narcissism and early 
traumatogenic object relating which the thesis has termed personological. Theories 
which in the clinical context, have brought relief to those with what were otherwise 
little understood and clinically marginalised narcissistic complaints, are now being 
deployed to marginalise those outside of the normative, hegemonic ambit of an 
ideological discourse.  
 
    The Camp David profiles of Anwar Sadat and Menachem Begin undertaken by 
Post and his CIA profiling unit were highly regarded in government circles. The 
chapter contrasts Post’s benign profile of Anwar Sadat, with his pathography of the 
adversarial Saddam Hussein. Post was extremely influential during the US 
Congressional vote during the 1990 Gulf Crisis, and was also closely involved with 
US intelligence circles in the run up to 2003 Iraq War. Post had however, wrongly 
predicted Saddam would quit Kuwait in 1991 and subsequently, that his malignant 
narcissism ensured that he would not rid himself of his weapons of mass 
destruction. The chapter critiques Post’s evolving strategy of rationalising these 
flawed predictions.  
 
 
2    Modern Conceptual Developments of the Pathologising Discourse. 
     
    Post War American psychoanalysis was ‘dominated by Viennese-American ego 
psychology’, a precursor for the personological paradigm in psychobiography (Hale, 
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2000, p 84). In theoretical terms, this represented a shift in focus from strictly 
uncovering repressed unconscious content, to those defence mechanisms deployed 
by the ego in order to keep that content unconscious (Freud, 2001/1923, S.E. XIX; 
Freud, 2001/1926, S.E. XX; Freud, A., 1948/1936; Hartmann, 1961/1939; 
Wallerstein, 2002). In ego psychology, the ego is seen as being fully in control, so 
that for Anna Freud, the ‘proper field for our observation is always the ego’ (Freud, 
A., 1948/1936, p 6).  
 
    According to this notion, the ego provides the psychic mechanism for the gradual 
separation from the original oneness with the mother, and the ego defences are 
developed to deal with the vicissitudes of life (Freud, A., 1948/1936). These ego 
defences in Anna Freud’s schema include ‘regression, reaction formation, isolation, 
undoing, projection, introjection, turning against the self, and reversal’ with a 
further ego defence of ‘sublimation or displacement of instinctual aims’ which is 
related to normal rather than neurotic functioning (Freud, A., 1948/1936, p 47). 
Although these mechanisms reflect the normal psychic functioning of protecting 
against the stresses of life, when they become exaggerated they may develop into 
neuroses. ‘At a distance’ personality profiling is predicated on the premise that 
there are clinically identifiable, distinguishable and individual characteristic ego 
defences which, as Post writes, mediate ‘between inner drives and the external 
world, each of which has its own cognitive, affective, and interpersonal style’ (Post, 
2006c, p 78). Essential for the efficacy of Post’s profiling is that an individual’s 
typical ego responses may be predicted. 
 
    In seeking to resolve the dialectic antagonism between the inner and outer 
worlds, Heinz Hartmann posited a conflict free domain, a middle ground between 
psychoanalysis as ‘a liberationist social and political theory’ and ‘a drive-based 
psychology that viewed social problems as inherently psychological absolving social 
structures of all responsibility’ (Makari, 2008, p 447; Hartmann, 1961). The central 
notion in Hartmann’s schema was that ‘[n]ot every adaptation to the environment, 
or every learning and maturational process, is a conflict’, and that there was in fact 
a ‘conflict-free ego sphere, for that ensemble of functions which at any given time 
exert their effects outside the region of mental conflict’ (Hartmann, 1961, pp 8-9, 
emphasis in the original; Hartmann, 1964).  
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    Post adapts Hartmann’s concept of a mediating conflict free ego sphere to 
encompass a ‘conflict-free leadership sphere: the more psychologically healthy the 
individual leader is, the greater the scope of political decisions that he can make 
that are free from personality distortion’ (Post, 2004, p 21). With the emphasis on 
adaptation to society, Post’s psychologically healthy leaders could be seen as those 
who follow the normative prescriptions of conformity, and those outside of this 
particular consensus, representing by default, some form of pathologically 
functioning ‘Otherness’. 
 
    American ego psychology was given a more enhanced social dimension through 
Erik Erikson’s notion of ‘identity’, which encompassed the stages of development 
for the entire life cycle (Hale, 2000; Erikson, 1968). In this socially integrative 
notion of identity, ‘the fate of childhood identifications, in turn, depends on the 
Child’s satisfactory interaction with trustworthy representatives of a meaningful 
hierarchy of roles as provided by the generations living together in some form of 
family’ (Erikson, 1968, p 159). The mother must then communicate to the baby 
that he ‘may trust her, the world, and - himself. Only a relatively “whole” society 
can vouchsafe to the infant, through the mother, an inner conviction that all the 
diffuse somatic experiences and all the confusing social cues of early life can be 
accommodated in a sense of continuity and sameness which gradually unites the 
inner and outer worlds’ (Erikson, 1968, p 82). 
 
    The focus on the progressive development of the individual from birth through to 
death, conceptualised by Erikson, is also seen as important to the development of a 
more integrative psychobiographical approach, because of its emphasis on later 
stages in life such as adolescence and not just infancy (Lowenberg, 1983). There is 
in this conceptualisation, the possibility of tracing a continuity of psychosocial 
identity ‘between one’s personal, family, ethnic, and national past and one’s 
current role and interaction with the present’ (Lowenberg, 1983, p 24). However, 
this notion of a ‘whole’ society begs the wider question of what constitutes a 
psychologically sound cultural environment, and more importantly, who decides 
what that is.  
 
    A culture relevant conceptualisation of ego psychology does at least address the 
essential problem of ahistoricity in traditional Freudian drive theory (Lowenberg, 
1983). The developmental changes in identity formation of the individual could now 
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be linked to changes in the dominant identity formation in a particular society, and 
at a given time (ibid). So that Erikson’s ‘great man’ in history paradigm, as 
exemplified by his psychobiographies of Luther and Gandhi, is an attempt to 
demonstrate that the leader seeks to resolve his ‘demonic intrapsychic conflicts’ 
which, as rooted in his own historical period, effects the ‘great collectivity of his 
contemporaries, as well as subsequent generations’ (Lifton, 1974, p 36; Erikson, 
1958; Lowenberg, 1983).   
 
    Post describes the period of transition in young adulthood when psychological 
and political identification consolidates, as having lasting consequences for political 
behaviour (Post, 2004). Many revolutionary leaders ‘experienced social upheaval 
during their adolescence. They found social sanction for their own age-related drive 
to be independent of authority, often crystallizing hyperindependence and 
resistance to authority as permanent character features’ (Post, 2004, p 24).        
   
    In adapting Erikson conceptualisation, it is from the conflicts of late adolescence 
and young adulthood that the individual in Post’s schema acquires a revolutionary 
nature as a character trait (Post, 2004). However, in adapting Kernberg and 
Kohut’s focus on the effects of early traumatogenic object relating, Post posits that 
the narcissistic personality organisations of these revolutionaries developed in 
childhood and adolescence, as a result of being ‘damaged early in life by inadequate 
parenting, especially by the mother’ (Post, 2004, p 27). This thesis proposes that 
the personality organisations typified by narcissistic injury resulting from 
childhood trauma need not be fortuitously commensurate with a character trait 
acquired from an identity crisis in adolescence. In fact, character traits may be 
seemingly contrary to personality formations.  
 
 
3    Object Relations and Adapting the Kleinian Notion of Paranoia.    
 
    The object relational notion of paranoia was of a developing psyche in relation to 
others in the early environment of the child. Clinically, with modifications by later 
theorists such as Otto Kernberg, Klein’s notions of splitting and projective 
identification were also being applied to the understanding borderline personalities. 
Indeed, for the psychoanalytic treatment of narcissistic personalities in the United 
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States, Kernberg had ‘tried to integrate British object relations theories with 
American ego psychology’ (Kernberg and Siniscalo, 2013/2001, p 7).  
 
    One of the key differences from both classic Freudian theory and ego psychology 
was Klein’s notion of a range of differentiated object relations in the first months of 
life. By contrast, Freudian theory as Anna Freud describes it, ‘allows at this period 
only for the crudest rudiments of object relationships and sees life governed by the 
desire for instinct gratification, in which perception of the object is only achieved 
slowly’ (A. Freud quoted in Couch, 1995, p12). As there is no direct evidence from 
the infant’s early phantasy, it must then, be ‘inferred from circumstantial evidence 
collected in later periods of childhood. That means that the inferences drawn from 
the later material are necessarily influenced by the theoretical views held by the 
various analysts’ (ibid). The premise of the thesis being that for the personality 
pathology theorists, the choice theory is itself influenced by the ideological agenda 
of the analyst.  
 
    An intrinsic link between paranoia and narcissism had been established by 
Freud, writing that ‘in paranoia the liberated libido becomes attached to the ego, 
and is used for the aggrandizement of the ego.1 A return is thus made to the stage 
of narcissism (known to us from the development of the libido), in which a person’s 
only sexual object is his own ego. On the basis of this clinical evidence we can 
suppose that paranoics have brought along with them a fixation at the stage of 
narcissism’ (Freud, 2001/1911, XII, p 72, emphasis in the original). Essential to his 
own concept of narcissism, Kernberg asserts that, a  
 
‘particular theoretical position has been distinguished by my belief that the 
characteristics specific to patients with narcissistic personality disorders 
reflect a pathologic narcissism that differs from both ordinary adult 
narcissism and fixation at or regression to normal infantile narcissism, 
pathologic narcissism reflects libidinal investment not in a normal integrated 
self-structure but in a pathologic self-structure’  
 
           (Kernberg, 1989, p 723). 
 
    The notion underlying Klein’s conceptualisation of paranoia, is the anxiety which 
‘arises from the operation of the death instinct within the organism, is felt as fear of 
152 
 
annihilation (death) and takes the form of fear of persecution’ (Klein, 1987/1946, p 
179). In Klein’s concept of paranoia,  
 
‘the characteristic defences are chiefly aimed at annihilating the 
“persecutors”, while anxiety on the ego’s account occupies a prominent place 
in the picture. As the ego becomes more fully organized, the internalized 
imagos will approximate more closely to reality and the ego will identify itself 
more fully with “good” objects. The dread of persecution, which was at first 
felt on the ego’s account, now relates to the good object as well and from now 
on preservation of the good object is regarded as synonymous with the 
survival of the ego ... Paranoid anxiety lest the objects sadistically destroyed 
should themselves be a source of poison and danger inside the subject’s 
body causes him, in spite of the vehemence of his oral sadistic onslaughts, 
at the same time to be profoundly mistrustful of them while yet 
incorporating them’  
    
(Klein, 1987/1935, p 118). 
 
    Aggression and destructiveness in the Kleinian schema are at the core of psychic 
functioning, with the ego defence mechanisms of splitting and projective 
identification establishing ‘the prototype of aggressive object relation’ (Klein, 
1987/1946, p 183). Kernberg further theorises ‘projective identification’ as a key 
element of his borderline personality syndrome, where borderlines ‘have to control 
the object in order to prevent it from attacking them under the influence of the 
(projected) aggressive impulses; they have to attack and control the object before 
(as they fear) they themselves are attacked and destroyed. In summary, projective 
identification is characterized by the lack of differentiation between self and object 
in that particular area, by continuing to experience the impulse as well as the fear 
of that impulse while the projection is active, and by the need to control the 
external object’ (Kernberg, 1975, p 31).  
 
    The mechanism of projection is central to Klein’s formulation of the paranoid-
schizoid position, wherein parts of the self are split off and projected onto another 
person, and where the other person feels this projection and reacts, is a projective 
identification. Following Klein, Kernberg has it that envy arises from the need to 
spoil and destroy the object despite its being needed for survival and thus an object 
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of love. Envy thus becomes ‘a major manifestation of human aggression’ linked to 
hatred, a derivative of the affect of rage (Kernberg, 2013/1996, p 3). In the 
psychoanalytic sense projection as Laplanche and Pontalis define it, is the 
‘operation whereby qualities, feelings or even ‘objects’, which the subject refuses to 
recognise or rejects in himself are expelled from the self and located in another 
person or thing. Projection so understood is a defence of very primitive origin which 
may be seen at work especially in paranoia’ (Laplanche and Pontalis, 1988/1973, p 
349). Envy was deeply implicated in the Kleinian notion of ‘projective identification, 
which then represents the forced entry into another person in order to destroy their 
best attributes’ (Hinshelwood, 1998, p 179). 
 
    Klein refers first to the ‘paranoid position, which extends over the first three or 
four months of life and is characterized by persecutory anxiety and splitting 
processes. Later on, in 1946 when I reformulated my views on the first three or four 
months of life, I called this stage (making use of a suggestion of Fairbairn’s) the 
paranoid-schizoid position, and, in working out its significance, sought to co-
ordinate my findings about splitting, projection, persecution and idealization’ 
(Klein, 1987/1955, p 53). Such mental states are seen as playing an important role 
throughout life, with the unitegrated self and object split into good and bad in the 
paranoid-schizoid position.  
 
    The pathological nature of the paranoid aspect of splitting is further theorised in 
the work of Kernberg, who has it that the splitting ‘mechanism is normally used 
only in an early stage of ego development during the first year of life, and rapidly is 
replaced by higher level defensive operations of the ego which center around 
repression and related mechanisms such as reaction formation, isolation, and 
undoing, all of which protect the ego from intrapsychic conflicts by means of the 
rejection of a drive derivative or its ideational representation, or both, from the 
conscious ego’ (Kernberg, 1975, p 25). Pathological conditions arise when this 
mechanism persists, and ‘splitting protects the ego from conflicts by means of the 
dissociation or active maintaining a part of introjections and identifications of 
strongly conflictual nature, namely, those libidinally determined from those 
aggressively determined, without regard to the access to consciousness’ (ibid, p 26).  
 
    An ongoing Kleinian emphasis on drives such as the ‘death instinct’ is argued to 
be  essentially ahistorical because if ‘war was fundamentally drive-based and 
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neurotic, then social injustice, nationalism, militarism, racism, economic turmoil, 
corruption, and a host of other factors were all irrelevant’ (Makari, 2008, p 448). 
Unable to temper their innate aggression, criminality was for Klein inborn and as 
Makari notes, is ‘only marginally affected by matters such as degrading 
surroundings’ (ibid, p 446). This normative notion is particularly important to 
modern personality pathology theorists in respect of terrorism where it is regarded 
as criminality, wherein the terrorist is deemed as being inherently pathological, 
rather than ideological in orientation.  
 
    One of Freud’s insights, had been that although there were criminals who acted 
out of a sense of guilt and broke the law in order to be punished, there were also 
‘those who commit crimes without any sense of guilt, who have either developed no 
moral inhibitions or who, in their conflict with society, consider themselves justified 
in their action’ (Freud, XIV, 2001/1916, p 333). The issue, however, is whether 
terrorists could be regarded simply as criminals succumbing to this masochistic 
need for punishment or more nearly, in Freudian terms, were they those who defied 
the law but were neither amoral nor neurotic, because of perceiving themselves to 
be in a justified conflict with society.  
 
    The ascription of criminality is then critical. If the psychobiographic analyst 
explains his subject in terms of a normative notion of criminality, he ipso facto 
pathologises him. However, if he believes that the subject is sincere in his beliefs, 
the subject would transcend normal pathological attributions of criminality. A 
determination of pathology further depends then on whether the analyst believes 
that a particular conflict with society is justifiable, because it would need to be 
justifiable in order to be a rational and sincere decision to take part in it. Effectively 
then, the decision to pathologise is an ideological one, with, paraphrasing the 
ubiquitous aphorism, that ‘one man’s pathological, is another man’s normal’.  
     
 
4    Heinz Kohut and the Turn to Narcissism.   
 
    Mirroring the growing American theoretical interest in Klein and object relations 
had been a line of development in clinical psychoanalysis. The population of 
potential psychoanalytic patients had widened from the traditionally private 
outpatient neurotic to include the hospitalised psychotic. The change,  as Arthur 
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Couch viewed it, ‘from Classical to “modern” was the “widening scope of analysis”, 
referring to the fact that the population of potential patients has changed from 
mainly neurotic ones to more patients with narcissistic, borderline, perverse, or 
psychotic personalities’ (Couch, 1995, p 14).  
 
    American analysts were increasingly prepared to treat such patients, despite the 
more traditional view as represented by figures such as Anna Freud that the 
‘psychoanalytic understanding of these severe disorders has far outstripped our 
capacity to help them by analytic therapy’ (Couch, 1995, p 14). Indeed Anna Freud 
remained ‘pessimistic about unmodified psychoanalysis of such patients with 
severe early deprivations in development, with resultant ego defects and lack of 
structuralization’ (ibid; Freud, 2001/1937, S.E. XXIII; Hale, 2000).  
 
    A more phenomenological approach was emerging ‘out of an effort to treat 
patients who were not responding to ego psychology therapies constructed around 
the analysis of psychological defenses’ (Mclean, 2007, p 41; Mollon, 2002a). Also, 
the perceived failure of classical psychoanalysis to apprehend the particular 
suffering of the modern clinical patient brought about a shift in focus from 
individuals suffering disturbances of sexual repression and self-control, to those 
suffering difficulty in interpersonal relationships and dissociative disorders. An 
emphasis on ‘“narcissistic affects”, such as shame and self-consciousness’, would 
‘inherently direct attention to phenomenology’ (Mollon, 2002a, p 3). 
 
    What Wallerstein terms the ‘hegemony of the ego psychology paradigm in 
America’ was not effectively challenged until the advent of Kohut’s self psychology 
(Wallerstein, 2002, p 146). The emphasis of self psychology is on the complex 
interrelationship of the psychic world of the subject as it creates itself and the 
social connectedness that it forms. Intrinsic to this conceptualisation is the 
‘embedded theory of narcissism’, a critical adjunct to the modern psychobiographic 
project in general, and more particularly, this thesis proposes, for the 
personological approach (Kets De Vries, 1990, p 426; Kohut, 2009/1971). 
 
    The schema of normal development was, for Kohut, that the ‘equilibrium of 
primary narcissism is disturbed by the unavoidable shortcomings of maternal care, 
but the child replaces the previous perfection (a) by establishing a grandiose and 
exhibitionistic image of the self: the grandiose self; and (b) by giving over the 
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previous perfection to an admired, omnipotent (transitional) self-object: the 
idealized parent imago’ (Kohut, 2009/1971, p 25, emphasis in the original). The 
‘self object’ in Kohut’s conceptualisation is neatly summarised by Mclean, as 
consisting ‘of the developing child plus each of those people who give the child the 
abilities to maintain self structure and firmness and a sense of cohesion and 
steadiness ... the infant is unaware that they are not part of his - or herself and 
that they are providing functions the infant will later learn to do on his or her own 
as these functions are incorporated into his or her psychic structure’ (Mclean, 
2007, p 41; Kohut, 2009/1971).  
 
    With the self at the centre of its own psychological universe, and narcissism an 
inherent feature in everyone, the quest to build and maintain self-esteem through 
the use of self objects develops as a life ambition (Kohut, 2009/1971). Kohut 
summarises the influence on mature psychological organisation of what he 
conceptualises as the two major derivatives of original narcissism. Under favourable 
circumstances ‘the neutralized forces emanating from the narcissistic self (the 
narcissistic needs of the personality and its ambitions) become gradually integrated 
into the web of our ego as a healthy enjoyment of our own activities and successes 
and as an adaptively useful sense of disappointment tinged with anger and shame 
over our failures and shortcomings’ (Kohut, 1966, p 254).  
 
    Shame predominates ‘when the ego is unable to provide a proper discharge for 
the exhibitionistic demands of the narcissistic self. Indeed, in almost all clinically 
significant instances of shame propensity, the personality is characterized by a 
defective idealization of the superego and by a concentration of the narcissistic 
libido upon the narcissistic self; and it is therefore the ambitious, success-driven 
person with a poorly integrated grandiose selfconcept and intense exhibitionistic-
narcissistic tensions who is most prone to experience shame’ (Kohut, 1966, p 254). 
In contrast to Kernberg, who believes all narcissism to be pathological, Kohut is 
positing the possibility of a continuum from what he regards as normal infantile 
narcissism through to pathological narcissism. Pathology for Kohut only arises with 
the failure of the early self object, with individuals then seeking in their adult lives 
to gratify their missing childhood self object needs (Kohut 2009/1971).  
 
    In normal development, the adult achieves a healthy narcissism reflecting a self 
confident self-esteem (Kohut 2009/1971). If the individual has not achieved a solid 
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grandiose self and idealised parent imago, he may suffer from a narcissistic 
pathology either borderline or psychotic (Tonkin and Fine, 1985; Kohut, 
2009/1971).  The ‘idealized parental imago image - the image of a perfect other 
with whom one could totally merge, and who would be a source of endless strength, 
perfect kindness, and unlimited power’, would ‘be subjected to disappointing 
comparisons to the actual parent’ (Saltzman, 1998).  
 
    Narcissistic pathology arises according to Kohut, from arrested normal 
narcissistic development due to a deficit in the child’s interpersonal interactions, or 
from a parental lack of empathy in the early developmental and transitional period 
(Kohut, 2009/1971). So that Kohut’s conception of analytic therapy was an attempt 
to compensate for the failure of early parenting which led according to Hale, to ‘self-
deficits’ which were normally narcissistic wounds (Hale, 2000, p 94; Akhtar and 
Anderson, 1982; Tonkin and Fine, 1985; Kets De Vries, 1990; Mclean, 2007).  
  
 
5    The Traumatic Triggering of Narcissistic Pathology.  
 
    In asserting the relationship between narcissism and early object relating, Klein 
has it that ‘auto-erotism and narcissism include the love for and relation with the 
internalized good object which in phantasy forms part of the loved body and self. It 
is to this internalized object that in auto-erotic gratification and narcissistic states 
a withdrawal takes place. Concurrently, from birth onwards, a relation to objects, 
primarily the mother (her breast) is present’ (Klein, 1987/1952, pp 204-205, 
emphasis in the original). 
 
     In her 1955 paper ‘Mourning and its Relation to Manic-Depressive States’, Klein 
outlines her analytic and theoretical breakthrough in the case of ‘Erna’, forming 
what this critique suggests as being the basis for the later theoretical adaptations 
of narcissistic pathology deployed in modern personality pathology profiling (Klein, 
1987/1955). Through Erna’s analysis Klein learned a good deal as she describes it  
 
‘about the phantasies and impulses underlying paranoid and manic-
depressive anxieties. For I came to understand the oral and anal nature of 
her introjection processes and the situations of internal persecution they 
engendered. I also became more aware of the ways in which internal 
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persecutions influence, by means of projection, the relation to external 
objects. The intensity of her envy and hatred unmistakably showed its 
derivation from the oral-sadistic relation to her mother’s breast, and was 
interwoven with the beginnings of her Oedipus complex.’  
 
(Klein, 1987/1955, pp 49-50)  
    
    Following Klein, Kernberg suggests, that this rage derives from the effort to 
eliminate a source of irritation and pain that the baby first experiences at the 
mother’s breast. Developmentally, the baby seeks to eliminate the obstacle to 
gratification, the bad object, and to make it suffer, to dominate and control it in 
order to avoid fears of persecution from it (Kernberg, 2013/1996). Hatred, in 
Kernberg’s schema, is structured in form and chronic, and is a derivative of rage 
which justifies itself as revenge. Thus ‘[p]aranoid fears of retaliation also are 
usually unavoidable accompaniments of intense hatred, so that paranoid features, 
a wish for revenge, and sadism go hand in hand’ (Kernberg, 2013/1996, p 3). 
Trauma is seen as the catalysing agent, and ‘the actual experience of sadistic 
behavior of a needed, inescapable object instantaneously shapes the rage reaction 
into the hatred of the sadistic object’ (Kernberg, 2013/1996, p 4). 
 
    The principal theoretical underpinning of modern adversarial personality 
profiling is, this thesis argues, Kernberg’s notion that the ‘intense activation of 
aggression’ is not only physiological but that ‘[m]ost importantly, traumatic 
experiences, such as intense and chronic pain, physical and sexual abuse, as well 
as severe pathology in early object relations would operate through the activation of 
aggressive affects determining the predominance of overall aggression over libidinal 
striving, resulting in conditions of severe psychopathology’ (Kernberg, 2013/1996, 
p 2). The key aim of clinical ‘at a distance’, adversarial political profiling is then, to 
indentify the traumatic experience which has activated the underlying inferred 
psychopathological formation, a psychopathology which this thesis claims is 
actually ideologically determined.    
   
    Although rather than a narcissistic continuum, narcissism in Kernberg’s 
formulation is always and only pathological, he does propose a continuum from the 
better functioning narcissist, ‘to severe narcissistic personality disorders with overt 
borderline functioning, that is, with generalized lack of impulse control, of anxiety 
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tolerance and of sublimatory channeling, the intensity of aggression mounts, 
reaching a maximum in the syndrome of malignant narcissism’ (Kernberg, 
2013/1996, p 3). Primitive splitting operations persist when ‘hatred overwhelmingly 
dominates an unconscious world of internalized object relations’ and ‘results in a 
borderline personality organization’ incorporating ‘ego-syntonic hatred, sadism and 
vengefulness’ (ibid, p 5). 
 
    As Kernberg focuses on the regressive potential of the primitive division of the 
world into idealised and persecutory segments, notwithstanding healthy early 
socialisation, there remains a readiness always of splitting the world into cultural 
stereotypes. Thus, the ‘“paranoid” polarity of ideologies that constitutes the 
concrete and grave threat to social life, and that may powerfully push a society into 
regressive group and mass phenomena that foster social violence’ (Kernberg, 2003, 
p 963). Whereas the self psychology of Kohut argues for a separate line of healthy 
narcissistic personality development, Kernberg as Post writes, ‘believes that the 
narcissistic personality develops only in response to psychological damage inflicted 
early in the course of development, and hence is always a pathological development 
... I find the psychogenetic formulations of Kernberg more congenial’ (Post, 2004, p 
189).  
 
    Following Kernberg’s formulation (and significant for adversarial profiling), in his 
schema, Post need only identify clinical narcissism or more properly the ‘at a 
distance’ equivalent, that is, traits resembling the syndrome of narcissism. 
Following the circular logic, once pathology has been ascribed, Post can infer 
childhood trauma as causality, because the narcissism has been ‘identified’. This 
conceptualisation, is effectively a template for Post’s pathologising of America’s 
ideological adversaries.  
 
 
6    Borderline Functioning. 
 
    The notion of a borderline personality with mild schizophrenia on the borderline 
between neurosis and psychosis was first formulated in the 1930’s by Adolf Stern 
(Stern, 1938). Analysts both psychoanalytic and psychiatric, began looking at 
personality disorders in patients whose social relations were problematic. As such, 
patients suffered from ‘overloads of aggression, anger, and distrust’, and the 
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analysts also looked at character neuroses which ‘included repeated and 
compulsive self-defeating behavior patterns’ (Hale, 2000, p 88).  
     
    Both Kernberg and Kohut agree, according to Tonkin and Fine, that there is a 
continuum from the neurotic to the psychotic, and that it represents oral rather 
than Oedipal conflict, because pathology of the oral phase involves more primitive 
and undifferentiated adaptations (Tonkin and Fine; Kohut 2009/1971; Kernberg; 
1975). Kohut regarded a borderline syndrome as being distinct from narcissistic 
personality disorders, whereas Kernberg defines ‘narcissistic personality disorder 
as a variety of borderline personality disorder’, with both theorists having 
commensurate differential treatment postures (Adler, 1980, p 46).   
 
    There may then be a borderline continuum as Adler posits, from seriously 
regressed individuals to those with a more stable narcissistic disorder (Adler, 1981; 
Akhtar and Anderson, 1982). Splitting and active dissociation are the central 
defence mechanisms of narcissistic and borderline disorders, however the 
narcissistic person ‘shows better impulse control and greater anxiety tolerance 
than the borderline person. Self-mutilation and persistent overt rage, often seen in 
the borderline personality, are not features of the narcissistic disorder’ (Akhtar and 
Anderson, 1982, p18; Mollon 2002a; Kennedy and Charles, 1990). 
 
    Emphasising ego functions and describing the defensive dynamics which 
underscore conflict and aggression, there are vicious circles  
 
‘involving projection of aggression and reintrojection of aggressively 
determined object and self images are probably a major factor in the 
development of both psychosis and borderline personality organization. In 
the psychoses their main effect is regressive refusion of self and object 
images; in the case of the borderline personality organization, what 
predominates is not refusion between self and object images, but an 
intensification and pathological fixation of splitting processes’  
 
(Kernberg, 1975, p 27, emphasis in the original).  
 
    The borderline personality disavows his rage and aggressive impulses through 
denial, along with the other ego defences of idealisation and projection, projective 
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identification, omnipotence and devaluation. It is however, splitting which is the 
‘essential defensive operation of the borderline personality organization which 
underlies all the others which follow (ibid, p 29).  Empirical support for diagnostic 
thresholds according to Bateman and Fonagy, is ‘problematic at best as it is 
impossible to distinguish clearly between “normal” and “abnormal” personalities’ 
(Bateman and Fonagy, 2004, p 2). Only when ‘“when personality traits are inflexible 
and maladaptive and cause significant functional impairments or subjective 
distress do they constitute personality disorders”’ (ibid). 
 
    In support of his notion of the prevalence of narcissistic borderline functioning 
amongst terrorists, Post cites the research of Lorenz Bollinger, suggesting that the 
‘terrorists he interviewed demonstrated a feature characteristic of individuals with 
narcissistic and borderline personalities - splitting. He found they had split off the 
de-valued parts of themselves and projected them onto the establishment which 
then became the target of their violent aggression’ (Post, 1987, p 308; Bayer-Katte 
et al, 1982). As opposed to a generalised condition, Bollinger actually believed, that 
the ‘[s]witchpoints in the pathway to becoming a terrorist or not can only be 
determined through individual reconstruction of psychosocial dynamics’ (Bollinger, 
1985, p 388). Post, however, argues that ‘[t]hroughout the broad spectrum of 
terrorist groups, no matter how diverse their causes, the absolutist rhetoric of 
terrorism is remarkably similar. The absolutist rhetoric of terrorism is 
characterised by splitting. Splitting is an important psychological characteristic of 
the borderline personality, a personality disorder which is disproportionately 
represented in the terrorist population’ (Post, 1987, p 311).  
 
    Again, for Bollinger, an individual ‘does not become a terrorist as a result of any 
primary single cause (e.g. genetic predisposition, sociopathy or labeling) but rather 
in the course of a psychosocial interaction process consisting of failing attempts of 
conflict resolution’ (Bollinger, 1985, p 387). In acknowledging their splitting and 
projection, Bollinger was reflecting what he saw as the current ‘groupthink’ of the 
individuals that he interviewed. What Post is doing, effectively, is reflecting the 
inherent them and us mentality of the group in conflict, which sees the other as all 
bad, and extrapolating this as an individual developmental trajectory and 
representing an individual pathology. 
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    Bollinger was a member of a much larger 1981 social scientific study led by 
Wanda von Bayer-Katte (1982) (and commissioned by the West German Ministry of 
the Interior), of 250 West German terrorists chiefly from the Rote Armee Fraktion 
(RAF)11. Another member of the study group, Herbert Jäger, ‘found no common 
pattern in attitudes towards violence, neither ambivalence or attraction among the 
West German terrorists. Some individuals reported a strong prior aversion to 
aggression’, so that attitudes were dependent not on underlying aggression but 
rather on later ‘individual socialization’ (Crenshaw, 1986, p 387; Jäger et al, 1982). 
 
    With such a homogeneous group as these West German terrorists, results 
involving ‘different findings by members of the same team have particular 
importance for a conceptual debate about the reliability and validity of analyses’ 
(Horgan, 2006, p 54). Similarly, the research suffered as Horgan has it, from a 
number of methodological flaws, particularly as it had been commissioned by the 
West German Ministry of the Interior, effectively the terrorist’s enemy. Most of the 
terrorists were unwilling to meet the researchers, who also suffered a lack of co-
operation from local authorities. As the research interviews were conducted by 
social scientists, they did not have the status of privileged communication and so 
the researchers could have been subpoenaed to give evidence against their 
interview subjects (Horgan, 2006). 
 
    The remarkable homogeneity amongst the terrorists was because they grew out 
the West German radical student and squatter movements. They led a communal 
life in which members were mainly known to each other and where recruitment 
was by networking (Horgan, 2006; Townsend, 2011). An explosives expert who 
‘graduated’ from Berlin’s notorious squat ‘Kommune I’ but later defected, Michael 
Baumann, says that ‘with me it all began with rock music and long hair ... In my 
case, in Berlin, it was like this [in the 1960s]: if you let your hair grow long you 
suddenly were in the position the blacks are in the United States’ (Baumann 
quoted in Kellen, 1998, p 54; Townsend, 2011). 
  
    A ‘them and us’ dichotomy, which is inherent in the subject position of terrorist 
or indeed counter-culturalist, is clearly amenable to being portrayed as splitting 
from and projecting onto, the ‘Other’. There were, according to Kellen, many 
disaffected young people in Post War West Germany and a large student and 
                                                 
11
 Also known as the Baader, Meinhof Gang. 
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squatter countercultural movement had evolved (Kellen, 1998; Haynal et al, 1983). 
However, that they were disaffected does not necessarily imply that they were 
narcissistically damaged, again it is only the normative assumption from the fact of 
their being either countercultural or terrorists. Leading a clandestine hunted life 
would probably tend to lead to the manifestation of neurotic symptoms, indeed 
some justifiable paranoia. As Kernberg points out, only a careful diagnostic 
examination would be able to reveal an underlying borderline organisation, because 
individual neurotic symptoms are not ‘pathognomonic’ in themselves, therefore 
needing a convergence of symptoms in order indicate borderline functioning 
(Kernberg, 1975, p 9). 
 
    Even if this convergence were demonstrated, it is further problematised as Gretty 
Mirdal points out, in that terrorists are generally only identified after they have 
spent a long ‘period of affiliation to a segregated group’ (Mirdal, 2013/2006, p 7). 
As such it would not be possible to tell whether the ‘so-called narcissistic traits 
that can be observed in some terrorists ... are the cause or the result of belonging 
to a fundamentalistic, fanatical or otherwise terroristic organisations’ (ibid). Clearly 
early ‘dispositions’ will influence development and exert a ‘certain bias onto 
pathway decisions’, but there are, according to Bollinger, ‘independent causal 
contingencies on the various steps of the terrorist career’ (Bollinger, 1985, p 388). 
Bollinger is at pains to point out that he believes that there is no teleological 
individual progression determined by a generalisable psychic propensity for 
terrorism, that ‘[t]here is no straight causal sequence between primary conditions 
and subsequent terrorist behavior’  (ibid). 
 
 
7    Jerrold Post’s Conceptualisation of Political Narcissism. 
 
   Citing Freud’s 1914 paper ‘On Narcissism: An Introduction’ Post conceptualises 
psychosis as being the total narcissistic withdrawal into the self. The psychological 
energy of so-called ‘lone terrorists’ such as the Unabomber Ted Kaczynski or the 
mass killer Anders Breivik, normally ‘invested in the world of people, the world of 
objects, is redirected and totally absorbed into the self’ (Post, 2015, p 8; Freud, 
2001/1914, S.E. XIV). Narcissism ‘reflects a return of the libido into the ego. Freud 
observed that for both psychotic disorders and neuroses, there was an excess of 
libidinal investment in the self and insufficient attachment or psychological 
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investment (cathexis) in others (objects)’ (Post, 1993, p 101). With primary 
narcissism ‘being a natural phase of early psychosexual development’, this 
secondary narcissism reflected an ‘imbalance of the self versus other’ (ibid).  
  
   As it relates to his own political psychobiographical perspective, Post defines the 
characteristics of narcissism as being  
 
‘concerned with high ambition and self-confidence, to possess high self 
estimates to the point of dreams of glory, a need to be considered special, a 
tendency to be so self-absorbed as to have difficulty sustaining mutual 
relationships, and to also possess the fragility underlying this grandiose 
façade, so that when the grandiose internal dreams of glory are shattered, 
overwhelming shame results’ 
 
          (Post, 2015, p 15).  
  
   When the narcissistic defences are breached, emotions are so overwhelming that 
the terror of meaninglessness impels such individuals to ‘create compensatory 
delusions’ (Post, 2015, p 9). Despite the narcissist’s total investment in the self, 
there is an inner sense of ‘inferiority, unworthiness, and unlovability’ and ‘paranoid 
feelings of narcissistic grandiosity and persecution’ designed to overcome this (Post, 
2015, p 10). Indeed paranoia may be considered as a ‘primitive form of narcissistic 
pathology’ (ibid). With narcissistic entitlement inevitably leading to disappointment 
and disillusionment, this in turn produces a retaliatory rage, ‘strongly associated 
with the frustration of narcissistic entitlement and insatiable narcissistic needs’ 
(Post, 2015, p10). 
 
    There exists ‘a primitive psychological state characterized by a split between the 
idealized good loving object and the bad persecuting object’, as described by Klein’s 
‘paranoid schizoid’ formulation, and is deployed by Robert Robins and Post, as an 
underlying theme of their ascriptions of paranoid group functioning (Robins and 
Post, 1997, p 77). The paranoiac’s projection results from a Kleinian perspective, in 
attacking others not out of a conscious but an unconscious irrational need, with 
effectively a permanent state of war needed to fulfil individual psychic needs, quite 
apart from exigent circumstances or causality (Makari, 2008). 
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    Following Kohut, Post argues that the ‘target of aggression, the persecutor, is the 
individual or group which is associated with a flaw in a “narcissistically perceived 
reality.” This is particularly the case when there are significant paranoid features, 
so that the wounded narcissist’s tendency is to blame others for his 
disappointment’ (Post, 1993, p 114). The projective identification with a perceived 
persecutor in Klein’s theory of aggressive object relating is particularly helpful in 
explaining an ‘unprovoked’ fear and hatred, independent of any external causality. 
The primary antagonist in a conflict need not then have been provoked, because 
the aggression may derive from within his individual psyche (Robins and Post, 
1997). Terrorists in Post’s schema, pursue violent aggression in order to assuage 
inner psychic deficits rather than as a result of genuine existential grievances (Post, 
1986; Post, 1998).  
     
    A child relieves the distress of the aggressive hatred within himself, which in 
Robins and Post’s view of Klein’s schema, means ‘splitting off and projecting the 
bad part - the internal persecutor - outward, onto other persons or objects, and 
retaining the good parts inside, idealizing them. Thus, the loving, nurturing part 
becomes the foundation of the idealized self-concept, while the negative destructive 
feelings are disowned and projected outward, onto strangers or groups’ (Robins and 
Post, 1997, p 77, emphasis in the original). Projection is for Robins and Post, the 
‘sine qua non of paranoia’, with the paranoid outlook ranging from the entirely 
normal to the severely psychopathological (ibid, p 76). 
 
    Progressing this from a political personality perspective, Robins and Post believe 
that the resulting persecutory and grandiose states are particularly significant, 
with suspicion the defining characteristic of the paranoid who searches endlessly 
for hidden meanings (Robins and Post, 1997). Again following Klein, paranoids rely 
on the ‘primitive psychological defenses of denial, distortion, and projection ...  
afraid of their own aggression, paranoids defend against their rage by viewing 
themselves as the victims of persecutors’ (ibid, p 14). The paranoid’s grandiose 
facade hides his feelings of inferiority, insecurity, insignificance and inadequacy, 
shielding his fragile ego, and when reality shatters this grandiose, the resulting 
shame, hurt, and rage at no longer being special, is again a manifestation ‘of 
narcissistic entitlement’ (Robins and Post, 1997, pp 16-17). 
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    In their explication of group paranoia, Robins and Post incorporate Wilfred 
Bion’s notion of basic assumption groups, which extends Klein’s theory of 
projection (Robins and Post, 1997). Basic assumptions in Bion’s schema are 
‘adumbrated by three formulations, dependence, pairing, and fighting or flight ... 
each basic assumption contains features that correspond so closely with extremely 
primitive part objects that sooner or later psychotic anxiety, appertaining to these 
primitive relationships, is released’ (Bion, 1961, p 187-188). In a group which is 
‘dominated by the basic assumption of unity for purposes of fight or flight ... the 
existence of an enemy the first requisite of this kind of group. If you can only fight 
or run away you must find something to fight or run away from’ (Bion, 2004/1962, 
p 67).  
 
    The task of finding this ‘something’ falls to the leader, who ‘is usually a man or a 
woman with marked paranoid trends; perhaps if the presence of an enemy is not 
immediately obvious to the group, the next best thing is for the group to choose a 
leader to whom it is’ (Bion, 2004/1962, p 67). Taking Bion’s view of group paranoia 
as being the manifestation of the leader’s pathology, Robins and Post see it as 
representing the ‘victory of the psychopathic leader over other healthier forms of 
group development’ (Robins and Post, 1997, p 85). More than this Robins and Post 
claim that the paranoid leader is also something of a creation of the group, which 
especially under traumatic circumstances may be amenable to only just such a 
leader who diagnoses their problems and along with the group, identifies or creates 
external enemies.       
 
    These groups then display an even greater suspiciousness and hostility than 
their individual members, because groups otherwise act to contain and inhibit 
what would be psychotic in an individual. The group members subsume their 
individuality and surrender to the leader, because ‘[b]elonging to the mass 
movement is much more important than the movement’s ethos. The cause is not 
the cause. The espoused cause of the movement is the rationale for joining, but the 
underlying need is to belong’ (Robins and Post, 1997, p 96, emphasis in the 
original). Robins and Post’s argument here, which is strongly disputed in this 
critique, is that movements or indeed terrorist organisations exist not to further an 
ideology, but simply to fulfil the psychological needs of their members.  
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    Directly disputing Post, groups such as the IRA, Hamas or al Qaeda are in no 
way, argues Frost, ‘social clubs that exist solely to provide an outlet for their 
members’ aggressive drives’ (Frost, 2005, p 45). If Post’s argument that the aim of 
the terrorist group was simply to perpetuate itself as an outlet for the psychic 
aggression of its members were to be applied consistently, ‘almost any group or 
institution could be seen as existing merely to serve its members psychological 
needs, with its overt functions taking a somewhat distant second place’ (ibid). 
Indeed from the functional perspective of anthropology, it would correspond to the 
always blurry distinction between what Monaghan and Just describe as the 
‘manifest and latent’ roles fulfilled by an organisation (Monaghan and Just, 2000, p 
59). In the reverse of Post’s argument, the thesis contends that the impetus for 
joining a group is initially ideological, but that the group then naturally fulfils a 
number of psychological functions, by virtue of its being a group.  
 
 
8    The ‘Grandiose Self’ of the Narcissistic Leader. 
 
   With their extreme egocentricity, sense of entitlement and omnipotence, 
individuals with significant narcissistic personality traits are, according to Post, 
‘inevitably drawn to the world of politics’ (Post, 2015, p 11). Unlike the sociopath 
however, the narcissist does have a conscience, but it is a flexible one which adapts 
to circumstances (Post, 2015). As such, there is both an overt and a covert aspect 
to the narcissist’s personality, where an ‘overt picture of haughty grandiosity 
overlies feelings of inferiority; the overt picture of zealous morality overlies a 
corruptible conscience’ (Post, 1993, p 105). In developing his theory of the political 
narcissist, Post relies principally on the theories Kohut for the charismatic leader 
follower relationship. For the effect of more extreme narcissistic pathology, Post 
follows Kernberg’s notion of malignant narcissism.  
 
    Both Kernberg and Kohut, according to Post, address the issue of primitive 
narcissism in a similar fashion. In the early stage of this primary narcissism, the 
infant experiences the external world, including the mother, as being part of him. 
With the frustrations of reality, the child begins to differentiate himself from the 
external world, but two psychological mechanisms develop in order to restore the 
sense of completeness. An ideal or grandiose self in which the child is made to feel 
highly valued and special, is engendered through the loving and admiring 
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‘mirroring’ response of the mother, and this treasured position is maintained 
through ‘splitting’ (Post, 1993). The very young child who is unable to tolerate the 
bad aspects of himself and his environment and to integrate them with the good 
ones into a realistic whole, ‘splits the good and the bad into the “me” and the “not 
me.” By rejecting all aspects of himself which do not fit his ideal or grandiose self, 
the child attempts to maintain it’ (Post, 1993, p106). 
 
     In relation to this grandiose self, there is as Post points out, a major theoretical 
distinction between Kohut and Kernberg, with Kohut believing that it ‘reflects the 
fixation of an archaic “normal” primitive self, the basis for his positing a healthy 
line of narcissistic development. In contrast, Kernberg believes the grandiose self is 
always pathological, differing from normal infantile narcissism in that the 
internalized object images are pathological’ (Post, 1993, p106).  
 
    The second mechanism by which the child restores his former psychological 
completeness is, for Kernberg, the attachment to an ‘ideal object’ or in Kohut’s 
formulation, deriving particularly from the father, an ‘idealized parental imago’ 
(Post, 1993, p 108). Following Kohut’s formulation as more amenable to his own 
leader-follower conceptualisation, Post notes if that during this ‘critical 
developmental period the child’s emerging self-concept is damaged’, it leads to what 
Kohut describes as the injured self or what Post himself describes as the wounded 
self (Post, 1993, p 108). During this crucial period any major trauma and loss 
‘damages the very foundation of the child’s subsequent personality development, 
leading to the wounded self, craving the mirroring and adulation of which he was 
deprived’ (Post, 2015, p 18). Such psychic injury or wounding may occur, for 
example, when children are rejected by cold or uncaring mothers, or conversely a 
special form of rejection by the overprotection of the ‘intrusive narcissistic mother’ 
(Post, 1993, p 108). 
 
    Forming the basis of Post’s conceptualisation of the narcissistic leader, the first 
personality type deriving from this narcissistic injury is the ‘mirror-hungry 
personality’ (Post, 1993, p 108). Critical to Kohut’s self psychology, as Post 
describes it, is that due to the disturbance of interpersonal relations, the ‘primary 
function of individuals in the narcissist’s personal surround is to shore up his or 
her self-esteem, to provide reassurance for the fragile self. The significant other 
serves, in Kohut’s terms, as a selfobject. The selfobject completes the famished self 
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of the narcissist’ (Post, 2015, p 14; emphasis in the original). Individuals, whose 
grandiose self craves confirmatory admiration in order to counteract their inner 
sense of worthlessness and lack of self-esteem are however, never fully satisfied 
with the responses in this ‘mirroring self-object relationship’ (Post, 1993, p 108; 
emphasis in the original). The narcissist uses the objectified individuals in his 
interpersonal relationships to shore up his self-esteem, and for the narcissistic 
leader, a ‘group of sycophantic advisors can in effect become a selfobject’ (ibid, p 
109).  
 
    The terrorist group may thus perform this function Johnson and Feldman in 
their Kohutian formulation, cite the small enigmatic, but media vaunted American 
terrorist group, the Symbionese Liberation Army (SLA), infamous for the 
kidnapping and subsequent recruitment of heiress Patty Hearst (Johnson and 
Feldman, 1992). In the disintegration and anxiety that follows when selfobjects fail 
to fulfil their function of maintaining the self, traditional beliefs are cast aside in a 
narcissistic rage, and the terrorist organisation serves as an alternative self-object 
providing ‘an empathetic matrix around which partial or temporary cohesion takes 
place’ (Johnson and Feldman, 1992 , p 298). Terrorism becomes ‘a symbol of the 
self’s anger at unempathetic responses from other self-objects’ (ibid, p 299). 
 
    Inadequate personalities suffering self pathology are seen as being attracted to 
terrorism in order to bolster self esteem, and are led by charismatic individuals 
such as the SLA’s Nancy Ling Perry (Johnson and Feldman, 1992). Perry used her 
leadership in order to offset her own self doubts, with terrorist activity providing 
according to Johnson and Feldman, a ‘source of cohesion that offsets the 
fragmentation of the damaged self’ (ibid, p 301). As with the highly vulnerable 
personalities of ‘the SLA, individual deficits were countered by the collective 
strength and cohesion of the group’ (Johnson and Feldman, 1992, p 301). In 
similar Kohutian terms, Peter Olsson argues that the terrorist is in fact regressing 
to the pre-differentiation phase where these early self-objects are parental imagos, 
supplying a narcissistic transitional function of self esteem (Olsson, 1988).  
 
 
9    The ‘Ideal-hungry Personality’ of the Follower. 
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    The ‘ideal-hungry personality’ of the ‘follower’, with a narcissistically wounded 
self, is the complementary of the ‘mirror-hungry personality’ of the leader (Post, 
1993; Post, 2015). What Post describes as Kohut’s elegant formulation of the 
‘mirroring and idealizing transferences’ along with an ‘elaboration of narcissistic 
transference’, is critical to his own conceptualisation of the charismatic leader-
follower relationship (Post, 2015, 74). Closely followed in Post’s schema, there are 
as presented in Kohut and Ernst Wolf’s formulation, ‘behavioural patterns and the 
injured self’ in which  
 
‘ideal-hungry personalities are forever in search of others whom they can 
admire for their prestige, power, beauty, intelligence, or moral stature. They 
can experience themselves as worthwhile only so long as they can relate to 
selfobjects to whom they can look up ... Again, in some instances, such 
relationships last a long time and are genuinely sustaining to both 
individuals involved. In most cases, however, the inner void cannot forever 
be filled by these means. The ideal-hungry feels the persistence of the 
structural defect and, as a consequence of this awareness, he begins to look 
for - and, of course, he inevitably finds - some realistic defects in his God. 
The search for new idealizable selfobjects is then continued, always with the 
hope that the next great figure to whom the ideal-hungry attaches himself 
will not disappoint him’  
 
(Kohut and Wolf, 1978, p 420). 
 
    Similarly, regarding it as a significant contribution to the understanding of the 
societal aspects of narcissism, Post cites Christopher Lasch’s The Culture of 
Narcissism (1079). In a critique of what he sees as modern narcissistic 
individualism, Lasch argues that ‘[e]very age develops its own peculiar form of 
pathology, which expresses in exaggerated form its underlying character structure’, 
and in Post War America, this was a narcissistic pathology (Lasch, 1991/1979, p 
41). As authority figures in modern society lose their credibility, ‘the superego in 
individuals increasingly fantasies about his parents – fantasies charged with 
sadistic rage - rather than from internalised ego ideals formed by a later experience 
of loved and respected models for social conduct’ (ibid, p 12).  
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    Individuals possessing a weak sense of self in need of constant validation, such 
as, according Lasch, Susan Stern of the American ‘Weatherman’ terrorist group, 
whose association with important people ‘made her feel important. “I felt I was part 
of a vast network of intense, exciting and brilliant people.” When the leaders she 
idealized disappointed her, as they always did, she looked for new heroes to take 
their place, hoping to warm herself in their “brilliance” and to overcome her feeling 
of insignificance’ (Lasch, 1991/1979, p 7). The Weathermen, ‘derived not so much 
from an older revolutionary tradition as from the turmoil and narcissistic anguish 
of contemporary America’ (ibid, p 8). Locating the psychology of Weathermen 
terrorism as a situated phenomenon, Lasch argues that it reflected the prevalent 
clinically identifiable pathology of narcissism in modern particularly American 
society (Lasch, 1991/1979). 
 
    Notwithstanding specific cultural factors, the ideal hungry individual is 
particularly attracted by the strength and certainty of the mirror hungry narcissist, 
in particular the charismatic leader (Post, 1993). There is a ‘psychological makeup 
and responses of individuals susceptible to charismatic leadership - the lock of the 
follower for the key of the leader’ (Post, 2015, 73). Indeed, Post believes that there is 
a disproportionate focus on the ‘magnetism of the leader, failing to make the 
fundamental observations that all leaders - especially charismatic leaders - are at 
heart the creation of their followers’ (Post, 2015, p 72).  
 
    Although not necessary for charismatic leadership, a paranoid conviction can in 
fact be an asset, but according to Post, when actual paranoia and charisma are 
linked, they have been responsible for the most violent excesses in history. Post 
links the rhetorical charisma of Hitler to Osama bin Laden’s rhetoric of 
emphasising that the ‘polarity is between good and evil, between children of God 
and the people of Satan’ (Post, 2015, p 76). The externalising rhetoric of the 
terrorist group is particularly attractive to narcissistically wounded individuals with 
a paranoid orientation (Post, 1986). With the mechanism of splitting critical for 
engendering a group ethos, ‘“they” (the establishment) are responsible for society’s 
(and our) failures, not only is it not immoral to strike out violently against them, 
but doing so is a moral imperative’ (Post, 1993, p 116). There is then according to 
Post, an overwhelming psychological attractiveness to terrorism for ‘alienated and 
marginal individuals who tend to externalize the source of their own failures - for 
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the narcissistically wounded “ideal-hungry” individuals described by Kohut’ (Post, 
2015, p 81). 
 
    The terrorist ‘groups draw their membership from marginal, isolated, and 
inadequate individuals from troubled families, so that for many, belonging to the 
terrorist group is the first time they have truly belonged to any group’ (Post, 1986, p 
211, emphasis in the original). The analysis that terrorists were marginalised 
individual’s acting out their individual pathologies, was originally conceptualised in 
order to explain the modern era of terrorism emblematically ushered in, according 
to Post, ‘by the radical Palestinian seizure of the Israeli Olympic village during the 
1972 Munich Olympics’ (Post, 2004, p 126).  
 
    Post’s later collaborative research would find rather, that for young Palestinians, 
joining the insurgency was actually a normative response. One of Post et al’s 
‘terrorist’ interviewees had it that, ‘e]nlistment was for me the done thing …in a 
way, it can be compared to a young Israeli from a nationalist Zionist family who 
wants to fulfil himself through army service’ (Post, Sprinzak and Denny, 2003, p 
182). Indeed, when they are in the insurgency such ‘terrorists are socialised like 
soldiers to attack the enemy, bringing into question whether a pathologising 
diagnosis can be used in an instance where a culture sanctions the killings’ (Post 
in Hough, 2003, p 821). Assaf Moghadam points out that ‘popular support for 
suicide bombings among Palestinians reached an all-time high, with over 70% of 
Palestinians expressing their support for such attacks’ (Moghadam, 2003, p 76). 
 
    Extensive meta research data is summed up by Andrew Silke that, ‘the best of 
the empirical work does not suggest, and never has suggested, that terrorists 
possess a distinct personality or that their psychology is somehow deviant from 
that of “normal” people’ (Silke, 2003a, p 32; Corrado, 1981; Crenshaw, 1990; 
Sageman, 2004; Horgan, 2006). With the evidence on ‘Palestinian terrorism’ not 
readily amenable to his conceptualisation, Post (1986, 1998, 2007) cites a 
somewhat anomalous finding in Robert Clark’s paper on Basque terrorism, 
‘Patterns in the Lives of ETA Members’ (1983). Clark’s very rudimentary indeed 
questionable statistics show that only 8% of the population of the Basque country 
are of mixed Spanish-Basque heritage, whilst some 40% of the Basque terrorist 
organisation ETA (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna) appear to be of mixed heritage (Clark, 
1983). The offspring of these families, (although not described as such in Cark’s 
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paper), ‘are treated as half-breeds and reviled ... suggesting they are sociologically 
marginal’ (Post, 1998 p 29). Extrapolating to the wider cohort of terrorists, Post has 
it, then, that as ‘outcasts’ belonging  
 
‘on the margins of society, they try to “out Basque the Basques.” They 
exaggerate their political identity in order to achieve a psychosocial identity. 
    I am suggesting then that a strong need to belong is a feature terrorists 
around the world share in common, however disparate their ideological 
causes. Moreover, underlying the need to belong is an incomplete or 
fragmented psychosocial identity, so that the only way the member feels 
reasonably complete is in relationship to the group; belonging to the group 
becomes an important component of the member’s self-concept. Indeed, 
belonging to the group for many is the most important component, the 
linchpin of psychosocial identity’  
 
(Post, 1986, p 215). 
 
    Clark’s own analysis of his findings are on the contrary, that it was from 
‘traditional Basque culture that individual etarras [ETA members] derive their 
emotional strength, the unusual mixture of social, cultural, and psychological 
forces that sustains them in the midst of a constantly failing guerrilla war’ (Clark, 
1983, p 448). That even as they become more committed to the terrorist group, 
relationships with friends and family ‘paradoxically become even more important in 
a sort of symbolic sense’, and that ‘it becomes even more important for them to 
know that their cultural origins are still intact, awaiting their return when and if 
they leave the struggle’ (ibid, p 447). Indeed, Clark found that it was particularly 
important for ETA members to be able to ‘seek refuge and solace (as well as 
material support) from among those whom they love and cherish. Etarras are not 
alienated persons; they are, on the contrary, deeply embedded in the culture whose 
rights they fight to defend’ (Clark, 1983, p 424). The seemingly taken for granted 
assumptions of terrorist alienation and marginality as the basis of a psychoanalytic 
conceptualisation of terrorism is, the thesis argues, actually an ideological 
construct.  
 
 
10    Charismatically Led Religious Cults as Model for Terrorist Groups.  
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    Extrapolating onto the wider terrorist cohort, Post believes that the study of 
‘charismatic religious groups provide confirmation for the hypothesis that 
narcissistically wounded individuals are especially attracted to charismatic leader-
follower relationships’ (Post, 2015, p 80). Taking the example of the mass suicide of 
the cult followers of the Reverend Jim Jones in their People’s Temple settlement in 
Jonestown Guyana, Post describes the ‘narcissistically wounded individuals’ whose 
psychological qualities rendered them ‘susceptible to the force of the charismatic 
leader and lead to collective regression’ (Post, 2004, p 188).  
 
    Similarly, Post references members of the Reverend Moon’s Unification Church 
as being ‘particularly important for the question of the capacity of terrorists to 
commit antisocial acts’ because ‘the more isolated and unaffiliated the new 
members, the more likely they were to hold assiduously – and unquestioningly - to 
their group membership, because it provided the members’ sole definition of 
themselves, their sole source of support’ (Post, 1998, p 34). With terrorists, ‘the 
greater the relief the new cult recruits felt on joining, the greater the likelihood they 
would engage in acts that violated the mores to which they had been socialized’ 
(Post, 1998, p 35). 
 
    The problem with an analysis of terrorism predicated on the psychology of cults 
is that there are actually only limited points of valence between them and organised 
terrorist groups. The 9/11 attackers in Post’s narrative had been inspired by bin 
Laden and ‘uncritically accepted the direction of the destructive charismatic leader’ 
(Post, 2004, p 5). But in contradistinction to Post’s narrative and indeed his 
proposition of authoritarian charismatically led terrorism, the ‘Hamburg cell’ chiefly 
responsible for the 9/11 attack had become ‘independently of any contact with bin 
Laden, committed to violence in the name of radical Islam’ (Burke, 2004, p 237).  
 
    The ‘Hamburg Cell’ was one of a number of autonomous though linked ‘groups 
who allied themselves with bin Laden during the 1990s to access resources to allow 
them to execute plans that they had developed on their own’ (Burke, 2004, p 237). 
Marc Sageman in particular has challenged Post’s notion of bin Laden as the 
charismatic leader having a history of violence, and is uncritically followed by the 
group (Sageman, 2004, p 90). This was certainly not true of the global Salafi jihad 
which, according to Sageman, ‘prominently features local initiative and 
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decentralized decisionmaking. Bin Laden had no history of violence before joining 
the jihad ... the leadership style in al Qaeda is not an authoritarian one. There is no 
consolidation of decision-making in its leader’ (Sageman, 2004, p 90).  
 
    Al Qaeda is, Post concedes, unlike ‘other charismatically led terrorist 
organisations’ in that it would survive perfectly well without its charismatic leader 
(Post, 2004, p 9; Jerrold Post, The Los Angeles Times, December the 9th, 2001b). In 
an attempt to reconcile this theoretical quandary, Post’s position is that after 9/11, 
‘bin Laden continued to maintain symbolic leadership control over the organization’ 
(Post, 2007, p 221, my emphasis). Bin Laden was either a symbolic leader or he 
was in control, either a figurehead or running the organisation. Notwithstanding 
Post’s somewhat ambiguous analysis, it would still mean that the then most 
prominent world terrorist organisation would be atypical of the formulation, despite 
Post’s adducing bin Laden and Al Qaeda as the principle and archetypal evidence 
for his theory. 
 
    Similarly, in challenging Post’s diagnosis of bin Laden’s grandiose and indeed 
malignant narcissism, Sageman regards one of the most attractive features about 
bin Laden as being ‘specifically his lack of narcissism, his humility, which 
impresses his followers and admirers - especially because he had the means to live 
luxuriously and chose to give up that lifestyle to live simply, among his mujahedin. 
His statements are also self-deprecating rather than grandiose. The only trauma in 
his childhood is the fact that his father died when he was around ten. Otherwise, 
he lived the privileged life of a prince’ (Sageman, 2004, p 86). Indeed as Sageman 
points out, the other leaders of Al Qaeda had similarly trouble free childhoods, 
their only trauma being perhaps arrest in early adulthood, ‘too late to cause the 
type of narcissistic wound described by Kernberg and Kohut’ (Sageman, 2004, p 
86). 
 
    Neither did bin Laden have any particular personal ambition according to Abdel 
Bari Atwan, who has conducted personal interviews with him (Atwan, 2007). 
Although wishing to re-establish the Muslim caliphate, bin Laden did not wish to 
become and was in fact excluded by Islamic prophecy, from becoming caliph (ibid). 
Life for bin Laden was designed as a test ‘by the Creator to examine his faith, 
steadfastness and obedience’ (Atwan, 2007, p 56). Whilst bin Laden’s asceticism 
and eschewing of a life of considerable wealth to live under constant stress and 
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deprivation and discouraging any personality cult around him, does not according 
to Frost, necessarily preclude Post’s diagnosis of malignant narcissism, it certainly 
does not support such a diagnosis. 
 
    If bin Laden was not particularly narcissistic, then a lock and key narcissistic 
transference with his followers is also problematised. If the followers are not 
necessarily narcissistically injured either, and bin Laden appears to deliberately 
eschew any narcissistic transference, it could be that he was actually an iconic 
figure admired by idealists rather than thralls. Such a demonising political 
discourse as Post’s may in any event be a political miscalculation, because a more 
realistic appraisal of terrorists as frequently ‘intelligent, psychologically healthy 
idealists only makes them more dangerous not less’ (Frost, 2005, p 44). 
 
 
11    The Temporarily Overwhelmed Follower of the Charismatic Leader.  
 
    Although narcissistic transferences occur, according to Post, in all ‘charismatic 
leader-follower relationships, and in some charismatic leader-follower relationships 
are crucial determinants’, he believes that they are more prevalent at certain 
historical moments (Post, 2004, p 191). Pointing out that at such times, apart from 
those always willing core followers of charismatic leaders, who are ideal-hungry 
narcissistically injured personalities themselves, Post argues that ‘otherwise 
mature and psychologically healthy individuals may temporarily come to feel 
overwhelmed and in need of a strong and self-assured leader’ (ibid, p 196). 
 
    When the historical moment passes,  
 
‘so too does the need. Few would omit Winston Churchill from the pantheon 
of charismatic leaders ... During the crisis, Churchill’s virtues were exalted 
and idealized. But when it passed and the need for a strong leader abated, 
how quickly the British people demystified the previously revered Churchill, 
focused on his leadership faults, and cast him out of office ... just as the 
object of individual veneration is inevitably dethroned as his worshippers 
achieve psychological maturity, so too the idealized leader will be discarded 
when the moment of historical need passes, as evidenced by the rise and fall 
of Winston Churchill’.  
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(Post, 2004, pp 196,199). 
 
    This particular narrative would seem to reflect Post’s own ideological discourse of 
democratic individualism and autonomy. The heroic wartime leader Churchill’s 
losing of the 1945 general election is presented as the archetypal and democratic 
normalisation of the temporary narcissistic transference between charismatic 
leader and needy followers. After the traumatic circumstances of war, these 
inherently healthy followers reassert their individual autonomy by breaking the 
spell of the charismatic leader, whose sole function was to see them through this 
existential and indeed psychic trauma. 
 
    Post’s political narrative is somewhat reductive reflecting an Americanocentric 
political discourse in which general elections are more nearly leadership contests. 
The British political system in which the executive is drawn from the legislature is 
necessarily a contest between political parties particularly in this less media 
intense Post War era. When the election took place in May 1945, Churchill had an 
exceptional 83% personal approval rating in the polls, but had neglected according 
to Paul Addison, not only domestic politics but also his Conservative Party 
interests, whilst conducting the War. The Labour Party had tuned into the national 
mood for social reform, campaigning on ‘full employment, social security and the 
issue which, according to the opinion polls, was most important in the minds of 
voters – housing’ (Addison, 2011, p 3). 
 
    Again, although Labour won a parliamentary landslide, due to the vagaries of the 
electoral system, they did so by achieving just over half of the electoral vote and 
Churchill, who had in fact restored the patriotic credibility of the Conservative 
Party from the tarnish of appeasement, is thought, according to Addison, to have 
mitigated the potential scale defeat. Critically, Churchill retained leadership of his 
party. Even accepting Post’s psychological account of Churchill’s rise and fall in 
1945, it would have meant that almost half the British people had remained 
psychologically overwhelmed by the trauma of war and were still in narcissistic 
transference with Churchill.  
 
    If only a very small proportion of the electorate had changed their vote, then the 
whole nation, in Post’s reductive analysis would have remained psychologically 
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immature. Indeed, in 1951 the British electorate decided that the Conservatives 
were more likely to end post War austerity and they won the election with their 
leader Churchill once again becoming Prime Minister, the British people having 
seemingly forgotten the ‘demystified’ Churchill’s leadership flaws (Addison, 2011; 
Post, 2004). Deploying a reductive conceptualisation of psychoanalytic theory 
imposes a correspondingly reductive narrative schema on otherwise complex 
events, as does viewing the psychology of leadership through the prism of another 
political culture. 
 
    
12    Destructive and Reparative Charismatic Leaders.  
     
    Following Volkan, Post argues that there is a distinction between ‘destructive’ 
and ‘reparative’ charismatic leaders (Post, 2015). Two leaders with the same 
psychic deficits can then produce completely differing existential outcomes. Post 
compares ‘the destructive charismatic as exemplified by Hitler’, with the reparative 
leadership of Kemal Atatürk which catalysed the ‘reshaping of society in a highly 
positive and creative fashion’ (Post, 2004, p 198). In his study of Atatürk, Volkan 
demonstrates ‘that the narcissistically wounded mirror-hungry leader, in projecting 
his intrapsychic splits on society, may be a force for healing. Such leaders seek a 
sense of wholeness through establishing a special relationship with their ideal-
hungry followers. As they try to heal their own narcissistic wounds through the 
vehicle of leadership, they may indeed be resolving splits in a wounded society’ 
(Post, 2004, p 198). 
  
    Little was known of Kemal Atatürk’s formative years, except that all ‘three of the 
previous children born to his parents died at an early age’, and Volkan thus infers 
that Atatürk was brought up in a house of mourning (Volkan, 2007, p 8; Volkan 
and Iskowitz, 1984). Because of this, his mother anxious after the loss of the 
children may have viewed Kemal as a replacement (Volkan, 2007). From his clinical 
experience, ergo as a form of ‘clinical parallelism’, Volkan proposes that ‘[a]s 
mother and child interact, what the mother “deposited” in the child, and her 
perception of him or her as a replacement or link, enters into the child’s own 
developing identity’ and as well as fearing for him, a ‘mother feels that the surviving 
child is special, but ‘at the same time may also be distant and ungiving as she 
struggles to deal with the previous losses the child embodies’ (Volkan, 2007, p 8).  
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    Psychoanalysts have observed, Volkan asserts, ‘that the child in such a 
relationship in turn may have fantasies of saving the mother from grief … the child 
or later an adult may become, through sublimating his or her original wish, truly 
concerned with the well being of the mother or, more likely, of her symbolic 
representation’ (Volkan, 2007, p 8). Volkan has it that they12 had ‘entertained the 
notion that young Mustafa [Atatürk], as a living link to his dead siblings, may have 
had early unconscious savior fantasies’, perhaps ‘the foundation of his later 
strivings to become the savior of his country’ (Volkan, 2007, p 8, emphasis in the 
original; Volkan and Iskowitz, 1984).  
 
    A chain of theorised inferences assessing Atatürk’s personality and his 
psychological makeup supposedly predicated upon clinical experience, is 
constructed from the one known fact, that three of Atatürk’s siblings, had died at 
an early age. Based on this, Volkan further infers a psychologically distant 
relationship of Atatürk with his mother. This inference then becomes the psychic 
‘fact’ behind what Volkan proposes as Atatürk’s self sufficiency, the root of his 
wishing to save Turkey, the impetus for his joining the army, and that his repeated 
behaviour in respect of examining and examinations was a symbol of this 
interpsychic separation from his mother (Volkan, 2007).  
 
    Such clinical parallelism was also the methodology of Walter Langer’s (1943) 
Wartime study of Hitler which similarly encompassed the filling in of the lacunae in 
biographical information with ‘knowledge gained from clinical experience in dealing 
with individuals of a similar type’ (Langer, 1943, p 1). Coincidentally then, Adolf 
Hitler had similarly lost three siblings before he was born, indeed, there were a 
number of parallels in the backgrounds of the two men. Both were the sons of 
fathers who were customs officials and devout mothers who intended religious 
schools for them, both were ideological nationalists who were born outside of their 
linguistic heartland in polyglot empires, both joined the army as a means of escape 
and both were deemed by Langer and Volkan to have had ‘saviour complexes’.  
 
    From Langer’s clinical experience, he took the exact opposite perspective from 
Volkan’s hypothesised distant relationship between Atatürk and his mother. On 
                                                 
12
 The original psychobiography The Immortal Atatürk: A Psychobiography (1984), was co-authored 
with Norman Iskowitz. 
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Langer’s narrative track of clinical parallelism, he believed that Hitler’s mother 
Klara because of having lost her previous three children, would on the contrary 
actually cater to Hitler’s ‘whims, even to the point of spoiling him, and that she was 
over-protective in her attitude towards him. We may assume that during the first 
five-years of Adolph’s life, he was the apple of his mother’s eye and that she 
lavished affection on him’ (Langer, 1943, pp 159-160). 
 
    In contradistinction to Volkan’s clinical analysis that a mother having previously 
lost three children soon after birth, would tend to be ‘distant and ungiving’, 
Langer’s clinical analysis had been that a mother in the same situation would 
actually bestow excessive love, and in Hitler’s case that there had formed ‘a strong 
libidinal attachment between mother and son’ (Volkan, 2007, p 8; Langer, 1943, p 
160). Langer and his team had further inferred that “[u]nconsciously, all the 
emotions he had once felt for his mother became transferred to Germany’ and that 
through Hitler’s symbolic transference of affect, his saviour fantasy was also that of 
saving his mother/Germany but from the brutality of the father, and despite his 
mother having betrayed him through her sexual acquiescence to the father (Langer, 
1943, p 164).  
 
    The hypothesised symbolic relationship of Atatürk and his mother however, 
implies the basis for a psychic formation of altruism. The early ‘fantasies of saving 
the mother from grief’ become ‘through sublimating his or her original wish, truly 
concerned with the well being of the mother or, more likely, of her symbolic 
representation’ (Volkan, 2007, p 8). Whereas, the symbolism deriving out of Hitler’s 
relationship to his mother was based on vengeful narcissism even illicit sex, in a 
degraded and unhealthy relationship of existential closeness to the point of incest. 
Atatürk however, is the saviour of his nation as a consequence of psychic 
reparation with an emotionally distant mother. 
  
    Biography is an unconscious vehicle, Avner Falk believes, for reflecting the 
biographer’s own emotional narrative and the processes of projection and of 
identification which may be empathetic or pathological (Falk, 1985). Freud, as Elms 
points out, had warned equally to avoid ‘pathographizing the psychobiographical 
subject and avoid idealizing the psychobiographical subject’ (Elms, 2003, p 42, 
emphasis in the original; Freud, S.E. XI, 1910). In Volkan’s analysis, there is a 
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seamless link from Atatürk’s Oedipal relationship to his mother through to adult 
greatness, in his hagiographic narrative of secular sainthood (Volkan, 2007). 
 
    That the pathographic style of analysis may then be used to denigrate or to 
idealise the subject, is summed up in Joyce Carol Oates acerbic phrase, that 
pathography is ‘hagiography’s diminished and often prurient twin’ (Joyce Oates, 
The New York Times, 28th of August, 1988). The uncovering of pathological 
characteristics is inherent in clinical or pathographic analyses, but can be simply 
disavowed or indeed, as with Volkan’s analysis of Atatürk, converted into a virtue. 
There is no unfolding process of discovering inner psychic reality, because the 
determination of pathology and its effects is already a function of the profiler’s 
emotional countertransference and or reflecting an ideological discourse.   
 
13    Jerrold Post and Task-Oriented Personality Profiling.      
 
    What had greatly enhanced the reputation of Post and his CAPPB 
psychodynamically oriented political profiling unit was the profiling of the leaders 
Anwar Sadat of Egypt and Menachem Begin of Israel, for the 1978 Camp David 
peace negotiation. Post and his unit had been tasked to undertake the profiles by 
President Jimmy Carter who had presided, and they were much lauded by him 
(Post, 1979; Post, 2006b; Omestad, 1994; Emily Eakin, The New York Times, 29th 
June, 2002). Indeed Omestad quotes former CIA ‘director Stansfield Turner, “Post’s 
profiles of Begin and Sadat pleased Carter. That created a demand to continue 
doing that”’ (Omestad, 1994, p 111).  
 
    In the profile of Begin13 for example, Post emphasised the ‘oppositionism and 
rigidity in his personality’ and the unflinching steadfastness of his belief in ‘Israel’s 
historic entitlement to the land of Israel’, but that he was prepared to compromise 
outside of this ideological core (Post, 2006a, pp 54, 58). Already a military dictator 
who would become ever more repressive, Sadat was given a political psychological 
profile which would uncannily resemble Post’s later profile of Saddam Hussein, 
minus what would be Saddam’s distinguishing diagnosis of malignant narcissism 
(Post, 2006a; Post 1990; Post, 2006b; Ibiblio.org, 2012).  
 
                                                 
13
 Begin was the Israeli Prime Minister and former leader of the Irgun terrorist group. 
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   Sadat and Saddam were seen by Post as being preoccupied with their role in 
history. Sadat identified himself with the Pharaohs and Saddam with Saladin or 
Nebuchadnezzar, both seeing themselves as great as the pre-eminent leaders in the 
Arab World. Both had Messiah complexes but were goal oriented and tactical 
pragmatists (Post, 1979; Post, 2006b; Post, 1990). Similarly, Sadat and Saddam 
according to Post both had grandiose personalities, totally identifying themselves 
with their nations (Post, 2006a). During the Camp David process, Sadat’s 
grandiosity magnified exponentially, referring for example to Egypt’s economy, as 
‘my economy’ (Post, 2006a , p 57). Just as in Saddam’s mind ‘the destiny of 
Saddam and Iraq are one and indistinguishable’ (Post, 1990, p 4). Both men 
revelled in the limelight and when Sadat ‘became the object of intense media 
attention ... it was an explosion of narcissistic supplies, and his extreme self-
confidence was magnified to grandiose extremes’ (Post, 2006a, p 57).  
 
    Saddam’s narcissistic, grandiose façade masked an underlying insecurity, being 
at the ‘very center of international attention, his appetite for glory has been 
stimulated all the more. The glory-seeking Saddam will not easily yield the spotlight 
of international attention’ (Post, 1990, p 6). Sadat’s anger at negative assessments 
from his advisors ‘led to a shrinkage of his leadership circle to sycophants who only 
told Sadat what he wanted to hear’ (Post, 2006a, p 57).  Saddam’s ‘sycophantic 
leadership circle’ was cowed by his brutality (Post, 1990, p 4). For Sadat, this 
meant that he was ‘increasingly out of touch with political reality’ (Post, 2006a, p 
57). Likewise, Saddam ‘is often politically out of touch with reality’ (Post, 1990, p 
4).  
 
    Both men were prepared to use aggression in pursuit of their goals, Saddam 
against Iran and Sadat had been a ‘hero in the Arab world for his willingness and 
initial success in attacking Israel’ (Post, 1990; Post, 2006a). For this instrumental 
use of aggression, Saddam was conceptualised as having the syndrome of 
malignant narcissism ‘the personality configuration of the destructive charismatic’ 
(Post, 1990, p 5). Whereas Sadat’s personality, in Post’s somewhat more benign 
appraisal was ‘the Barbara Walters Syndrome’14 (Post, 2006a, p 57). In Post’s 
estimation, Sadat’s grandiose personality allowed him to see the ‘big picture’ and 
develop ‘his innovative foreign policy’, which was obviously advantageous to the 
interests of the US and Israel, whereas Saddam’s horizons were still parochial, 
                                                 
14
 Waters was a famous American television journalist who had interviewed Sadat. 
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although seen as stretching as far as threatening Israel (Post, 2006a, p 56; Post 
and Baram, 2003a). 
 
    The Camp David profiles are straightforward political psychologies designed for 
understanding and working empathy, so that the ‘grandiosity’ of Sadat, is reduced 
to just an amiable metaphor, as the ‘Barbara Walters Syndrome’ (Post, 1979, p 4). 
However, Saddam is ‘diagnosed’ as demonstrating a ‘malignant narcissism’, in what 
is very much the pathography of a perceived adversary of America and Israel (Post, 
1990; Post, 2006a). 
 
    As a postscript, in his profile entitled ‘Sadat’s Nobel Prize Complex’, Post 
reflected on Sadat’s grandiosity which he felt could be a negotiating leverage for 
Carter. An intuitively and deceptively simple strategy then suggested itself, that of 
acceding to Begin’s ideological bottom line whilst making Sadat look good. Begin 
gained peace, security and kept control over the biblical lands of Israel, and Sadat 
got the Nobel Prize that he craved (Post, 2006a). The result of Camp David was then 
in Edward Said’s view, that Sadat became ‘effectively removed from any serious role 
outside Egypt (the treaty totally isolated him from the Arab world)’ (Said, 1979, p 
227). On October 6th 1981, Sadat was assassinated by Muslim Brotherhood 
offshoots Islamic Jihad and Al Gamaa al-Islamiyya, condemning him for apostasy 
and for ‘the peace treaty he’d signed with Israel’ (Tristam, 2012, p 2). 
     
 
14    The Malignant Narcissist as Political Leader.  
 
    Citing Volkan’s observation that the narcissistic leader may take advantage of 
his power by restructuring his reality, he can then, according to Post, sustain his 
grandiose self-image through the devaluation or even elimination of anyone 
threatening his fragile self-esteem (Post, 1993). Hitler, Mussolini, and Stalin used 
rage to intimidate their subordinates, whilst Saddam Hussein’s penchant was for 
killing advisors who criticized him (ibid). What the narcissistic leader says or does 
is calculated for effect, with his only stable belief being the ‘centrality of the self. 
What is good for him is good for his country’ (Post, 1993, p 110; emphasis in the 
original). The narcissist leader genuinely believes he and his country are one and 
the same (Post, 1993). For Saddam ‘he and Iraq were one and indistinguishable, 
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and the concept of an Iraq without his leadership was inconceivable for the Iraqi 
president’ (Post, 1993, p 111). 
 
    Post had posited his personality pathology schema of Saddam the malignant 
narcissist in his 1990 profile presented to the House Armed Services Committee of 
the US Congress. The Israeli historian Baram15 unearthed the remarkable 
corroborating information about Saddam’s earliest years (Post, 1993; Post and 
Baram, 2003; Post, 2013). Eight months pregnant with Saddam and destitute after 
the death of her husband, Saddam’s mother ‘attempted suicide. A Jewish family 
saved her. Then she tried to abort herself of Saddam, but was again prevented from 
doing this by her Jewish benefactors. After Saddam was born, on April 28, 1937, 
his mother did not wish to see him’ (Post and Baram, 2003, p 164). Only Baram 
appears to have had access to the source, which was a Jewish family said to be 
living anonymously in Israel (WorldNetDaily, 4th of March 2003; Tamar Miller and 
Tamar Morad, The Boston Globe, the 27th of October, 2002). 
 
    Following this single source of evidence, the origins of Saddam’s wounded self 
could argues Post, be traced back to the womb as his mother attempted to abort 
the future Saddam:  
 
‘It is difficult to imagine a more traumatic early childhood. The first years of 
life are of crucial importance to developing healthy self-esteem and 
confidence, a reflection of the adoration of the mother for her newborn. 
Saddam was deprived of this “mirroring.” Most individuals so wounded 
would be deeply scarred, unable to function effectively as adults ... 
    To put the above into psychoanalytic perspective, using the self 
psychology framework of Heinz Kohut, Saddam had experienced major 
traumas during his earlier years, producing a profoundly wounded self, with 
major damage to his self-esteem’  
 
(Post, 2013, p 479). 
     
    The development of a pathological ‘grandiose self’ is, as Post describes 
Kernberg’s formulation, that of extreme grandiosity, ‘associated with primitive and 
defective superego formation’, leading to the formation of a dangerous personality 
                                                 
15
 Baram was Post’s co-author in the 2003 profile ‘Saddam is Iraq: Iraq is Saddam’.  
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disorder, ‘malignant narcissism’ (Post, 1993, p 114). The components which make 
up Kernberg’s syndrome of malignant narcissism, as Post ascribes them to 
Saddam, are a ‘grandiose narcissism with such extreme self-absorption that there 
is an incapacity to empathize with the pain or suffering of others’, a ‘defective 
superego or conscience’ along with an unconstrained ego syntonic aggression for 
his own purposes, and a paranoid outlook which justifies this boundless 
aggression (Post, 1993, p 114).  
 
   When the grandiose façade is narcissistically wounded, it triggers, according to 
Post, an intense narcissistic rage and a need for revenge, with the target of that 
aggression as the narcissistically perceived persecutor. The narcissist’s rage is then 
self righteous and entitled, but underlying the rage is the shame and humiliation 
over the perceived wrong which is assuaged by revenge. Post posits the possibility 
that Saddam’s ‘motive in invading Kuwait involved retaliation for the diplomatic 
“back of the hand” Kuwait dealt to Saddam, refusing even to discuss his grievances 
over territorial and economic disputes’ (Post, 1993, p 114). 
 
    The ‘primary loyalty of narcissists is to themselves’, and as an indicator of 
Saddam’s malignant narcissism, Post had maintained that there was ‘no evidence 
he is constrained by conscience; his only loyalty is to Saddam Hussein’ (Post, 1990, 
p 5). Post would subsequently, in reconciliation of his failed 1990 prediction that 
Saddam would withdraw from Kuwait, remark that, ‘Saddam had, in effect, painted 
himself into a corner’, becoming so ‘absolutist in his commitment to the Palestinian 
cause, to not yielding even partially over Kuwait until there was justice for the 
Palestinian people’ (Post and Baram, 2003, p 182). It was then ‘extremely difficult 
for him to reverse himself without being dishonored’ (ibid; Post, 1990). Staying loyal 
out of a sense of honour seems perfectly reasonable, but whatever way Saddam’s 
motives are construed for such loyalty, he did remain loyal to the Palestinians.   
 
    Indeed, in the view of Saddam’s biographers such as Cockburn and Cockburn 
(1999), loyalty was intrinsic to Saddam’s emotional and cultural matrix. That 
Saddam particularly relied on the reciprocal loyalty of ‘his halfbrothers - Barzan, 
Sabawi, and Watban - and his cousins, like Ali Hassan al-Majid, to stock the senior 
ranks of his regime argue that his inner family was always tightly knit against the 
outside world, whatever its inner tensions’ (Cockburn and Cockburn, 1999, p 68). 
From a cultural perspective, the ‘strength of Saddam’s family and clan connections 
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matter because he was born into a tribal society. He has maintained many of its 
characteristics throughout his life. It was a world of intense loyalties within the 
clan, but cruel and hostile to outsiders’ (Cockburn and Cockburn, 1999, p 68; 
Claypool, 1993). 
 
    A failure to take such cultural factors into account is according to Richard 
Omestad, not only a complaint about Post’s profile, but is seen as an enduring 
deficiency of profiling in general. Indeed Omestad points to Volkan, who considered 
‘that some of Hussein’s traits - typed by Post as “malignant narcissism” - could 
reflect instead the characteristics of Arab nationalism’ (Omestad, 1994, p 119). 
Although Post claims to mitigate this cultural deficit by involving regional 
specialists, if they have the same ideological perspective, any particular cultural 
awareness will simply be reconciled within the discursive imperative. From a 
pragmatic perspective, the high level Israeli analyst Ami Ayolon summarises it that, 
‘“there is no rational answer” to Saddam’s thinking, as “he thinks in another way. If 
we look at him through Western eyes, with Western values, he is impossible to 
comprehend”’ (Ami Ayolon, quoted in, Seliktar and Dutter, 2009, p 283).  
    
    As opposed to Post’s personological perspective, this reflects the argument that 
Saddam’s sense of loyalty was characterological, that is, a differential character 
trait derived developmentally within the family. Indeed, Post’s 2003 co-author 
Baram, points out that, Saddam ‘“is also very loyal and remembers favors - even 
from a Jew.” A Baghdadi Jewish merchant now living in Israel told Baram of 
languishing in jail for ten years until Saddam, touring the prison to inspect “the 
daily catch,” recognized him as a man who had given him spare change in his 
street-kid days, and set him free’ (Tamar Miller and Tamar Morad, The Boston 
Globe, the 27th of October, 2002).   
 
    This issue particularly problematises the more reductive focus of personality 
pathology profiling and emphasises a personological versus characterological 
distinction which is identified by this thesis. Individuals may possess character 
traits which are seemingly contrary to their putative ‘core’ personality. Thus, it is in 
practical terms impossible to accommodate character nuances theoretically or 
ideologically in a profile or a psychobiography, predicated on a particular 
personological personality pathology schema. The behaviour of an individual may 
appear completely contrary to a putative personality organisation, but be perfectly 
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consistent with a differential character trait. So that Saddam Hussein cannot in 
Post’s schema, be a malignant narcissist loyal only to himself and show loyalty to 
others.  
 
    As commensurate with his diagnosis, Post unreservedly accepts a traumatic 
infancy for Saddam and a failure to bond with his mother, ignoring a biographical 
strand that ‘Saddam’s bond with his mother Sabha was particularly deep ... 
Throughout her life, Saddam would visit Sabha as often as he could. When she 
died in 1982, Saddam commissioned a huge tomb for her in Tikrit, commemorating 
her as the Mother of Militants’ (Balaghi, 2006, p 3). Objectively verifiable accounts 
become elusive as events of Saddam’s early life merge with his politically 
constructed persona, wherein much was ‘made of his modest origins and his 
struggles as a young, orphaned peasant boy. Saddam’s peasant upbringing was 
used to humanize his political rhetoric and reflect his empathy for the struggling 
common man’ (Balaghi, 2006, p 2). 
 
    Any number of contradictory but plausible childhood scenarios could have been 
etched for Saddam. Cockburn and Cockburn argue that the picture of a deprived 
childhood was one later painted by Saddam, but that this was again subverted by 
his critics who ‘stressed early traumas to prove that he came from a dysfunctional 
family’ (Cockburn and Cockburn, 1999, p 68). 
 
    There are wholly negative biographies of Saddam, in particular that of Efraim 
Karsh and Inari Rautsi’s 1991 Saddam Hussein: A Political Biography (1991). 
Although Post doesn’t actually cite his sources, his profile of Saddam Hussein is 
linked by being narrated in the same manner, with the same evidence base, the 
same factual errors and skewed interpretations, with both accounts striving ‘to 
present the worst possible interpretation of Hussein’s actions throughout his 
career’ (Ghadban, 1992, p 785; Karsh and Rautsi, 2002/1991; Post and Baram, 
2003). This is not to say that Karsh and Rautsi, and indeed Post, are wrong, but to 
emphasise that notwithstanding the conceptual theory or clinical expertise the 
psychobiographer brings to his analysis, his relationship is with his data source, 
not his subject.  
 
 
15    Saddam Hussein and the Evolution of a Profile. 
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    It was on the strength of his 1990 profile of Saddam extensively featured in the 
media ,that Post had been invited to testify before the US congressional House 
Armed Services Committee and House Foreign Affairs Committee, both of which 
were holding hearings on the 1990 Gulf crisis (Omestad, 1994; Post, 1990). Indeed, 
both Omestad and Emily Eakin of the New York Times report accounts that ‘the 
psychological profile of Saddam Hussein that Dr. Post presented to members of 
Congress in 1990 was what convinced previously reluctant lawmakers to support 
the Persian Gulf war’ (Emily Eakin, The New York Times, 29th June, 2002; 
Omestad, 1994).  
 
    In his testimony to the House Armed Services Committee, Post claimed that, 
‘decision makers’ were being misled ‘into believing he [Saddam] is unpredictable 
when in fact he is not’ (Post, 1990, pp 1). Indeed, if aggression were to prove 
counterproductive, Saddam ‘has shown a pattern of reversing his course’ with ‘a 
remarkable capacity to find face saving justification’ (Post, 1990, pp 4, 6). What 
particularly struck readers, was the ‘focus on Hussein’s rapid reversal ... Most saw 
Post’s profile as strengthening the case for believing that Hussein would again back 
down at the last moment. Of course, he did not’ (Omestad, 1991, p 113).  
 
    In a 2013 reassessment of the flawed assessment of the 1990 profile Post writes 
that, ‘it was emphasized that Saddam considered himself a “revolutionary 
pragmatist” and that he had in the past reversed himself. But there were two 
conditions thta [sic] had to be satisfied for Saddam to reverse himself and withdraw 
from Kuwait: he must be able to save face, and he must be assured that his power 
would be preserved. As the deadline approached, George H. W. Bush, at a press 
conference, pounded on the table as he declared: “There will be no face saving!” The 
story leaked from a general (who was subsequently forced to retire) concerning 
contingency plans to eliminate Saddam and effect a regime change. Thus the two 
conditions necessary to permit Saddam to reverse himself were not met’ (Post, 
2013, p 480). 
 
    President George H.W. Bush had given his press conference on the 30th 
November 1990, with Post giving his address to the House Armed Services 
Committee on the 5th and the Foreign Affairs Committee on 12th  December (George 
H.W. Bush, Presidential News Conference 30th November, 1990; Post, 1990). Any 
189 
 
claim that the profile was overtaken by these subsequent events is undermined 
because the events had actually occurred prior. 
 
    Again, in his 2003 justification of the failed prediction, Post had it that ‘Saddam 
may well have heard President Bush’s Western words of intent through a Middle 
Eastern filter and calculated that he was bluffing. It is also possible he downgraded 
the magnitude of the threat, likening the threatened response to the characteristic 
Arab hyperbole’ (Post and Baram, 2003, p 181). In 2003, Post is arguing that 
Saddam did not change his course because he believed that his regime was 
perfectly safe in thinking that President Bush was bluffing, and in 2013 Post is 
arguing that he did not change his course believing that he was in mortal danger 
because there were definite plans to effect a regime change.  
 
    In the run up to the 2003 conflict, it was ‘through Jerrold Post, [that] we do more 
or less know what the Bush administration expects of Saddam Hussein’ (Julian 
Borger, The Guardian, Thursday the 14th of November, 2002; Post and Baram, 
2003). The BBC similarly reported that; ‘Now US Government officials are calling on 
Dr Post to guide them in their decisions as they engage Iraq in a high-rolling game 
of cat and mouse, which could be the difference between war or peace’ (BBC News, 
15th November 2002). 
 
    Saddam’s motivating impetus in the 2003 crisis was according to Post, ‘a 
psychological template of compensatory grandiosity, as if to vow, “Never again, 
never again shall I submit to superior force.” This was the developmental 
psychological path Saddam followed’ (Post and Baram, 2003a, p 164). For Saddam 
‘to be understood to have nuclear weapons, and WMD in general, was considered 
important. Major leaders have major league weapons. Moreover, for a person with 
tremendous insecurities as Saddam, these weapons can offer security that cannot 
be matched by any other’ (Post and Baram, 2003a, p 209).  
 
    As Borger recounts, Saddam would ‘never give up his arsenal of mass 
destruction, which Post says are essential to his self-image as a world class leader. 
“Big boys have big toys,” as he puts it. “Without the weapons, he’s nothing.”’ (Post 
reported by Julian Borger, The Guardian, 14th of November 2002). Saddam 
threatens ‘Israel with annihilation (“I shall burn half of Israel”), unthinkable 
without weapons of mass destruction. There is every reason to believe that, if 
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Saddam ever had nuclear weapons to match those of Israel, he would have been 
rattling them and offering every Arab and Islamic State that would request his 
protection the Iraqi nuclear umbrella’ (Post and Baram, 2003, p 209). Saddam 
would not hesitate to ‘order the use of chemical and biological weapons against the 
invading troops and against Israel’ (Post reported by Julian Borger, The Guardian, 
14th of November, 2002). 
 
    Baram, Post’s co-author in the 2003 profile, would later admit to journalist Orly 
Hapern, that ‘[i]f I knew then what I know today, I would not have recommended 
going to war, because Saddam was far less dangerous than I thought’ (Orly 
Halpern, forward.com, January the 5th 2007). From an Arab perspective at the 
time, the Middle East commentator Adel Darwish, believed that it was not a 
preoccupation with Saladin and Nebuchadnezzar but rather Saddam’s obsession 
with the central character and storyline of The Godfather, ‘on which he modelled 
many of his tactical moves later’ (Adel Darwish, Middle East Analyst, 6th of 
December, 2002). Based on this insight, Darwish has it that ‘[c]ontrary to Dr Post’s 
assessment, Saddam will give up his war toys. There is a realistic possibility that 
Hans Blix [the UN weapons inspector] would, genuinely, report in February that he 
has found nothing suspicious’ (ibid).  
 
    Rather than Post’s claim that Saddam could not face the humiliation [of  giving 
up his WMD], in line with the ‘live to fight another day tactics’ of the ‘Godfather’, a 
sanctions compliant Saddam ‘might come out deranged, and weakened, humiliated 
but still very much in control of Iraq’ (Adel Darwish, Middle East Analyst, 6th of 
December, 2002). As opposed to what the thesis argues was Post’s ideologically 
predicated assessment of a narcissistic Saddam who could not face humiliation, 
Darwish proposes that Saddam would readily suffer such narcissistic injuries to 
his ego, in order to remain in power. 
 
    In the 2013 reassessment of the flawed 2003 profile, Post argues that one of the 
principal reasons given by President George W Bush for the 2003 war was that 
‘Saddam was developing a nuclear capability and would endanger the United States 
by providing a weapon of mass destruction to terrorists’ (Post, 2013, p 481). The 
discursive ploy of this reassessment is that Saddam would not make such a 
weapon available to terrorists, because ‘analysis based on his political personality 
profile made clear that this was inconceivable. Saddam was a prudent 
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decisionmaker, with a fixed address, and would never give up control of a nuclear 
weapon. He knew that if the provenance of such a weapon were traced back to Iraq, 
his country would be incinerated’ (Post, 2013, p 481, my emphasis). Post’s 
retrospective prediction or hindsight bias stemming from the 2003 profile has 
become that, Saddam would never give up control of his WMD. Post’s position is 
that the rational Saddam would not risk incineration by allowing a third party to 
use his WMD. However, Post also posits that the same Saddam, would be prepared 
to offer a nuclear umbrella to all and sundry third parties and attempt to destroy 
Israel himself, with the then certainty, rather than risk, of incineration.  
     
    In a later postscript to his 2003 profile Post had said, that ‘[i]t was thought that 
Saddam would not go down to the last flaming bunker if he had a way out, but that 
he could have been extremely dangerous and might have stopped at nothing if he 
was backed into a corner, if he believed his very survival as a world-class political 
actor was threatened. It was believed that Saddam could have responded with 
unrestrained aggression, ordering the use of whatever weapons and resources were 
at his disposal, in what would surely be a tragic and bloody final act’, that whatever 
else, he ‘“will not go gentle into that good night”’ (Post and Baram, 2003, p 216; 
Post, 2006d, p 365). Going gently into the good night is exactly what Saddam did 
do, and he was later found hiding in a hole in the ground.  
  
16    Conclusion 
 
    This chapter has outlined the principle psychoanalytic theories underlying 
personological, adversarial ‘at a distance’ profiling, most notably deployed by 
Jerrold Post. There was description of how object relations infused by an ahistorical 
Kleinian notion of paranoia became influential in American psychoanalysis. This 
was a critical formulation for personality theorists, because determined by the ego 
defences of splitting and projection, group paranoia, hatred and aggression could 
be explained as being unprovoked by external causation. 
 
    Paranoid projections were described as the psychic mechanism underlying the 
grandiose façade of narcissistic leaders. These leaders in Wilfred Bion’s 
conceptualisation reflect back the paranoid wishes of their followers in seeking out 
enemies. The clinical developments in Post War America, representing the turn to 
narcissism inherent in Heinz Kohut’s phenomenological self psychology were 
192 
 
outlined. Pathological functioning due to the deficits in the interpersonal 
relationships of early childhood resulting in narcissistic injury was, the thesis 
argued, a universal in the subject formation of personological, personality 
pathology profiling.  
 
    The seemingly ‘successful’ profiles of Anwar Sadat and Menachem Begin had 
given Post a measure of institutional authority. The notoriety of his profile of 
Saddam Hussein had brought a number of psychoanalytic concepts, in particular 
paranoid functioning and the notion of malignant narcissism, to public attention. 
The thesis argues that psychoanalytic diagnoses such as Post’s pathologising of 
Saddam Hussein are effectively deployed as scientific validation of 
political/ideological positions. The next chapter seeks to demonstrate how 
psychoanalysis may be integrated with a particular ideological stance and then 
deployed in open polemics.   
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PSYCHO-CULTURAL CRITIQUES AND IDEOLOGICAL POLEMICS. 
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1    Introduction.     
 
 
    This chapter focuses on a critique of the way psychoanalysts who have adopted a 
personality pathology approach, elide ideological imperatives with culturally 
oriented psychoanalytic/psycho-cultural, analyses. Individual psychic trauma is 
extrapolated to a group and indeed culture wide level. Jerrold Post argues that the 
inherently obstructive personality of Yasser Arafat reflects a wilful Palestinian 
refusal to come to terms with reality thus perpetuating terrorism. Nancy Kobrin 
argues that the envy deriving out of this unrealistic world view, coupled with 
degenerate child rearing practices, makes the Arab, and indeed Muslim world in 
general, prone to terrorism.  
 
    The chapter makes the argument that to attribute a personality formation much 
less a particular developmental trajectory for an imperfectly definable political 
concept such as the ‘terrorist’ is a category error. As such, the evidence adduced in 
support of any particular conceptualisation of such a terrorist personality or 
culture will necessarily be flawed. Unlike individual psychobiography where an 
analysis may be theoretically and clinically sound, irrespective of the existential 
evidence, cultural psychobiography is bespoke and relies firmly on its cultural 
authenticity. Thus, bespoke cultural evidence is then critiqued in some detail.  
 
    Flawed evidence the chapter will demonstrate, nonetheless becomes part of the 
accepted psychoanalytic literature. In turn, this ‘evidence’ becomes the basis for 
further speculation, thus proving itself as a circular argument.  Becoming part of 
the literature, these reified ideological assumptions are then re-adduced as 
evidence determining clinically oriented psychoanalytic assumptions of terrorism. 
The difficulties of the psychoanalytic analyses of non-western cultures are 
examined, and how psychoanalysis may be deployed in open cultural polemics, 
particularly in respect of a denigration of Islamic societies. In their analyses, Vamik 
Volkan (1997) argues that, terrorist leaders exhibit the same pathological formation 
of malignant narcissism as serial killers, and Kobrin (2010), takes the psychology of 
Al Qaeda as reflecting that of a serial killer. 
 
    The serial killer, it is posited by this thesis, does have a discernible personality 
formation and that it corresponds with personality pathology ascriptions. What 
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distinguishes the serial killer from terrorist multiple killers, is their particular 
fantasy constellations. The serial killer has an individual fantasy script whereas the 
terrorist is part of a collective phantasy or ideology. In this way, otherwise 
psychologically ‘normal’ individuals may adhere to a violent revolutionary ideology. 
Whilst part of a revolutionary group, these otherwise normal individuals may 
commit acts of terrorism, and the thesis discusses a psychoanalytic understanding 
of the psychic mechanisms such as brutalising socialisation and depersonalisation, 
which may facilitate this.   
 
 
2    A Psychoanalytic Discourse of Political Terrorism. 
 
    A normative psychoanalytic paradigm of terrorism is that having suffered early 
traumatic psychic injuries and split off their cultural idealisations, individuals 
adopt fundamentalist ideologies deliberately antagonistic to the dominant 
establishment group or culture and then regress into the violence represented by 
terrorism (Kernberg, 2003). Rejected and traumatised themselves, the leadership of 
the terrorist group often present with the ‘syndrome of malignant narcissism, 
individuals stemming from an elitist class within which they felt rejected or 
traumatized’ (Kernberg, 2003, p 958). These leaders then gather their followers 
from the ‘disadvantaged or traumatized social group’ (ibid).  
 
    The thesis argument is that Otto Kernberg conflates what may actually be a 
rational cause of conflict arising from a group being disadvantaged and 
traumatised, with a narcissistic pathology. As a result, the disadvantaged, 
traumatised group is regarded as turning to terrorism because of pathology and not 
their cause. The conflict itself is then seen as a pathological response by the group 
and terrorism as the manifestation of this pathology. The cause itself is then 
discounted as being irrational and motivated by internal pathological psychic 
drivers rather than a legitimate or in any event existential, casus belli.  
     
    The influential book Terrorism: How the West can Win (1986), edited by future 
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, reflects the US and Israeli 
governmental positions on terrorist motivation. The root cause of terrorism 
according to Netanyahu, resided ‘not in grievances but in a disposition toward 
unbridled violence. This can be traced to a world view which asserts that certain 
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ideological and religious goals justify, indeed demand, the shedding of all moral 
inhibitions. In this context, the observation that the root cause of terrorism is 
terrorists is more than a tautology’ (Netanyahu, 1986b, p 204; my Italics). Post has 
it that the ‘cause is not the cause’ of terrorism, and his similarly tautological 
aphorism is that individuals become terrorists in order to join terrorist groups and 
commit acts of terrorism’ (Post, 1998, p 35, emphasis in the original). 
 
    Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat is diagnosed by Post as having an inherently 
obstructive ‘one-dimensional personality’ as a ‘result of an exclusive preoccupation 
with the Palestinian issue which is expressed in a narrow perspective on a range of 
subjects (Kimhi, Even and Post, 2001, p 26). Arafat’s personality formation is 
ascribed as having a number of ‘characteristic features of the paranoid personality 
... the borderline personality ... the narcissistic personality’ (Kimhi, Even and Post, 
2001, pp 25, 26). The nature of both the individual leader’s and his group’s 
collective psyche, meant that the Palestinian people were doomed to repeated and 
wilful self-inflicted psychic failure and political defeat (Post, 1986; Post, 1998).  
 
    This in turn, Post argued, needed an enemy to blame, and that enemy was 
Israel. As blame had found its outlet in terrorism, this then became an end it itself. 
The continuing “unity of purpose” of Palestinian terrorism finds ‘its roots in one 
person: Yasser Arafat ... who provided the “sense making”, unifying explanation for 
their difficulties’ (Post, 2007b, p 29). The deep seated intergenerational 
psychopolitics of hatred amongst Palestinian terrorists inspired ‘by the model of 
Yasser Arafat, argue for continuation of Palestinian/Israeli hatred and perpetuation 
of the violent struggle’ (Post, 2007b, p 37).    
  
    The perpetuation of the Palestinian/Israeli struggle was determined by the 
psychology of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and its leader Arafat, 
because ‘[t]o succeed in achieving its espoused cause would threaten the goal of 
survival’ (Post, 1998, p 38). Whenever the possibility of achieving ‘a partial 
territorial solution to the Palestinian problem’, which would have meant divesting 
himself of his radical left wing, Arafat yielded to the ‘radical left, who were 
committed to winning their struggle through violence. The espoused cause – a 
Palestinian homeland - did not seem to be the PLO’s primary goal’ (Post, 1998, pp 
37-38).  
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    A ‘partial territorial solution’ may not have been ideologically acceptable to the 
Palestinian people, and that it might not have been politically possible for Arafat to 
divest himself of his left wing. In Post’s analysis, there is a firm correspondence 
between a normative, indeed hegemonic value judgement of the PLO’s political 
rationale, and his diagnosis of Arafat’ supposedly pathological and obstructive 
personality. The continued Palestinian struggle is reduced, in Post’s ahistorical 
notion of the ‘threat of success’, to the simple mechanism of a repetition 
compulsion (Post, 1998, p 37). Freud notes of repetition compulsion, that there are 
people ‘in whose lives the same reactions are perpetually being repeated 
uncorrected, to their own detriment, or others who seem to be pursued by a 
relentless fate, though closer investigation teaches us that they are unwittingly 
bringing this fate on themselves. In such cases we attribute a ‘Daemonic’ character 
to the compulsion to repeat’ (Freud, 2001/1933, XXII, pp 106-107).  
 
    Politically this repeated ‘Daemonic’ sabotaging of one’s own interests is seen, as 
former Israeli Foreign Minister Aba Eban famously put it, that the ‘Palestinians 
never miss a chance to miss a chance’ (Aba Eban, quoted by Carlo Strenger, The 
Guardian, 30th of December, 2008). The repetition in this case continuing terrorism 
becomes the goal in itself. Following Post, Vamik Volkan similarly argues that, 
‘[faced with the opportunity to negotiate a settlement with a target group, a terrorist 
may increase his demands and intensify his violence’ (Volkan, 1998, p 163). 
Similarly, ‘when Israelis and Palestinians were making genuine progress toward 
peaceful coexistence, Hamas engineered a series of suicide bomb attacks in Israel. 
For Hamas, terrorism is an end in itself’ (ibid, p 160).   
 
    Netanyahu, according to his own ideological discourse of terrorism, writes that 
the ‘terrorist objective, of course, is not negotiation but capitulation’ (Netanyahu, 
1986b, pp 201-2). Failing to deal with terrorism militarily, ‘usually increases 
terrorist action to a point where terrorist action becomes so outrageous that the 
society threatened by it reacts strongly, and usually manages to defeat terrorism. 
Efforts to compromise with terrorist organizations usually fail: at the bottom, 
compromise and conciliation are anathema to the terrorists because they threaten 
the very basis of their ideological commitment’ (Kernberg, 2003, p 964). Kernberg 
contends that the terrorist cannot be reasoned with, citing how, in the ‘pseudo-
rationality of the terrorist, Volkan has explored how, behind the imperviousness to 
ordinary logic, one typically finds an ideology that permits no questioning and, 
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tested regarding its internal logic, reveals both an underlying confusion as well as 
the total inability to negotiate that confusion rationally’ (Kernberg, 2003, p 957). 
 
    As the peace processes, of South Africa and Northern Ireland demonstrate, and 
as was known to Kernberg at the time of writing, terrorists can compromise and 
conciliate. Their ideological commitment is to a cause, not simply or solely the 
perpetuation of a struggle. Kernberg is again conflating an ideological with a 
psychological rationale, and his analysis reflects the political position of 
governments which have no intention of negotiating with what they designate as 
terrorists.       
 
    Netanyahu’s position is an outright denial that terrorism results from ‘certain 
“root causes,” such as poverty, political oppression, denial of national aspirations, 
etc. But terrorism is not an automatic result of anything. It is a choice, an evil 
choice’ (Netanyahu, 1986b, p 203). At the core of Post’s psychic schema, the 
individual unable to face his own inadequacies chooses terrorism, because he 
‘needs a target to blame and attack for his own inner weaknesses and 
inadequacies.  
    Such individuals find the polarizing, absolutist rhetoric of terrorism extremely 
attractive. ‘“It’s not us - it’s them. They are the cause of our problems” provides a 
psychologically satisfying explanation for what has gone wrong in their lives’ (Post, 
2004, p 129). The premise of the personality pathology theory of terrorism is that 
whatever the socio-political conditions, terrorism is deemed to be a ‘pathological’ 
ergo evil, choice of the individual. 
 
 
3    The Ideological Determinants and Clinical Psychoanalytic Theorisation.  
 
   Psychoanalytic theorists such as Salman Akhtar evolve clinical psychoanalytic 
adaptations from what is essentially ideological personality pathology perspective. 
As the terrorist organization in this formulation is established on the principle of 
the externalization and perpetuation of one’s own victimhood, it inherently cannot, 
 
‘afford to succeed in its surface agenda. If the group were to succeed, it 
would no longer be needed. Its projectively buttressed identity would 
collapse and the pain of its own suffering would insist on being recognized 
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and psychically metabolized. Because the terrorist leader cannot tolerate 
such a depressive crisis, he unconsciously aims for the impossible.1,13 The 
resulting failure to achieve the officially stated goal is unconsciously desired 
because it facilitates the continued externalization of the victimized aspects 
of the individual and group self’  
 
(Akhtar16, 1999, p 352).  
 
    Along with incorporating Post’s (1998) notion of the threat of success, Akhtar’s 
understanding of victimisation has been taken from Volkan’s analysis in Bloodlines: 
From Ethnic Pride to Ethnic Terrorism (1998/1997). In turn taken from political 
psychologist Jeanne Knutson’s unpublished research, Volkan claims that Knutson 
had conducted hundreds of interviews with an unknown number of Northern Irish 
terrorist leaders, and that they had ‘all been victims of terror themselves, all had 
experienced violations of their personal boundaries themselves’ (Volkan, 
1998/1997, p 160). Volkan does not give any reference for this claim nor does he 
include Knutson in his bibliography. Elsewhere Knutson’s extensive published 
research does lead her to conclude that the catalyst for taking up a terrorist 
identity, was ‘a severe life disappointment (or series of disappointments) which 
dramatically shifts the balance of expectations away from other available identities’ 
(Knutson, 1981, p 115). Such disappointments include the ‘disregard of a 
husband’, and ‘failure of the entrance examinations’ to university (ibid). Knutson is 
not talking about violent traumas, early traumatogenic object relating or particular 
developmental trajectories but about the ongoing exigencies in life.  
  
   Volkan claims that the personal identity problems of terrorist leaders, begin 
during their developmental years, such that ‘[m]any experience violations of their 
personal boundaries in the form of beatings by parents, incest, or other such 
events’ (Volkan, 1998/1997, p161). These findings are from CSMHI (The Center for 
the Study of the Mind and Human Interaction) an organisation founded by Volkan, 
and are simply a repeat of the same unsupported proposition, made in his article 
‘The Psychodynamics of Ethnic Terrorism’ (1995) (co-authored with Max Harris). 
Again, without giving a reference or being included in his bibliography (although on 
                                                 
16
 The references that Akhtar cites are [1] Volkan, V. (1998) Bloodlines: From Ethnic Pride to Ethnic 
Terrorism and [13] Post, J. (1990b) ‘Terrorist psycho-logic terrorist behavior as a 
product of psychological forces’ In: Reich W, ed. Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, 
Theologies, States of Mind. 
200 
 
a related topic in a 1995 article Volkan refers to a ‘personal communication’), 
Volkan cites Katherine Kennedy, an ‘international relations specialist’, as 
interviewing twenty three Northern Irish ‘terrorists’ or ‘freedom fighters’ who had all 
‘experienced traumas in their formative years’ (Volkan, 1998/1997, p 161; Volkan 
and Harris, 1995).  
 
    Also presented as an evidence backed conceptualisation, although again only 
deriving from claims in the same 1995 article co-authored with Harris, Volkan has 
it that ‘childhood victimization, of course, need not be physical; it can include being 
abandoned by a mother at an early age, disappointment over being let down by 
loved ones, a deep sense of personal failure following parental divorce, or rejection 
by peer groups … Their reactions to these personal traumas later dovetail with 
their victimization by an enemy group’ (Volkan, 1998/1997, p 161; my italics). This 
notion of ‘dovetailing’ creates the discursive impression that these actually 
disparate and uncorroborated findings form part of an integrated research 
narrative, incorporating all of the ‘research subjects’.    
  
   Taking Volkan’s discursive conflation as the actual body of Knutson’s evidence, 
Timothy Gallimore states that  
 
‘Jeanne Knutson found that “all had been victims of terror themselves, all 
had experienced violations of their personal boundaries that damaged or 
destroyed their faith in personal safety” (Volkan, 1998/1997, p 160). These 
violations occurred in beatings or abandonment by parents, parental 
divorce, and incest or other sexual abuse, and rejection by peer groups. The 
common element among all these terrorists was the experience of personal 
trauma during their formative years’  
 
           (Gallimore, 2004, p 78).  
 
Developing from this, Gallimore continues that   
 
‘the terrorist personality appears to develop from a painful and dysfunctional 
childhood in which the individual forms personality and identity disorders. 
The terrorist responds to his personal identity problems and attempts to 
strengthen his troubled internal sense of self by seeking power to hurt and 
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by expressing an entitlement to power. These psychologically damaged 
individuals seek power and sanction for their violent actions through 
membership in groups and organizations that give them a sense of shared 
identity in an attempt to replace their flawed personal identity’  
 
(Gallimore, 2004, p 78).  
 
    Volkan’s conflating of two separate but only putative ‘findings’ of experiencing 
different ‘violations of personal boundaries’ with his own observations, is now 
synthesised as Gallimore’s clinical hypothesis’. By the time the discursive 
conflation reaches Tod Schneider, it has become ‘Jeanne Knutson interviewed 
hundreds of Northern Ireland terrorist leaders and found they had all been 
brutalized in their childhoods, often by their parents’ (Schneider, 2002, p 27). 
 
    Most of the major players in a terrorist organization are, then, according to 
Akhtar:  
 
‘themselves, deeply traumatized individuals. As children, they suffered 
chronic physical abuse and profound emotional humiliation. The “safety 
feeling,” which is necessary for healthy psychic growth, was thus violated. 
They grew up mistrusting others, loathing passivity, and dreading the 
recurrence of a violation of their psychophysical boundaries. “At the base, 
this intense anxiety over future loss is driven by the semiconscious inner 
knowledge that passivity ensures victimization.”[Volkan, 1997] To eliminate 
this fear, such individuals feel the need to “kill off” their view of themselves 
as victims. One way to accomplish this is to turn passivity into activity, 
masochism into sadism, and victimhood into victimizing others. Hatred and 
violent tendencies toward others thus develop. Devaluing others buttresses 
fragile self-esteem. The resulting “malignant narcissism” [Kernberg, 1984] 
renders mute the voice of reason and morality. Sociopathic behavior and 
outright cruelty are thus justified. The narrowed cognition characteristic of 
paranoid mentality, along with a thin patina of political rationalization, gives 
a gloss of logic to the entire psychic organization’  
          
   (Akhtar, 1999, pp 351-352).  
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    Representing a concise and abstracted (ergo, seemingly apolitical) psychoanalytic 
analysis, Akhtar’s conceptualisation of terrorism is recycled as the psychoanalytic 
discourse of terrorism. For example, in elucidating ‘the psychoanalytic dimension’ 
of terrorism, Michiko Shimokobe cites Akhtar that, ‘[a]ccording to recent 
psychoanalytic insight into terrorism ... terrorists are deeply traumatized 
individuals who have “suffered chronic physical abuse and profound emotional 
humiliation” (Akhtar 90). Their strongest emotional feeling is not their retrospective 
psychological pain but the perspective fear that they might lose something essential 
to their physical and psychological identities. Passivity is what they loath most ... 
Terrorists are victimized beforehand and they attempt to turn their helpless 
passivity into a terrorizing activity’ (Shimokobe, 2013, p 9). Shimokobe’s 
presentation gives an ongoing synthesising clinical abstraction of this ideological, 
indeed politically grounded, pathologising discourse.  
 
    One of the principle contentions of the personality pathology paradigm was 
predicated on Kernberg’s theorisation of the traumatic genesis of borderline 
personality and malignant narcissism. Post and Volkan17, whose training ‘reflects 
the theoretical perspectives of Otto Kernberg’, infer such trauma on the basis of 
Kernberg’s theorisation (Post, 2013, p 482). It is ironic then that in citing Post and 
Volkan, Kernberg completes the circularity of the personality pathology argument. 
Post and Volkan make the presumption of particularly childhood trauma, and then 
Kernberg in his exposition of terrorism takes this presumption as actual evidence, 
stating that the ‘literature on the personality features of individual terrorists 
frequently describes a history of severe trauma, a sense of inferiority or 
abandonment in infancy and childhood compensated later on by an aggressive self-
affirmation and the transformation of a sense of victimization into an ideologically 
rationalized passion for sadistic revenge as the redress of earlier grievances. (Post, 
2001; Volkan, 2001a, 2001b)’ (Kernberg, 2003, p 957). 
 
 
4    Psychoanalysts and Overt Ideological Polemics. 
  
   Inherent to Kernberg’s adaptation of the pathologising discourse is the notion 
that ‘the development of normal ego identity’ is dependent on an essentially ‘liberal’ 
social system (Kernberg, 2003, p 959). The current violent reaction against Western 
                                                 
17
 Volkan was trained at the New York Psychoanalytic Institute. 
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hegemony by militant Islam is, according to Robins and Post, ‘embraced by a 
significant section of the Muslim political community. There are many reasons for 
this readiness to use violence, and a paranoid worldview is one of them’ (Robins 
and Post, 1997, p 158). Following Robins and Post’s contention that humiliating 
defeat by the Jews was seen by many devout Muslims as a punishment from God, 
Joseph Berke and Stanley Schneider posit that the ‘Muslim way of life turned into 
sullen resentment, and then shattering rage, both narcissistic and nationalistic’ 
(Berke and Schneider, 2006, p 1; Robins and Post, 1997).  
  
    This reflects a strand of cultural psychobiographic analyses which argues that 
there is a propensity, indeed the inevitability for terrorism embedded within the 
Muslim psyche. One significant cultural analysis promoting this view is from 
Kobrin, a psychoanalyst and psychohistorian trained at the Chicago Institute of 
Psychoanalysis and a U.S counterterrorism ‘expert’ whose work has been used by 
the U.S. military since 2002 ‘in the war on terrorism’ (Kobrin, 2010, p xxi; Nancy 
Hartevelt Kobrin - Israel/LinkedIn, 2014a). Kobrin is a fellow of the American 
Center for Democracy (ACD) which ‘is dedicated to exposing and monitoring non-
traditional threats to U.S. political and economic freedoms and its national security 
from within and without ... [ACD identifies] strategies used by radical regimes and 
movements to subvert America’s Judeo-Christian values, Constitutional rights and 
political and economic systems’ (ACD, 2015). 
  
    Under the aegis of the U.S. Department of Defense, the Joint Improvised 
Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO), fuses ‘intelligence and operational 
analysis that support planning and operations from tactical through strategic 
levels’ (JIEDDO, LinkedIn, 08/04/2015). Its reports include intelligence on the 
‘social networks that may provide insight into how insurgent groups communicate 
and relate to their members, and other technical and cultural phenomena’ (McLean 
and Goodrich, 2008, p i). Included in such material for Report 21 was a symposium 
on ‘Child Suicide Bombers’ organised by Jamie Glazov for Frontpagemag.com on the 
11th of April, 2008. Described as a ‘psycho-analyst, Arabist, and counter-terrorism 
expert’, the lead speaker was Kobrin (Jamie Glazov Frontpagemag.com, 11th of April, 
2008, p 53).  
 
    Arab Muslim culture as a whole, in Kobrin’s overarching psycho-cultural 
analysis, is seen as deploying the primitive ego defences of splitting and projection. 
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The mass rallies of Hamas or Hezbollah are ‘of enraged males and the absence of 
females, it is a literal and concrete representation of displaced rage from their early 
childhoods outwards on to an enemy, yet the true enemy has been the war within 
themselves all along. They learn to project outwards and thereby never have to 
assume responsibility’ (Kobrin, 2008, p 60).  
     
    Kobrin’s psycho-cultural adaptation relies on a core of what the thesis has 
identified as personological psychobiography. This relates problematic personality 
development to primitive pre-Oedipal rage, and deploying the ego defences of 
splitting and projection in order to compensate for deficits in early object relating. 
To alleviate the urges and desires which become unbearable, the suicide bomber 
according to Kobrin employs  
 
‘the unconscious defense mechanism of dual protective identification: the 
split-off bad and unwanted parts of the self are projected on to the hated, 
evil other in a reciprocal way, recycling an unending hatred and violence 
with moments of perverse pleasure in the sadomasochistic glue of traumatic 
bonding. What one hates most about ones self is split off, projected on to the 
other, and uncannily not recognized. Then the other is attacked over it. The 
murderous rage against the other is thus really against the other of the self, 
which has been disavowed, or ones persecutory internal objects. The 
dynamic harks back to a specific dimension of the first relationship in life 
with the mother - namely, the early maternal fusion. Melanie Klein described 
the paranoid-schizoid experiences of the infant vacillating between eros and 
violence as well as between merger and separation. Today we speak in terms 
of maternal attachment problems - especially those that are disorganized 
and chaotic - about a kind of traumatic bonding’ 
 
 (Kobrin, 2010, p 58). 
 
Personality is ‘essentially “set in cement” by age three’, so that in ‘not developing 
empathy, usually something that occurs between the mother and the baby in their 
relational bond’, the inclination toward violence is also ‘in place developmentally by 
age three’ (Kobrin, interview with Reza Akhlaghi in Foreign Policy Association, 
February the 22nd, 2014, p 2).  
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    Echoing Post’s notion of the polarizing rhetoric of terrorism, Kobrin argues that 
for Islam, there is the ‘problem of “contraction,” black and white polarizing 
thinking, which runs throughout the Koran, the Hadith, and the Sira. This 
‘ideological’ splitting makes it nearly impossible to establish balance, to achieve 
moderation’ (Kobrin, 2008, p 55). With the home taken as representing a 
microcosm of society in Kobrin’s schema, in a ‘dysfunctional family, which is not 
egalitarian, you will have a dysfunctional society. Why is this so? I state that its 
citizens do not develop the requisite “psychological” infrastructure for a democracy. 
To wit, the Arab spring failed’ (Kobrin, 2008, p 55).  
 
    As proposed by Kobrin’s colleague and fellow psychohistorian and therapist 
Joanie Lachkar, the development of ‘Muslim sons is in sharp contrast to our sons 
in the West. Healthy development occurs when the son is allowed the space and 
time to bond with the material object mother and later moves away and separates 
from her by use of transitional objects and the transitional space ... he merely 
seeks to triumphantly overcome his pre-oedipal issues by seeking his own male 
identity’ (Lachkar, 2008, p 59). Whereas in ‘psychodynamic terms’ as Lachkar puts 
it, Muslim children have ‘part object functions, not being children to be loved or 
cherished, but to be used/misused/abused as a cultural self serving object (as are 
the mothers and women)’ (Lachkar, 2008, p 56).  
 
    Healthy psychological development is seen as a function of Western child rearing 
practices, and Muslim culture pathologised by reference to them. In Muslim society 
according to Kobrin, ‘[e]ven their child rearing practices are imbued with group 
thinking rather than focusing on the individual needs necessary for healthy child 
development’ (Kobrin, interview with Reza Akhlaghi in Foreign Policy Association, 
February the 22nd, 2014). As the third member of the symposium Post’s 
collaborator Anat Berko, argues, that ‘[i]n a society where the individual is not 
valued, there is no place for his “I” or “myself”’ (Berko, 2008, p 62; Post and Berko, 
2009). 
 
    These all enveloping pathological societal influences mean according Lachkar, 
that ‘Arabs have striking similarities to borderline personality disorders. Indeed, 
they exhibit many of the same traits, states and characteristics - including such 
defences as victimization, self-sacrifice, bonding with pain, shame, self-destruction. 
This is not a far cry from borderline patients in clinical practice who when feeling 
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betrayed or abandoned will spend the rest of their lives getting even, getting back or 
retaliating. Revenge becomes a more pervasive force than life itself. The reference is 
to a group of people who collectively not only feel deprived but become the 
deprivation - enacting the same traumatic experience again and again’ (Lachkar, 
2008, 63). This description reflects the notion of terrorist repetition compulsion, 
designated by Post as the ‘threat of success’ (Post, 1986).  
 
    Writing on the 2014 Israeli operation in Gaza, Kobrin says, ‘our troops in Gaza 
must tediously and dangerously dismantle the tunnels. We are forced once again to 
deal with Hamas’ shit. But what Hamas doesn’t get, is that, we understand their 
tragic infantile behavior. This gives us a special psychological “protective” edge 
which is complementary to and synergistic with our military Protective Edge’ 
(Nancy Kobrin, The Times of Israel, 21st of July, 2014b). The psychoanalytic 
determination of ‘Hamas’ shit’ is that its needs are ‘considered “dirty” like feces. It 
makes one feel impure and hence extremely anxious. They must split off and 
project their dirty feelings into the other. Hamas misuses the tunnel as an object’ 
(ibid). As such, the ‘terrorist tunnel is more than just a tactical tool. It is also an 
object which links back to childhood deprivation’ (Nancy Kobrin, The Times of 
Israel, 21st of July, 2014b). She goes on t state, as ‘my colleague Joan Lachkar, 
PhD put it: “Hamas bonds to us through their anus not through their hearts. 
Whatever they do, it all turns out to be shit. We then see the shit and hence the 
shame”’  
 
 
5    Nancy Kobrin’s Cultural Psychobiography of Islam.  
 
    In introducing Kobrin’s then forthcoming book the Sheik’s New Clothes: the 
Psychoanalytic Roots of Islamic Suicide Terrorism, psychotherapist Phyllis Chesler 
sums up Kobrin’s description of Muslim culture, as a ‘barbarous family and clan 
dynamics in which children, both boys and girls, are routinely orally and anally 
raped by male relatives; infant males are sometimes sadistically over-stimulated by 
being masturbated’ (Phyllis Chesler, FrontPageMag.com, the 3rd of May 2004). 
Following Chesler’s article in Frontpage, ‘the U.S. Army requested to read the 
manuscript’, and Kobrin gave permission for them to use it in their psychological, 
‘psyops’ operations (Kobrin, 2010, p xx1).  
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    In support of her critique Kobrin states that  Volkan ‘has repeatedly asserted 
that in Arab Muslim culture, there is a socialized need to hate and have an enemy, 
and it is learned behavior in the home’ (Kobrin, 2010, p 10). Although Volkan does 
describe the process of a Muslim child externalising his hatred onto pigs as a 
representation of a Christian other, he is in the same passage at pains to compare 
this for example, to Christian Armenians refusing Muslim Azerbaijani blood 
(Volkan, 1998/1997). Seeking to explicate an apolitical psychoanalytic process of 
establishing formal enemies, Volkan draws a line from the first problematic 
circumstance of an unresponsive mother to the neonate, through to stranger 
anxiety, and progressing to ethnic enmity (Volkan, 1998/1997).  
 
    ‘Islamic suicide terrorism against Jews and crusaders’, in Kobrin’s critique, 
represents a socially sanctioned outlet for a concrete explosion of repressed sexual 
desire in a paranoid manipulation of religion (Kobrin, 2010, p 34) This in turn 
‘defends against infantile self-hatred by projecting on its murder victims’ (Kobrin, 
2010, p 38). Referring explicitly to Post, Kobrin argues that shame and humiliation 
are ‘the key emotional experiences for the individual and the group that have been 
at the center of psychohistory’s discussion concerning the repetition of childhood 
traumatic experience under the guise of political violence. It has been noted that 
terrorists attach to their charismatic leader and participate in a paranoid delusion, 
thus alleviating their persecutory anxieties through political violence’ (Kobrin, 
2010, p 57; Robins and Post, 1997).  
   
    In misrepresenting him, Kobrin has particularised Volkan’s actually general 
notion, to specifically Islamic cultural practices in explaining ‘Islamic terrorists’, 
who have a ‘need to hate and the need to have enemies - needs stemming from the 
externalization of the hatreds developed through blaming and shaming child-
rearing practices, learned in early childhood, while these nascent terrorists were 
“embedded” in their families’ (Kobrin, 2010, p 20). The Islamic terrorist’s objective 
is ‘to acquire honor by terrifying others into fearing that they will be shamed and 
humiliated. The matter is further complicated by the fact that honor is a matter of 
gender and sex so that child-rearing practices revolve around the concrete, physical 
sex of the child - namely, his or her genitalia’ (Kobrin, 2010, p 21).  
 
    Kobrin’s psycho-cultural explanation of Islam as a bespoke psychoanalytic a 
critique, depends explicitly for its validity on being an accurate representation of 
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Islamic cultural practices. The general psychobiographical premise is that 
particular cultures, cultural practices and familial relationships will tend to 
produce the prevalence of a certain character formation. This is exemplified by Erik 
Erikson’s contention that the nature of the German character was amenable to the 
message of Hitler, as a corollary of particular German child rearing practices, 
principally the vicissitudes of German adolescence (Erikson, 1942; Erikson, 
1963/1950). Kobrin’s psychoanalytic conceptualisation thus depends on 
demonstrating the sexually aberrant childrearing practices which she claims are 
common to Arab/Muslim culture, particularly in respect of the boy child’s genitals.  
 
    Citing as one of her sources S.J. Breiner (1990), Kobrin draws attention to an 
intimate Egyptian practice of mothers preparing the child’s foreskin for the 
ceremony of circumcision, which may take place any time before maturity (Kobrin, 
2010). Breiner’s source, Patai and DeAtkine, accepting though that ‘this particular 
custom may be a local development’ amongst the ‘fellahin of Upper Egypt’, and so 
not evidence of sexual practices throughout the Arab world (Patai and DeAtkine, 
1973, p 33). Notwithstanding, Patai and DeAtkine claimed that the ‘association of 
the mother, and hence women in general, with erotic pleasure is something that 
Arab male infants in general experience and that predisposes them to accept the 
stereotype of the woman as primarily a sexual object and a creature who cannot 
resist temptation’ (Patai and DeAtkine, 1973, p 33). An interesting if dubious 
cultural mitigation is provided by another of Kobrin’s sources, Edwardes and 
Masters the Cradle of Erotica (1964), which explains that ‘Muslims do it to retract 
the prepuce, but because the Jewish infant is already circumcised (since eight days 
after birth) this motive has no meaning to the Jews. They do it merely because it is 
superexciting to the suckling’ (Edwardes and Masters, 1964, p 250).  
 
    Patai and DeAtkine’s account is in any event controversial and contested, Brian 
Whitaker18 claiming that the book is problematically sourced and openly racist. It is 
nonetheless widely used as the ‘the bible on Arab behaviour for the US military’ 
and American ‘neoconservatives’ (Brian Whitaker, The Guardian, 24th of May 2004). 
American journalist Seymour Hersh actually revived interest in the book by linking 
Patai and DeAtkine’s notion of Arab shame and humiliation deriving from sexual 
taboos as underlying the abuses perpetrated by US soldiers on Arab prisoners at 
Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq (Seymour Hersh, The New Yorker, 24th of May 2004). 
                                                 
18
 Whitaker is the Arabist former Middle East Editor of the Guardian. 
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    Notwithstanding, Kobrin continues that the Arab boy is therefore 
‘overstimulated, enraged, trapped, and fearful of not being able to control his 
sexual urges. Allen Edwardes and Robert E. L. Masters also reported how the 
family may masturbate the infant’s penis for hours at a time in order to “increase 
its size and strengthen it”’ (Kobrin, 2010, p 17). Edwardes and Masters are actually 
quoting from a 1933 book by German Orientalist Bernhard Stern19, who has it that 
the ‘Arab distinguishes himself through the display of a powerful glans penis. I 
have been told that from childhood on they rub the penis energetically to increase 
its size and strengthen it’ (Stern cited in Edwardes and Masters, 1964, p 40). The 
activity was from ‘childhood on’ not infancy, no mention of it being a group activity 
and nothing more than a second hand traveller’s tale anyway. 
 
    Kobrin’s notion of the group masturbation of infants does appear in Edwardes 
and Masters account but not as an Islamic cultural practice, stating that ‘[a]ctive 
masturbation is aroused in many male infants among North African Jews by their 
mothers, nurses, older sisters, and other attending females who pacify and soothe 
the displeased baby by tickling his genitals. This method of becalming is not only 
common but may indeed be considered quite customary ... Seeing that he enjoys it, 
they fondle his genitals repeatedly. This is not always a casual tickling of the 
testicles, but a steady stimulation of the penis’ (Edwardes and Masters, 1964, p 
249). If the cultural practices being adduced as evidence for a specific psycho-
cultural critique belong to another culture, then they cannot be adduced as valid 
evidence for the culture being critiqued and pathologised. They would either, reflect 
more general (ergo non-pathological) cross-cultural practices or possibly in Kobrin’s 
terms, point to an underlying source of pathology in that other culture.  
 
    Kobrin adduces further evidence from Abdelwahab Bouhdiba, having it that the  
 
‘French-trained Tunisian psychoanalyst who is also a Muslim, emphasizes 
the common occurrence of pederasty, mutual masturbation fellatio, and anal 
intercourse during childhood in Arab Muslim culture. For example, the word 
hammam, referring to the hot waters of the public bathhouse, is slang for 
sex because seven - to fourteen-year-old boys go to the baths with their 
mothers and sisters’  
                                                 
19
 Aberglaube und Geschlechtsleben in der Türkei. 2 vols. Berlin: 1933. 
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(Kobrin, 2010, p 17).  
 
Bouhdiba is though talking about a somewhat different conceptualisation of the 
hammam, not slang for sex with minors, but a popular metaphor linking eroticism 
with cleansing (Bouhdiba, 2004).  
 
    As Bouhdiba explains,  
 
‘[i]n many Arab countries, “going to the hammam” quite simply means 
“making love”, since going to the hammam is part of the process of removing 
the impurity consequent on the sexual act; and since the hammam, by 
virtue of the various forms of cleansing practised there, is also a preparation 
for the sexual act, it can be said that the hammam is both conclusion and 
preparation for the work of the flesh. The hammam is the epilogue of the 
flesh and the prologue of prayer. The practices of the hammam are pre - and 
post-sexual practices. Purification and sexuality are linked’  
 
(Bouhdiba, 2004, p 165).  
 
    The hammam in Bouhdiba’s critique is part of a cultural cleansing ritual, an 
ancillary function as synecdoche, purification not paedophilia. Bathing and the 
sexual stimulation of minors is detailed by Edwardes and Masters, but again as a 
Jewish practice. According to Edwardes and Masters, Jewish ‘orthodox children [up 
to five years old] are ordinarily bathed once or twice a day, morning and/or 
evening, their naked bodies are continuously exposed to the wanton handling of 
lustful females. Without exception, washing and drying of the genitals induce 
repeated erections; and all during the bath the stripling’s penis is flipped and 
frictionized until he has an orgasm or two’ (Edwardes and Masters, 1964, p 251).  
 
    Kobrin again cites Breiner, who ‘noted how common it was in ancient Egypt for 
wet nurses and nurses to introduce children to sexual activity and “to play and 
suck on the male child’s genitals so that little boys would have stronger erections. 
This activity was known as “playing with the sweet finger” or “little finger.” Genital 
manipulation by others continues to this day’ (Kobrin, 2010, pp 16-17). Breiner’s 
source for this particular practice Norman Mailer’s novel, Ancient Evenings (1983) 
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as is also Kobrin’s claim that such genital manipulation continues into modern 
times (Breiner, 1990; Kobrin, 2010).  
  
   Mailer’s novel is actually set exclusively in ancient Egypt with no mention of 
modern day practices, and Mailer does not give a bibliography or cite any sources. 
As a source then, Mailer is somewhat problematic, with Mark Hooperarguing that 
he runs ‘roughshod over historical detail with cheerful abandon’ (Mark Hooper, 
theguardian.com, the 8th of January, 2008). The practice does, however, appear in 
Edwardes and Masters, but is again a Jewish custom whereby ‘[m]ale infants are 
masturbated almost every day and night by their female nurses. This is especially 
the case in orthodox and rabbinical families, who hire “outside” women to perform 
the necessary services’ (Edwardes and Masters, 1964, p 250). 
  
   Another Arab Muslim sexual practice, according to Kobrin, ‘involves older males 
in the clan targeting young boys for anal intercourse, with the latter forced to play 
out the passive “female” role’ (Kobrin, 2010, p 20). However, the evidence adduced 
for this once again derives from Breiner’s study of ancient Egypt, where decidedly 
pre-Islamic soldiers believed that ‘if you had anal sex with a man, this would alter 
that man into a woman for that period of time, thus making the man who mounted 
stronger’ (Breiner, 1990, p 25). Breiner’s is in any event a comparative study of 
ancient child abuse, and he argues that in terms ‘of child abuse among the 
ancients, the Egyptians were not major offenders’ (ibid, p 192).  
 
    The illogicality of linking the contingency of terrorism, even the particularity of 
suicide terrorism, to a psychoanalytic and psychosexual developmental analysis, is 
inadvertently demonstrated from the same polemical position as Kobrin’s, 
published again in FrontPage Magazine. In explaining why Muslim converts ‘engage 
in terrorism at a higher rate than Muslims’, Daniel Greenfield argues that it relates 
to the ‘four reasons for the rise of the Muslim Suicide Convert. Muslim converts are 
gullible, fanatical, suicidal and expendable’ (Daniel Greenfield, FrontPage Magazine, 
the 2nd of January, 2014).  
 
    Muslims ‘have learned to make the necessary compromises with their fanatical 
religion that make their lives livable ... The Muslim Suicide Convert seeks an 
uncompromising purity. He rejects the compromises that Muslims have learned to 
make over the centuries’ (Daniel Greenfield, FrontPage Magazine, 2nd of January, 
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2014). The propensity for suicide terrorism does not, in Greenfield’s analysis, reside 
in cultural practices, but at the intersection of the anomie and alienation of 
Western culture and the strictures of a more rigorous Eastern theology. Suicide 
terrorism is a contingent anomaly, not a teleological psychic trajectory, socially 
determined or otherwise.  
 
 
6   Normative Conceptualisations of Ego Development.  
 
    Although democracy as an ideology in the view of Kernberg, ‘cannot aspire to the 
dynamic force of totalitarian fundamentalism’, the ‘education of the individual 
within a tolerant social system may provide for the development of normal ego 
identity and an integrated, autonomous system of morality’ (Kernberg, 2003, p 959, 
my emphasis). Thus, the possession of a ‘normal ego identity’ is conflated with a 
normative Western democratic discourse. From a normative Western perspective, 
these other cultures would inevitably exhibit some aberrant psychological 
functioning, if merely by dint of being outside of that Western norm. Such 
normative positioning is already a criticism levelled at psychoanalysis as a 
discipline, with non-Western cultures ‘bunched more at the neurotic end of the 
spectrum’, as measured against a normative Western yardstick (Kakar, 1985, p 
441).  
 
    In practical terms, as Freud points out, ‘for an individual neurosis we take as 
our starting-point the contrast that distinguishes the patient from his environment, 
which is assumed to be “normal”. For a group all of whose members are affected by 
one and the same disorder no such background could exist’ (Freud, 1930, S.E. XXI, 
p 144). Erich Fromm proposes a formulation which would generally accommodate 
cultural differentiation without a commensurate pathologising of the individual, in 
that there is  
 
‘an important difference between individual and social mental illness, which 
suggests a differentiation between two concepts: that of defect, and that of 
neurosis. If a person fails to attain freedom, spontaneity, a genuine 
expression of self, he may be considered to have a severe defect, provided we 
assume that freedom and spontaneity are the objective goals to be attained 
by every human being. If such a goal is not attained by the majority of 
213 
 
members of any given society, we deal with the phenomenon of socially 
patterned defect. The individual shares it with many others; he is not aware 
of it as a defect, and his security is not threatened by the experience of being 
different, of being an outcast, as it were. What he may have lost in richness 
and in a genuine feeling of happiness, is made up by the security of fitting in 
with the rest of mankind - as he knows them. As a matter of fact, his very 
defect may have been raised to a virtue by his culture, and thus may give 
him an enhanced feeling of achievement’  
 
(Fromm, 1944, pp 5-6).  
 
Individuals who thrive in cultures which privilege conformity and obedience over 
‘freedom and spontaneity’ can then, from a Western normative perspective, be 
deemed part of a socially defective community, but not individually neurotic 
members of it.  
 
    Fromm’s perspective still privileges his own conception of the good life as a 
societal yardstick. Similarly, if the evidence had been there, it would in principle 
have accommodated Kobrin’s notion of Arab/Muslim society as being somehow 
defective. Notwithstanding, taking Kobrin’s psycho-cultural analysis of an 
overarching Arab/Muslim societal pathology, it would be even harder to explain 
why such a tiny minority do turn to terrorism, and still not answer why those 
particular individuals and not any of the much larger majority. 
 
 
7    Developmental Ascriptions for Contingent Categories. 
 
    Although terrorising an enemy group is an ancient tactic, the nomenclature of 
terrorism derives from the ‘terror’ of the French revolution, and it was given its 
modern form when anarchists first started using dynamite (Townshend, 2011). 
What was a discernible tactic is now used more as a political concept, so that 
defining terrorism has become idiosyncratic, inherently reflecting the agenda of the 
definer, his ideology and his power to label.    
 
    Definitions of terrorism according Madjd-Sadjadi and Vencill (2005), inevitably 
reflect overlapping and competing agendas. The net effect of the distinction between 
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the FBI and US State Department definitions, as Tom O’Connor (2011) points out, 
is that exactly the same incident may be classified as terrorist by one branch of 
government and not by another. In examining the seven major US governmental 
definitions, Madjd-Sadjadi and Vencill find that ‘virtually any action can be defined 
as terrorism, or can be excluded from the definition, depending on the desired 
result’ (Madjd-Sadjadi and Vencill, 2005, p 71; O’Connor, 2011). Whether a group 
is designated as terrorist or not is a contingent political decision. So that although 
subsequently reinstated to the list of banned terrorist groups, in 1997 US Secretary 
of State Madeline Albright had excluded both the IRA and the PLO which was 
‘because of their roles in the then-pending peace talks in Northern Ireland and 
Israel, respectively’ (Madjd-Sadjadi and Vencill, 2005, p 72). 
 
    The thesis argues that some of the basic assumptions behind psychoanalytic 
profiling, psychobiography or indeed psychoanalytic concepts deployed in attribute 
labelling, actually constitute in philosophical terms, a category error or mistake. 
The category error consists in attaching an individual teleological psychic 
development or personality formation to a contingent eventuality such as a 
revolution. Or, of attaching a specific psychology to a nebulous generic category 
such as terrorism/terrorist which may be either a mind set or a tactic, and whose 
definition depends on a variable politico-moral determination.  
 
    Category errors go beyond, as Jack Meiland explains, ‘simple error or ordinary 
mistakes, as when one attributes a property to a thing which that thing could have 
but does not have, since category mistakes involve attributions of properties ... to 
things ... that those things cannot have’ (Meiland, 2001, p 123). In his advocacy of 
this concept introduced by the philosopher Gilbert Ryle, Mark Lindner gives the 
example of ‘[t]wo citizens who pay taxes belong to the same category but the 
average taxpayer does not. As long as the citizens continue to misconstrue the 
“average taxpayer” they will think of him as some peculiarly ghostly additional 
taxpayer’ (Lindner, 2015). The ‘average taxpayer’, ‘the terrorist’ or ‘the 
revolutionary’ are notional concepts, and whilst it is possible to imbue them with 
characteristics moral or otherwise, the characteristics are similarly notional, 
ideologically determined and simply cannot be re-adduced to represent the 
contingent reality or personality formation of any particular individual who pays 
tax, commits an act of terrorism or takes part in a revolution.   
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    Neumann and Smith contend that ‘an objective appreciation of terrorism as a 
strategic phenomenon has been undermined largely by mixing up terrorism as a 
coherent description of a particular tactic – the use of violence to instil fear for 
political ends – with a moral judgement on the actor’s method’s and objectives. 
Once a descriptive term becomes wrapped into judgemental connotations, any hope 
of an effective meaning has been lost. The conceptual confusion leads to the classic 
category mistake embodied in the much-cited phrase, “one man’s freedom fighter is 
another man’s terrorist”. Logically you can actually be both without contradiction’ 
(Neumann and Smith, 2008, p 13).  
 
    It is quite possible, and this thesis believes right, to pass a negative moral 
judgement on acts of terrorism. The ‘freedom fighter’ who employs terrorist tactics 
is a terrorist even if you agree with his cause. It is not a category error; it is a 
simple if deliberate mistake not to include him in the category of terrorist. The 
distinction between them is synthetic and ideological as they are not being 
attributed with characteristics which they cannot both possess. They could both be 
categorised together as revolutionaries. To ascribe a personality formation to what 
is an ideological label, not an actual individual, is a category error. It is again 
possible to imagine a psychoanalytically derived terrorist personality, conjuring up 
the notion of the transcendental psychological attributes of a terroriser, without his 
necessarily being party to an actual ‘terrorist’ campaign. 
 
    Concerning what this thesis terms as the contingent, Erich Fromm describes as 
behavioural, having it that  
 
‘[q]uite obviously the revolutionary character is not a person who 
participates in revolutions. This is exactly the point of difference between 
behavior [contingency] and character [personality] in the Freudian dynamic 
sense. Anyone can, for a number of reasons, participate in a revolution 
regardless of what he feels, provided he acts for the revolution. But the fact 
that he acts as a revolutionary tells us little about his character [personality]’  
 
(Fromm, 1963, p 154).  
 
    It is not the province of psychoanalysis to create an essentially spurious notion 
of the ‘terrorist personality’, from ideologically defined individuals. The personality 
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pathology discourse is used to distance the normative and hegemonic as moral, 
from the pathologised ‘Other’, rather than from the terrorist act which may actually 
be perpetrated by friend or foe, state or enemy of the state. The power of the 
personality pathology discourse is then in switching the focus from the grievances 
which give rise to terrorism, or in diverting attention away from terrorist acts 
committed by their own normative establishment or allies, because terrorism has 
become the province the ‘terrorist personality’, the pathological ‘Other’.  
 
    In his paper, ‘The Relevance of Psychoanalysis to an understanding of 
Terrorism’, Stuart Twemlow builds on his expertise in dispute resolution. Through 
a clinical account of terrorism as encompassing notions of family dynamics, shame, 
humiliation, and narcissistic grandiosity and rage, Twemlow equates terrorism with 
for example, bullying, the ‘terrorizing’ of analysts by borderline, violent or paranoid 
patients, apocalyptic cults, and disaffected middle class American school shooters 
whom he identifies with young Palestinians insurgents (Twemlow, 2005).  
 
    This inclusive, transcendental ‘psychoanalytic’ perception of the ‘terrorist’, does 
‘scant justice to Irish, Basque and Palestinian families’ and their ‘terrorist’ groups 
which ‘have practical and limited territorial aims’ (Friedman, 2005, pp 964, 965). 
There is a distinct difference then, between a psychoanalytic notion of a ‘terrorist’ 
personality and a psychoanalytic explanation of the contingency of terrorist acts.  
 
    The proper enquiry for psychoanalysis, irrespective of the normative status or 
ideological positioning of the subject involved, the examination of the overarching 
psychic mechanisms which facilitate individuals, whether insurgents or indeed 
counterinsurgents, to commit heinous acts of terror. From a subject position 
outside of the traditional normative Western ambit, Leopold Nosek20 argues, that, 
from a psychoanalytic perspective, ‘terrorism is a label - an improper term for 
reflection’ (Nosek, 2003, p 32).  
 
    Regards the phenomenon of ‘terrorism’, ‘nothing allows us to talk, as analysts, 
with an alleged scientific expertise about ideological issues. On the other hand, 
terms like terror, horror, uncanny, sinister are within the traditional scope of our 
reflection’ (Nosek, 2003, p 33). A psychoanalytic view of ‘terror’, is a very different 
concept from the logically absurd ascription of ‘terrorist’, to a developmental 
                                                 
20
 Nosek was the former President of the Brazilian Psychoanalytic Society of São Paulo. 
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personality formation of a subject who has an ideologically designated and 
contingently determined involvement in the category of ‘terrorism’, which defies a 
exact definition anyway. 
 
    The tenor of the institutional establishment and particularly the normative 
American discourse of terrorism, as Lisa Stampnitzky argues, is continually 
‘hybridized by the moral discourse of the public sphere, in which terrorism is 
conceived as a problem of evil and pathology’ (Stampnitzky, 2013, p 13). This is 
because commentators such as Post and Kernberg conflate the 
scientific/psychiatric with normative prescriptions based on what are actually 
ideologically determined psychoanalytic conceptualisations. Credible causes or 
legitimate grievances may then be discredited as a result of this medico-scientific 
labelling of pathology. 
 
 
8    A Collective Phantasy as Opposed to Individual Fantasy.      
 
    For Kobrin, Al Qaeda’s group ‘psyche shares a striking similarity to that of a 
regular serial killer’ (Kobrin, 2010, pp 97, 96). Whereas for Robert Pape, in his 
comprehensive study of suicide terrorism ‘The Chicago Project’, ‘the organisation’s 
[Al Qaeda’s] strategic logic has been to compel Western combat forces to leave the 
Arabian Peninsula’ (Pape, 2006, p 29). There are specific contingent goals for 
suicide terrorism campaigns, in particular the establishment of some form of self-
determination. The main findings of his research are that rather than reflecting an 
individual psychic impulsion, suicide terrorism is ‘more likely when a national 
community is: occupied by a foreign power; the foreign power is of a different 
religion; the foreign power is a democracy; and ordinary violence has not produced 
concessions’ (Pape, 2008, p 275).  
 
    Organisations such as Al Qaeda have a contingent, existential strategic logic to 
their activities. Serial killing does reflect a transcendental psychic impulsion, and 
analysable developmental trajectory. With the serial killer according to Akhtar, 
‘major sectors of their psyche have become dehumanized, and it is the 
“instinctualized” (i.e. psychosomatically anchored, tension-reducing, cyclical, and 
repetitive) extrusion of this dehumanized core via its induction in others that forms 
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the central dynamics of serial murder’, whereas ‘dehumanization in terrorist 
violence is largely a matter of strategy’ (Akhtar, 2003, pp 238, 139). 
      
    For Jack Douglas, one the originator’s of the FBI’s serial killer study, ‘[p]robably 
the most crucial single factor in the development of a serial rapist or killer is the 
role of fantasy’ (Douglas and Olshaker, 1997, p 114). In sexually oriented serial 
killing, perverse primary phantasies become manifest through conscious fantasies, 
so that the ‘contents of the clearly conscious phantasies of perverts (which in 
favourable circumstances can be transformed into manifest behaviour)’ (Freud, 
2001/1905, S.E. VII, pp164-165). Although as Laplanche and Pontalis point out, 
Freud’s intention tended towards demonstrating the analogous constituents of 
conscious and unconscious ‘phantasies’, they point to Susan Isaacs useful 
distinction of denoting ‘fantasy’ as being conscious, and ‘phantasy’ as the ‘“the 
primary content of unconscious mental processes”’ (Laplanche and Pontalis, 
1988/1973, p 318).  
 
 
    There are discernible levels of interacting fantasy organisation, Duncan 
Cartwright argues, where for example ‘it is usually the case that in perverse or 
sadistic violence, conscious violent fantasies are clearly present and, in different 
ways, contribute to conscious actions of the offender. In this case the distinction 
between fantasy as a sublimatory activity and unconscious phantasy collapses, 
and what is usually destructive, but unconscious, becomes permissible in the 
conscious mind’ (Cartwright, 2002, p 49).  
 
    Freud’s earlier writings on violence and murder appear to emphasize, as 
Cartwright sees it, ‘oedipal phantasies as being prominent in acts of violence’, with 
other writers linking such violence to ‘castrating or mutilating phantasies originally 
directed at parents. Others have argued that violent encounters have their roots in 
fearful phantasies of sexual inadequacy that expose the individual in a shameful 
way’ (Cartwright, 2002, p 50). The phantasies around the maternal object however, 
are of feeling engulfed or attacked, provoking a self preservative violence in a 
desperate desire for separateness (Cartwright, 2002). The mother, as in the FBI 
studies, has been found to be an almost universally domineering character in the 
childhoods of serial killers, and the father normally weak or absent (Douglas and 
Olshaker, 1997; Hazelwood and Michaud, 2001). Indeed the serial killer is often 
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symbolically killing his mother over and over, sometimes until he screws himself up 
to do the actual killing of the mother. 
  
    This childhood trauma, the genesis of the original phantasy constellation, which 
does reflect the early traumatic object relating of the personality pathology thesis, 
is hidden behind the distortions of conscious fantasy. In individual violence as 
reflected in serial killing, the phantasy constellation moves from that deriving from 
the unconscious and repressed, to a very specific and idiosyncratic conscious 
fantasy script (Laplanche and Pontalis, 1988/1973). Terrorist killing does not rely 
on this idiosyncratic personal fantasy script, because as Cartwright points out, 
although group or socially sanctioned violence is ‘clearly worked out many times 
consciously, it is different in the sense that these actions do not necessarily stem 
from unconscious mental structures. Gang members or soldiers may fantasize 
many times about how they would respond when threatened or under attack, but 
their actions may not necessarily be linked to unconscious phantasy’ (Cartwright, 
2002, p 49). These exigent fantasies are not keenly evolving fantasy scripts, but a 
way of mentalising and diminishing apprehension.  
 
    Freud believed certain primal phantasies to be common to all humans, that they 
are hereditary or phylogenetic phantasies of origins. There is an innate conception 
even in the infant, ‘a hardly definable knowledge, something as it were preparatory 
to an understanding’, which is analogous to ‘the far-reaching instinctive knowledge 
of animals’ (Freud, 2001/1918, XVII, p 120). Following on from an innate 
sensibility to a phantasy of origin, culturally derived myths of origin, acting as 
primal phantasies are transposed as nationalist ideologies, particularly as Volkan 
believes, predicated on ancient trauma (Volkan, 1998/1997).  
 
    The thesis proposes a distinction in that terrorism is violence predicated on a 
collective phantasy or in this context, a nationalist ideology, as opposed to the 
serial killer, whose malignant narcissism (resulting from individual trauma), is 
acted out in his idiosyncratic fantasy script. Except in symbolic terms victims are 
incidental in terrorist violence, and it is not the violence itself which the focus of 
the fantasy, but self-evidently the terror that they create in the survivors. So that 
even if it is an individual trauma which propels the subject into the group, any 
idiosyncratic fantasy formation would need to be subsumed within this primal or 
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ideological phantasy, such as a creation myth embedded within the national 
psyche.  
  
   The phenomenon of the self radicalised ‘lone wolf terrorist’ may seemingly bridge 
the conceptual gap, between perhaps marginalised, traumatised narcissistically 
wounded individuals, which would reflect a serial killer, and ideological terrorist. 
The lone wolf is by definition acting alone, but as Bakker and de Graaf argue, the 
definition of ‘lone wolf terrorism has to be extended to include individuals that are 
inspired by a certain group but who are not under the orders of any other person, 
group or network’ (Bakker and de Graaf, 2011). However, although some will 
clearly take their inspiration from particular causes, the ‘lone wolf terrorist’ is 
nonetheless acting out his own personal rage. As a corollary, it is the act of terror 
itself and his own personal gratification from it, which is the focus of his fantasy, 
rather than any instrumental effect which he may not even live to see. The ‘lone 
wolf terrorist’ may espouse an ideology, and although perhaps reflecting a 
particular zeitgeist, his terrorism is not externally contingent. The lone wolf decides 
how, where, when and against whom he will strike.  
 
    This is critical because it is an inherent presumption of personality pathology 
theorists that the terrorist group is amenable to these psychologically damaged 
personalities, and designed to meet their psychological needs. This may be true of 
an overarching ideology for a self-radicalising individual, but serious terrorist 
groups function as disciplined organisations that select their members to meet 
their organisational requirements and their group ethos. Belonging to a group is 
more than sharing an ideology or even supporting a group’s agenda over the 
internet. The lone wolf terrorist is by definition not part of a group.  
 
    In his depiction of the notorious 1993 IRA ‘Shankill Bombing’, Andrew Silke 
describes Thomas Begley one of the IRA bombers who was killed in commission of 
the act. Begley ‘was described by neighbors as a shy and polite man. Others were 
less complimentary in their descriptions of the young bomber. Some expressed 
surprise that the IRA had allowed Begley to join their ranks - in their views he was 
an unpopular thug held in low regard in the area. As one source put it: “I never 
thought I’d see the day when the IRA used people like him”’ (Silke, 2003c, p 50). 
This exemplifies very poignantly that terrorist organisations have reputations 
221 
 
within the communities from which they gain their succour, who they have in their 
organisation reflects on them.  
 
    For ETA members, there was a lengthy process of initiation intrinsically linked to 
adolescent rites of passage peculiar to Basque culture. The process of recruitment 
was very protracted, and as Robert Clark’s research found, that far from being 
particularly psychologically vulnerable, ‘many potential etarras resist for months or 
even years before yielding to the call to join’ (Clark, 1983, p 436). Even from the 
perspective of movements which accept unsolicited volunteers such as the IRA, the 
recruitment process is similarly protracted, due to the evaluation of the candidate’s 
usefulness to the organisation and checking the bone fides of his ideological 
commitment and background (Horgan, 2006). Indeed the IRA in the 1980s, ‘turned 
away far more people than it actually accepted into its ranks’, deliberately limiting 
its size (Silke, 2003a p 46; Horgan, 2006).  
 
    Citing a Northern Irish terrorist leader, Horgan describes how the truly 
psychopathic killer would ‘stand out like a sore thumb’, and be weeded out as a 
threat to organisational security (Horgan, 2006, p 5). The danger, is then, that the 
literature on terrorism which overwhelmingly demonstrates the relative normality of 
terrorists is skewed because ‘some exceptions to the rule of terrorists as “normal” 
can be (and are) pointed to as a means of supporting a more significant position’ 
(Horgan, 2006, p 69). Given that contingent terrorists do not have the same psychic 
makeup as psychopathic killers, and that political violence for vengeance or in 
defence of individual or national identity may be a moral or even psychologically 
valid response, ‘terrorism as an activity is most certainly abnormal’ (Silke, 2003a, p 
33). If the personality pathology model of terrorism is rejected, are there 
psychoanalytic explanations for these otherwise ‘normal’ moral individuals 
committing abnormal (ergo ‘pathological’), indeed immoral acts of terrorism?  
 
 
9    The Ideological Exploitation of the ‘Inclination to Aggression’. 
     
    If those labelled terrorist, as Mirdal argues, are ‘neither insane, inhuman or 
abnormal’ and their cause credible, then it follows that it is likely to be the 
psychological processes operating within the terrorist group, that promotes and 
sanctions such abnormal or pathological behaviour (Mirdal, 2013/2006, p 10; 
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Silke, 2003a; Horgan 2006; Sageman, 2004). The inherent psychic functioning 
which demarcates the serial killer; depersonalisation, devaluation and 
dehumanisation, may be inculcated through group conditioning processes into 
otherwise ‘normal’ individuals, allowing them to commit acts which would 
otherwise contravene their moral codes.  
 
    Although a derivative of the ‘death wish’, Freud saw the ‘inclination to aggression 
as an original, self-subsisting instinctual disposition in man’ (Freud, 2001/1930 
[1929], S.E. XXI, p 122). No instinct could operate in isolation but must be alloyed 
with another in order to achieve its aim (Freud, 2001/1933, S.E. XXII). The 
satisfaction of destructive impulses may be facilitated by their fusion with other 
impulses of an ideological kind as with for example, the Spanish Inquisition or the 
Crusades, ‘where idealistic motives served only as an excuse for the destructive 
appetites’ (Freud, 2001/1933, S.E. XXII, p 210). What Freud is arguing is that 
aggression as a general disposition in man is exploited by ideological commitment 
to a group or cause, not the result of aberrant individual psychology. It would thus 
be an exploitation of the same human disposition, for a terrorist group, as for the 
crusaders against terrorism. 
 
    At the individual interface of aggression, dehumanization is one of the facilitating 
processes, as Bernard et al express it, which lessens the emotional turmoil caused 
by the stresses of ‘inner conflict and external threat’ by decreasing the sense of 
personal individuality (Bernard et al, 1971/1965, p 103). Dehumanisation as a 
process results from the misperception of the humanity of others, and ranges from 
‘viewing them en bloc as “subhuman” or “bad human” (a long-familiar component of 
group prejudice) to viewing them as “nonhuman,” as though they were inanimate 
items or “dispensable supplies.” As such, their maltreatment or even their 
destruction may be carried out or acquiesced in with relative freedom from the 
restraints of conscience or feelings of brotherhood’ (Bernard et al, 1971/1965, p 
102). 
 
    Similarly, the composite ego defence of depersonalisation relies on mechanisms 
of unconscious denial and repression, along with the ‘isolation of affect, and 
compartmentalization’ (Bernard et al, 1971/1965, p 103, p 103). Although as Paul 
Denis points out, the concept of depersonalisation is not dealt with directly by 
Freud, in psychoanalytic terms ‘‘‘depersonalization’’ refers to the appearance of 
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subjective impressions of change affecting the person or the surrounding world. 
Their intensity varies, ranging from a simple feeling of dizziness to painful feelings 
of physical transformation, from the fleeting feeling of estrangement to the 
impression that the world has become unrecognizable, dead, or uninhabited’ 
(Denis, 2005, p 393). 
 
   This estrangement or walling off of psychological elements would account for the 
sense of psychological immunity needed to facilitate the committing of terrorist 
outrages. For most people, according to Bernard et al, the ‘advocacy of or 
participation in the wholesale slaughter and maiming of their fellow human beings 
is checked by opposing feelings of guilt, shame, or horror. Immunity from these 
feelings may be gained however, by a selfautomatizing detachment from a sense of 
personal responsibility for the outcome of such actions, thereby making them 
easier to carry out’ (Bernard et al, 1971/1965, p 113, emphasis in the original). 
These are individual psychic processes explaining the propensity to terrorist 
violence, which exist independently of the personality development of the subject. 
This supports the thesis argument that there is no particular terrorist personality 
formation, rather that there is a contingent psychic process, particularly promoted 
in a group context, which facilitates the commission of acts of terrorism. 
 
  
10   The Psychic Conditioning for Brutality. 
 
    In the process of group functioning, there is for Freud following Gustav Le Bon’s 
original notion, a sentiment of numerical invincibility, giving a sense of collective 
psychological immunity allowing the individual, to 
 
‘throw off the repressions of his unconscious instinctual impulses. The 
apparently new characteristics which he then displays are in fact the 
manifestation of his unconscious, in which all that is evil in the human 
mind is contained as a predisposition. We can find no difficulty in 
understanding the disappearance of conscience or of a sense of 
responsibility in these circumstances. It has long been our contention that 
“social anxiety” is the essence of what is called conscience’ 
 
           (Freud, 2001/1921, S.E. XVIII, p 74). 
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    This is a revival, in Freud’s view, of the instincts of the ‘primal horde. Just as 
primitive man survives potentially in every individual’ (Freud, 2001/1921, S.E. 
XVIII, p 123). For Freud, without social restraints any individual irrespective of a 
particular personality formation or even natural propensity would be capable of 
committing a terrorist atrocity. 
    The group itself, lacks emotional restraint, cannot tolerate moderation or delay, 
shows regression to more primitive mental activity, and works out its emotional 
excesses in the form of action (Freud, 2001/1921, S.E. XVIII). The notion of 
deindividuation, where individuals lose their sense of themselves in the anonymity 
of the crowd, further inhibits restraint. A heightened sense of deindividuation 
occurred according to Silke when terrorists wore disguises, so that more serious 
injury was inflicted, more victims were attacked at the scene, and threatened after 
the attacks (Silke, 2003b). 
 
    The psychic processes that lead to depersonalised terrorism are the same 
whether the individual acts on behalf of a state security service or for an anti-state 
insurgency. In his psychoanalytic study of Nazi war criminals Licensed Mass 
Murder, Henry Dicks21, searched for a nexus which would incorporate as terrorists, 
groups such as the ‘inquisitors of the Holy Office’ (Dicks, 1972, p 18). In his study, 
Dicks seeks to understand not only ‘how a proportion of German males had 
become motivated to cross the threshold of being considered for terrorist roles’, but 
how ‘the “practice” of officially sanctioned terrorism may meet the needs and 
stresses of these people’ (Dicks, 1972, p 87). 
 
    Although questioning the ethological and anthropological validity of Freud’s 
notion of the ‘primal horde’, Dicks nonetheless believes ‘Freud’s classical study of 
regression inherent in group behaviour and dynamics is still the best theoretical 
model for explaining the phenomena of certain affiliative groups animated by 
aggressive intent resulting from social despair’ (Dicks, 1972, p 256). So that with a 
couple of dubious exceptions, Dicks records that none of the SS killers which he 
analysed ‘would have been likely to become “common murderers” in normal 
conditions’ (ibid, p 253). The instigatory triggering of their psychic anesthetisation 
was not ‘a sudden, solitary experience, but a process extending over time, shared 
                                                 
21
 Dicks was a psychiatrist and member of the Tavistock Clinic whose wartime experience included the 
medical care of Rudolf Hess. 
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with team mates in a facilitating group setting’ (Dicks, 1972, p 253). Dicks cites in 
particular Stanley Milgram’s research in relation to understanding individual in his 
Obedience to Authority (2005/1974). Becoming a terrorist is a process and ‘not 
usually something that happens quickly or easily’ (Silke, 2003a, p 35). 
 
    In a later edition of his seminal study on obedience to authority, Milgram 
similarly refers back to Dick’s analysis, as substantiating his own experimental 
work (Milgram, 2005/1974). Milgram writes that a ‘situation confronted both our 
experimental subject and the German subject and evoked in each a set of parallel 
psychological adjustments ... He [Dicks] finds clear parallels in the psychological 
mechanisms of his SS and Gestapo interviewees and subjects in the laboratory’ 
(Milgram, 2005/1974, pp 176-177; Dicks, 1972). In his experiment, Milgram found 
that the ordinary person was prepared to dole out what he was led to believe were 
dangerously increasing levels of electric shock to the screams of his ‘victim’ 
(Milgram, 2005/1974). Milgram argues that this was ‘out of a sense of obligation – 
a conception of his duties as a subject - and not from any peculiarly aggressive 
tendencies’ (Milgram, 2005/1974, p 7). The aggression, albeit reluctant, was 
operationalised by institutional authority, along with Milgram’s subjects’ 
willingness to obey that authority (Milgram, 2005/1974). 
 
    The same ego defences used as justifications, were observed in both sets of 
research and Milgram was able, in Dick’s estimation, to  
 
‘identify the nascence of a need to devalue the victim: many of his subjects 
did so as a consequence (or I would say as a guilt projection) of acting 
against the suffering person. Common comments in the post-experimental 
interviews were “He was so stupid and stubborn he deserved to get 
shocked”. We recognize the same tendency’ amongst SS subjects ‘to justify 
one’s own action by pointing to the disobedience or viciousness of the 
victims who are felt as “only to have themselves to blame”’ 
 
(Dicks, 1972, p 262, emphasis in the original). 
 
    What both Dick’s and Milgram are arguing, then, is not the propensity for 
violence of an authoritarian personality but the propensity for authority to mould 
the ordinary individual towards violence. Once within the system of authority, the 
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individual ‘no longer responds with his own moral sentiments to the ordered action. 
“His moral concern shifts to the plane of worrying how well or badly he manages to 
fulfil the expectations the authority has of him.” From this arises the 
dehumanization of the attitude towards the job which assumes the tyranny of a 
system’ (Dicks, 1972, p 262). 
 
    In the military system, cohesion depends not only on a preparedness to obey but 
also on the integration of individuals into the group. If the individual soldier is 
further bonded within the much smaller circle of his comrades, the probability of 
his participation in killing is, according to Dave Grossman, significantly increased 
(Grossman, 1996). Even within a conventional military organisation, this aspect 
may be exploited or subverted, as the  
 
‘authority is protected from the trauma of, and responsibility for, killing 
because others do the dirty work. The killer can rationalize that the 
responsibility really belongs to the authority and that his guilt is diffused 
among everyone who stands beside him and pulls the trigger with him. This 
diffusion of responsibility and group absolution of guilt is the basic 
psychological leverage that makes all firing squads and most atrocity 
situations function’  
 
(Grossman, 1996, p 225).  
 
    There is, then, an unholy conflation of the psychic distance of authority with the 
psychic intimacy of camaraderie, to murderous effect.  
 
    Implicit in the group affiliation process of Dicks’ SS killers were manic psychic 
defence mechanisms characterised by an increasing and brutalising repression: the 
individual gradually became governed by his distrust and hatred (Dicks, 1972). The 
defences of splitting, projective identification, denial, idealisation and omnipotent 
control, in their Kleinian conceptualisation, are as Dicks argues, gradually 
integrated into the adult character. In the restructuring of their ego defences, there 
was a ‘planned brutalization or breaking down of the psychic boundaries guarding 
against the break-through of the murderous death constellation’ (Dicks, 1972, p 
259). 
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    This process does not rely on the personality pathology theory determinant of 
trauma or deficient object relations suffered in early childhood, but focuses on 
developmentally acquired psychic defences. The brutalising indoctrination process 
also provides an alternative psychoanalytic formulation, to account for how 
otherwise psychologically healthy individuals can carry out punishment beatings 
and terrorist killings. By extension, it also explains why their confreres and their 
communities can either actively support or tacitly acquiesce in such brutality 
(Dicks, 1972; Milgram, 2005/1974). It is not just a particular personality type but 
anyone can, as Mirdal points out, ‘under circumstances of extreme fear, stress and 
pressure commit acts of terror and violence against defenceless persons’ (Mirdal, 
2013/2006, p 10). 
 
    
11    Conclusion.  
 
    Taking principally the rise of ‘Arab’ terrorism, the chapter demonstrated how 
psychoanalysts whether wittingly or not, devise cultural analyses which correspond 
to political imperatives. There was a critique including a detailed examination of the 
evidence adduced, to show how a psychoanalytic sensibility may be attached to 
wider cultural discourses and polemics. It was demonstrated, that Kobrin’s psycho-
cultural analysis of Islam, sought merely to add a psychoanalytic element to a 
cultural and ideological polemic that was based on flawed cultural evidence of 
degenerate child rearing practices in the Muslim world. Such evidence would be 
inherently inadequate to sustain her psychobiographical conceptualisation of a 
terrorist personality or indeed culture. Assigning a specific personality formation to 
an indeterminate political concept is, in any event, a category error. The chapter 
demonstrated that this flawed evidence nonetheless becomes part of the accepted 
psychoanalytic literature, having supposedly ‘proved’ itself as a circular argument.  
 
    It was argued that adherence to a collective phantasy, rather than acting out an 
individual fantasy script, is the feature distinguishing the terrorist multiple killer 
from the serial killer. Thus, otherwise psychologically ‘normal’ individuals may 
adhere to a violent revolutionary ideology, and whilst part of a revolutionary group, 
may commit acts of terrorism. A psychoanalytic explanation of the psychic 
mechanisms (including depersonalisation and the social conditioning to brutality), 
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which allows psychologically healthy individuals to commit acts of terrorism, was 
given.  
 
    It is my contention that particularly in personological psychobiography, that 
pathologising is a function of the ideological agenda of the analyst. In cultural 
critiques, psychoanalytic concepts are fairly malleable as there is clearly no clinical 
yardstick against which to validate the analyses. The effects of social trauma are 
readily amenable to interpretations of psychic injury as the cause of terrorist 
violence. Whilst there is no way of disproving this, there is no way of demonstrating 
a causal link either. What is the case, however, is that it neglects any culpability of 
the party causing the trauma for its part in the resulting terrorist violence. It is this 
essentially one sided-bias, which undermines the personality pathology thesis, and 
this argument figures large in the conclusion to this thesis.  
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1    Introduction.  
 
    In epitomising the notion of ‘Social Darwinism’, Herbert Spencer coined the term 
‘survival of the fittest’ which was then applied to competition between social groups 
(Bannister, 2000). This led to Francis Galton’s eugenicist argument ‘that particular 
racial or social groups – usually Anglo-Saxons – were “naturally” superior to other 
groups’ (ibid). These groups or nations evolved by succeeding in conflicts with other 
nations, a notion used to justify imperial expansion. This thesis identifies a 
personality pathology discourse within psychoanalysis, which similarly reflects a 
particular normative, hegemonic, establishment position. The argument is not that 
this pathologising discourse is as egregious as the ultimate logic of Social 
Darwinism, and the stigma which still attaches in applying evolutionary theories to 
society. The identification with a particular ideological and contingent position is, 
however, inherently detrimental to the reputation and credibility of any universal 
discipline. 
 
    The thesis has identified a personality pathology discourse within 
psychoanalysis, which reflects a particular normative, hegemonic, establishment 
position. These psychoanalytic personality pathology theorists locate the turn to 
terrorism within the psyche of the ‘terrorist’. Political terrorists are then seen as 
engaging ‘in gratuitous violence, which reveals psychopathological rather than 
socio-political’ causes (Corrado, 1981, p 295). The objective of the thesis has not 
been to offer an alternative ideological polemic or deploy alternative psychoanalytic 
theories, but to demonstrate the conceptual, theoretical and clinical/technical 
flaws of the personality pathology project.  
 
    The predicament for psychoanalysis is that flaws inherent within the 
psychobiographic project are readily amenable to ideological exploitation. Just as 
the excesses of Social Darwinism can be refuted without the intention of 
undermining the theory of evolution, the personality pathology discourse can be 
undermined by rejecting its deployment of psychoanalysis, without it being an 
attack on psychoanalysis. As with Social Darwinism and evolutionary biology, with 
personality pathology theory, a psychoanalytic framework is being applied to a 
particular ideological construct. When psychoanalysts accept normative ideological 
ascriptions from purely within their own cultural matrix, the psychic trajectories of 
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the ‘Other’, whether labelled terrorist, revolutionary or even dictator, must 
necessarily also be ideologically not psychoanalytically determined.  
 
    As was demonstrated in the thesis, Post’s relentlessly negative portrayal of 
Yasser Arafat and the Palestinians is ideologically commensurate with the 
institutional Israeli position. A Muslim student researching a psychoanalytic 
account of Arafat, a figure still universally revered throughout the Islamic world, 
may find their world view unilaterally pathologised from the normative hegemonic 
perspective of the personality pathology discourse. The psychoanalytic perspective 
as presented by figures such as Nancy Kobrin (2010) and Joanie Lachkar (2008) 
would be viewed not as universal discipline, but as an ideology, inherently 
antithetical to Islam. The argument of the thesis is that these commentators, form 
part of an ideologically driven discourse, within psychoanalysis. 
 
 
2    The Limitations of the Research. 
 
    This thesis is an examination of process - the analysis of a particular discourse, 
the ideologically driven personality pathology approach to the psychoanalytic 
profiling of perceived adversaries. The hypotheses of the thesis are not, then, tested 
against newly derived information such as research interviews, but rely almost 
exclusively on the documentary evidence extant in the literature of the discursive 
process. The research aim was not to uncover an alternative ‘true’ paradigm. The 
thesis does not seek to analyse the psychological motivations of the protagonists of 
personality pathology theory, or seek direct ‘proof’ that their subjects are or are not 
pathological.  
 
    For example, it is pointed out that Nancy Kobrin (2010) has actually adduced 
what are described as Jewish practices as evidence but ascribed them as an 
Islamic ‘pathology’. The thesis does not engage in psychoanalytic speculation as to 
why she does this. The thesis did not seek to interview Kobrin or any of the other 
personality pathology theorists, nor are there interviews with their 
psychobiographic subjects or other ‘terrorists’. The view of this thesis is that this 
would simply create another polemic within the discourse, rather than the more 
technical unpacking of that discourse.   
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    There is no overarching analysis of an historical development, but rather an 
account of the contingent circumstances which created the current discourse. The 
research reflects more a series of these seemingly arbitrary events that had no 
teleological trajectory or inevitability, but created the environment in which the 
personality pathology paradigm functions. As the research does not build theory 
from findings in an archive, original sources are the public documents of the 
discourse itself. So that as Jerrold Post adduces as evidence Robert Clark’s 1983 
paper ‘Patterns in the Lives of ETA Members’, it is this paper which is treated as 
the original source. There is no attempt at researching the ‘truth’ of ETA, only an 
analysis of how Post (1986, 1998, 2007) has used Clark as evidence.  
 
    The field of terrorism research is now quite vast, in particular that of the 
psychology of terrorism. This research does not refer to this field of study other 
than to point out that the overwhelming weight of empirical studies find the relative 
psychological ‘normality’ of the terrorists studied (Silke, 2003a; Sageman, 2004; 
Horgan, 2006). The thesis’s view is that covering this more fully would again divert 
the argument away from strictly investigating the personality pathology paradigm. 
Also, a comparison between the personality pathology theory and other specific 
models of terrorism would be unfeasible. As the thesis argues that the ‘terrorist 
personality’ is a logical absurdity, it would mean comparing the ideological notion 
of terrorism as representing the desire to be a terrorist, against particular 
explanatory theories of the root causes of terrorism. They represent two separate 
categories.    
 
    As opposed to the purely notional and unfalsifiable category of an ahistorical 
psychic impulsion to commit acts of terrorism, there are a number of varied and 
particular existential causes identified in the terrorism literature. These observable 
contingencies are for a point of comparison outlined by John Horgan as, the  
 
‘Lack of democracy, civil liberties and the rule of law: Failed or weak states: 
Rapid modernization: Extremist ideologies of a secular or religious nature: 
Historical antecedents of political violence, civil wars, revolutions, 
dictatorships or occupation: Hegemony and inequality of power: Illegitimate 
or corrupt governments: Powerful external actors upholding illegitimate 
governments: Repression by foreign occupation or by colonial powers: The 
experience of discrimination on the basis of ethnic or religious origins: 
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Failure or unwillingness by the state to integrate dissident groups or 
emerging social classes: The experience of social injustice: The presence of 
charismatic ideological leaders’  
 
(Horgan, 2006, p 83).   
 
    In personality pathology theory, other psychoanalytic conceptualisations such as 
those of Carl Gustav Jung or Jacques Lacan are not deployed at all, and only 
extremely rarely in psychobiography generally. Using principally Freud’s notion of 
an innate aggression and Henry Dick’s (1972) notion of brutalising socialisation, 
the thesis does offer a psychoanalytic explanation of why terrorism may be carried 
out by individuals who were not pathological, at least to start with. The thesis does 
not otherwise wish to engage in an internecine debate within psychoanalysis and 
be judged on this basis. One hope is for the thesis to challenge the ideological bias 
of the dominant psychoanalytic paradigm within its own terms of reference using 
its own concepts and evidence. 
 
    The objective of the thesis is to demonstrate that personality pathology theory is 
ideologically determined, but not to offer an alternative ideological perspective. The 
thesis argues that the one sided analysis of Yasser Arafat and the Palestinians is 
biased irrespective of the validity of the psychoanalytic concepts used, but the 
thesis does not champion the Palestinian cause or denigrate the Israelis. The thesis 
argues that Post’s analysis of Saddam Hussein is problematic, not that Saddam is 
a good man. The argument is that any ideological bias is harmful to the reputation 
of psychoanalysis as a discipline.     
 
    The thesis does not challenge the personal or professional bona fides of the 
psychoanalytic personality theorists. If the major protagonists were simply rogue 
commentators with a misperception of psychoanalytic concepts, they could be 
summarily refuted, and there would be no real research purpose. The objective of 
the thesis is to undermine the pathologising discourse from an academic 
perspective on the basis of evidence adduced. Engaging in speculation, ideological 
polemic, internecine psychoanalytic debate, character assassination or indeed ‘wild 
analysis’, would diffuse and detract from that focus. 
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    Similarly, there would be no weight to the thesis if psychoanalysis did not have a 
wider social influence. A full enquiry into the role of psychoanalysis and 
particularly American society would be beyond the scope of this thesis. The 
influence of psychoanalysis is inferred at the confluence of specific examples, 
particularly as described in the modern context of public psychobiography. As 
Emily Eakin of the New York Times reported, ‘the psychological profile of Saddam 
Hussein that Dr. Post presented to members of Congress in 1990 was what 
convinced previously reluctant lawmakers to support the Persian Gulf war’ (Emily 
Eakin, The New York Times, 29th June, 2002; Omestad, 1994). With the US Senate 
majority for war being just five, only three would have had to have had their minds 
changed by Post, to potentially change the course of history. Even if those 
lawmakers could be asked, there is no actual way of telling what really decided 
them. What is possible, however, is to infer is that psychoanalytic perspectives were 
taken into account at such momentous times. Whether Post actually influenced the 
vote or not, the perception that he did is part of the discourse, and thus 
discursively creates its own influence. Whatever the precise nature of the direct 
influence, psychoanalysis is, in the US, clearly part of an establishment matrix.  
 
    With his background, Post is the quintessential link between the academy and 
policy makers. Post neatly sums up the influence of experts, such as himself, and 
by extension, that of his psychoanalytic perspective:  
 
‘To influence the public’s or the government’s perception of a problem by 
one’s writings ... The writings of serious students of social reality can, over 
time, lead members of a society - at all levels - to see an issue that was not 
seen before or to see an issue in a new fashion. Members of the policy 
community who have never met the writer in question, and may indeed not 
have read the book or article in question, will find themselves crafting policy 
answers that fit a situation that has been defined for them by the author. In 
effect, the policy community will absorb from the culture the definitions and 
interpretations that now have become “obvious,” “self-evident,” and “matter 
of fact.” Thus, if one does have impact, it can be significant. One will be 
framing the question and building the context in which the policy choices 
are made. No one is more powerful than the person who frames the question 
and - over time - academic scholars who make their thinking accessible 
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through their words to the government community can create the lenses 
through which the public and the government construe reality’  
 
(Post and Ezekiel, 1988, p 508).  
 
When policy makers call on experts such as Post, they will have a certain 
expectation of the form of information that they will receive, and how that 
information will be used to their advantage. Arguably, the decision to present a 
subject as pathological has already been made, in the decision to consult Post. 
 
 
3    The Overarching Flaws Inherent in the Psychobiographic Project. 
 
    Simply deciding on a psychoanalytic analysis, whether it is of an individual or a 
group, inherently focuses on any putative ‘pathological’ functioning. Choosing or 
not choosing a particular subject is then a value laden decision in itself.  
 
        Because of its generally more limited historical scope, psychobiography tends 
to be reductive. Pathography as the clinically determined aspect of 
psychobiography reduces a complex life to the representation of a diagnosis. 
Emphasis on personality determination presents a simplistic view of complex socio-
historical events. 
     
    As with psychoanalysis in general, psychobiographic interpretations are not 
readily falsifiable. The lack of psychobiographic evidence particularly in respect of 
the subject’s childhood means that similarly unfalsifiable psychic trajectories are 
constructed. Even contradictory evidence may not falsify psychobiographic 
analyses as it may be discounted as not being psychically significant or 
representing for example, a reaction formation.  
 
    There are, any number of possible interpretations of the same material, let alone 
possible selection criteria for data. As there is no objective means of validating any 
particular interpretation, within their own terms even obviously biased analyses 
may be perfectly feasible and consonant with psychoanalytic conceptualisations.  
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    Psychoanalytic concepts that allow inference from adult behaviour, as in what 
the thesis has termed personological profiling, allows for a circular argument to 
pathologise from an a priori ideological position. Evidence can be selectively chosen 
commensurate with an ideological position, and an appropriate psychoanalytic 
concept deployed. For example, as terrorism is deemed pathological, an event in 
childhood may be inferred as traumatic, as that explains the adult pathology which 
in circular fashion will be deemed to have been caused by that same traumatic 
event in childhood.  
 
    Without the presence of a willing subject to analyse, the psychobiographer’s 
analysis has no interpretative validation. The analysis is then wholly predicated on 
one side of the ‘encounter’, reliant on the expertise of the psychobiographer, which 
will inherently validate his own position. Speculation is initially presented as expert 
intuition, then further as inference in the analysis and finally reified as evidence 
upon which to build further inference.  
 
    Reified inferences which are flawed or based on faulty evidence nonetheless 
become established in the literature. This is the case with the generally accepted 
psychoanalytic premise that terrorism arises out of marginality, and that individual 
terrorists have all suffered early traumatic experiences. 
 
    Methods designed to counteract bias such as the analysis of countertransference 
reaction similarly rely on the subjectivity of the analyst. Although the intrinsic 
virtue of a psychoanalytic analysis is that it may produce counterintuitive and 
indeed subjective findings, psychobiography seeks validation through conceptual 
and narrative coherence. Instead of being complex and contradictory, the subject is 
represented as a function of a particular one dimensional personality formation, as 
with Saddam Hussein the ‘malignant narcissist’.  
 
    Similarly, the psychobiographer may base his psychic trajectory on a parallel 
analytic case, which this thesis has termed clinical parallelism, in order to give his 
analysis a narrative unity. Although this means that the analysis is clinically 
coherent, the psychobiographic subject is then determined by another individual’s 
clinical narrative. This is then outside of the subject’s context, effectively an 
ahistorical analysis.  
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    Psychoanalysis is a retrodictive rather predictive discipline. Expecting a 
psychoanalytic profile to predict the future behaviour of an individual or a group, is 
outside of its capacity, and also places an exaggerated emphasis on the influence of 
personality over any externally contingent or social forces. In the clinical context, 
the therapist is expected to influence the perception that the subject has of himself, 
in psychobiography, the psychobiographer seeks to influence the perception of the 
subject by others.   
 
 
4    Bias and Personality Pathology Theory.  
 
    A basic premise of the therapeutic relationship is that the analyst seeks to 
ameliorate the condition of his patient. In adversarial personality pathology 
profiling the situation is reversed, the subject is a perceived enemy. Bias in this 
respect would appear understandable, indeed, it is expected. Singling out Post and 
Kobrin, two of the principal protagonists of this thesis, David Lotto believes that 
‘the prevalence of this “pot calling the kettle black” genre of American 
psychohistory is that all Americans have been bombarded, from their first history 
lessons in elementary school through what is presented in the mainstream media, 
with material that is viewed from an American exceptionalism perspective’ (Lotto, 
2012, p 278). When ‘Americans write and speak about psychopathology, 
unpleasant psychodynamics, or harmful child-rearing practices of “terrorists,” 
“Islamic Fundamentalists,” or any of the many groups, countries, or individual 
leaders who have been designated as enemies of this nation, they are vulnerable to 
bias primarily because of their identifications with the group which is said to be 
threatened by these enemies’ (Lotto, 2012, p 278). 
 
    The principle objective of the thesis has been to identify this bias as a 
pathologising discourse, representing a distinct paradigm within the psychoanalytic 
discipline of psychobiography. It was demonstrated that there was a developmental 
strand of personological pathologising from the early pathographies of Freud’s 
Vienna Circle in particular those of Isidor Sadger, through to the modern ‘at a 
distance’ political profiling of ideological adversaries. It was shown that the 
pathologising discourse was always determined by the ideological position, the 
agenda personal or political of the profiler. Ideological positions, are whether 
intentionally or not, then elided as psychoanalytic determinations. It is impossible 
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in such analyses to differentiate the psychoanalytic from the ideological, and that 
the acceptance of such analyses inherently involves an acceptance of the 
ideological position. In his psychobiography of Leonardo Da Vinci, the analytic 
‘expectations’ of the atheist Freud, was that Leonardo would have escaped ‘from 
dogmatic religion’ (Freud, 2001/ 1910, S.E. XI, p 123). 
 
    As opposed to the accumulation of evidence for the chronological dénouement of 
an historical narrative, psychobiography is essentially ahistorical. Psychobiography 
and more particularly its pathographic form, begins with an interpretation or 
diagnosis and works back to find justificatory evidence. This clinical method of 
investigation in psychobiography is also inherently predicated on there being a 
clinical problem to investigate which inevitably tends to pathologise its subject. 
Evidence is accrued incrementally in historical research and interpretations may be 
refined to accommodate any new contradictory evidence. As psychobiography is 
predicated on an initial interpretation and based on a theoretical schema, the 
thesis proposed that evolving evidence contradictory to a clinical evaluation 
completely undermines the analysis. This was poignantly demonstrated with the 
discovering of homoerotic letters which problematised Victor Wolfenstein’s (1967) 
Oedipal analysis of Gandhi.  
 
    The thesis similarly identified that the wider findings of group or cultural 
analyses were being re-adduced as individual psychobiographic explanations. 
Terrorist groups may for example collectively exhibit the splitting and projection of 
borderline functioning, but this does not mean that the group is then made up of 
borderline individuals. Similarly, an Oedipal explanation of group or social conflict, 
does not signify that the individuals involved in that conflict are acting out 
problematic Oedipus complexes due to actual conflict with their parents. Indeed, 
this thesis makes the claim that to attribute individual developmental trajectories 
to individuals involved in contingent conflict, such as revolution or terrorism, 
represents a category error. 
 
    Inherent in the very choice of the psychobiographical subject is some form of 
agenda. The thesis demonstrated that in the modern clinical ‘at a distance’ political 
profiles, diagnoses of pathology are ideologically rather than clinically determined. 
President Anwar Sadat of Egypt and President Saddam Hussein of Iraq were given 
practically identical Post (Post, 1979; Post, 1991). The diagnostic determination of 
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putative ally Sadat’s ‘grandiose narcissism’ was assessed, however, as an amiable 
‘Barbara Walters syndrome’, whereas for the ideological adversary Saddam, the 
diagnosis was the seriously pathological syndrome of ‘malignant narcissism’. 
 
    The psychoanalytic concepts deployed in the modern ‘at a distance’ personality 
pathology profiles of Post et al, are chiefly the object relational theories of Melanie 
Klein, the ego psychology of Eric Erikson, the self psychology of Heinz Kohut and 
Otto Kernberg’s notions of malignant narcissism and borderline functioning. There 
are obvious evidential implications of ascribing pathology on the basis of theories 
mainly predicated on pre-Oedipal deficits and trauma in the acquisition of the self. 
As the requisite pre-Oedipal evidence could not normally come from the subject, 
the trauma that instigated later psychic deficits would necessarily need to be 
inferred from adult behaviour. It was then the analyst’s current perspective on his 
subject, rather than on any necessary evidence, which would determine the 
presentation of the subject’s psychic trajectory. 
 
    This form of personality assessment or as the thesis describes it, personological 
profiling, represents a more modern strand in psychobiography. This contrasts with 
what the thesis argued were traditional Freudian psychobiographies. What the 
thesis describes as characterological profiling, are predicated on the subject’s 
childhood history, sexual development and Oedipus complex. Ipso facto, 
characterological profiles necessitate delving as far as is known, into the 
individual’s childhood in order to explicate the relationship between early 
developmental stages and character formation. Characterological profiles offer the 
possibility of a more developed and nuanced profile, but frequently become 
embroiled in convoluted arcane and ultimately unsatisfactory speculations. The 
thesis argued that personological and characterological profiling represent two 
distinct strands within psychobiography, and presents this as a new analytic model 
for assessing psychobiographies. 
 
    Although psychoanalytic concepts can accommodate notions of terror and the 
terroriser, the thesis argued that psychoanalytic ascriptions of pathology could not 
be adduced for individuals in the particular contingent circumstance of terrorism. 
Whilst the terrorist is a somewhat nebulous and ill defined concept, psychoanalytic 
notions as deployed by the FBI for example, are a critical analytic tool for the 
motivational analysis in the psychic developmental trajectories of serial killers. In 
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discussing the reasons why the motivational model for serial killers could not be 
applied to terrorists, the thesis proposed that a distinction could be made between 
the collective intergenerational phantasies or ideologies which motivated terrorists, 
and the individual fantasy scripts which serial killers acted out.  
 
    An individual trauma which propels the subject into the group, and any 
idiosyncratic fantasy formation, would need to be subsumed within this primal 
phantasy and he would have to act at the behest of his group leaders. The 
phenomenon of the ‘lone wolf terrorist’ may seemingly bridge the 
conceptualisations of marginalised, traumatised, narcissistically wounded 
individuals who may also be killers, and ideological terrorism. But the ‘lone wolf’ is 
not a contingent subject, he decides how, where and when he will strike, and 
although he may be espousing a wider ideology, the act derives from his own 
psychic impulsion. The lone wolf is nearer not only to the serial killer, but also to a 
more transcendental psychoanalytic notion of a terroriser. The error, this thesis 
argues, is in attributing his psychic functioning to the wider cohort of contingent 
‘terrorists’.  
         
    The thesis has argued that designating a specific ‘terrorist personality’ is 
logically flawed, a category error. An individual may be a terrorist leader at one 
stage in his career, and later as with Nelson Mandela, a Nobel Peace laureate. The 
same psychic development and personality formation would then have to explain 
both opposing aspects of this career, rendering it meaningless. Similarly, according 
to the Global Terrorism Index, of the ‘17,958 people who died in terrorist attacks in 
2013, 82 percent were in one of five countries: Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Nigeria, 
and Syria’ (Gilsinan, 2014). These are countries distinguished by having ongoing 
large scale conflicts. If terrorism were not simply a tactic employed in these 
conflicts, those countries would have to have developmentally accumulated an 
inordinate number of terrorist personalities prior to those conflicts. 
 
    Very large, although geographically circumscribed organisations, may be 
designated by various countries but not others, whole or in part, as terrorist. These 
include Hamas, which forms the democratically elected government of Gaza, and 
Hezbollah which has ministers in the Lebanese unity government. In order to 
function in the mainstream of political life, these organisations would necessarily 
contain a variety of personalities. Contrarily, Post claims that terrorists are 
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personalities on the margins of society, but even the research that he took this 
inference from (Clark, 1983), showed that the ETA terrorists were actually well 
integrated into their communities. Similarly, Kobrin’s proposition that the terrorist 
personality was an inevitable corollary of Islamic child rearing practices was shown 
to rely on wholly distorted evidence.     
  
    The overarching deficit in the psychobiographic project is the lack of a willing 
subject in person, and the thesis critiqued the methods employed in 
psychobiography to compensate for this. In a clinical analysis, from the patient’s 
story or anamnesis and his speech in the therapeutic encounter, the analyst makes 
his inferences and interpretations. For the psychobiographer, there is though no 
way of testing these inferences or interpretations, he can only make a presumption 
of how the psychobiographic subject would react. Reflecting the need to validate 
these presumptions, the thesis has identified a clinically derived psychobiographic 
method deployed as a form of facsimile analytic process, which has been termed 
‘clinical parallelism’.  
 
    Because the psychobiographer is not looking for a guide to make interventions in 
an ongoing treatment, he seeks something to explain a possible psychic trajectory 
for an already decided narrative. He needs a linear spine on which to frame that 
narrative. Taking a parallel narrative avoids choosing between hundreds of possible 
inferences, and the comparison of an actual case and how it unfolded gives 
credibility to the account. Otherwise, it would appear as a wholly arbitrary choice 
of inferences. The intrinsic virtue of psychoanalysis is, however, in teasing out the 
counterintuitive and uniqueness of an individual. This conflict of approaches leads 
to the essential dilemma of the psychobiographic project. In order to be clinically 
validated, the analysis must meet known objective criteria, such as a resolved case 
history or therapeutic encounter but that obviates against its being a unique and 
bespoke psychoanalytic enquiry. 
 
    The case histories of actual patients may then be taken as reflecting the psychic 
trajectories of biographical subjects, notably by Freud in his Leonardo (2001/1910). 
Similarly, the method of enquiring into his subject may be paralleled by a clinical 
case, as with Volkan and his patient Gary for his analysis of Kemal Atatürk. In 
attempting to simulate the clinical context without direct subject involvement, this 
practice of clinical parallelism leads, the thesis argued, to an ahistorical psychically 
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determinist prognostic or predictive trajectory, that of the unfolding pathology of 
pathographic analyses.  
 
    As a corollary of the clinical parallelism deployed in the ‘at a distance’ clinical 
profiling of the pathologising discourse, subjects are necessarily ‘medicalised’.  
Prediction is then a form of prognostic trajectory determined by an analyst’s 
intuition or countertransference, which the thesis argues, is actually the analyst’s 
ideological position. In absence of the spontaneous corroborative iterative 
interaction with the subject, if contrary material is later uncovered, it is either 
theoretically rejected or reconciled by altering and subsuming it within the 
overarching ideological discourse. Indeed, such was the case with the extraordinary 
example of Renatus Hartogs, who re-imagined his own diagnostic findings, in order 
to fit with the new popular perception of Lee Harvey Oswald as a presidential 
assassin (Hartogs, 1953; Hartogs and Freeman, 1965). Hartogs had effectively 
recreated Oswald as an entirely different personality.  
 
 
5    Psychobiography as a Personal Construct and a More Holistic Approach.  
 
    As a psychobiography is something of an intuited and interpreted personal 
construct of the analyst, the psychobiographic subject should, in the view of this 
thesis, be clearly demarcated as the creation of the psychobiographer. A basic 
problem of the psychobiographic project is in the expectation that it will find the 
‘truth’ of the subject. No matter how insightful the analysis, there will always be 
lacunae in the clinical data, and no theoretical conceptualisation, clinical 
technique, ‘clinical parallelism’, or otherwise, can compensate for this. The 
discovery years after his death of Gandhi’s homoerotic correspondence had 
effectively made Gandhi a different psychic subject from the one analysed by 
Erikson (1993/1970}. Erikson’s analysis is still insightful, but it’s not the truth of 
Gandhi, it is the truth of ‘Erikson’s Gandhi’.  
 
    William McKinley Runyan (1984) famously took thirteen of the most prominent 
psychodynamic theories of the time as to why Vincent Van Gogh had cut off his 
ear. Runyan proposed and demonstrated a number of criteria for assessing their 
relative validity, arguing that psychobiography could be evaluated against the ‘full 
range of available relevant evidence’ (Runyan, 1984, p 47). In the view of this 
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thesis, Runyan misses the point, because all of the explanations were valid within 
their own terms. The merit of a particular psychobiography, this thesis believes, 
should be assessed within its own terms because it will always lack or subjectively 
underplay some form of evidence. Instead of trying to assess a nebulous notion of 
capturing the ‘truth’ of its subject, the assessment would be on the consonance 
with its own evidence, how does this fit with a psychoanalytic understanding of the 
subject (i.e. the subject as a data set), and its resonance for the reader.  
 
    This would then lead full circle back to the original psychobiographic objectives 
of Freud’s Vienna Circle that of appraising psychoanalytic concepts in lieu of actual 
case histories, by reference to familiar figures both literary and historical. Indeed, 
this thesis would see no theoretical distinction between analysing historical, 
contemporary or literary figures. The distinction would clearly be in the existential 
consequences for living subjects. 
 
    A psychobiography would effectively be a psychoanalytic discussion paper 
normally of a particular aspect of the subject’s psyche, and the wider context of 
psychobiography would be a psychoanalytically informed cultural critique. 
Interestingly, the most exhaustive recent art historical research comes to the view 
that Vincent’s artistic companion Paul ‘Gauguin, a fencing ace, most likely sliced 
off the ear with his sword during a fight, and the two artists agreed to hush up the 
truth’ (Angelique Chrisafis, The Guardian, 4th of May, 2009). In this scenario, the 
thirteen explanations as to why Vincent cut off his ear would then have no external 
validity. They would, however, still be interesting and valid psychoanalytic 
perspectives on why someone such as Vincent, might have done something as 
traumatic as cutting off his ear. 
  
    As the thesis has argued, a psychobiography is an integrated narrative with a 
teleological conclusion, not an historical work in progress. It has a trajectory 
predicated on its theoretical and ideological conception of the subject. The very 
narrative unity of a profile may create an inflated sense of understanding of the 
subject. This may not only overestimate the subject’s personality coherence, but 
also the material real world significance of that individual in a complex socio-
historical context. Similarly, creating a coherent developmental trajectory to explain 
past behaviour does not necessarily translate into any facility for prediction. 
Clinical profiles may scientise evil and give a window of comprehension on perhaps 
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otherwise incomprehensible cruelty, but as a corollary they may also give scientific 
credibility and legitimacy to the demonization of their subject, by validating what is 
actually an ideologically driven pathologising discourse.  
 
    It is possible, then, to present an ideological rather than a psychoanalytic 
analysis, by only analysing one side of a conflict. Yasser Arafat and the PLO are 
collectively designated by Post as authors of their own misfortune, caught in a 
repetition compulsion, always sabotaging their own prospects. A more holistic 
psychoanalytic perspective of such a conflict would also entail a differential 
ideological perspective. In her own psychoanalytic assessment of the 
Israeli/Palestinian conflict, Linda Robinson believes that the problem is one of 
memory and forgetting. Each side becomes indifferent to the other’s pain through 
‘an over-determined preoccupation with their own suffering’ (Robinson, 2003, p 
155). Israel has dissociated its anguished memory of being stateless which ‘allows 
it to oppress another whose wishes mirror its own’ (ibid). Whilst the Palestinian 
yearning for a state has resulted in ‘terrorizing killing and maiming Israelis’ 
(Robinson, 2003, p 155). In turn, Arafat becomes ‘the debased other onto whom 
some Israelis can project despised and disowned qualities, and thus can feel 
superior’ (ibid).  
 
    Finding psychic deficits on both sides of a conflict, whilst it may seemingly even 
out obvious bias, still inherently pathologises what might be a legitimate struggle 
for one or indeed both parties to the conflict, and by extension the participants. 
There is, particularly in clinically oriented psychoanalytic analyses of those labelled 
as terrorist, a presumption of pathology. What is needed, this thesis argues, is a 
body of psychoanalytic research that does not make this pathologising 
presumption. Based on interview material and so not part of the research 
methodology, this author’s perspective is put forward in a paper to be published in 
the Journal of Terrorism Research (Geoghegan, 2016, in press). Instead of acting out 
an individual narcissistic injury through the terrorist group, the individuals in that 
group may actually be rational actors seeking to assuage the narcissistic injuries 
inflicted upon a whole culture. These individuals are not themselves narcissistically 
injured, traumatised and marginalised, but rather, those group members who have 
a greatly heightened sense of belonging. They take it upon themselves to carry the 
burden of the narcissistically injured culture as a function of their own identities, 
actively seeking to lance a festering national wound.  
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    The trauma to the nation in effect becomes a narcissistic aspect of the collective 
ego, and it is clung to as a badge of honour reflecting a sense of national 
identification. Thus, the object introjected is the sense of loss transmuted onto the 
individual ego in a narcissistic identification. This may be the humiliation of the 
Great Irish Famine, the demeaning effects of apartheid in South Africa or the 
shame of French defeat in 1940. There is ambivalence between loving one’s country 
and humiliation at its defeat, a narcissistic wound manifesting as a cultural stain 
on both the national and individual psyche.  
 
    The mourning for an ambivalently loved object gives rise, in Klein’s schema, for a 
concern to put matters right which she terms reparation (Klein, 1987/1946). There 
is a psychic need to take upon themselves the reparations needed to grieve, and 
thus resolve, the mourning process. This may be mourning for the loss of national 
liberty or pride, for example. Particular individuals, who identify more intensely 
with their country or culture, feel the weight of this national melancholia bearing 
down on them, more acutely than others. The reparative process for them involves 
restoring the obsessively mourned object and thus shoring up their individual 
psyches, by joining a ‘resistance’ movement in order to heal the national wound. 
 
    Although the personality pathology model is the dominant psychoanalytic 
paradigm in explaining political violence, there is no particular reason in 
psychoanalysis, why either social upheaval or individual participation in it should 
be regarded as normatively pathological. The culture-wide melancholia induced by 
national trauma reflects a universal nationalist aspiration, so that individuals 
acting upon that sentiment could not, in Freud’s terms, be regarded as individually 
pathological. For an individual neurosis, Freud explains, ‘we take as our starting-
point the contrast that distinguishes the patient from his environment, which is 
assumed to “normal”. For a group all of whose members are affected by one and the 
same disorder no such background could exist’ (Freud, 2001/ 1930, XXI, p 144). 
 
    If anything, revolutionary activity is part of an evolutionary process; there are 
‘victors and vanquished who turn into masters and slaves. The justice of the 
community then becomes an expression of the unequal degrees of power…the 
oppressed members of the group make constant efforts to obtain more power…from 
unequal justice to justice for all…a solution by violence, ending in the 
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establishment of a fresh rule of law’ (Freud, 2001/1933, XXII, p 206). 
Decolonization as a process was, in Frantz Fanon’s view, a necessarily violent 
phenomenon. The ‘native discovers reality and transforms it into a pattern of his 
customs, into the practice of violence and into his plan for freedom’ (Fanon, 
2001/1963, p 45). 
 
      The conflicts arising were exploited by the superpowers to extend their spheres 
of influence, irrespective of the particular merits of the regimes they either 
supported or opposed (Fanon, 2001/1963). It is authoritarian regimes themselves, 
Nancy Caro Hollander argues, that split the world ‘into good and evil - Western 
Civilization vs. “subversion;” the projection of everything bad onto a hated object 
(the “subversive”) with the consequent need to control it for fear of being controlled 
by it’ (Caro Hollander, 2006, p 4). Revolutionary violence would then derive from 
the resultant trauma, deprivation and frustration, with ‘groups seeking a radical 
change in the social order, often based on attitudes of love, concern, and 
responsibility for others’ (Caro Hollander, 2006, p 3). 
 
    Psychoanalysis as a depth psychology should be able to eschew 
political/ideological considerations in respect of the justice (or otherwise) of a 
particular cause or any consequent moral opprobrium over the tactics employed 
(i.e. terrorism). However irrational or morally reprehensible any particular side of a 
conflict might appear the individual response to it may be otherwise psychically 
quite rational, and within the context, morally recognisable. If the subject position 
of the analyst is not a strictly normative and establishment one, as it is with 
personality pathology theorists, there is the possibility of taking a psychoanalytic 
perspective that does not ideologically create the ‘pathological’ adversary.  
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